The NASA-FAA Coordinating Committee had its origin in a meeting which Dr. Raymond L. Bisplinghoff, Associate Administrator for Advanced Research and Technology, and I had with Mr. N. E. Halaby, Administrator, Federal Aviation Agency (FAA), on March 24, 196 4. The object of the meeting was to explore any possible interest and thought within FAA regarding a future hypervelocity transport development. As it turned out, most of the discussion centered around R&D in support of the SST and the matter of coordination between NASA and FAA.
Mr. Halaby made some surprising statements. He expressed concern over what appeared to him to be unwarranted duplication in development work on the power plants for the SST. He stated that he had no knowledge of what was going on in NASA in this area, but he did have the impression that NASA was using the SST to justify funds for development work which would be too late to benefit the SST and for which FAA had already contracted with industry.
Dr. Bisplinghoff explained that the work being done by NASA was fulfilling the traditional role of up-grading the technology involved. He expressed the view that much work remains to be done in improving the type of power plant which will be used in the initial SST prototypes or production vehicles.
Dr. Bisplinghoff also made the point that the basis for our work in support of the SST was the agreement signed by Mr. Halaby and Mr. Webb setting forth NASA's responsibility for the technical aspects of the program. NASA had agreed to conduct research programs leading to the designs of the airframe and propulsion systems and to provide technical support in the final design and construction of the prototype.
Mr. Halaby stated that, when questioned by the Bureau of the Budget and Congressional committees about the justification for NASA's requested funding for aeronautical research, he was forced to say that he 'new nothing about NASA' s plans and programs. He said he would like to become familiar with these programs so that he could support them, just as he would like to have NASA support the SST project.
As to NASA-FAA coordination' Mr. Halaby expressed the feeling..-that this was a one-way street - that information flowed only from FAA to NASA with very little coming back. I cited several instances of existing machinery for coordination and channels open to FAA for expressing their R&D requirements to NASA. Mr. Halaby seemed unaware of these. On this basis , he suggested that the difficulty might be one of inadequate vertical communication within his own agency. He conceded that this might be the case (later confirmed).
 Mr. Halaby expressed his impression that NASA was not being responsive to FAA needs. We assured him that this was a mistaken impression and that NASA was eager to be as responsive as possible to the needs and requirements of FAA as well as those of DOD, other agencies of the Government, industry, and the scientific community.
Mr. Halaby expressed a need for facilities to make full-scale test of the supersonic transport engines at various altitudes. He stated that existing wind tunnels, including those at Tullahoma, were not adequate for this.
The meeting ended on an amicable and constructive note, with agreement on three actions which should be taken:
It was apparent from this meeting that there needed to be established a permanent mechanism through which officials on the policy and decision making level of the two Agencies could be kept informed of the requirements of FAA for improved or new technology, the capability of NASA to assist in meeting those requirements, and the en-going activities in relating these two factors.
These matters were staffed within NASA over the next several months We understood that Halaby was, in the meantime, being briefed by his people as to the nature and scope of the NASA-FAA interface. It wasn't until November 2, 1964, that we managed to get the two Administrators together to review the aeronautical R&D programs of NASA and the FAA and to discuss policy matters of mutual interest.
On January 11, 1965, Mr. Webb signed a letter to Mr. Halaby, prepared in Defense Affairs, suggesting- "that it would be in our mutual benefit to establish a permanent body charred with coordinating the research and development activities of our two Agencies from the standpoint of top management and with ensuring that you and I, as Administrators' are kept fully informed concerning the important interfaces between our two Agencies as a  basis for major executive decisions." The letter went on to say that we had in mind a board patterned after the AACB in its composition, functions, and authority. Subject to Mr. Halaby's concurrence in this proposal, Mr. Webb designated me as his representative to work with a representative to be appointed by Halaby in preparing proposed terms of reference for such a board.
Halaby's response dated February 4, 1965, was favorable. He designated Mr. George P. Bates, Jr., Acting Director of the Aircraft Development Service of FAA (and a former NASA employee) as his representative.
Between these two letters, on January 28, 1965, full-scale briefings of senior officials were exchanged. FAA informed us of their principal technological and operational problem areas and needs and of their developmental programs. NASA gave a comprehensive review of its aeronautical R&D programs and plans.
Bates and I promptly began our discussions. Initially, he took a strong position that in lieu of a bilateral NASA-FAA board the AACB should be expanded to become a DOD-NASA-FAA organization with FAA membership on the full Board and on the Aeronautics Panel. We in NASA were strongly opposed to this idea, believing that the bilateral integrity of the AACB should be preserved. We pointed out that in addition to the statutory nature of the AACB and the special relationship between NASA and the DOD, as established in the Space Act, a major portion of the business conducted in the AACB pertained to space and was therefore of no direct interest to FAA. Furthermore, coordination of the activities of FAA-NASA and FAA-DOD groups dealing with aeronautics matters could be adequately accomplished through interlocking memberships on such groups. After considerable discussion on this point, Bates reluctantly agreed to proceed on the basis of a bilateral arrangement.
Each of us prepared draft charters, but we worked from the NASA draft in arriving at a final version.
The agreement establishing the "NASA-FAA Coordinating Board!' was signed into effect on April 21, 1965. (Subsequently, at the request of BuBud, "Board" was changed to "Committee" in the title because of certain budgetary implications.) The structuring and principles of operation of the Committee were generally similar to those of the AACB, except that the establishment of sub-panels was left to the discretion of the Committee. The functions of the new Committee were stated as follows:
"The NASA-FAA Coordinating Board (Committee) shall be responsible for facilitating:
BuBud and the National Aeronautics and Space Council were notified of the establishment of the new joint body. Dr. E. C. Welch, Executive Secretary of the Space Council, requested that an observer from the Council staff be admitted to the meetings of the Committee, and this was approved.
The initially appointed membership of the Committee was as follows:
The first meeting took place on May 20, 1965. For the first few months, the Committee met at monthly intervals. Later on, as the Committee settled into the routine of its business, the periods between meetings were extended to six to eight weeks.
In July 1965, Mr. Blatt replaced Mr. Shank as the FAA Co-chairman, the latter having left FAA M . Dr. Mac C. Adams became the NASA Co-chairman in February 196 6 and he in turn was succeeded by Mr. Harper in July 1967. The total membership was increased from twelve to fourteen by an amendment to the charter effective February 8, 1966.
Two policy matters concerning the NASA-FAA relationship came under discussion in the early meetings of the Committee. The FAA felt that NASA could be of assistance in expanding the data base and in developing the methodology for codifying the criteria to govern the certification of new aircraft. For example, FAA expressed the need for improvement -in its ability to convert the subjective handling qualities of an aircraft into measurable factors which, in turn, could be written into performance specifications. NASA had made studies and conducted experiments along these lines. Mr. Webb took a very positive position that, whereas NASA was prepared to make available to FAA all pertinent data it had accumulated on this subject and to lend its expertise in developing methods of utilizing these data in the drafting of definitive specifications or criteria, NASA was not to become involved in any way in the actual decision to certify an aircraft as being airworthy nor in any other aspects of the regulatory functions of the FAA.
The second matter concerned that step in the complete certification cycle in which the FAA conducts a review of the engineering; design of a proposed new aircraft with the objective of revealing, early in the design process, any potential problem areas which might delay or prevent certification of the aircraft. Up until then, the design review had essentially looked only at the structural integrity of the new design dynamics and prospective handling qualities of the design were not Manufacturers were not required to submit, and in fact withheld as proprietary  information, the aerodynamic data obtained from wind-tunnel tests, which data would be necessary for such an evaluation. NASA members of the Committee pointed out the advantages of broadening the scope of the design review to include an evaluation as to handling qualities and flight standards; i.e., of conducting a review in the same manner that NASA, at the request of DOD, reviews a design of a proposed new military aircraft. The FAA, while concurring in the desirability of this, stated that it did not have within its organization the capability to evaluate handling qualities from windtunnel data. The possibility was considered of NASA accomplishing for the FAA that part of the design review pertaining to handling qualities, but this idea was abandoned because of a feeling on the part of NASA top management that such action might be interpreted by industry as participation by NASA in the regulatory function of the FAA. In lieu of such an arrangement, NASA representatives indicated a willingness to render assistance in the form of training FAA personnel to do the handling qualities evaluation. As part of this cross-support, NASA offered to accept FAA employees on detail with our flight simulator groups for training in NASA evaluation techniques.
The Committee proved to be a highly productive and effective instrument in promoting mutual support and generally strengthening the NASA-FAA relationship. Among the many subjects dealt with by the Committee, in addition to those mentioned above, were the need for and characteristics of a traffic control-navigation-communication satellite, handling qualities of V/STOL and general aviation aircraft, physiological and psychological parameters related to flight crews, aircraft simulators, structure and engine design criteria, noise abatement, tank sealants, aircraft materials, aircraft fuels and lubricants, fire prevention, avionics, flight instruments, lightning and fuel hazards, boundary layer control, auxiliary surfaces, control surfaces, metal fatigue, clear air turbulence, pilot training, the sonic boom, supersonic transport development, air traffic control, collision prevention, airworthiness, cockpit arrangements, and all-weather operation.