The Gemini Program was an integral part of the step-by-step progression (i.e., Mercury - Gemini - Apollo) in the development of a capability to conduct manned space flight operations which would lead to the achievement of the national goal of a manned lunar landing. But even before Gemini was initiated early in 1962, it was visualized as a program in which the Air Force would be deeply involved.
The crisis regarding the management of the Gemini Program which occurred at the time the new Office of Defense Affairs was being established has been described earlier in this narrative. As stated, Mr. McNamara's informal proposal that the management of Gemini be transferred to the DOD, and his subsequent formal proposal that the program be placed under joint NASA-DOD management, was met by a compromise NASA-DOD agreement, drafted by Defense Affairs and signed on January 21, 1963, which provided:
The last provision, included at the insistence of Mr. McNamara, represented a major concession by NASA, many of whose key officials regarded it as a one-way restriction. NASA would feel compelled to agree to any manned space flight project determined by DOD to be necessary for national defense. On the other hand, DOD might oppose a proposed NASA project designed to achieve scientific and/or technological objectives on the basis of an opinion that the expected results did not justify the cost, thereby exercising a veto over NASA future planning in this area. However, no difficulty resulted from this provision during the period of this narrative.
The original composition of the GPPB, approved by the Administrator and the Secretary of Defense, was:
NASA:
DOD:
Holmes was replaced by Dr. George E. Mueller in September 1963, Kavanau by Dr. Albert C. Hall in August 1963, and Baxter J. Anderson, Lt. Col. John J. Anderson, USAF, in July 1963.
In all, fourteen meetings were held, the final meeting on April 12, 1965. Thereafter, the functions of the Board were, generally speaking, absorbed by the newly created joint Manned Space Flight Policy Committee, (MSFPC).
The first meeting of the GPPB, held on February 8, 1963, was organizational. The Co-chairmen agreed that one of the functions of the board was to relate the Gemini project to national objectives in manned space flight as a basis for decisions on any new work to be initiated. Steps were taken to acquaint the Board with the technical and managerial aspects of [85] the Gemini program and with the DOD objectives in participating in the program. It was agreed that NASA would continue to handle news releases, clearing strictly military matters with the DOD Co-chairman prior to release, and that the DOD would establish the security classification of DOD sponsored experiments on an individual basis, as required. It was proposed by the DOD members that the Dyna-Soar program be brought under the purview of the Board; it was later decided that this would not be appropriate. In general, a cordial and effective working relationship was established at the outset, which prevailed during the entire life of the Board.
The efforts of the GPPB were primarily devoted to:
The Board was kept informed of the status of' the Paraglider Development Program, but this program was essentially a unilateral NASA effort and one with which the Board did not concern itself to any great extent.
One of the early actions of the Board (March 7, 1963) was to convene a joint Ad Hoc Study Group at MSC to compare NASA and DOD objectives for the Gemini Program and in the light of this review to recommend a list of DOD experiments for inclusion in the Gemini Flight Program. In addition, the Ad Hoc Group was to recommend to the GPPB the extent and method of DOD participation in GEMINI in accordance with the provisions of the NASA-DOD agreement on January 21, 1963. The final report of this Group was submitted on May 6, 1963.
In jointly agreed guidelines furnished to the Ad Hoc Group, it was specified that the Gemini Program would be conducted so as to satisfy: first, the essential objectives of the Manned Lunar Landing Program (MLLP) and, secondly, NASA and DOD objectives other than those of the MLLP. In the second category, DOD experiments would be given priority. The difficulty of meeting the security requirements of military experiments in an open program was recognized in the guidelines, and the Study Group was asked to develop a policy and methods for coping with this problem.
On April 1 , 1963, the initial guidelines to the Study Group were expanded to require that the Group consider an add-on program of two to six Gemini flights, in addition to the twelve originally planned, these flights to be sponsored and funded by the DOD and specifically oriented toward the development of equipment for DOD mission objectives and the training of DOD astronauts. The military missions in which the DOD was interested had previously been identified by Mr. McNamara
[86] In response to an interim report of the Study Group, an Air Force Field Office, as an extension of the Space Systems Division (SSD) of AFSC, was established at MSC on August 25, 1903. Its function was generally to assist in the planning and implementation of DOD participation in and support of Gemini and specifically to manage the integration of DOD in-flight experiments into the Program. This office, headed by Col. Dan McKee, was composed of about eleven Air Force Officers stationed at MSC and two at what was then NASA's Launch Operations Center, Cape Canaveral.
Much of the time and effort of the GPPB was devoted to the program of man-rating the TITAN II. The early engineering test flights of this vehicle revealed problems of longitudinal oscillation during first-stage flight and of second-stage combustion instability. The Air Force initiated intensive programs to correct these deficiencies and to improve overall vehicle reliability. The Board monitored these programs very closely. NASA made its in-house competence available to assist.
NASA undertook a simulation program utilizing the centrifuge at Ames to study the effect of the longitudinal oscillations on astronauts. It was found that the "POGO effect" encountered in the early test flights was sufficient to blur the vision of an astronaut to the point that he could not read the panel instruments. A maximum acceptable amplitude of vibration was established in these tests, and the Air Force was able to devise fixes which brought the GLV performance within this tolerance.
The combustion instability was also corrected in good time, so that the GLV ultimately proved to be a highly satisfactory and dependable vehicle.
The list of DOD experiments recommended by the Ad Hoc Study Group was approved in principle by the GPPB. Primarily, these experiments were directed toward determining the military usefulness of a man in space and the physiological effects on man of protracted exposure to weightlessness.
The flying of classified experiments was a controversial issue, not as much between NASA and the DOD as within NASA itself. Some key NASA officials vigorously opposed the imposition of any security restrictions on the character of Gemini experiments or their results, contending that to do so would compromise the open nature of NASA's program and the peaceful image of the Agency. Defense Affairs took a strong position in favor of flying DOD experiments and of imposing the minimum security measures considered necessary by the Defense Department in the rational interest. We cited the clear intent of the Space Act that the civilian and military segments of the total activity of the United States in space should be mutually supporting and the authority given the Administrator to "establish such security requirements, restrictions, and safeguards as he deems necessary in the interest of national security." The Defense Affairs position was eventually supported by NASA top management. A plan was worked out under the aegis of the GPPB whereby DOD classified experiments were installed prior to flight and removed after recovery without exposure to the public, and results were [87] screened by a joint committee who decided what should and should not be released. The arrangements worked out very satisfactorily.
In response to a request from Mr. McNamara that the Board examine its role in the planning for the use of elements of the Gemini Program in other DOD and NASA projects, the Co-chairmen agreed to monitor DOD-NASA studies in the Manned Orbiting Laboratory field and to select certain of these studies for detailed review by the Board.
Some forty-nine experiments were scheduled for the Gemini flight series, of which sixteen were DOD experiments. Some of these experiments were conducted more than once.
The Board recommended that additional Gemini flights under Air Force management specifically to meet DOD objectives not be scheduled except as part of a well defined and continuing military program. Later, one Gemini-B engineering test flight was flown as part of the DOD's MOL Program.
[88] Coordination of Studies of Manned Orbiting Space Stations
A long series of discussions, exchanges of correspondence, and agreements on this subject had its origin in the AACB meeting of March 19, 1963. Mr. D. Brainerd Holmes, Deputy Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, NASA, and Chairman of the MSF Panel, outlined NASA's plans for studies related to space stations. Dr. Brockway McMillan, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (R&D) and Vice Chairman of the MSF Panel, said Mr. McNamara believed that neither Agency should perform studies in this area without the other's concurrence. The Co-chairmen requested that the MSF Panel develop recommendations for insuring the desired NASA-DOD coordination of manned orbital space station studies.
On April 24, 1963, Dr. Seamans wrote to Mr. John Ruble, Assistant Secretary of Defense (DDR&E), expressing his views in the premises. He stated that the existing agreement not to undertake a major launch vehicle or spacecraft development for manned flight beyond Apollo without joint NASA-DOD approval did not encompass advanced studies designed to provide essential data for wise decisions on such developments. He said NASA was unwilling to accept the delay and complicated technical monitorship which would accompany a joint-concurrence approach.
Mr. Webb wrote to Mr. McNamara that same day, drawing attention to the apparent lack of a meeting of the minds concerning the proper coordination of exploratory studies. Referring to the essentiality of advanced studies in meeting NASA's statutory responsibility to achieve and maintain a position of world leadership in science and technology, Webb stated his position in terms similar to those contained in Seamans' letter to Ruble. He took a conciliatory tone, saying he would like nothing better than a two-way exchange of ideas and plans concerning the initiation of such advanced studies and offered to meet with the Secretary to discuss the matter personally.
A letter from McNamara to Webb of May 25, 1963, referred to their "recent discussions," and enclosed a proposed DOD-NASA agreement "Concerning a Manned Orbital Test Station Program" which Mr. McNamara had signed. (This method of transacting business, in which the Secretary would forward a signed draft agreement to the Administrator for the latter's signature without the benefit of any prior mutual staffing, was a gambit used more than once by Mr. McNamara.)
The proposed agreement called for the establishment of a joint "Manned Orbital Test Station Program Planning Group" under the Co-chairmen of the AACB to monitor and, when necessary, to sponsor studies in this area. The proposed agreement provided that, should either Agency decide to formulate a program based on the results of such studies, the development plan would be given to the Group for examination as to conformity with both NASA and DOD requirements. The plan would be forwarded through the Co-chairmen, [89] AACB, to the Secretary and the Administrator for their joint approval. In the event the program was to be undertaken, a "national decision" would be made as to assignment of management responsibility.
Mr. Webb did not sign the proposed agreement. Instead he proposed in a reply to Mr. McNamara dated June 7, 1963, that they await the outcome of related staff work then in progress in the AACB before deciding what further definitive action would be in order.
At the AACB meeting on June 27, 1983, Holmes presented a proposal, signed by McMillan and himself, setting forth a recommended procedure for ensuring NASA-DOD coordination in the area of studies of manned orbiting space stations. The AACB Co-chairmen took the proposal under study, expressing a desire to consummate a NASA-DOD agreement on this subject prior to the next meeting.
At the next meeting on August 9, 1963, Dr. Brown stated that the Holmes-McMillan agreement provided only a mechanism for an exchange of information, that DOD desired a more formal procedure including a requirement or joint concurrence on the initiation of all such studies, and that Mr. McNamara would send a proposed agreement to Mr. Webb. Dr. Seamans expressed reservations concerning the proposed-sign-off requirement. The Co-chairmen again agreed to attempt to resolve the matter prior to the next meeting..
The DOD position caused considerable concern in NASA Headquarters. It seemed evident that Mr. McNamara was seeking to exercise control over NASA study efforts in this area. Mr. Webb desired to avoid a confrontation with Mr. McNamara on this issue, but was determined not to accept voluntarily a veto power by the Secretary of the Defense over the NASA study effort considered essential by the Administrator as a basis for NASA programmatic an planning decisions.
Mr. McNamara's second letter to Mr. Webb on this subject, dated August &, 136 , enclosed a joint memorandum from the Co-chairmen of the AACB to the Chairman of the MSF Panel, already signed by Dr. Brown, which concurred in the procedure proposed by the Panel for the coordination of' studies of a manned orbital laboratory, characterizing the procedure as a "mechanism for exchange of information between the Department of' Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration on manned orbital stations." Mr. McNamara said that if Dr. Seamans agreed, he should sign the memorandum. Dr. Seamans did not agree and did not sign the memorandum. .
Mr. McNamara went on to say that he was not satisfied that a mere exchange of information was sufficient in this important national effort. He felt that he and Mr. Webb should agree to more formal coordination in this field. Accordingly, he enclosed a proposed DOD-NASA agreement, again -which he had not seen before but which Mr. McNamara had signed. He requested that Mr. Webb sign if he were in agreement with the approach to the problem reflected in the proposed agreement.
[90] This latest proposed agreement contained a preamble which stressed the essentiality of centralized coordinated planning of DOD and NASA needs and requirements in any follow-on program after Apollo. me substance of the proposed agreement was a provision which would have required a joint sign-off as a condition for the initiation of any contractor study program or project in the field of manned orbital test stations of a magnitude equal to or greater than a $1,000 per year level of effort. The proposal further provided that concurrence authority would be delegated to the Co-chairmen of the AACB and that concurrence would be automatic if a written reply to a request for concurrence were not received within fourteen days.
Mr. Webb declined to sign this document also. While it did to a degree meet Webb's concern over the previously proposed categorical signoff requirement of all manned space flight studies, the proposed terms were inadequate and represented an oversimplification in that they did not define an orderly and effective cooperation and coordination process.
In consultation with our opposite staff people in DDR&E, Defense Affairs prepared a new draft agreement for consideration in lieu of the proposed Brown-Seamans memorandum to the MSF Panel and the NASA-DOD agreement proposed by McNamara. Our draft reflected Mr. Webb's sharing of Mr. McNamara's opinion that the Holmes-McMillan proposed procedure did not go far enough in establishing a basis for effective NASA-DOD contribution and the view of all of us in NASA that the submission of any study work statement for concurrence and/or comments by the other Agency should be preceded by adequate mutual staff work to ensure that the needs of both Agencies were met and that there was no unwarranted duplication.
In a preamble of "Basic Considerations" the draft stated: "The National Space Program has now advanced to the point that further significant programs in the areas of scientific research, space exploration, basic space technology, and defense applications may well require the operation of a manned orbit research and development system involving spacecraft Larger and more sophisticated than Gemini end Apollo." lt further expressed the common view of the Secretary and the Administrator that, so far as practicable, the future requirements of both Agencies in this area should be encompassed in a single project.
The proposed agreement provided that, should the Secretary and the Administrator not agree on any issue considered by either party adversely to involve the responsibilities of his Agency, the issue would be jointly referred to the President through the Space Council for resolution. It further provided that the DOD and NASA would continue to conduct advanced and exploratory studies in this area as considered necessary by the Secretary and the Administrator, respectively, and that these studies would be coordinated under the AACB in accordance with a detailed procedure set forth in an attachment.
[91] The draft contained the following additional provisions:
[92] The detailed procedure attached provided for an expeditious review by the MSF Panel of completed and on-going studies to determine which of these required coordinating action. m e Panel would thereafter designate to the AACB those future studies which either Agency considered should be formally coordinated. After designation of a study for coordination, the non-sponsoring Agency would be allowed fifteen days for concurrence or) if not concurring, for submitting written reasons for non-concurrence, together with a list of requirements desired to be incorporated. The absence of a reply within the fifteen-day limit would be considered concurrence. Likewise, the AACB would be allowed thirty days after designation to either (1) certify in writing that satisfactory coordination had been accomplished or (2) jointly submit to the Secretary and the Administrator an explanation of any areas of disagreement. At that point, the sponsoring Agency might, if desired, proceed with the study.
Mr. Webb's letter for transmitting the draft agreement (with attachment) to Mr. McNamara set forth Mr. Webb's views on this subject at some length and expressed his desire to "go more than half way" to meet Mr. McNamara's requirements in the premises. Before signing the letter and the draft agreement, Webb tried to call Mr. McNamara on August 17, 1963, to see whether he could personally call on the Secretary to discuss the letter and agreement. The Secretary was not available in the Pentagon, and so Mr. Webb dictated an additional covering letter, telling of his attempt to arrange a personal call to deliver the agreement and letter of transmittal. He then signed all three documents and mailed the package. The covering letter said that the addition of George Mueller and other new senior officials in MSF and the centralization of control of the administration of all such agreements under Admiral Boone "should go a long way toward eliminating some of the problems we have had in achieving a full understanding all up and down the line as to what objectives we were seeking in these projects and in our relations with DOD." Mr. Webb said finally that if the agreement did not meet with what Mr. McNamara had in mind, he (Webb) would like to go over to Mr. McNamara's office and talk the matter over.
We immediately began submitting studies for DOD concurrence or comment, in advance of Mr. McNamara's action on the proposed agreement and coordination procedure. On August 23, 1963, I sent to Dr. Hall (DDR&E) a long list of potential NASA engineering and scientific experiments for the MOL.
Mr. McNamara's reply to Mr. Webb's letter of August 17 was sent on September 16, 1963. The Secretary said that he appreciated Mr. Webb's constructive and earnest efforts to develop a method which would insure a sound, coordinated approach to this potentially important national effort, that many activities had already been implemented which had gone a long way toward improving the exchange of information and coordination in our study efforts, that he concurred in our proposed agreement in many respects and felt it was an excellent contribution to improved understanding and mutually useful effort, but did so with certain reservations.
[93] The Secretary's reservations related to possible unilateral action in the face of disagreements and to NASA's proposed $3.5-million contractor study effort for the design of a Manned Orbital Research Laboratory, which study he considered to be premature by eight months to a year, as the DOD would need that much time to make judgments on incorporating DOD requirements into the design. He was concerned that the agreement did not define a level of effort to qualify a study for coordination and still thought $100,000 would be a reasonable threshold. He agreed that the AACB, if properly constituted and used, was the proper medium for interagency coordination. He felt that the President should be informed concerning the nature and extent of any disagreement before any program actions were initiated unilaterally. He believed that it was not essential at that time to define the procedure for implementing a possible development program.
Finally, Mr. McNamara said that, hoping Mr. Webb could accept his expressed reservations, he had signed the agreement (September 14, 1963) as NASA had prepared it.
Mr. Webb's reply on September 23, 1963, contained renewed assurances of our continued effort toward further improving the NASA-DOD effectiveness in the manned space flight area. In noting Mr. McNamara's expressed reservations and concern, the Administrator reaffirmed his desire to do all he could to insure that any advanced engineering studies would be so integrated that the requirements and design constraints of both Agencies would be taken fully into account from the outset. Mr. Webb stated he was submitting the $3.5-million study, referred to by McNamara, to the AACB for coordination.
In implementation of the Webb-McNamara agreement of September 14, 1963, the AACB assigned to the MSF Panel responsibility for optimizing the utilization of current and planned earth orbital studies and the establishment of requirements which would meet the objectives of both DOD and NASA in this area. On November 6, 1963, the MSF Panel formed a National Space Station Planning Subpanel (NSSPS) to perform this function, the charter of which was approved by the AACB on January 31, 1964. (See Attachment VIII.)
The NSSPS met four times during 1963 and then lapsed into inactivity With the reconstitution of the MSF Panel in 1967, as described elsewhere herein, the Panel assumed the functions of the Subpanel, and the Subpanel was disestablished, effective December 31, 1967.
[94] Agreement Covering a Possible New Manned Earth Orbital Research and Development Project
Toward the middle of 1963, Mr. McNamara and his principal subordinates for R&D apparently felt the need for a further agreement covering a possible major space station development, an agreement more comprehensive and detailed than the clause in the Gemini agreement of January 21, 1963, which restrained either Agency from initiating a major new program of manned space flight in near-earth orbit without the concurrence of the other. DOD wished to place special emphasis on coordination in the early conceptual states of advanced exploratory studies in this area. Several such studies had been conducted or were in progress in both Agencies.
The result was a NASA-DOD agreement, signed into effect on September 14, 1963, after lengthy negotiations, which was titled "Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Covering a Possible New Manned Earth Orbital Research and Development Project."
The preamble to the agreement stated that its purpose was to insure that in the national interest complete coordination would be achieved between NASA and the DOD in approaching a possible new project in the area of manned earth orbital research and development vehicles. It was recognized that the National Space Program had advanced to the point that further significant progress in the areas of scientific research, space exploration, basic space technology, and defense applications might well require the operation of a manned orbital system larger and more sophisticated that GEMINI and APOLLO. Since such a system would be a major technical and financial undertaking, advanced exploratory studies and any follow-on actions should be most carefully coordinated in the AACB. So far as practicable, all foreseeable future requirements of both Agencies, and any other interested government agencies, should be encompassed in a single project, and it appeared that this could be done.
It was further recognized that such an advanced R&D system capable of prolonged space flight would provide basic scientific and technical knowledge and basic design and operational criteria applicable across the board to both military and civilian operational programs and would be a mandatory forerunner of any long-duration manned space operational system.
Salient points of the basic agreement were:
A detailed procedure for joint reviews by the MSF Panel of the AACB of all studies in this area completed in the previous three year s or then in progress, and for a coordinated approach to all future studies, was contained in the attachment to the basic agreement. Consultation would begin early in the conceptual or planning stage of a new study effort, a measure strongly stressed by Defense Affairs as a prerequisite to effective coordination. (A description of proper "coordination, "* which I had written....
* My definition of "coordination:"
An activity having responsibility to "coordinate" with another activity in discharging an assigned function will: (1) recognize the interest of the other activity; (2) initiate a full and timely exchange of information and consultations; (3) encourage the active participation of the other activity from the outset; and (4) make an earnest effort to meet the requirements and objectives of the other activity.
"Concurrence of the other activity will be sought in the proposed action. Concurrence is not required as a precondition to taking action; however, matters on which agreement is not reached may be referred for resolution to the next higher authority in which both activities have a voice."
[96] ....years earlier and which had been accepted by the Military Services, was furnished to our Program Offices.) The Panel would identify to the AACB those studies being processed or considered which, in the opinion of either Agency, required formal coordination to incorporate the requirements of both Agencies and avoid unwarranted duplication of study effort. Time limits were prescribed for the submission of comments by an Agency on a proposed study by the other. An explanation of any areas of disagreement would be furnished by the AACB to the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator, after which the sponsoring Agency would be free to proceed with the study, if desired. These latter provisions were incorporated into the agreement at our insistence to prevent the indefinite delay of a study because of lack of agreement as to its nature or justification.
Pursuant to this agreement of September 14, 1963, the MSF Panel announced at the meeting of the AACB on November 7, 1963, that a subpanel was being established to coordinate NASA and DOD manned space station studies, and that the provisions of the agreement were being met (see charter, Attachment VIII). While a certain amount of foot-dragging on the part of some individuals in OMSF had to be overcome in bringing the DOD representatives into our study plans sufficiently early to fully meet the intent of the agreement, the procedure proved to be reasonably effective. The subpanel is still functioning.
[97] The Air Force Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) Program
On December 10, 1963, Mr. McNamara announced cancellation of the Dyna-Soar Program and assignment to the Air Force of a new program for the development of a near-earth Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL).
The primary objective of the MOL Program, as announced by the Secretary of Defense, was to determine the military usefulness of man in space. Secondarily, the MOL was to carry various military experiments involving manned use of equipment and instrumentation in orbit. NASA was invited to propose technological and scientific experiments for civilian use which would be incorporated on a payload-capacity-available basis.
This announcement was followed by a protracted phase of program definition in which NASA coordinated with the DOD in evolving a system concept for meeting the military requirements established unilaterally by the DOD. This concept differed somewhat from the original DOD concept. When the Air Force was finally authorized to proceed with the MOL project, Defense Affairs prepared a letter for Dr. Seamans to send to Dr. Brown, then still the Director of Defense Research and Engineering but the newly designated Secretary of the Air Force, which pledged NASA's full support of the Program. The letter, dated September 27, 1965, expressed NASA's concurrence in the justification of an experimental manned space flight program under the Military and our accord in the stated MDL objectives. The DOD invitation to NASA to participate in the MOL flight missions was accepted. While we foresaw certain problems in integrating purely civilian experiments into the classified MOL program, we felt that these could be surmounted. Finally, the letter stated that NASA stood ready to plan with the Air Force for the maximum practical utilization by the DOD of NASA-developed hardware and technology; our production, testing, check-out, simulation, training, mission control, and data acquisition and processing facilities; and our management and operational experience.
We foresaw that the interrelationships between the MOL and the Gemini, Apollo, and Apollo Applications programs, as well as the NASA support of and participation in the MOL Program, would require joint planning and monitoring on the policy decision level. Dr. Seamans' offer to meet with Dr. Brown to discuss methods to accomplish this led to establishment of the Manned Space Flight Policy Committee, (MSFPC) which will be discussed later.
Defense Affairs drafted an internal NASA position paper with respect to the MOL project which, in addition to matters covered in the letter of September 27, included the following points as reflecting NASA's attitude toward the project:
The design concept of MOL was premised on the use of a somewhat modified Gemini spacecraft (designated Gemini B) as the crew compartment during launch and recovery and the use of Gemini and Apollo subsystems to the maximum extent technically feasible. It was to be launched on a Titan III booster. NASA pledged full support of the Program. All Gemini Program equipment for which MOL had a requirement was transferred to the DOD, on a nonreimbursable basis, as soon as it was no longer needed by Gemini. This transfer included three Gemini spacecraft which had been flown, a thermal test spacecraft, numerous Gemini engineering models, boilerplate and static test spacecraft, most of the aerospace ground equipment, factory test equipment, tooling, about forty-three recovery training spacecraft models and all associated recovering equipment, a Gemini mission simulator and many similar components, various articles of subsystem hardware, etc. The material transferred represented an original cost to NASA of about $100 million.
Training aids were made available for DOD use on a shared basis. It was determined that it was not practicable to have a single joint program for the training of astronauts. Apollo ships and tracking stations were made available to support MOL on a basis of noninterference with APOLLO. A NASA engineer, Mr. Michael I. Yarnmovych, who was thoroughly familiar with the Gemini design, was detailed to Air Force Headquarters for work on MOL, and an engineer from the Manned Spacecraft Center, Mr. Duncan Collins, was detailed to the Space Systems Division of AFSC. NASA Reliability and Quality Control personnel working on GEMINI were detailed to the Air Force to work on GEMINI B and MOL. NASA managers, engineers, and technicians were made available to consult with their Air Force counterparts as needed.
[99] Modifications to Gemini spacecraft for use in Gemini B engineering flights were accomplished through an extension of the NASA contract for the procurement of Gemini's. An agreement was consummated under which the Air Force could contract directly with McDonnell Aircraft for the production of Gemini B's on a basis of no delay in the production of Gemini's.
Arrangements were made for NASA officials to have access to MOL data as necessary to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, provide technical advice and support, and eliminate program procurement and operational conflicts.
Several joint cooperation mechanisms were established in the field of space medicine/bioastronautics, notably one involving space suit development.
A number of studies were made to explore technical feasibility and economic factors in the use of the MOL laboratory module in the Apollo Applications Program (AAP), the use of Titan III to launch AAP missions, and the adaptation of Apollo/Saturn hardware to the MOL mission.
NASA support to MOL in the form of technical advice and assistance transfer of hardware, contract negotiations, and analytical studies came directly out of OMSF. Tracking, communications, and data handling support arrangements were made in OTDA. Other Program Offices and some of the Headquarters functional offices also performed support roles. Defense Affairs was very active in planning, initiating, coordinating, and monitoring all aspects of the support effort, in drafting or reviewing support agreements, in arranging transfers of exchange personnel, in scheduling briefings, in formulating directives or charters for ad hoc coordinating groups, in arranging security clearances, etc.
[100] The Manned Space Flight Policy Committee (MSFPC)
The preliminary actions leading to establishment of the MSFPC on January 14, 1966, were an example of a procedure long advocated by Defense Affairs as a means of smoothing out the interactions between NASA and the DOD and of avoiding head-on confrontations on controversial issues. We advocated a standard procedure of attempting to reach a meeting of minds on any important proposed action by means of informal interagency discussions before the internal views of one Agency became crystallized into an official Agency position through presentation in formal correspondence. Soliciting the comments of the addressee or other party regarding a proposed letter or agreement while still in draft form and if necessary face-to-face discussions by staff representatives before finalizing the document were key features of this recommended procedure. NASA top officials were always willing to follow this procedure in dealing with potentially controversial matters, but not so in all cases on the DOD side.
Dr. Seamans' letter to Dr. Foster of September 27, 1965, pledging full NASA support of the MOL Program, was, of course, well received. Dr. Foster agreed in principle that a new coordinating mechanism was needed to conduct joint planning on the policy decision level concerning NASA's support of the MOL and coordination of the manned space flight programs of the two Agencies in general. Because of the security classification of the MOL and the sensitivity of some of the planned military experiments, it was considered advisable that the necessary coordination be accomplished outside the framework of the AACB.
Before Dr. Foster's views were formally sent to NASA in writing, I met with Mr. Daniel J. Fink, Deputy to Dr. Foster for space systems, to discuss a draft reply to Dr. Seamans' letter. Together we worked out arrangements to establish a new joint group which later was given the title of ''The Manned Space Flight Policy Committee." We agreed on the composition and functions of the group and were in agreement that the new group should absorb the functions of GPPB, noting that the latter group had not met in some seven months. These informal agreements were incorporated in Dr. Foster's reply to Dr. Seamans dated November 19, 1965.
Dr. Foster felt that a formal charter for the new group would not be essential, but was amenable to having one if Dr. Seamans so desired. We on the NASA side did prefer a charter. Mr. Fink and I met on December 2, 1965, to work one out.
The MSFPC was established by a NASA-DOD Memorandum of Understanding approved by Mr. Webb and Mr. McNamara, effective January 14, 1966. It superseded the agreement of January 21, 1963, which had established the GPPB. The agreement provided that the MSFPC would be composed of the Deputy Administrator of NASA (Dr.Seamans) and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering of the DOD (Dr. Foster), acting as Co-chairmen, and two [101] additional members from each Agency to be approved by the Administrator and the Secretary of Defense. The functions assigned in the charter were:
In addition to Dr. Seamans and Dr. Foster, the initial membership
NASA
Dr. George E. Mueller, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight Dr. Homer E. Newell, Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications.
DOD
Mr. Daniel J. Fink, Deputy Director, DDR&E (Strategic and Space Systems) Dr. Alexander H. Flax, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Research and Development).
Pursuant to the concept of a membership empowered to make policy decisions for their respective Agencies and being mindful of security considerations, Dr. Foster had wished to keep the group small and to dispense with the formality of having secretaries to prepare minutes of meetings. He envisaged an informal procedure at meetings, with written documents limited to simple advance agenda and brief memoranda to record agreed action items.
This arrangement imposed some difficulties for NASA. Since the procedural functioning of this committee was to fall within the purview of Defense Affairs, Dr. Seamans' initial thought was that I should be a member, but when it became evident that the NASA experiments most likely to be considered for the MOL would be in the categories of space sciences and earth resources observations, both categories being under Newell, it was considered essential the he be the third NASA member. The internal arrangement was that one of the NASA members would brief me promptly and fully after each meeting so that I could initiate or monitor the necessary followup actions and could work with Fink or Flax in keeping records of the meetings. While reasonably satisfactory in theory, this arrangement did not [102] work out well in practice. It was always difficult for Seamans, Mueller, or Newell, all being very busy people, to find time to fill me in concerning discussions at meetings in sufficient detail to enable me to discharge my responsibilities in a proper manner.
In October 1966, I discussed with Mr. Fink the need for a secretary or co-secretaries for the MSFPC, with the result that Lt. Col. Floyd J. Sweet of my office and Maj. William R. Yost, USAF, from DOD, were appointed as Co-secretaries, effective December 13, 1966. This move considerably facilitated the role of Defense Affairs in support of the MSFPC, but still was not an entirely satisfactory substitute for my hearing the discussions of the Committee first hand. I continued to feel that we should have pressed Dr. Foster to accept a membership of four from each side so that Defense Affairs could be included.
On December 20, 1967, the Administrator approved a revision of the charter of the MSFPC which provided that:
Mr. David Williamson, then in the Office of Program Plans and Analysis, was appointed as the NASA Executive Coordinator.
At their meeting on September 12, 1966, the MSFPC appointed a subgroup, designated the Survey Applications Coordinating Committee (SACC) to coordinate the technical aspects of various experiments planned for DOD and NASA manned space flight missions, including those associated with NASA's Earth Resources Survey Program (ERSP). The initial NASA membership of this group was:
This sub-group met first on September 29, 1966. Meetings were held at the call of the Co-chairmen. mere were a total of nine meetings held during the period of this narrative.
[103] The first meeting of the MSFPC was held on January 21, 1956. Between then and the end of 1967, five more meetings were held. The Board functioned effectively in exchanging information and in coordinating a wide range of matters pertaining to the interrelationships between the MOL program of the DOD and the Gemini and Apollo programs and post-Apollo planning of NASA. A number of studies were conducted under the aegis of the Committee, notably one to determine the advantages and disadvantages of using Titan III/MOL hardware in the AAP and of using Apollo/Saturn hardware for the MOL Program. Various mixes of Titan III/MOL and uprated Saturn I/Apollo systems for low earth orbit missions were examined in these studies.
One of the early actions of the Committee was to agree on a revised charter for the Manned Space Flight Experiments Board (MSFEB), an advisory board to the OMSF on which the DOD had representation.
As the principal policy matters generated by the advent of the MOL Program and of mutual concern were dealt with and resolved by the MSFPC, the work of the Committee tended more and more to be accomplished through individual contacts of NASA and DOD cognizant officials. Up until the appointment of the two Executive Coordinators, much of the back-up work for the Committee was done by Defense Affairs with, of course, the help of other Offices. We proposed agenda items and discussed our items and those proposed by DOD with the cognizant NASA and DOD officials. We prepared NASA position papers on agenda items, briefed Dr. Seamans and the other NASA members in preparation for meetings, drafted and negotiated agreements, wrote supporting papers, and generally performed or monitored all of the necessary support work for the Committee.
NATIONAL SPACE STATION PLANNING SUBPANEL of the MANNED SPACE FLIGHT PANEL, AACB Charter
1. Purpose
2. Organizational Placement
3. General Responsibility
4. Functions
The following specific functions are to be performed by the NSS Planning Subpanel in the discharge of the above General Responsibility:
[105] 5. Membership
6. General
Meetings of the MSS Planning Subpanel shall be held at least once a month.
January 10, 1964