Because the Mercury concept included water landing of the spacecraft, the problems of search and recovery were to be given considerable attention. As early as the winter of 1958-59, the Space Task Group, with the assistance of the Launch Officer as-signed to STG, had developed a basic recovery plan. In early Spring of 1959, a joint NASA-DOD working group was established to develop these plans in more detail. This resulted in Navy responsibility for recovery being assigned to the Atlantic Fleet, and in turn to Destroyer Flotilla Four (DesFlotFour). When General Yates became the DOD representative for Project Mercury in August 1959, the earlier joint NASA-DOD working group was superseded; Capt. J. G. Franklin, USN, became Naval Deputy to General Yates, and recovery became the responsibility of the Project Mercury Support Planning Office. According to Paul E. Purser, Special Assistant to the Director of Project. Mercury, "Because of the excellent progress already made and the excellent working relationships which had been established, DesFlotFour remained responsible for the details of the recovery operation." ²³

During the spring and summer of 1959, the Space Task Group furnished several boilerplate spacecraft which were used by DesFlotFour in developing detailed recovery techniques.

Following the appointment of General Yates, in August 1959, as the DOD Representative for Project Mercury Support operations and his designation of Dr. Knauf in December 1959 as his Assistant for Bioastronautics, plans for recovery of the astronaut had received new impetus. The earlier planning of Dr. Graybiel and his group (as requested by STG) was now reoriented to the DOD-STG effort at the Air Force Missile Test Center. Tentative plans began to develop for the medical care and maintenance of the astronaut following impact. ²⁴

On January 9, 1960, Dr. Knauf met with Dr. Graybiel and his group to exchange ideas about the course of this planning. Dr. Knauf noted that General Yates did not accept the premise that a medical officer should be involved in actual recovery operations, and that the position and function of the medical officer in primary operations areas was as yet unclear. It appeared that only major medical problems should be treated by the recovery teams, with no definitive care aboard the destroyer. Existing hospital facilities along the path of orbit should be alerted, and the astronaut should be taken to the nearest shore hospital with dispatch.²⁵

Through the next 6 months, the Naval School of Aviation Medicine worked intensively to prepare a plan for the recovery of the astronauts at sea. The dimension of this planning is apparent in the fact that the primary eight planned impact areas had an average width of 33 miles and a combined length of 2,747 miles. When the first orbital flight was made, there were in fact 24 ships including 3 carriers deployed, with 13 Marine helicopters, 1 Navy aircraft, and 15,000 Navy personnel involved in recovery operations alone.
 
In early 1960, however, the medical aspects of this program were as yet under study, and not until June 1960 was the final report submitted to NASA .²⁶ This plan, sent. from the DOD Representative for Project Mercury Support to the Space Task Group, was eventually to become the NASA Recovery Plan.
 

On July 7, 1960, STG forwarded the Animal Recovery Plan to General Davis, the DOD Representative, Project Mercury Support Operations.²⁷ On the same day, Walter C. Williams, Associate Director of Project Mercury, informed him that if the proposed animal recovery plan were put into effect, it would be necessary for veterinary personnel to be assigned to duty both on vessels and at the Aeromedical Field Laboratory at Holloman Air Force Base to receive training in the routine and emergency handling of animals.²⁸ Initial requirements were as follows:

                                                             Veterinarians              Technicians
                            Little Joe 5..........................1                              1
                            Redstone 2..........................2                              6
                            Atlas 4.................................2                             16
                            Atlas 5.................................2                             22

(Subsequently the requirements for Redstone 2 were doubled, and requirements for Atlas 5 were set at 12 veterinarians and 20 technicians.) ²⁹

It was understood by STG that the Department of Defense could meet this requirement and that selection of personnel would be under the guidance of Maj. Walter E. Brewer, USAF (VC). Training schedules would be established by the Aeromedical Field Laboratory in consultation with Major Brewer.

Although the Commander, AFMTC, was the DOD representative responsible for recovery, the responsibility for recovery of the Mercury astronaut and spacecraft in preplanned high-probability areas and contingency areas in the Atlantic Ocean was assigned to CINCLANT, who designated the Commander, Destroyer Flotilla Four, as his executive agent in this matter. This was outlined in NASA Project Mercury Working Paper No. 162, "Project Mercury Medical Recovery Operation." Task Force 140 was established in the Atlantic Fleet of the U.S. Navy and designated the Project Recovery Force for the Atlantic Command area. U.S. unified and specified commands were directed to support the Project Mercury operation "to the maximum consistent with primary responsibilities for national defenses."

The manned spacecraft would be inserted into orbit through use of the Atlas launch vehicle and its associated radio-inertial guidance system. The launch would be from AFMTC, Cape Canaveral, Fla., a site that would enable an eastward launch over water, to take advantage of the earth's rotation. The launch azimuth would be slightly north of east to obtain an orbit inclination of approximately 32.5%; with this inclination, all orbits would cross the continental United States and would avoid unfriendly territory. Since the spacecraft landing was planned for a water area, every effort was to be made, in the event of an emergency, to land the spacecraft in water.

The planning of Air Rescue Service was to be guided by this premise, although it was recognized that land recovery must also be considered, particularly for the North American and African continents. It was, therefore, envisioned that Air Rescue Service forces, along with other forces of the unified and specified commands, would be deployed to preselected sites to permit location of the spacecraft within 18 hours after notification of the predicted landing point. The expected lifetime of spacecraft search aids was 24 hours, so they could not be depended upon after that elapsed time.

On March 7, 1961, the Assistant for Bioastronautics requested CINCUSAFE, ARS, CINCPAC, CINCLANT, and CINCEUR to examine the requirements placed upon them by NASA Project Mercury Working Paper No. 162, which dealt with "Project Mercury Medical Recovery Operation ."³⁰ Each addressee was requested to derive an operational procedure for providing medical support as an annex to its "Contingency Area Operations Plan." Since the several search and rescue areas varied widely in geographical character and in availability of local resources, the medical annex was to be coordinated among the various agencies involved. In summary, the annex provided that search and rescue forces including an appropriate number of pararescue teams trained in Project Mercury spacecraft emergency procedures would be responsible for search, location, and retrieval of any Project Mercury spacecraft or astronaut that might land in any of the designated regions except the part of the Atlantic Ocean included in Project Mercury planned landing areas 1 through 9.

During Project Mercury manned flight operations each aeromedical monitor assigned to a tracking station on the Project Mercury global range would exercise emergency medical surveillance over the area for which he had been assigned responsibility. These areas of responsibility were as follows:

Aeromedical monitor site                                            Longitude boundaries of area of responsibility

Bermuda.......................................................................   80 deg. W. to 60 deg. W.
Atlantic Ocean ship........................................................  60 deg. W. to 30 deg. W.
Canary Islands...............................................................  30 deg. W. to Meridian of Greenwich
Kano, Nigeria................................................................  Meridian of Greenwich to 30 deg. E.
Zanzibar........................................................................   30 deg. E. to 60 deg. E.
Indian Ocean ship..........................................................   60 deg. E. to 100 deg. E.
Muchea, Australia.........................................................   100 deg. E. to 130 deg. E.
Woomera, Australia......................................................   130 deg. E. to 170 deg. E.
Canton Island................................................................   170 deg. E. to 160 deg. W.
Hawaii...........................................................................  160 deg. W. to 140 deg. W.
Pacific Missile Range......................................................  140 deg. W. to 120 deg. W.
Guaymas, Mexico...........................................................  120 deg. W. to 100 deg. W.
Corpus Christi, Tex.........................................................  100 deg. W. to 80 deg. W.

In the event of an emergency landing in his area, the aeromedical monitor concerned would assume full responsibility for the medical care of the astronaut The theater surgeon concerned would, in coordination with the designated aeromedical monitor, assume medical administrative responsibility for the initial hospital care of the astronaut. The STG was to be prepared to airlift to any point agreed upon -by -the theater surgeon concerned and the medical director of Project Mercury such professional medical specialty support as might be required to provide the desired medical care for the astronaut when a comparable level of medical competence was not available locally. The various areas of responsibility and the procedures involved were clearly defined.

23.  Paul E. Purser, Spec. Asst. to Dir., Project Mercury, Memo for Files, Subj: Additional Background Material on Project Mercury, May 11, 1960.

24.  Ashton Graybiel, "Aerospace Medicine and Project Mercury-Navy Participation," Aerospace Med., vol. 33, no. 10, Oct. 1962, pp. 1193-1198.

25.  Informal notes of meeting with Dr. Knauf by Dr. Beischer, U.S. Naval School of Aviation Medicine, July 9,1960.

26. A. Graybiel, D. E. Beischer, et al., "Project Mercury—Medical Aspects of the Recovery Program," SAM P-14, prepared for NASA at U.S. Naval School of Aviation Medicine, Pensacola, Fla., 1960.

27.  Walter C. Williams, Assoc. Dir. of Project Mercury, Ltr to Maj. Gen. Leighton I. Davis, DOD Representative, Project Mercury Support Operations, Attn.: Col. Knauf, July 7,1960.

28.  Col. Raymond A. Yerg, USAF (MC), Deputy for Bioastronautics, Ltr to; M. M. Link, Sept. 27, 1963.

29.  Animal Recovery Plan, initialed "JPH, 6/30/60," attached as enclosure to ltr from Walter C. Williams, Assoc. Dir. of Project Mercury, to DOD Representative, Project Mercury Support Operations, July 7,1960.

30.  Asst. for Bioastronautics, Ltr to CINCUSAFE, ARS, CINCPAC, CINCLANT, and CINCEUR, Mar. 7, 1961.