Part I. The Original Ranger
On April 12, 1961, a few months before the ill-fated flight of Ranger 2, the, Soviet Union launched Major Yuri Gagarin on a one-orbit flight around the world. The new Soviet space achievement brought to a head an increasingly salient debate about the American space program, a debate whose outcome profoundly affected the Ranger Project.
MAN ON THE MOON
The debate centered on whether the U.S. space program should stress manned or unmanned exploration of space and the planets. For some time NASA had been pushing ahead with Project Mercury, which aimed at the earth-orbiting of manned spacecraft, and NASA leaders had long been discussing manned projects to follow Mercury. As early as May 1959, NASA's Goett Committee had recommended that the space agency undertake a manned circumlunar flight mission, tentatively identified as Project Apollo, though the Eisenhower administration had refused to budget anything for it beyond planning studies. But in a report of mid-January 1961, John F. Kennedy's Ad Hoc Committee on Space, composed largely of scientists and chaired by Jerome Wiesner, the incoming President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology, criticized the emerging programmatic emphasis on man in space. By placing the highest national priority on the Mercury manned earth-orbital project, the report declared, "we have strengthened the popular belief that man in space is the most important aim of our nonmilitary space effort." Accompanying national publicity had further exaggerated "that aspect of [the nations] space activity..." The report argued that NASA needed to increase emphasis on space science, allot more missions for earth applications, develop larger launch vehicles, and organize the entire space program more effectively. 1
Elsewhere, in NASA's Lunar and Planetary Programs Division, Edgar Cortright and Oran Nicks objected to engineering for man in space at the expense of quality space science. As Project Mercury suggested, just to fly a man into orbit, keep him alive, and return him safely to earth called for remarkable feats of engineering-from complex life support systems to atmospheric reentry and recovery systems. Compared with the effort that went into satisfying these engineering demands, pure science was virtually invisible in Project Mercury. 2 On March 31, the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences added views of its own. In separate reports to the new administration the Board advised that man in space could be an important component of the nation's exploratory program, though it was "not now possible to decide whether man will be able to accompany expeditions to the Moon and planets." The board went on to recommend that planning proceed "on the premise that man will be included." But to the board, man in space meant trained scientists seeking knowledge, not engineer-pilots bent on showing the flag. 3 And the board continued with an endorsement of unmanned scientific space exploration strong enough to make its approval of manned flights seem a mere genuflection to public sentiment. 4
Nevertheless, the public at large seemed generally unconcerned with the advance of sky or planetary science as such. In 1960, while scrutinizing the proposal for Project Ranger, Congressman Albert Thomas of Houston, the powerful chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Independent Offices, interrupted the testimony of NASA Associate Administrator Richard Homer to inquire just how far away the moon was from the earth. Horner replied that it was a quarter-million miles distant. Nodding and holding up background data furnished by NASA, Thomas read: "Your justifications continue: ‘as our nearest major body in the solar system, basically unchanged for billions of years, the Moon offers unique potentialities for better understanding of historical and contemporary phenomena of the solar system...’ We know all about that," Thomas snapped. "If it has not been changed for billions of years, why not leave it alone?" 5
After Gagarin's feat, Thomas could agree with the sentiments of Congressman James Fulton of Pennsylvania: that NASA should "stop some of this WPA scientific business." Along with other Congressmen, Fulton declared emphatically: "We are in a competitive race with Russia," a race that prohibited a space program aimed merely at serving the needs of science. 6 In the White House, eight days after the Gagarin flight, President Kennedy, sensitive to public sentiment, directed Vice President Lyndon Johnson to take charge of surveying the space program and determining where "we have a chance of beating the Soviets..." 7 In short order, Johnson drew up a report with the aid of, among others, the Secretary of Defense and the new head of NASA, James E. Webb. President Kennedy announced the resulting decision to a joint session of Congress, where, on May 25, 1961, he called for a national program to land a man on the moon and return him safely to earth before the end of the decade.
Amid the eagerness to best the Russians in what was now commonly called the space race, the authorization for Project Apollo whisked through the Congress. The outcome was a clear cut victory for an emphasis on manned over unmanned space exploration, for technological spectaculars, some critics snapped, over sound space and planetary research. Whatever the general accuracy of the critics, the commitment to Project Apollo certainly raised havoc with the scientific planning for Project Ranger.
RANGERS FOR APOLLO
Even before funds for the manned lunar landing were in hand, NASA Administrator Webb, his deputies Dryden and Seamans, and Space Flight Director Silverstein had decided that the unmanned scientific lunar program would contribute to making straight the way for Project Apollo. 8 On the day that Kennedy delivered his special message to Congress, Abraham Hyatt, NASA Director of Program Planning and Evaluation, issued a Master Plan of launches for the conquest of the moon. Instead of missions for scientific purposes, both of JPL's lunar Right projects, Ranger and Surveyor, appeared listed as missions in "direct support" of the manned lunar landing program. 9
When on June 8, 196 1, NASA Deputy Administrator Hugh L. Dryden appeared before the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, he testified that provision already had been made to strengthen the nation's manned lunar program by augmenting NASA's unmanned lunar flights. "We want to know something about the character of the surface on which the landing is to be made," he explained, "and obtain just as much information as we can before man actually gets there. 10 In subsequent testimony, Silverstein supplied further details. Project Ranger would be increased by four flights to secure closeup pictures and possibly other data concerning the moon's topography. Planetary scientists might obtain information and debate lunar hypotheses at their convenience, but, speaking as NASA's chief engineer and a prospective manager of the manned lunar landing program, Silverstein declared: "it is [now] vital for us to know what the moon's surface is like. 11 The legislators agreed. Several weeks later, Congress appropriated funds for the additional Ranger missions.
Silverstein formally notified JPL of NASA's plans on June 9. Reiterating the justification for extending Project Ranger, in a letter to Pickering he observed that the manned lunar landing created the "need for early data on the surface topography and hardness of the moon..." Four more flights would contribute to meeting this goal, "afford a better opportunity for Ranger project success, and make a corresponding contribution to national prestige during the early phases of our lunar program." He instructed the Laboratory to examine improved high resolution television cameras and other instruments that could return information on the hardness of the lunar surface, such as a penetrometer capsule. JPL's recommendation, together with estimates of the cost and level of effort required, was to be submitted to NASA Headquarters before the end of the month. 12
High-resolution photographs of selected areas of the moon's surface, JPL Lunar Program Director Cummings informed Edgar Cortright and Oran Nicks in a meeting at Headquarters on June 21, would be the greatest single contribution Ranger could make to Project Apollo. The landing Sear of an Apollo vehicle designed for the worst lunar surface conditions, he said, could easily claim 50 percent of the allowable weight. On a more favorable surface, however, the landing gear could likely be reduced to less than 5 percent of that weight. Closeup pictures taken by Ranger spacecraft prior to impact would permit engineers to design Apollo's landing gear with increased confidence. For this purpose, the standard Ranger bus could be modified to support a tower carrying a television subsystem in place of the Block II seismometer capsule. Necessary information on the hardness of the lunar surface could be obtained from the Block II radar reflectivity experiment suggested by Walter Brown in March, from special accelerometers contained in the Block II lunar capsules, from ground-based radar investigation of the lunar surface, and from the Surveyor soft-landing missions now scheduled to follow Ranger in 1964.
To implement this proposal, Cummings continued, JPL recommended contracting for the complete television subsystem, much as the Block H lunar capsule subsystem was designed and developed by the Aeronutronic Division of the Ford Motor Company. For the new missions, however, if the flight schedules projected by NASA to begin in January 1963 were to be met, no time could be spared for the normal process of competitive bidding A single firm should be selected and a contract awarded immediately. JPL preferred the Radio Corporation of America. Of the five potential sources, RCA alone possessed experience in developing the space television cameras for the original Ranger and Tiros projects. After further discussion, Cortright approved the television as payload for the extended Project Ranger. Nine days later, Cummings learned that Headquarters would approve the proposed sole-source contract with RCA for the television subsystem. 13
No time was spared. On July 5, 1961, representatives of the Astro Electronics Division of RCA in Hightstown, New Jersey, met at JPL to define plans for the payload. Photographs of the lunar surface, it was decided, would be taken by a special television system with a shuttered vidicon. The participants assigned top priority to high-resolution pictures. And complete responsibility for the television subsystem, including details of its design, fabrication, and testing, was delegated to RCA. JPL's Systems Division would monitor RCA's performance on the contract with consultant support from the Space Sciences Division. On August 25, RCA accepted the JPL Letter Contract. The company agreed to furnish one proof test model and four flight units of a television subsystem, each consisting of a battery of "three or more" high-resolution TV cameras. 14 Four days later, on August 29, NASA Associate Administrator Robert Seamans publicly announced the expansion of Project Ranger from five to nine flights. The new Ranger missions, he informed the nation, would return high-resolution pictures of the lunar surface as "part of the general acceleration of the program to land an American on the moon by 1970. 15
This expansion brought with it changes in project staffing and controls. At NASA Headquarters, Lunar and Planetary Program Director Cortright instituted quarterly project review meetings. Supplementing the normal flow of communications, NASA and JPL Ranger personnel would meet-beginning in September and following once every three months thereafter-to evaluate the progress and problems of the project and make plans for any remedial action necessary. NASA’s knowledge of and control over project developments, Cortright and Nicks correctly perceived, would thereby be strengthened. At JPL, new personnel assignments were made. Cummings established a Ranger Project Policy and Requirements Document, controlling parts selection, test, and quality assurance requirements primarily for JPL's in-house spacecraft effort-from the design phase through space flight operations. In addition, to assist Ranger Project Manager Burke, he appointed a Ranger Spacecraft Systems Manager, Allen E. Wolfe. 16
Wolfe had come to JPL in 1952 after military service, a stint with the Army's Ballistic Research Laboratories at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, and a wartime degree in electrical engineering from Caltech. At the Laboratory he had participated in developing the instrumentation for various missiles tested at the White Sands Proving Ground in New Mexico. Taciturn, Wolfe had acquired a well deserved reputation for technical competence and coolness under pressure-a characteristic perhaps most appreciated by those who had occasion to meet him in a sociable game of poker. In the fall of 1960, Systems Division Chief Schurmeier had appointed Wolfe Ranger Project Engineer, replacing Gordon Kautz, who had moved over to the Ranger Project Office as Burke's deputy. Now, in August 1961, as Ranger Spacecraft Systems Manager, his sole responsibility was to guide development of the spacecraft through all phases of assembly and testing, not only for the follow-on missions but for the remaining Block II flights as well (Figure 44).
Fig. 44. JPL Ranger Spacecraft Systems Manager Allen Wolfe
With the missions approved, the principal contract awarded, and his staff augmented, Burke instructed the JPL technical divisions to place orders for the hardware necessary for Ranger flights 6 through 9. 17 To be known collectively as Ranger Block III, these spacecraft would be subject to design constraints and a test regime similar to the ones imposed on their predecessors. Components for both the spacecraft bus and RCA's television subsystem, for example, would be heat sterilized before assembly, and treated with ethylene-oxide gas afterwards. But one prior difficulty was removed. The engineers knew the allowable weight of the spacecraft; at least 360 kilograms (800 pounds) could be allocated among its various subsystems.
RCA completed design of the television payload in September 1961. 18 Weighing 135 kilograms (350 pounds), the subsystem was composed of three major assemblies: a tower superstructure and thermal shield, a central box containing the principal electronic components, and, located above the box near the top of the tower, six television cameras and their associated bracketry and electronics. Two of the cameras would be equipped with 25-millimeter wide-angle lenses, and four with 75-millimeter telephoto lenses.. The four narrow-angle telephoto cameras, positioned for overlapping coverage, would furnish a resolution on the order of 0. 1 to 0.5 meter (4 to 20 inches) in the final pictures. All of the cameras were to be operated in sequence under a coralnuous recycling program from turn-on to impact. While one camera was taking a picture, another would be in a state of "readout"-converting the video data for transmission to earth-while on another the images would be erased preparatory to taking further pictures. Operated by a separate battery power supply, the television system was to be independent of the Ranger power subsystem (Figure 45). Two transmitters, one acting as a backup in the event of any technical malfunction in the other, would ensure transmission of the information to earth. At the Goldstone tracking station, the video data would be recorded on 35-millimeter film and magnetic tape. 19
Fig. 45. Ranger Block III Television Camera Sequencing
In appearance, outside of the television package, Rangers 6 through 9 looked virtually identical to their predecessors. Made up of the same subsystems, they featured trapezoidal solar panels, a midcourse propulsion unit beneath the bus, a hinged high-gain dish antenna, and an omnidirectional antenna atop the tower superstructure (Figure 46). To meet the short schedules, and adhering to Burke's dictum, design changes beyond those necessary to accommodate the television package would be minimized. The total weight of 360 kilograms (800 pounds), nevertheless, meant a net gain of some 23 kilograms (50 pounds) for the spacecraft bus-as contrasted with the erroneous figure of weight assigned the Block II lunar spacecraft. For the first time, weight could be used for redundant engineering components. Most notable among them: two backup clocks to enable Ranger to complete a mission even if its electronic brain, the central computer and sequencer, should fail in flight. All of the television cameras were to be pointed so that the normal sun and earth acquisition procedures of the Ranger spacecraft would automatically position them to sweep the moon in most trajectories even without accomplishing the planned midcourse or terminal maneuvers. 20
Fig. 46. Model of Ranger Block III Preliminary Design
On September 19, 1961, NASA Headquarters issued the flight schedule for Rangers 6 through 9; they would be launched in January, April, May, and August of 1963, respectively. 21 The urgency expressed by this schedule, Nicks explained to Cummings, derived from the national commitment to Project Apollo and the delay in the Centaur launch vehicle program, which postponed the Rights of the Surveyor lunar soft-lander project. Every effort must be exerted, he advised, "to get the most from existing Ranger developments." 22 Privately, Nicks questioned what "the most" might be. The Atlas-Agena B vehicles had experienced failures with Rangers 1 and 2. The spacecraft and the ground-based Deep Space Network were not yet proved in actual lunar Right-through command and execution of the spacecraft midcourse and terminal maneuvers. The most that might reasonably be expected, he confided to Cortright, was one success in Ranger Block II, and perhaps two successes in the Block III flights. 23
At JPL, Cummings and Burke could concur with Nicks' reserved prognosis. Burke, in fact, in discussion with his counterparts at NASA Headquarters, used the figure of one complete success in each remaining block of lunar flights as a reasonable expectation. Planning had begun at NASA and JPL to add still more Rangers to increase the probability of success, building upon the technology to be demonstrated in these early flights. 24 But more important to both JPL men at that moment were the changed justification and objectives of Project Ranger. The original Ranger Block II, to be sure, would continue in the name of science. The new Ranger Block III, however, was to fly in support of Apollo; engineers had to have a closeup look at the surface upon which Apollo must land. Planetary scientists could draw on these lunar photographs for what they could find in them.
As enunciated by the President, members of the Congress, and the NASA leadership, the new national goal could hardly be misunderstood. 25 Cummings explained its portent and ramifications for NASA-JPL unmanned flight projects to Vice President Johnson on October 4: "Originally our lunar program had been oriented toward scientific and technological objectives," he stated. "Now...the emphasis has been changed so that support of the manned operations is the primary objective, and space technology and lunar science are secondary. We believe, however, that we can accomplish the space science and technology objectives as planned, while at the same time providing essential support to the manned effort." 26
THE NEW ORDER
The downgrading of space science forced by the commitment to Apollo bothered high NASA officials, including the head of the agency, James E. Webb. The son of a county school superintendent in Oxford, North Carolina, Webb, aged 54, had already distinguished himself in half a dozen careers, including those of aviator, lawyer, administrator, and statesman. He impressed Congressmen with his ability to field questions, remember figures, and overwhelm with information. "Listening to Jim Webb," one of them remarked, is like taking a drink from a fire hydrant! Webb had long been familiar with the policy and politics of scientific research and development, not least because before World War II he had been an executive of the Sperry Gyroscope Company and after it, in the Truman administration, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Figure 47).
Fig. 47. NASA Administrator James Webb
Webb appreciated science qua science, and he understood the scientists' contradictory aspirations to academic independence, peer-group determination of scientific merit, and substantial governmental funding. In later months, prodded to cut back NASA's space science efforts until Apollo was accomplished, Webb would tell the President that he could not run a truncated program. But Webb, who had endorsed the Apollo program to Kennedy, now had his priorities fixed on the manned lunar landing, and he reorganized the space agency accordingly.
The realignment, effective November 1, 1961, was marked at Headquarters by the following salient features:
Beyond acknowledging the significance now attached to the manned space flight program (which existed previously as a subdivision within Space Flight Programs), this reorganization made Seamans the general manager of the whole agency. JPL's lunar and interplanetary flight projects remained under the functional direction of Newell's office, where Edgar Cortright moved up to become his deputy. Oran Nicks became Director of the Lunar and Planetary Programs Division in place of Cortright. 27
In the new Office of Space Sciences, the deem emphasis of space science as such troubled Homer Newell. 28 As an engineering tour de force, landing a man on the moon might bolster a sagging national economy, reestablish a shaken faith in the supremacy of American technology, or guarantee some short-term, advantages in international diplomacy. It definitely promised to dislocate the planning for the scientific exploration of the moon; it even threatened to undermine the raison d’être of NASA's unmanned lunar program already in being or projected. First, Apollo was physically separated from the rest of the lunar program, located in an office for which Newell was not responsible. Second, Newell was expected to represent the interests of space science in NASA, and to push for adding space science in Project Apollo. Third, if he were successful in this endeavor, his own unmanned lunar missions and the remaining experimenters hard at work on their instruments would be in for more trouble. Why rough-land a seismometer on the moon with Ranger, or soft-land a variety of instruments with Surveyor, or return lunar surface samples with Prospector, when Apollo might perform these same functions in a few years’ time? Brainerd Holmes and other high officials in the newly formed Office of Manned Space Flight, who would shortly petition President Kennedy for supplemental Apollo appropriations, might have added, "Why, indeed?"
Nevertheless, Newell intended to secure a significant return for space science from all of the automated flights at the earliest opportunity, and to enlarge that return from Apollo as the manned program progressed. He personally had selected the name and emphasis for the organization he now commanded: the Office of Space Sciences. Though it might be dwarfed in size, on the charts of the reorganized NASA it would be at least recognizable on a par with the Office of Manned Space Flight. Internally, Space Sciences was -reorganized to combine the science and engineering functions so carefully separated under Silverstein. In the new Lunar and Planetary Program Office, Oran Nicks established individual offices for Ranger, Surveyor, and Mariner R, a new JPL project recently approved, to send a modified Mariner and Ranger spacecraft-hence the name Mariner R-to Venus in 1962.
The individual offices included program engineers and scientists.* N. William Cunningham, previously a staff scientist for Silverstein, was named Ranger Program Chief (Figure 48). A wartime radio operator aboard naval aircraft, who had later earned degrees in meteorology and physics at Texas A & M College, Cunningham would guide Ranger developments with Burke in the Project Office at JPL. His deputy and Program Engineer was Walter Jakobowski, a man of inquiring temperament well suited to his role as troubleshooter. A Ranger Program Scientist was not immediately named. Charles P. Sonett, a UCLA physicist with a background in sky science and the Chief of Sciences in Nicks' office, served in this capacity in the interim. NASA now had a management structure with which to prosecute Project Apollo, and the Office of Space Sciences had combined science and engineering in a program office for Project Ranger.
* The word "program" was substituted in place of project to avoid confusion with and imply a different function from the Project Offices already existing at the field center level.
Fig. 48. NASA Ranger Program Chief William Cunningham
James Burke in Pasadena was pleased with the creation of a counterpart Ranger Office at NASA Headquarters. At last after two years, two individuals at Headquarters were to be concerned with his problems alone. Moreover, from past dealings on the scientific side of Ranger, Burke knew that Cunningham understood the engineering constraints that science entailed and would be quick to foresee other potential problems as well. Burke was even more pleased by the national commitment to Project Apollo. The potential interference of space science activities, he reasoned, would have to be contained during the monumental engineering effort to land a man on the moon and return him safely to earth. 29 That enterprise might well relieve some of the pressure for "more science" in Project Ranger-especially since Ranger now was considered to be supportive of the Apollo goal.
Chapter Seven - Notes
The hyphenated numbers in parentheses at the ends of individual citations are catalog numbers of documents on file in the history archives of the JPL library.
1. Text as printed in "Excerpts from Task Force's Report to Kennedy on U. S. Position in Space Race," The New York Times, January 12, 196 1, p. 1; cf President's Science Advisory Committee, " Report of Ad Hoc Panel on Man-in-Space, "November 18, 1960 (2-2368b).
2. Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., James M. Grimwood, and Charles C. Alexander, This New Ocean: A History of Project Mercury (NASA SP-4201. Washington: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1966).
3. "Man's Role in the National Space Program, " a policy paper developed by the Space Science Board, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., March 27, 196 1, pp. 1-2 (2-932c).
4. "Support of Basic Research for Space Science," a policy paper developed by the Space Science Board, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., March 27, 1961 (2-932b).
5. United States Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1961, Hearings before the Subcommittee, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, 1960, Part 3, p. 466.
6. United States Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, H.R. 6169-A Bill to Amend the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Hearings before the Committee, 87th Congress, 1st Session, 1961, p. 5.
7. Memorandum from John Kennedy to Lyndon Johnson, April 20, 1961, cited in John M. Logsdon, The Decision To Go To the Moon: Project Apollo and the National Interest (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1970), p. 109.
8. Interview of Oran Nicks by Irving Ertel, William Putnam, and James Grimwood, January 23, 1967, p. 2 (5-724).
9. NASA Master Plan for Space Launches as of May 25, 1961 (2-2243); also NASA memorandum from Oran Nicks to Edgar Cortright, subject: "Items Requiring Review and Decision by the Director of OSFP, " June 1, 1961 (2-1487a&b).
10. United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Science and Astronautics, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1962, Hearings before the Committee, 87th Congress, 1st Session, on H.R. 6874, 1961, p. 56.
11. Ibid., p. 65.
12. Letter from Oran Nicks to William Pickering, June 9, 1961 (2-1129).
13. JPL Interoffice Memo from Clifford Cummings to James Burke, subject: "Ranger Follow-on," July 5, 1961 (2-1157); JPL Interoffice Memo from Clifford Cummings to Ted Candee, subject: "Letter Contract No. 950137, Ranger Follow-on TV Mission," September 11, 1961 (2-2241); JPL Interoffice Memo from Charles Hemler to File 1647, subject: "High Resolution T.V. Camera Mission Contractor Selection," July 14, 1961 (21704); and "Ranger History," a working draft in preparation for the Congressional hearings held the week of April 27, 1964, p. 18 (2-458).
14. NASA memorandum from Oran Nicks to Edgar Cortright, subject: Review of JPL-RCA Management of Ranger Camera Capsule, " January 15, 1962 (2-336); Minutes of the Ranger TV System Meeting, held on July 7, 1961 (2-1711 ); Ranger TV Subsystem (Block III) Final Report (Princeton, New Jersey: Astro-Electronics Division, Radio Corporation of America, July 22, 1965), Volume 1: Summary, p. 2 5 (2-960).
15. Gladwin Hill, "Ranger Project Adds 4 Rockets to Televise Pictures of Moon," The New York Times, August 30, 1961, p. 4; also JPL News Release of August 29, 1961 (2-2124); and "Unmanned Lunar Program to be Accelerated," Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 14, 1961, p. 2 8.
16. Ranger Block 3 Project Policy and Requirements (JPL EPD 65. Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, March 8, 1963); JPL Interoffice Memo from James Burke and Harris Schurmeier to Ranger Program Distribution Lists 6 and 7, subject: "Spacecraft System Manager for Ranger," August 31, 1961 (2-1525).
17. JPL Interoffice Memo from James Burke to Division Chiefs, Section Chiefs, and Group Supervisors, subject: "Ranger Follow-on, " September 1, 1961 (2-2125).
18. JPL Interoffice Memo 313-12 from Donald Kindt to Raymond Heacock, subject: "RCA TV Subsystem Design Modification," February 15, 1962 (2- 1231).
19. Space Programs Summary No. 37-15, Volume I for the period March 1, 1962, to May 1, 1962 (Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, May 31, 1962), p. 29; Space Programs Summary No. 37-13, Volume II, for the period November 1, 1961, to January 1, 1962 (Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, February 1, 1962), pp. 23-26.
20. Space Programs Summary No. 37-16, Volume VI for the period May 1, 1962, to August 1, 1962 (Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, August 31, 1962), p. 13.
21. Official NASA Flight Schedule, September 19, 1961 (2-968).
22. Letter from Oran Nicks to Clifford Cummings, September 27, 1961 (2- 1147).
23. NASA memorandum from Oran Nicks to Edgar Cortright, subject: "Lunar Program Support to Manned Lunar Landing, " December 6,1961 (2-433).
24. Ranger Project Development Plan (Revised. Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, June 5, 1961 ), p. 35 (2-621); JPL Interoffice Memo from Clifford Cummings to Harris Schurmeier, September 19, 1961 (2-1145); JPL Interoffice Memo from Homer Stewart to Gordon Kautz, subject: "Ranger Follow-On Program Expectations," June 11, 1962 (2-1255).
25. For unmanned exploration, "the principal purpose of [ Rangers 6-91 is to support the accelerated program to land an American on the Moon by 1970. Sixth Semiannual Report to the Congress, July 1 through December31, 1961 (Washington: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1962), p. 67.
26. Clifford I. Cummings, "The Lunar Program," Minutes of Briefing on the Occasion of the Visit of Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice President of the United States of America to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, October 4, 1961 (Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, October 19, 1961), p. 1; see also Minutes of Briefing on the Occasion of the Visit of U.S. Senator Robert S. Kerr, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Science and James E. Webb, Administrator, NASA to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, October 3, 1961 (Pasadena, California: Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, October 20, 1961).
27. Robert L. Rosholt, An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963 (NASA SP-4101. Washington: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1966); cf also NASA News Release, subject: "Administration and the Conquest of Space" Banquet Address by James Webb, NASA Administrator, at the National Conference of the American Society for Public Administration, Detroit, Michigan, April 14, 1966 (2-462).
28. Cf, for example, the letter from Homer Newell to Joseph Karth, April 10, 1962 (2-897); and NASA memorandum from Homer Newell to James Webb, April 2, 1963 (2-2171)
29. As Burke saw and described the technological progression: "The Rangers are enormously more complex than Pioneer 4, yet they are but a small step toward the technology that will be required for the reliable transportation of men and equipment to and from the moon... " James D. Burke, "The Ranger Spacecraft," Astronautics, September 1961, p. 23.