[33] Laying the proper organizational foundation for life sciences at NASA presented special problems. Administrator Glennan realized that NASA needed to expand the scope of its life sciences activities if it was going to reduce its reliance on military personnel and facilities to provide biomedical research for future manned programs. The scientific community also looked to NASA to support biological investigations in space and basic research in biomedicine. At the same time, he was reluctant to increase in-house personnel and facilities or to disrupt existing personal and organizational relationships. Nor did he want to alarm the military services and Congress. To help him resolve this dilemma, he asked Clark Randt, a personal acquaintance, to join NASA as a special assistant and invited a group of prominent biomedical scientists to serve as a Biosciences Advisory Committee.

Randt was an excellent choice for life sciences advisor. A respected clinician, biomedical scientist, and medical administrator, he was believed to be an excellent choice to bridge the gap between academic life scientists and NASA's engineering- and physical science-oriented management. At the time of his appointment, Randt was director of the division of neurology at Case Western Reserve University Medical School in Cleveland and was recognized for his important contributions in sensory neurophysiology.² Glennan was also impressed by Randt's attitude toward science and the space program. As a clinician, Randt perceived the value of basic research in terms of its potential applications. His commitment to an expanded and strengthened program of basic biomedical research within NASA was firmly linked to potential clinical uses within the manned space program. Moreover, Randt was an enthusiastic supporter of manned spaceflight and believed that a successful program required the cooperation of life scientists, engineers, and mission planners.³

[34] During the time he worked for NASA, from July 1959 to March 1960, Randt focused on three problem areas: NASA's needs and capabilities in the life sciences, liaison with other government agencies having biomedical research and development programs and facilities, and NASA's ability to attract the support of the academic community to the agency's long-range objectives in biology and medicine.

In February 1960, Randt recommended to Glennan that NASA implement a life sciences program that would provide for "sequential evolution" of life sciences "research, development and training" related to the biomedical requirements for manned spaceflight, the biological effects of the space environment, and the search for evidence of extraterrestrial life. He suggested that this evolution should proceed through three phases. Phase one, 1960 to 1963, should center on biomedical research and development related to manned flights of short duration (2 to 7 days) in Earth orbit (no more than 500 miles from the Earth). Biological research should be limited to ground-based facilities with the objective of identifying research problems requiring further investigation in flight. The second phase, 1964 to 1970, should focus on biomedical research and development related to human requirements during 10- to 30-day flights and biological investigations of subhuman organisms in support of manned flights (e.g., studies of the effects on cellular organisms of weightlessness, radiation, and alterations in body rhythms). Finally, in phase three, beyond 1970, biomedical research and development should address human requirements for flights exceeding six months in duration and one million miles in distance. Biological research in this phase would be essentially independent of manned spaceflight and centered on problems related to the origin and evolution of life and the search for extraterrestrial life-forms.

To accomplish these objectives, Randt claimed, NASA needed to give high priority to basic biomedical research and to integrate all life sciences research and development. Noting that the life sciences comprise a continuum from basic research in biology to clinical practice, he suggested that the organization and management of life sciences programs should reflect this. In practical terms, this meant that the four primary life sciences activities-space biology, human research, biotechnology, and space medicine-should be administered within a single life sciences program office. He also urged the creation of a life sciences research center and an active program of grants and contracts to life scientists. The center and the program would fall within the jurisdiction of the director of the Life Sciences Programs Office.

Randt recognized that an expanded and strengthened life sciences program within NASA would be resisted by the military services and their supporters in Congress, but he believed this opposition could be quieted if [35] NASA clearly defined its legitimate areas of interest and pushed for authorization to develop in-house capabilities only where military programs were inadequate. He suggested that military capabilities were limited to biotechnology (development of life systems and protective equipment and the attendant human research) and that NASA was justified in developing capabilities in other life sciences areas. He further suggested that NASA establish a formal liaison in the life sciences between NASA and the Defense Department. This, he believed, would enable NASA to avoid direct confrontation with the Air Force while taking advantage of interservice rivalries. Finally, he urged Glennan to negotiate with the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences for the formation of a life sciences committee that would be responsive to NASA's needs. This, in his view, would give NASA the same type of advisory service as the Air Force enjoyed through the Bioastronautics Committee.⁴

THE KETY REPORT

While serving as Glennan's life sciences advisor, Randt represented NASA at meetings of the Biosciences Advisory Committee. Glennan had asked the committee to provide expert advice on life sciences programs and to respond to complaints from academic life scientists. He named as chairman Dr. Seymour Kety, a prominent neurologist and researcher with the National Institutes of Health, and instructed him to select as members of the committee scientists of recognized stature in the bioscience specialties" who have had "diversified training and experience" and are as interested in "fundamental research" as in "applied research and technical development."⁵ In short, Glennan wanted a biosciences committee that reflected the needs and interests of academic and other basic research-oriented life scientists.⁶

Glennan and his staff formulated 11 "functional objectives" for the Kety committee. These included determining NASA's present and future needs in the life sciences; the extent to which NASA should assume responsibility for life sciences research, development, and training; and the life sciences organization that NASA would need to meet its responsibilities In setting forth these objectives, Glennan wanted specific guidelines for a life sciences program. He specified that the committee give evidence that NASA's biomedical objectives could be met through existing facilities and provide specifics about "the proportion of in-house to extramural effort . . . the rate of buildup for each-[and] the composition, organization, status and size of the NASA in-house capability." He also asked for hard data to justify a life sciences research facility.⁷

[36] The Kety committee conducted its investigation from June to November 1959, presented a draft report to Glennan in December 1959, and submitted its final report in January 1960. The report urged increased emphasis on basic science and warned against making the life sciences program strictly an adjunct to manned spaceflight applications and operations. It identified two broad objectives: investigation of the biological effects of extraterrestrial environments "including the search for extraterrestrial life" and scientific investigations related to manned space flight and exploration." While expressing unqualified support for the manned space program, it stressed that the ultimate objective was to expand opportunities for extraterrestrial science.⁸

To achieve these objectives, the report continued, NASA first needed to implement an imaginative and long-range program" of biological, medical, and behavioral research with clearly identified scientific objectives and emphasis on the interrelationships among biological, biotechnical, and medical research and development. The report suggested three subdivisions for the life sciences:⁹

1. Basic biology; effects of extraterrestrial environments on biological systems, with special emphasis on 'those phenomena associated with weightlessness, ionizing radiation, and alterations in life rhythms" and the search for organic molecules that "might be precursors or evidence of extraterrestrial life."

2. Applied medicine and biology: medical and biological research related to manned spaceflight, including "effects of weightlessness on human performance, radiation hazards, tolerance of force stresses, and maintenance of life-sustaining artificial environments."

3. Medical and behavioral sciences: fundamental investigations" concerned with longer range human requirements in space and scientific investigation of the effects of space on human biology and behavior, including research into 'metabolism, nutrition, blood circulation, respiration, and the nervous system control of bodily functions and performance in space equivalent situations."

A second requirement noted in the report was that NASA take responsibility for leadership, coordination and operation of the biomedical aspects of the national space program." While avoiding sharp criticism of the military services, the authors did offer two reasons why a civilian agency was better qualified to manage this area of research and development. First, the military services were not in a position to achieve the objectives of investigating "fundamental biological questions relative to extraterrestrial environments and the scientific and technological aspects of manned space flight," because the services must properly give primary attention to the development of weapons systems and the national [37] defense." In contrast, NASA was "unhampered by such predetermined objectives" and therefore had the flexibility to pursue the broader life sciences objectives. Second, civilian control of biomedical programs would reaffirm America's "international role" as a "basically peaceful and benevolent power" that seeks to use manned spaceflight to symbolize the scientific aspirations of all men" rather than 'military strength."

However, the authors recognized the legitimate interests of the military services in space and their unique capabilities for supporting NASA's endeavors. NASA and the military services should form a "civilian-military liaison committee" for the biosciences, responsible for ensuring maximum integration" and utilization of existing biomedical personnel and facilities and to provide mechanisms for sharing scientific and technical information.¹⁰

The final requirement for the achievement of biomedical objectives in space, according to the Kety committee, was a NASA organization with authority to plan and oversee the total life sciences program. The committee recommended an office of life sciences with "responsibility and authority for planning, organizing, and operating" a program that would encompass "intramural and extramural research, development and training"." The director of this office should be "directly responsible to the Administrator of NASA in the same manner and at the same directional level as the other program directors." The report recommended that this office be divided into four sections, three related to the areas of research described above and the fourth to manage NASA's extramural life sciences program. The director should establish four advisory committees "made up of consultants outside of NASA" and corresponding to the four subdivisions of the office.¹¹

The heart of this organization, however, should be a life sciences research center and several auxiliary facilities located at universities. The central facility, the authors suggested, should be colocated with Goddard Space Flight Center and serve as "the nucleus" for a ''national undertaking', in space-related life sciences research, development, and training. The proposed center would be staffed by a small group of full-time "competent biological, medical and psychological scientists" who would conceive and direct "a broad and thoughtfully planned biomedical program of research extending from the most fundamental aspects to their most practical applications." It should be responsive to the director of the life sciences office and support and coordinate research at a network of auxiliary research institutes. The latter would be organized to conduct research along specific lines; for example, one center would be exclusively Concerned with brain and nervous system research.¹²

The report of the Kety committee can be viewed as both a serious effort to give Glennan the advice he requested and an attempt to negotiate an [38] active role for research-oriented life scientists within the space program. The committee gave Glennan good reasons for building up the life sciences, solid arguments in favor of civilian control of space life sciences, scientific justification for the manned space program, and detailed specifications for organizing and managing a life sciences program. However, all recommendations were predicated on the premises that the life sciences were of fundamental importance to the national space effort, that their value was founded on basic biological and medical research, and that the achievement of life sciences objectives depended on the use and development of academic life scientists and facilities and the active involvement of research-oriented life scientists in the space effort.

From Glennan's perspective, the report was satisfying because it gave him leverage in his dealings with representatives of both the scientific and military communities. To scientific critics, he could point to the Kety report as an "unbiased" justification of manned spaceflight. NASA's support for the report also demonstrated the agency's desire both to provide adequate life sciences support for manned flight and to give science status comparable to that already enjoyed by engineering and operations. At the same time, the Kety report gave Glennan fundamental arguments that could be used in efforts to convince the military services and Congress that NASA was justified in seeking internal capabilities in the life sciences. The most important aspect of the report, however, was that the recommendations were fully consistent with Glennan's own views of NASA. While it called for a vastly expanded program in the life sciences, it also emphasized that the in-house component should be small and should coordinate and manage, rather than conduct, research. Glennan could implement the major recommendations without a large-scale buildup in personnel and the increase in funds could be kept within manageable limits by transferring research and development allocations from military facilities to academic ones. Indeed, the authors of the report were not necessarily calling for a major increase in total life sciences funding, but simply in the amount being allocated to colleges and universities.¹³

Although Glennan was prepared to accept the report's recommendations concerning research objectives and headquarters organization, he doubted that NASA could obtain congressional support for a life sciences research facility in the near future. The Air Force and certain members of Congress would view it as a duplication of existing facilities, which Congress, on previous occasions, had directed NASA to avoid.¹⁴ In light of this anticipated opposition, and because he did not believe the need for a life sciences research center was imminent, Glennan decided not to act on this recommendation until the new headquarters office had been firmly established. In this way, the new office could proceed cautiously with the development of a detailed and thoroughly justified plan before [39] approaching Congress with a request to construct the facility. To avoid a premature confrontation, he did not announce the establishment of the Office of Life Science Programs until March 1, 1960, two weeks after the House of Representatives had completed its hearings on NASA's budget request for fiscal year 1961.¹⁵

Thus NASA s aspirations in the life sciences were not a source of contention during the House hearings and, in fact, were barely mentioned. NASA did not require congressional approval for an internal reorganization, but it did need authorization for the related operating funds. Glennan's staff accomplished this by including funds for biosciences as part of the overall request for research and development funds. The specific requests were innocuous: to transfer certain funds which had previously been approved for use in manned spaceflight to the "Directorate of Advanced Research" for support of university research in the area of the biosciences," and to provide new funds for FY 1961 to support research in bioscience" as part of the overall appropriation for support of university grants and contracts. The House approved the request with the understanding that the funds were to be used to encourage 'the nation's biomedical scientists" to investigate problems confronting man in traveling through space [in the areas of] biophysics, bioengineering, metabolism, behavior and space environment."¹⁶

NASA's intentions in the life sciences did become a matter of congressional concern after Glennan's March 1 announcement of the new Office of Life Science Programs, however, when the authorization bill passed to the Senate. Perhaps because Glennan included no information related to the new office in the materials he provided to the Senate committee before the hearings, there was little controversy,¹⁷ but some members expressed reservations. Sen. Margaret Chase Smith (R-Maine) asked Glennan to elaborate on NASA's use of existing biomedical facilities and future plans in the life sciences. Sen. Stephen M. Young is-Ohio), in questioning Gen. Bernard Schriever of the Air Force, implied that NASA was moving toward "an absolute duplication of the Air Force biomedical research activities" Nonetheless, the Senate approved the authorization, possibly because the funds involved were minuscule and would not be used for construction of new faciIities.¹⁸

As mild as the hearings had been, it soon became apparent that key members of the House and Senate wanted to look more closely at the implications of NASA's recently announced plans. Concerned over the proliferation of biomedical activities throughout the government, and responding to public anxiety over Soviet advances in space and missiles-and aware that 1960 was an election year-both houses held hearings on biomedical activities of federal agencies in the summer.¹⁹

[40] Certain key members of the House and Senate were convinced that NASA's seemingly modest plans would mushroom like the programs of other government agencies.²⁰ This, as Sen. Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.) observed, could lead other agencies, such as the Federal Aviation Administration, to press for their own biomedical programs, and soon government support for biomedical research and development would be spread across so many offices that coordination would be impossible and duplications would be extensive. ²¹ Many members of Congress believed, with Rep. Emilio P. Daddario (R-Conn.), that NASA had no requirements in the life sciences that could not be met through the extensive and often underused biomedical laboratories of the Air Force and the Navy. Daddario argued that a NASA life sciences program not only would cause duplication and waste, but would generate intense competition for the limited supply of biologists, bioengineers, biomedical scientists, and clinicians.²² Some questioned NASA's need for a biology-oriented program, observing that the National Institutes of Health already had the capability for sponsoring and directing research in the area. ²³

In short, the Office of Life Science Programs began formal operations faced with a dilemma. To satisfy its critics in the scientific community, NASA would have to press for a life sciences program whose scope and nature would be unacceptable to many in Congress and would be strongly opposed by the Air Force. Clark Randt, the first director of the office, would spend most of his time in an unsuccessful attempt to resolve this dilemma.

OFFICE OF LIFE SCIENCE PROGRAMS

Organized along lines proposed by the Biosciences Advisory Committee, the Office of Life Science Programs was equal in status, on paper at least, to NASA's other program offices. The director held a line position equivalent to that of other program directors and, like them, reported directly to the NASA associate administrator.^*

According to the official NASA statements, the life sciences office was to become "the focal point for a national and international effort" in the space life sciences.²⁴ Responsible for implementing the recommendations of the Biosciences Advisory Committee, the office's long-range functions were divided between basic research and research in support of manned flight. It was to develop a program of basic research with objectives that included knowledge of the biological effects of the physical factors of [41] space, new information bearing on biological evolution, and the search for evidence of extraterrestrial life. It was also to establish a program of biological and medical research in support of long-duration manned spacefIights.

At first, Glennan and his staff gave Randt strong support and seemed to fully endorse the recommendations of the Biosciences Advisory Committee.²⁵ They generally supported Randt's efforts to make the Office of Life Science Programs a viable organization. In mid-March, Randt requested that all funds for bioscience grants and contracts ($2 million for FY 1961) be placed under his direct control. Heretofore, such funds had been administered through the Office of Advanced Research Programs. Following the recommendation of Associate Administrator Richard Homer, Glennan approved the request-a significant concession. ²⁶

Glennan also indicated that he approved of Randt's efforts to make NASA's life sciences programs independent of the military services. He agreed with Randt that coordination of life sciences matters with the military services should be at the Defense Department level, rather than with the individual services. Randt believed that this would improve overall coordination and help reduce Air Force influence within the space program. He also approved Randt's recommendation that NASA support the formation of a life sciences committee within the Space Science Board, a move that, in part, was also intended to reduce Air Force influence. In late 1959, the Air Force had backed the creation of an Armed Forces-National Research Council Bioastronautics Committee to facilitate communication between military agencies and life scientists in academia. Randt was pressed by key members of this committee to have the committee advise NASA as well. He rejected the idea and successfully avoided a situation that would have worked against NASA's independence in the life sciences.²⁷

Glennan also encouraged Randt to locate an appropriate site for the life sciences research facility recommended by the Kety committee and to prepare a strong case for presentation to Congress. By late June 1960, Randt had identified the Ames Research Center and the newly constructed Goddard Space Flight Center as candidates for the facility. Although Glennan did not make a firm commitment, he indicated that he would do so in the near future and would select Ames as the site.²⁸

During his first six months in office, then, Randt had reason to believe that the Office of Life Science Programs would evolve into the organization envisioned in the Kety report. Accordingly, he focused on the creation of an effective organization and the rationalization of a long-range life sciences research and development program.

Following the recommendations of the Kety committee, Randt divided the Office into three parts: space biology, flight medicine and biology, and [42] space medical and behavioral sciences. The division of space biology would be responsible for planning and implementing the biological research program, including developing the technology required for inflight biological investigations. The flight medicine and biology division was to have, in the post-Mercury era, responsibility for applied research in support of manned spaceflight. It would sponsor and coordinate human factors research in support of the engineering and operational requirements of advanced programs and its activities would be directly linked to those of the agents responsible for manned spaceflight projects. The division of space medical and behavioral sciences would promote the basic research in human physiology and behavior which would identify man's qualifications and requirements for long-duration spaceflight and support efforts to plan for advanced manned programs.

Randt wanted the three divisions to function as an integrated unit. Ideally, information gained from biological research on subhuman organisms would guide those in space medicine in planning basic research in human biology and behavior. The knowledge gained from space medical research, in turn, would contribute to the planning of applied (human factors) research, which, in the end, would provide the basis for design and development of spacecraft and planning of mission operations. Randt was trying to give NASA's life sciences organization a pattern which was generally typical of biomedical research organizations such as the National Institutes of Health and university medical centers, and which reflected a view common among life scientists that biology, medical science, and clinical medicine were parts of an integrated and coordinated whole. ²⁹

Randt also oversaw the formulation of a "Ten Year Plan" for the Office of Life Science Programs intended to show how life sciences research and development would support the overall national space program, identify facilities required to support the program, and provide estimates of the costs involved. The bulk of the plan focused on the support the office would provide to the manned space program. While the plan for the space biology division called for activity in exobiology, it emphasized study of the effects of space on lower biological organisms, with specific attention paid to weightlessness, ionizing radiation, thermal extremes, electromagnetic fields, and alterations in biological rhythms (e.g., the day-night cycle). ³⁰ Research in space medical and behavioral sciences would be directed toward assessing the effects on human physiological systems of long-term exposure to the space environment. Human metabolism would be studied to determine requirements for food and water, as would the disposal of solid and liquid wastes. Psychology was to be the third area o research, for such factors as isolation and confinement were likely to have significant effects on human behavior and performance during long [43] duration spaceflight. The final area of research, sociology, would explore interactional behavior in confined spaces.³¹

The research plan for flight medicine was premised upon a post-Mercury manned program leading to a circumlunar flight or lunar landing. The first objective would be to obtain enough information about human requirements in flights of "7 to 60 days" for engineers to design life systems so that "weight [would] be minimized and reliability maximized." specific areas of concern would be control of atmosphere, temperature, and humidity; radiation; metabolic requirements; crew comfort and safety; and human requirements related to weightlessness and acceleration. Second, flight medicine would establish requirements for optimum integration of man and machine, such as the characteristics and placement of control and display systems and the nature and mechanics of human information processing. The goal was to ensure that the spacecraft operator would have no difficulty in determining what was happening at any given moment, the position of his vehicle in space and time, and what to do in an emergency. Finally, the flight medical area would sponsor research in the development of scientific instruments for flight crews.³²

Randt emphasized in the Ten Year Plan that while he intended to "utilize to the maximum extent possible" existing military, industrial, and academic research facilities, the objectives set forth in the plan could not be realized unless NASA established a strong internal capability in life sciences. The heart of this capability would be a research facility to "provide the necessary internal competence for over-all management and program competence," ensure coordination among the "diversified" organizations conducting life sciences research for NASA, and stimulate research and training in the space sciences.³³ That capability depended as well on an adequate research and development budget, which he estimated would have to rise from the 1960 level of $2 million to $50 million in FY 1963 and $100 million by the end of the 10-year period. Likewise, the evolution of the program necessitated a buildup of in-house life sciences personnel. He estimated that by FY 1963 the Office of Life Science Programs and the life sciences research facility would require a staff of 75, about half of whom would be professionals.³⁴

By late September 1960, Randt had completed his preliminary organizational work. He had filled the key positions and established channels of coordination with the military services and the Space Science Board. Most important, perhaps, he had presented a long-range program for the office, including a strong justification for a life sciences research facility. He was ready to move on with the development of the program. However, he was beginning to doubt Glennan's commitment to the program.

The first indication was a change in Glennan's support for Randt's staffing plan In March, when Randt had projected a buildup of 32 to 38 staff [44] persons by the end of FY 1961, and 60 by the end of FY 1962, Glennan had made no objections. Subsequently, Randt presented these numbers to congressional committees. In late July, however. Glennan advised Randt that the projection might have to be scaled down, and in September, Glennan said the total life sciences staff could not exceed 20 at the end of FY 1961 and 38 at the end of FY 1962. This effectively halved the capabilities for which Randt had planned, and he viewed this decision as stopping the progress of this program soon after it was initiated."³⁵ At the very least, the life sciences Ten Year Plan might no longer be realistic.

Glennan's reasons for making this decision are not known.^** It may have been a response to criticisms from members of Congress concerned with possible duplication of facilities and competition for personnel. Congressman Daddario, in particular, strongly opposed the staff projections; he doubted the need for so many people, and he was certain that, given the limited supply of scientists and engineers in space-related biology, medicine, and bioengineering, NASA could build up its life sciences staff only by attracting specialists from the military services.³⁶ There is no evidence that Glennan acted in response to such complaints, but he himself was not in favor of large-scale internal buildups.³⁷

Randt continued to press Glennan for approval of his original staff plan and in October, at a staff meeting, he issued an ultimatum: that Glennan approve his requests or fire him. Glennan was inclined to release Randt, but members of the staff encouraged Glennan to work out a compromise. In the end, Glennan agreed to increase the staff complement to 30 in FY 1961 and 50 in FY 1962, which Randt found acceptable. Glennan relented because he realized that Randt "had a hard row to hoe because he had to deal with a bunch of engineers who had no real empathy for the life sciences."³⁸

Randt was also beginning to wonder whether he would ever receive a firm commitment for the research facility that he considered the key to the whole program. Glennan had expressed support for the concept as early as March and had reaffirmed this support on various occasions.³⁹ His reluctance to make a firm commitment stemmed from factors unrelated to the life sciences.

At the time the Office of Life Science Programs was formed, it seemed to Glennan, his staff, and Randt that Ames Research Center would be the ideal site for the life sciences facility. Ames had personnel experienced in the area of biotechnology and hardware who would be useful in human factors research. Further, Ames was underused and its management made [45] a strong bid for the facility. Most important, at least to Randt, Ames was located near many medical schools, medical research centers, universities, and major aerospace industries. By June, Randt, Associate Administrator Horner, and Glennan were all agreed that Ames was the logical choice.⁴⁰

However, more was at issue than the location of the life sciences facility. From the outset, everyone involved had assumed that the facility would be near the principal manned spaceflight activity, to encourage regular interaction between those engaged in life sciences research and development and those involved in biomedical operations. Initially, this did not seem to be a problem, as Glennan suggested basing the Space Task Group in California.⁴¹ He made no formal commitment, however, and directed Randt to continue investigating Ames as a possible site.

In the interim, Glennan learned from members of his staff that relocation of the Space Task Group and construction of the life sciences facility in California could encounter "political resistance.' Virginia politicians were upset by rumors that the Space Task Group would leave Langley, and politicians from several states, including Massachusetts, Florida, Texas, and Maryland, had expressed an interest in having the manned spaceflight facility built in their respective states. Studies by Glennan's staff suggested that Ames posed a political problem" due to a "rather large buildup of federal activities there in recent years." However, the staff assessment was that the life sciences facility could be moved to California without political repercussions, provided the manned activity went elsewhere.⁴²

There being no obvious solution to the problem, Glennan tabled the matter for his successor to resolve.⁴³ He was preparing to resign, having agreed to serve as NASA administrator only until the end of the Eisenhower administration, and a new President would be elected in two weeks. It seems likely that he was also anxious to avoid any suggestion that he was allowing politics to influence his decisions. Glennan was a Republican and an Eisenhower appointee. The Republican candidate, Richard Nixon, was Vice-President and a Californian. A decision by Glennan to locate the two facilities in California might well have raised suspicions.

Randt, not surprisingly, was greatly upset. Not only did the future development of the life sciences program depend on this facility, his ability to devise a strong budget presentation was weakened. To be sure of Congressional authorization for construction funds, he had to have a Strong justification. He felt that the strength of that justification depended on his knowing where the facility would be located and how it would be related to the manned spaceflight center. He continued to press for a [46] commitment from Glennan, but without success When Glennan resigned in December 1960, the issue remained in limbo.⁴⁴

A final source of frustration during this period was the relationship of the Office of Life Science Programs to the biomedical components of the Space Task Group. When Randt accepted the directorship of the office, he understood that biomedical preparations for Project Mercury were well under way, but he assumed that his office would have some involvement in the biomedical activities. The Biosciences Advisory Committee, which NASA had sponsored and whose recommendations Glennan appeared to endorse, had recommended that "the biomedical aspects of Project Mercury be placed squarely under the jurisdiction of the Office of Life Science Programs and that it be coordinated with other aspects of the life sciences program."⁴⁵

Randt, however, quickly discovered that Glennan, Homer, Deputy Administrator Hugh Dryden, and Director of Space Flight Programs Abe Silverstein were firmly opposed to this recommendation. They believed that its implementation would disrupt established channels of communication and lines of authority, create internal dissension, and interfere with the progress of Project Mercury. Accordingly, Dryden, acting for Glennan, prevailed on Randt to cosign with Silverstein an agreement that "the interests of NASA are best served by retaining the full authority for the biomedical aspects of Mercury" in the Office of Space Flight Programs. In agreeing to this, Randt understood that his office would be consulted by the Space Task Group staff and that the arrangement would not apply to post-Mercury manned activities.⁴⁶ Nonetheless, his office had been shut out of NASA's only active life sciences project, one which employed 80 percent of its life sciences personnel and received nearly 70 percent of its life sciences research and development funds in FY 1961.⁴⁷

In September 1960 Randt decided to press for more involvement in the biomedical aspects of the Space Task Group. Having discovered that Glennan's commitment to the life sciences program might be wavering, Randt began to doubt that his office would be allowed to participate fully in the biomedical aspects of post-Mercury manned programs. In July Congress had authorized NASA studies of a manned lunar project, and responsibility was allocated to the Office of Space Flight Programs and the Space Task Group. Since the biomedical aspects of this study would be conducted by the biomedical component of the Space Task Group, Randt saw that his office could be shut out of the biomedical aspect of the new program for the same reasons that it had been shut out of Mercury.⁴⁸

A number of other events also alerted Randt to the deteriorating prospects for a life sciences program. First, Dr. Stanley White, the head of the Space Task Group's Life Systems Branch and nominal head of all Mercury biomedical activities, had told Randt that biomedical personnel were not [47] being brought into the decision making.⁴⁹ Second, Randt was troubled by recent complaints from some prominent scientists that NASA was incapable of providing adequate biomedical support for Project Mercury. Fearing that NASA was 'recklessly endangering" the lives of the astronauts" they succeeded in convincing the President's Science Advisory Committee to sponsor full-scale investigations of Project Mercury and the biomedical aspects of the space program.⁵⁰

Randt was also disturbed by activities in the Air Force. Recently, the Air Force Systems Command had sponsored a study of the space program under the direction of Trevor Gardner. The resulting report had strongly favored a twofold space program, with NASA managing the scientific aspects and the Air Force managing the manned program. The Air Force had also instituted a major reorganization, one aspect of which was the centralization of Air Force bioastronautics (life sciences) programs within the Aerospace Medical Division of the Air Force Systems Command.⁵¹ Clearly, the Air Force was planning a major effort to gain congressional approval to direct post-Mercury manned programs and was prepared to use its capabilities in the life sciences as part of its justification.

For these various reasons, Randt decided to press his case. In December 1960, he proposed four changes to the new associate administrator, Robert Seamans: granting the Office of Life Science Programs responsibility for "recruiting and productively employing human factors and medical personnel" prior to their assignment to the Space Task Group; consolidation of the four separate biomedical activities at Space Task Group within the Life Systems Branch; elevation of the Life Systems Branch to division status; and creation of a third associate directorship at the Space Task Group and placement of a life scientist in this position.⁵²

Not surprisingly, Randt's proposals were unacceptable to Silverstein and Space Task Group Director Robert Gilruth. Commenting for himself and Gilruth, Silverstein reminded Seamans of the agreement Randt had signed the previous March, implying that Randt had already given up any claim to authority within the Space Task Group. Silverstein further advised Seamans that the Space Task Group had already made changes that satisfied Randt's second and third recommendations. The final recommendation was impractical. The associate directors, Silverstein noted, must be able to fill in for the director on occasion, and he claimed that life scientists lacked the "training and skills" to do so. The implication was that associate directors must be engineers.⁵³

Seamans asked the NASA Office of Programs and Evaluation to investigate the matter. The resulting staff study seemed to endorse Silverstein's position, and it recommended retention of the status quo. However' the study was actually a victory for Randt, since it specified that he was to be consulted about all current biomedical planning for the [48] Apollo program and that, once the Apollo organization became separate from the Mercury organization, a biomedical associate director for Apollo should be appointed.⁵⁴

This small victory, however, was insufficient to overcome Randt's sense of frustration. In January 1961, he was no closer to having a life sciences facility or the requisite budget than he had been in October 1960. The life sciences program was in limbo. Glennan had resigned, but a new administrator had not been appointed. The new President had yet to give any indication of his plans for the space program. A group of scientists, commissioned by President-elect Kennedy and chaired by Dr. Jerome Wiesner, had issued a report that was highly critical of NASA. Believed by many to reflect Kennedy's views, the report recommended that NASA be enjoined from any further expansion of its in-house capabilities and be denied authorization to prepare for further manned programs until it had completed Project Mercury. Though generally opposed to a large manned program, the Wiesner report stated that such a program, if authorized, should be under the direction of the military services. ⁵⁵ Obviously, none of this boded well for the Office of Life Science Programs.

Randt's apprehensions increased as January passed into February. Kennedy had appointed an administrator, James Webb, but Randt had been unable to gain access to Webb's office. For all practical purposes, NASA management remained in the hands of Deputy Administrator Dryden, who in Randt's view, was unsympathetic to the life sciences and personally hostile to Randt. Moreover, Randt was beginning to suspect that someone on his staff was leaking information about life sciences budget plans to the Air Force, allowing Air Force personnel to come to NASA authorization hearings fully prepared to challenge NASA's requests.⁵⁶

In spite of these frustrations, Randt made one final effort to salvage the life sciences program. In late February, he submitted to Seamans a detailed "Proposal to Consolidate the Total Life Sciences Program," which was essentially a restatement of the Kety recommendations and a reiteration of Randt's views about the program. He hoped his paper would provide NASA with leverage against the Air Force in the upcoming congressional hearings and would contribute to NASA's efforts to convince the new President to support a post-Mercury manned program under NASA auspices. ⁵⁷ Seamans passed the report on to Dryden, but what happened to it thereafter is not known. Failing to receive an acknowledgment, unable to gain an audience with the new administrator, and believing that copies of his proposal were given to Air Force representatives, Randt handed in his resignation and made arrangements to return to academia.⁵⁸

Future events would justify Randt's misgivings. In early March 1961, Congressman Daddario released a lengthy statement castigating NASA for its life sciences plans. He charged that NASA needed neither a life [49] sciences program nor a life sciences facility, since the military services could meet NASA's requirements Thus, he contended, NASA's impending budget requests related to the life sciences represented a waste of taxpayers' dollars. His comments were read into the NASA FY 1962 authorization hearings and he raised the same issues when questioning NASA witnesses. ⁵⁹

Nevertheless, Congress authorized funds for the Office of Life Science Programs and for the construction of a life sciences research facility at Ames. It did so primarily because the chairman of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Overton Brooks, was adamantly opposed to military control of the space program. Brooks had used his influence with Vice-President Lyndon Johnson, a fellow Texan, to gain a commitment from Kennedy that NASA would receive the post-Mercury manned program and a larger budget than it received in FY 1961.⁶⁰. The congressional authorizations, however, did not salvage NASA's faltering life sciences program.

The new director of the Office of Life Science Programs, Air Force Gen. Charles Roadman, was a hardworking bureaucrat, experienced aerospace physician, and dedicated supporter of the space program. He did not, however, share Randt's vision for life sciences. He was as dedicated to the military model of biomedicine as Randt had been to the academic model. A former flight surgeon and commander, he was mission-oriented rather than research-oriented. He recognized the importance and value of basic research in biology and medicine, but did not believe that basic research on animals had any relevance to manned spaceflight. Nor did he believe that NASA was the legitimate setting for research in medical science. Consequently, he favored a life sciences program that separated space biology from space medicine, and he recommended that the former be placed with the space sciences, the latter with manned flight programs. ⁶¹

In April 1961 the committee selected by the President's Science Advisory Committee to investigate Project Mercury issued its final report. Its chairman, Donald Hornig, reported that the consensus among members was that NASA's biomedical preparations and capabilities for Project Mercury were fully adequate. Hornig was satisfied that NASA had considered all relevant human factors in designing the spacecraft and planning the mission operations and had taken every precaution to ensure the health and safety of the astronauts.^*** In the two months after Hornig's report, NASA conducted two manned suborbital flights; neither gave any reason [50] to doubt the adequacy of NASA's biomedical preparations for Project Mercury.⁶²

Thus NASA's Office of Life Science Programs was moribund during the last six months of its life. It had no strong supporters among NASA's top management, and it was directed by a man whose priorities in relation to the life sciences were completely different from those which the office was intended to promote Finally, the pressure from the scientific community, which had provided much of the impetus for establishment of the office, had diminished, partly because NASA had demonstrated its ability to use the life sciences in support of manned spaceflight. Few mourned when, in August 1961, the Office of Life Science Programs passed out of existence.

Many reasons have been given for the short life of the office: inadequate funding, insufficient authority, inconsistent support from management, resistance from NASA's engineers and physical scientists, congressional and military opposition 6. While these were contributing factors, the fundamental cause lay in the relationship of the office to the overall NASA organization.

The rationale that underlay the formation of the office was inconsistent with NASA's immediate requirements. In 1960-1961, NASA's primary responsibility was to place a man in Earth orbit, and its requirements in the life sciences were basically operational. Although NASA gave considerable support to physical science and astronomy investigations in space, it showed little interest in the biosciences and had formulated no major inflight biological studies. Basic research in medical science and human factors, though recognized as important for the future, was not perceived as a pressing concern. Given the uncertainties about the post-Mercury manned program and the prospect that Mercury would be the primary manned effort over the next two or three years, there was no strong justification for extensive research in support of advanced manned programs. The human factors research and development required for Mercury were already under way in the Office of Space Flight Programs. In short, the Office of Life Science Programs met requirements that either did not yet exist (in relation to the approved Mercury program) or were so limited in scope that they did not justify a major commitment at the program level.

The organization and research programs were not attuned to the current orientation of the space agency. The office and its programs were basically patterned after a biomedical research center model, one more suitable to an umbrella research organization such as the National Institutes of Health or a university medical center. This model assumed that research and development priorities would be established by life scientists and that researchers would not be constrained by such matters as the [51] applied value of their work or the necessity of meeting deadlines. NASA, of course' was patterned on the engineering research and development model of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, in which engineers and physical scientists decided research and development priorities Moreover, NASA's major mission depended ultimately on concepts developed by engineers and physical scientists; and it was under pressure to meet specific deadlines. In effect, the Office of Life Science Programs was a square peg trying to fit into a round hole.

The office was oriented more toward the interests of external scientists rather than to the needs of NASA. Biomedical scientists outside NASA preferred to expose humans to experimental or risk situations only after extensive research on lower organisms and mammals. Such an approach assumed that time and expense were not major factors; but for NASA time and expense were critical. In 1960-1961 NASA was engaged in a space race and was expected to compete, successfully, with a minimal investment of time and money. It could not afford to hold back the manned program until it obtained unequivocal evidence that man could endure the ordeal of spaceflight, especially when there was no direct evidence to preclude a manned mission of the Mercury class. Thus, NASA favored the approach long used by the Air Force, one in which carefully selected men were exposed to increasingly greater levels of risk for increasing durations, with data derived from each step used in planning the next step. For NASA the flight medicine approach to the qualification of man for spaceflight seemed to be the best compromise between the need to safeguard human life and the need to meet mission objectives.

^** GIennan does not recall this specific decision and has no references to it in his diary. Available documents shed no light.

^*** Though satisfied with NASA s biomedical preparations for Mercury Hornig considered them inadequate for longer duration manned missions and was sharply critical of NASA s use of the "aeromedical approach" to the qualifications of man for spaceflight

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