The goal of placing a man on the Moon in nine years forced NASA to accelerate the pace and expand the scope of the space program. For the post-Mercury era, NASA would require an organization and a style of management that would be equally responsive to the research, development, and operations requirements of both approved (current) and advanced (long-range) manned programs; effect a balance between scientific investigations and manned spaceflight; and encourage integration of basic research, applied research and development, and manned operations.
On November 1, 1961, NASA Administrator James Webb announced a major reorganization that was intended to strengthen the agency's capabilities for satisfying these requirements. The new organization would remain fundamentally unchanged for the next 10 years and probably was a significant factor in attaining the lunar landing goal. The restructuring of the headquarters organization and implementation of new management procedures created unanticipated problems, however. Strong criticisms came from parts of the scientific community, tensions between NASA and the Air Force were aggravated, and internal factionalism increased. These problems were amplified in the life sciences programs.
RESURRECTlNG THE LIFE SCIENCES PROGRAM
Webb decided to restructure the headquarters organization after concluding that existing arrangements were incompatible with NASA's new responsibilities. A compatible arrangement, he believed, would create a balance between centralized direction of the overall space effort and functional autonomy for specific space programs. Such a balance could  be achieved by placing increased emphasis and clearer focus" on NASA s major programs (space science, advanced research and development, manned spaceflight), by providing program directors with ' the authority and freedom necessary to accomplish their program objectives," by encouraging close coordination between program directors and center directors in decision making, and by making NASA's top management (Webb, Deputy Administrator Hugh Dryden, and Associate Administrator Robert Seamans) responsible for directing the overall space effort and coordinating and integrating the major programs
Webb abolished the existing program offices, which he considered too task oriented (e.g, focused on launch vehicle development, administration of grants and contracts), and replaced them with offices that were oriented toward major program functions. The program office directors were to have complete autonomy to plan, budget, and manage the program functions of their respective offices. The head of the Office of Space Science was given authority to direct the research, development, and operations required to support a program of basic scientific investigations in space. The Office of Advanced Research and Technology received jurisdiction over research and technology development in support of advanced aeronautical and manned spaceflight systems. Authority to plan and direct approved manned space programs (including development, testing, and evaluation of life support systems; selection and training of flight crews; and management of manned spaceflight operations) was vested in the Office of Manned Space Flight.*
Webb hoped, through this reorganization, to improve channels of communication between NASA Headquarters and the field centers, to clarify lines of authority connecting program and project elements, and to promote close coordination between program directors and center directors. Previously, NASA had followed management practices that had been established within the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. The centers, which managed research and development projects, had been virtually autonomous in technical decision making, but had not taken part in program decision making. Program directors had handled program budgeting and planning without directly involving the center directors and had rarely become involved in project management. This arrangement was satisfactory for the NACA, which was project oriented, primarily concerned with applied research and engineering, and generally not responsible for operational system design, development, and operations. It was  also satisfactory for NASA during its early years, when the agency's project responsibilities were few and relatively narrow in scope. To Webb, the arrangement was not suited to an agency that had responsibility for major programs and a diversity of supporting research, technology, and development projects that included several large manned spaceflight projects. Those responsibilities, he believed, necessitated integration of program and project management.
To encourage close coordination between program offices and centers, Webb made the center directors line officials and authorized them to participate in program decision making. He assigned each center functional responsibility over research, technology, and development activities that corresponded to the functional requirements of the major programs. Each center director reported directly to one of the three program directors. In short, the center directors were to be directly involved in preparing program budgets and plans, while program directors were made accountable for monitoring the projects supporting their programs.
Dryden and Seamans were to provide overall direction and integration of space programs. Dryden became responsible for overseeing the management and coordination of technical activities. Seamans, as general manager, oversaw the day-to-day activities of the agency, including the coordination of program budgets and plans and the resolution of interprogram disputes.1
In authorizing the reorganization, Webb appeared to give no special thought to the life sciences. For all practical purposes, life sciences had lost program status in NASA with the departure of Clark Randt in March 1961. The life systems and medical operations staffs at the Space Task Group had been outside the authority of the Office of Life Science Programs. A few life scientists at Ames were trying to organize a project office, but were hindered by uncertainties concerning the approved, inadequate funding and the absence of a life sciences laboratory and of clear guidelines. 2
Randt's successor, Air Force Gen. Charles Roadman, was a mission-oriented, practical-minded physician who did not share Randt's belief that space biology, human research, and space medicine belonged in a single Program office. Instead, he saw three unrelated fields with different, often incompatible objectives. Believing that space medicine was the only life sciences activity of immediate importance to the space program, he made no real effort to strengthen the rest of the program. He urged the replacement of the Office of Life Science Programs by a Directorate of Space Medicine under the spaceflight programs office.3
Following the reorganization, the new program directors began to press for clarification of this ambiguous situation. Dr. Brainerd Holmes, head of manned spaceflight, responding to recommendations from Roadman,  asked Seamans for authority to create a space medicine directorate Holmes suggested that this directorate could absorb most of the staff, programs, and contracts of the defunct Office of Life Science Programs. He added that the space medicine director could easily function as the spokesman for NASA's life sciences programs. 4
Concurrently, Dr Homer Newell, head of the Office of Space Science, believing that space biology was being badly neglected, sought Seamans's approval for the establishment of a biosciences division, which would absorb the space biology staff and programs of the Office of Life Science Programs. Like Holmes, Newell believed that his own life sciences subordinate would be the logical point of contact for life scientists outside NASA.5 The center directors at the Space Task Group (soon to be redesignated the Manned Spacecraft Center) and Ames were also interested in divining the future course of NASA's life sciences programs Space Task Group Director Robert Gilruth had plans to elevate the life systems branch to division status and to appoint a space medicine coordinator to his own staff. He wanted to know how these offices would be connected with the program offices. Gilruth also wanted assurance that his group would retain authority over the biomedical research and development required for approved manned programs and would not have to go outside the manned spaceflight chain of command for critical biomedical support.6
Gilruth's counterpart at Ames, Smith DeFrance, wanted firm commitments from headquarters that would energize the moribund life sciences component at Ames. DeFrance feared that a buildup of biomedical research and development capabilities at the Manned Spacecraft Center would deprive Ames of an active role in the agency's life sciences effort.7
Seamans had to deal with these contradictory recommendations. Aware that key administrators wanted the life sciences problem resolved, that a disorganized and uncoordinated life sciences effort could retard the manned space program, and that the organization and management of the life sciences had to be compatible with the overall NASA organization, Seamans formed a group to study NASA's needs in the life sciences and to make recommendations about the organization and management of 'an integrated Aerospace Biology and Life Support (Aerospace Medicine) program " Seamans appointed Bernard Maggin, from the Office of Programs, to chair this Life Sciences Working Group.8
Maggin's committee included representatives from each of the headquarters program offices and from the interested centers (Goddard, Manned Spacecraft Center, Ames). This group completed its study in March 1962 and issued a report that contained recommendations for reorganizing the life sciences programs. The report identified three life  sciences program requirements: biological investigations in space, including research on the biological effects of the space environment and search for extraterrestrial life; human research, the "utilization and life support" of man in advanced aerospace systems and operations; and biomedical research, life support systems development, and medical operations in support of approved manned spaceflight programs. These requirements, the committee believed, coincided with the responsibilities, respectively, of the Office of Space Science, the Office of Advanced Research and Technology, and the Office of Manned Space Flight.
The Maggin committee noted that the overall effectiveness of these life sciences programs would require high-level coordination and a nominal degree of integration of the separate components. Otherwise, overlapping responsibilities' internal jurisdictional disputes, and duplication of efforts in the life sciences programs would ultimately reduce the effectiveness and increase the costs of the total space program. To make coordination possible, Maggin's committee recommended that the life sciences have a "programming capability" at headquarters, that is, a capability for planning and coordinating the overall life sciences effort. With this capability, the three life sciences directors could devise mutually acceptable procedures for allocating responsibilities and resources and resolving jurisdictional disagreements.
In the committee's view, the best way to do this would be to designate one of the three life sciences divisions as the office responsible for coordination of the overall life sciences program. That division would assume the former responsibilities of the Office of Life Science Programs: review and approval of research and development proposals, budgets, and plans; integration of life sciences programs; and liaison with life sciences components of the military services, industry, and universities. The Working Group report identified the Office of Advanced Research and Technology as the logical focus for life sciences program coordination. With responsibility for applied research and development related to advanced manned systems, the office was a middle link between scientific and manned operational programs.
The report also pointed to a need for "a reasonable technical capability in the field'' and recommended that it be centered at Ames. NASA should triple its request for funding for facilities and make a commitment to expand and strengthen the existing life sciences component at Ames. This component, the report suggested, should have responsibility for managing all in-house life sciences research and technology development projects and for monitoring all related grants and contracts.9
Seamans approved the general recommendations of the Life Sciences Working Group. Between March and June 1962, he authorized Ames Director DeFrance to hire a life sciences director for Ames and directed  the Office of Advanced Research and Technology to establish a Directorate of Biotechnology and Human Research. However, he did not give this new off ice the breadth of authority recommended by the Maggin committee. Its responsibilities were to include management of research and development related to ' the fundamental understanding of man pertaining to and directly related to his utilization and life support in aerospace flight and operations," review of all life sciences research and development proposals, and representation of NASA's life sciences on committees coordinating the space-related research and technology development of NASA and the Defense Department. The director of the office would make recommendations to Seamans only on changes that should be made in the life sciences programs outside his jurisdiction."10
In limiting the authority of the new position, Seamans was responding to objections from the other program offices. Homer Newell and his director of biosciences, Dr. Orr Reynolds, doubted that an agency oriented toward applied research and engineering development would promote the growth and development of basic biological research. They also questioned the ability of the Office of Advanced Research and Technology to communicate effectively with biological scientists. Holmes and Roadman, from the Office of Manned Space Flight, feared that the pace of the approved manned space program would be retarded if its biomedical aspects were regulated by an outside group agency.11 Seamans agreed with these objections, and further limited the office's program jurisdiction to research and development required for advanced, rather than approved, manned programs.
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF LIFE SCIENCES PROGRAMS DURING THE PROJECT GEMINI ERA
NASA resurrected its life sciences programs in 1962, but did not revive its life sciences program office. The reorganization that followed the report of the Life Sciences Working Group created three separate, functionally independent life sciences components and placed them under the management jurisdiction of three program office administrators. The administrative arrangements in this new organizational scheme are depicted in the chart on the next page.
NASA management believed that this reorganization would augment life sciences support for each of the major programs while furthering the objectives of the NASA-wide reorganization of November 1961: functional autonomy for program offices and overall coordination of programming The life sciences divisions were to function independently, and each life sciences director was to have autonomy in his own program. Ideally, each director would design a program that was compatible with the mission and  objectives of his program office. The director of Biotechnology and Human Research would review the research and technology development aspects of all three programs to ensure that they were free of unnecessary duplication and did not overlap jurisdictional boundaries. Subsequently, the several program office administrators would review their respective life sciences programs and give final approval for their integration into the overall program office plan Finally, the life sciences programs would be reviewed by Seamans and Dryden as part of their review of the major programs.
Management realities did not follow the management ideal, however. Genuine coordination of life sciences programs was difficult to achieve, and jurisdictional disputes were frequent and difficult to resolve. The life sciences directors did not work in harmony toward a coordinated program. NASA's top management did not give the human research division the authority it needed to enforce program coordination. Seamans alone had that authority, and he had neither the time nor the inclination to function as the de facto director of life sciences programs. Equally important, the life sciences program directors designed their programs to satisfy their.....
 .....respective interests, rather than to achieve a coordinated program. When program office requirements conflicted with overall life sciences program interests, each life sciences director backed parochial concerns rather than support broader agency responsibilities. In short, the collective life sciences programs management system was plagued by the problem that had plagued the Office of Life Science Programs: responsibilities without authority.
While these organizational assignments and allocations of responsibility made sense in terms of overall space program requirements, they did not function effectively in the real operating environment and with the personalities within the life sciences. Management assumed that biology, medical science (human research), and clinical medicine could be easily compartmentalized; but these fields have broad areas of natural overlap. NASA management failed to issue guidelines that would clarify jurisdictional boundaries within these gray areas or provide any office or individual with the authority necessary to resolve questions and programs involving these boundaries. 12
The problems emerging from this situation were most apparent in the relations between the human research-biotechnology and biosciences divisions. On paper, the responsibilities of each were clear. The former had responsibility for human research (basic and applied studies of man and his physiological and psychological reactions to spaceflight), human factors engineering (application of human research to man-machine integration), and biotechnology (application of knowledge gained from human research to design and engineering of life support, control, and protective systems). The responsibilities of the latter encompassed environmental biology (basic research into the effects of the spaceflight environment on physiology and behavior of subhuman organisms) and exobiology (search for extraterrestrial life). In theory, basic research in environmental biology would complement the applied research sponsored by Biotechnology and Human Research. 13
In reality, the exercise of responsibilities was not so clear, and jurisdictional disputes developed. In part, these disputes can be attributed to the presence of two directors, Dr. Orr Reynolds and Dr. Eugene Konecci, who were strong-willed and highly motivated science administrators. Reynolds was a physiologist with experience in both basic research and administration. He came to NASA from a high-level position in the Department of Defense with the understanding that he would have a free hand to develop a bioscience program comparable to the DoD programs with which he was familiar. Reynolds assumed that his office would promote basic research that would both contribute to scientific knowledge and investigate problems of concern to `'manned spaceflight and exploration.
He also assumed that his program would encompass research on the entire  span of subhuman organisms, from plants and lower animals to primates. He did not view basic biology as an isolated field of inquiry, but as the first link in a chain of research that culminated in clinical medical applications.14
Konecci' educated in medicine and engineering and experienced in working with both physicians and engineers in industrial settings, was strongly attuned to the biomedicine-engineering interface. He was also strongly oriented toward the systems approach to problem solving, and he believed that systems analysis was the logical way to approach life sciences problems of manned spaceflight. He did not view the life sciences as a continuum, but rather as modes for analyzing systems. In his view, the spacecraft was a total system consisting of numerous machine subsystems (e.g, environmental control system). Likewise, man consisted of numerous subsystems. The ultimate objective of life sciences research and development was to optimize the integration of man and spacecraft in terms of their subsystems.15
Konecci believed that each spacecraft subsystem should be designed with three sets of parameters in mind: human, environmental, and machine. The purpose of basic research was to increase knowledge of human parameters; of applied research, knowledge of human physiological and performance limitations relative to environmental factors; and engineering research, knowledge of the factors necessary to design machines that were compatible with human factors For Konecci, the starting point for life sciences research and development was not a field of inquiry such as biology, or a style such as basic research, but rather a specific system (or subsystem) that required analysis. The end point was not clinical medicine or clinical applications, but the integration of man and machine in terms of the specific system or subsystem being analyzed. 16
Given these differences in viewpoint and philosophy and failure to follow the intended division of activity between the two offices, conflicts between the two were inevitable. The most frequent disagreement concerned primate research. Reynolds, believing that his office had authority over all basic research on subhumans, insisted that ground-based research and infiight experiment involving primates fell within his jurisdiction. Konecci countered that distinctions between basic and applied research were irrelevant so far as man-machine systems were concerned Moreover, primate research was a natural adjunct to human research and therefore within his jurisdiction.
These differences were really only surface manifestations of a more Substantial and deeper problem: the two were struggling to create viable programs in the face of sharply limited resources. On paper, NASA s Separate life sciences programs had a major place in the space program,  but in reality they were treated as low priority items. Reynolds, Konecci, and the director of space medicine (Charles Roadman, 1962; George Knauf, 1962-1964) were competing for limited funds, flight projects, and research facilities, and to a degree Reynolds and Konecci were also competing for control of a single flight project and a single research facility.
NASA's life sciences programs were grossly underfunded relative to other program areas. Some $8.5 billion was appropriated to the agency for research and development from 1962 through 1964. The amount for the three life sciences areas was $157 million, or 1.6 percent. Within the specific life sciences programs, this was broken down as shown in Table 1. 17
NASA management did attempt to obtain larger sums for the life sciences, but Congress refused the requests In 1964, for example, Congress reduced the total life sciences research and development request by 31 percent (from $67.1 million to 45.4 million). The space medicine request was reduced by 35 percent (from $16 7 million to 11.0 million), the human factors request by 28 percent (from $18.2 million to 13.2 million), and biosciences by 41 percent ($32 2 million to 21.2 million). No other area of research and development in any of the three major program areas had its budget request reduced by more than 18 percent, and on average the 20 other line items were reduced by 6 percent Congress justified the reductions for space medicine and human factors on the basis of the availability of comparable capabilities in other government agencies and offered no explanation for reducing the biosciences request.18
It is not surprising that the life sciences directors engaged in intense competition for funds, or that they sought to tailor their funding request to the high-priority item of the 1960s, Apollo. 19 Reynolds's office, for example, had a total research and development budget of approximately $24 million for 1964 and pegged 67 percent of it for research in environmental and behavioral biology on problems directly related to manned spaceflight: weightlessness, acceleration forces, alterations in day-night cycle. Similarly, Konecci's office committed 53 percent of its $18.2 million to basic and applied research in environmental and behavioral studies. 20
The work of the two offices overlapped, most obviously in the area of primate research. Reynolds believed that his office could, and should, examine environmental and behavioral problems systematically, moving from lower organisms to primates. Konecci assumed that primate studies were within the jurisdiction of his office, believing that primates were natural analogues for human research. Without top management resolution of the issue, the two offices pursued independent, often duplicative programs. 21
This conflict carried over into the only approved, purely life sciences inflight research project, Biosatellite. Conceived by the Office of Space
Life Sciences Program
Life Sciences as percentage of total office program
Office of Manned Space Flight (5,600)
Office of Space Science (1,793)
Office of Advanced Research and Technology (1,120)
Science in 1962 and strongly supported by academic life scientists.22 Biosatellite was to be a long-range project that would begin in 1966 with a package of biological experiments containing cellular organisms. Subsequently, three to six missions were to be flown, progressing toward primate flights of 15 to 30 days. The objective was to study the effects of weightlessness and acceleration forces on terrestrial organisms. 23 The human research and biotechnology directorate also wanted a flight program, but failing to obtain approval, insisted that it should have a major role in the management of Biosatellite. The rationale was that the development of advanced technological systems fell within its jurisdiction, that it had a need to test out biotechnological systems, and, most important, that it should have priority over inflight experiments involving primates. 24
To resolve this issue and get Biosatellite moving, Seamans, Newell, and Raymond Bisplinghoff, the associate administrator for advanced research and technology, agreed to set up a joint Office of Space Science-Office of Advanced Research and Technology Biosatellite Working Group, which was to consist of the program associate administrators, directors of biosciences and human research and biotechnology, and representatives from Ames. The group began meeting in January 1963 and agreed that the Office of Space Science would manage the development of "basic spacecraft and recovery systems" for flights not involving primates and the basic research that did not involve primates. The Division of Biotechnology and Human Research would develop "advanced life support Systems for later flights involving primates" and manage applied research related to biotechnology. 25
This effort at cooperation failed. Newell and Reynolds claimed that Konecci refused to attend group meetings or to communicate with Office of Space Science representatives. The joint committee was dissolved and the two offices went their separate ways.26 Because the Office of Space Science had responsibility for the early flights, it eventually gained primary control over the entire project. After Konecci's resignation in  1964, his successors lost interest in Biosatellite and began to plan a separate flight program with a frog's otolith as the object of study.27
Limitations of facilities also aggravated relations. Nominally, Goddard was within the jurisdiction of the Office of Space Science, Ames the jurisdiction of the Office of Advanced Research and Technology This meant that the center responsible for unmanned flight operations was divorced from the center responsible for life sciences research and development. In practical terms, the Office of Space Science could control flight scheduling for unmanned flights and give priority to flights within its jurisdiction. Conversely, the Office of Advanced Research and Technology had jurisdiction over the center where the life sciences laboratory was located and could coerce Ames into supporting the type of research that would support its objectives. This, in fact, is what Konecci attempted to do; in early 1963, he made a major effort to have the Ames life sciences group concentrate on biotechnology and human factors research rather than biosciences. 28 This had the unintended effect of causing divided loyalties on the Ames staff.29
The difficulties at Ames were another manifestation of the absence of clear, integrated responsibility and authority for life sciences. The laboratory at Ames had been created as a biotechnology laboratory; it was expected to provide research and development for the manned space program, and the nucleus of its staff was to be drawn from specialists in human engineering and bioengineering. 30 However, after the dissolution of the Office of Life Science Programs, the management of the laboratory was placed in the hands of life scientists who were interested in basic biological and medical research. As a result, an internal division between bioscientists and bioengineers developed. This division was aggravated by the fact that the former were new to Ames, while the latter had been with Ames since the NACA years. The former tended to look to the Office of Space Science for direction, the latter to the Office of Advanced Research and Technology.
By early 1963, the Ames life sciences program was in disarray. The laboratory director, Webb Haymaker, was a brilliant scientist who avoided administrative involvement. His second-in-command, Siegfried Gerathewohl, had no authority to deal with the growing factionalism. As a result, the various factions went their separate ways.31 When Konecci tried to direct the Ames staff to concentrate on biotechnology he was within his rights, since Ames was within the jurisdiction of his office; however, his efforts only aggravated the internal factionalism. This situation continued for more than a year. Resolution did not begin until early 1964, when Konecci resigned and Ames hired a director of life sciences, Harold Klein, who was both a scientist and an administrator.32
 The second problem at Ames also stemmed from unclear lines of authority. Without decisive direction from headquarters, individual scientists initiated research projects based on interest rather than program value.33 Some of the projects were poorly conceived. At the same time, Ames decided to go ahead with plans for an animal research program, including the creation of a primate colony. This raised the hackles of the Air Force and its allies in Congress, since Ames was violating an agreement accepted by Deputy Administrator Dryden a year earlier. During the FY 1963 authorization hearings, Dryden had assured Congress that NASA would forego development of its own primate colony and rely instead on the colony already operated by the Air Force. Although Ames was ordered to terminate its efforts in this direction, Air Force suspicions about NASA's intentions in the life sciences had been raised.34
The absence of effective coordination in the life sciences was also evident at the Manned Spacecraft Center Since its inception as the Space Task Group in 1958, the center had enjoyed virtual autonomy and was not accustomed to seeking support or guidance outside the manned spaceflight chain of command. Its biomedical components reported to its director and had limited contact with headquarters The space medicine directors at the Office of Manned Space Flight, Charles Roadman and George Knauf, were both satisfied with this arrangement. As a result, the biomedical staffs at the center proceeded as if they had the authority to pursue their own independent programs.
Expressing the view prevalent at the Manned Spacecraft Center, Richard S. Johnston, chief of the Crew Systems Division, asserted: "We are not flying man to determine biological effects . [but] to determine his capabilities in the space environment." With the exception of exobiology, Johnston claimed, the sole function of life sciences in NASA was to support manned spaceflight. Research along these lines belonged with those responsible for manned spaceflight, and ''basic research in medical science' physiology, biology, etc., is the responsibility not of NASA, but the NIH". 35
Accordingly, the Manned Spacecraft Center began to establish its own biomedical research program. In 1963, Dr. Lawrence Dietlein, a medical Scientist, was hired to head a new Space Medicine Branch within the Crew Systems Division. Dietlein's office assumed responsibility for the basic and applied research required by crew systems and for designing the inflight medical experiments for the Gemini and Apollo missions.36 Concurrently, the center allocated a major portion of its total aerospace medicine budget to research. Of $31.5 million allocated for aerospace medicine research, development, and operations for 1962-1964, 74 percent was allocated for basic and applied medical research and design and development of inflight medical experiments.37 The program was larger  than the related Office of Advanced Research and Technology program By mid-1965, the center's biomedical research capabilities had become so significant that its director integrated all biomedical components into a division-level Directorate of Medical Research and Operations. 38
The Manned Spacecraft Center steadily increased its medical research capabilities over the objections of the Ames life sciences staff and of the associate administrator for advanced research and technology It was able to do so because, until late 1964, management had issued no specific directives outlining authorities for biomedical research Moreover, it could easily justify this buildup on the basis of its need to investigate in a timely fashion the abnormalities discovered during the Mercury flights. Finally, it could pursue this independent course because no one in authority prevented it.
A final organizational weakness was the failure to identify an official life sciences spokesman for the agency. Nominally, the Office of Advanced Research and Technology filled this role. However, the key administrators were specialists in human engineering, flight medicine, and bioengineering and had industrial and military backgrounds. None was familiar with research problems of interest to biologists and medical scientists or sensitive to the concerns of academic life scientists. Consequently, life scientists from colleges and universities preferred to communicate with the Office of Space Science biosciences director, Orr Reynolds. This arrangement was such that NASA seemed to speak with two different voices, and it was frequently criticized by academic life scientists.39
The military services were also confused by this situation. Officially, the Office of Advanced Research and Technology represented NASA in dealing with the military. However, when the authority was given (June 1962), NASA's coordination with the services was limited to a single agency, the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board, a single level of coordination (NASA and the Department of Defense), and a single area, supporting research and technology for manned spaceflight. Subsequently, NASA had occasion to deal with DoD on questions of space biology and with the Air Force on bioastronautics (space medicine). Reynolds assumed responsibility for space biology coordination, and George Knauf (Office of Manned Space Flight) dealt with the Air Force on matters concerning bioastronautics. 40
The result was internal strife, particularly between Konecci and Knauf NASA was under increasing congressional pressure from April 1962 to late 1963 to work out specific agreements with the Air Force that would preclude duplication in their space medicine and bioastronautics programs.41 Since this issue concerned only manned spaceflight, Webb directed the Office of Manned Space Flight to negotiate with the Air Force Systems Command. George Mueller and his Air Force counterpart  subsequently formed a Space Medicine Bioastronautics Coordinating Committee to allocate research and development responsibilities between the two agencies, share personnel and facilities, and formulate a joint space medicine-bioastronautics budget.42
Konecci vehemently protested this arrangement, insisting that all NASA-military coordinations should go through the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board. He did not want to provide Knauf and the Air Force with data on medical research contracts sponsored by the Office of Advanced Research and Technology, or Ames life scientists to engage in the coordination effort. He reasoned that the authority of the Space Medicine-Bioastronautics Coordinating Committee was limited to approved manned programs and that the committee had no legitimate authority over advanced research and development. Knauf replied, and management agreed, that coordination had to encompass the biomedical aspect of both approved and advanced manned programs, since the Air Force made no distinction between the two. In the end, Konecci cooperated fully.43
TOWARD A COORDINATED LIFE SCIENCES PROGRAM
By late 1963, it was obvious to NASA's top management that some changes had to be made in the organization and management of NASA's life sciences programs. Clearly, the life sciences directors and offices were working at cross-purposes. Equally important, the disorganized state of the life sciences programs was impeding NASA's efforts to attract the interest and support of academic life scientists and to improve relations with the military services. Between February 1962 and February 1964, NASA's management of its life sciences programs was the object of increasing criticism from Congress and the scientific community.
Life scientists outside NASA conducted four reviews of NASA's life sciences programs during this period, and all reached the same general conclusions.** The programs were disorganized, and the disorganization Stemmed from the absence of decisive leadership at the top management levels. Without decisive leadership, the programs lacked purpose and direction, were ineffective, and were incapable of promoting confidence among, or support from, high-quality scientists in colleges and universities. This situation would continue unless NASA appointed a respected  life scientist to a high-level position (preferably as a deputy to the associate administrator) and gave him the authority to plan and direct the overall life sciences program and to represent NASA in its relations with life scientists outside the agency.44
Concurrently, Congress monitored NASA's efforts to effect a coordinated life sciences program with the military Congress was particularly concerned that NASA and the Air Force work out specific agreements related to space medicine and bioastronautics in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of programs and facilities, prevent competition for the limited number of specialists in the field, ensure adequate military support for the biomedical aspects of the manned lunar landing program, and ensure that NASA would give fair consideration to proposals for inflight experiments submitted by the military services. Here again, lack of a single spokesman and lack of decisive internal leadership were cited as factors working against effective coordination.45
Seamans had anticipated the need for improvements in the management of the life sciences programs as early as March 1963, when he decided to hold periodic reviews of the programs. By requiring the life sciences directors to come together to explain and justify their programs to him, Seamans hoped to improve his capabilities for resolving internal disagreements and providing direction for the overall programs.46 However, he lacked the time or the professional qualifications to serve as a de facto director of life sciences programs, so he urged the life sciences directors to begin meeting informally. At one meeting held in August 1963, the "Senior Biomedical Representatives" agreed on the need for a cooperative effort "to insure the development within NASA of a well-conceived, comprehensive, overall biomedical program."47
Program reviews and informal meetings did not solve the problem, however. Seamans was not particularly pleased with the program review presentations,48 and the directors apparently were unable to meet regularly on an informal basis. Subsequently, Seamans authorized a formal Life Sciences Directors Group to be headed by the director of space medicine and gave him the authority to represent the associate administrator at meetings of the group. The chairman was to report directly to Seamans, rather than to his own program office administrator, on matters of concern to the life sciences program as a whole. The group was to devise a coordinated life sciences program, prepare a coordinated budget, resolve jurisdictional disputes, and recommend changes in the overall program. Decisions reached by the group were subject to Seamans's approval.49
The formation of the Life Sciences Directors Group can be seen as an attempted compromise between the centralized life sciences Office desired by scientists and the decentralized arrangement that was most compatible with the program offices and the overall needs of the  agency.50 At the time the group was established (June 1964), W. Randolph Lovelace II had agreed to become the director of space medicine. Lovelace had the influence, personal and professional prestige, and experience to be an effective spokesman to both the scientific community and the military services. He could provide direction to the life sciences and encourage cooperation among the life sciences directors. Moreover, Lovelace had the personal authority necessary to keep the program office administrators from interfering in life sciences program decisions. Although nominally subordinate to the associate administrator of the Office of Manned Space Flight, he had a direct though unofficial line to NASA's top management. Finally, his influence extended to Congress and the military, so that he could be expected to promote NASA's interests successfully in negotiations with Congress and the Air Force. With Lovelace as director of space medicine and chairman of the Life Sciences Directors Group, NASA could maintain the integrity of its organization while having a de facto director of life sciences.51
In 1964, NASA management also tried to better coordinate the planning of experiments for manned flights. Proposals for inflight experiments were coming from three different quarters: the Office of Space Science (OSS) through its Space Sciences Steering Committee, the Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF) through its Space Medicine Advisory Group, and the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) through its Space Medicine Branch. The OSS was proposing experiments in both the physical and life sciences, OMSF in the basic medical sciences, and MSC in medical experiments linked to specific operational problems. In addition, the military services, with no approved manned flights of their own, were pressing NASA to fly experiments related to military requirements.
Clearly, some method had to be found to select from the many proposals a finite number of experiments that could be flown on any one flight. Considerations of weight and space, engineering, time required of the crew, and the astronauts' reluctance to perform experiments were all limiting factors. In early 1964 Seamans directed Mueller to form within the Office of Manned Space Flight a Manned Space Flight Experiments Board. 52
The board was actually inspired by the efforts of Homer Newell and George Mueller to establish guidelines for selecting and incorporating experiments proposed by the Office of Space Science into manned flights. Mueller had de facto veto authority over such experiments, since the Office of Manned Space Flight had authority over experiments packaging for manned flights. They agreed that OSS should select the experiments, and then OMSF would decide the order in which they would be flown. The board formalized the agreement reached by Newell and Mueller. In addition, a Defense Department representative was added to the board to ensure that the military would receive fair consideration.53
 Subsequently, at the request of Lovelace, Mueller agreed to establish a Medical Experiments Panel within the board. Such a panel was deemed necessary by Dr. Sherman Vinograd, chief of medical research at the Office of Manned Space Flight, to ensure input from biomedical scientists outside NASA and coordination between OMSF and the Manned Spacecraft Center. Unofficially, Vinograd was worried that the center, with actual control over flight operations, would give preference to experiments proposed by its own staff and low priority to those recommended by the Space Medicine Advisory Group. The panel was also viewed as a means of drawing the astronauts into experiment planning.54
Management decisions related to the organization and management of life sciences programs had the primary objective of augmenting biomedical support for NASA's major programs within an accelerated and diversified space program. However, factors other than technical and operational requirements were significant in shaping these decisions. Internal disputes over jurisdiction and responsibilities showed that arrangements for organizing and managing the life sciences programs were defective. The evidence forced NASA management to develop a new management structure that would contribute to a better coordinated life sciences program while maintaining the integrity of the overall organization.
Management decisions concerning life sciences programs were also influenced by external forces-the scientific community, Congress, and the military services-particularly from 1961 to 1964. The role of these forces in shaping the organization and management, as well as the growth and development, of NASA's life sciences programs was significant throughout the entire manned space program.
* Initially, Webb also created an Office of Applications, which had responsibility for communications and meteorological satellites, but this office was combined with the Office of Space Sciences in 1963.
** The President's Science Advisory Committee conducted an investigation of biomedical programs during the summer of 1962. The Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences, supported by NASA funds, surveyed the agency's life sciences programs that same Summer in late 1963, Nello Pace, hired as a consultant by Webb, examined the agency's life Sciences requirements.