[119] The final 10 months of the Gemini era provided NASA's biomedical scientists with optimism and confidence. The Gemini missions dispelled any lingering doubts about NASA's ability to provide effective biomedical support for its flight crews and provided assurance that progress toward the planned lunar landing would not be retarded by human factors. The Gemini flights yielded biomedical data that greatly expanded knowledge of human reactions to spaceflight and the space environment and alerted NASA management to the need for a more comprehensive biomedical research program. Management's positive response to various recommendations from external and internal advisory groups and its tentative support for the Integrated Medical and Behavioral Laboratory Measurement System was evidence of this new awareness.

Increased emphasis on biomedical research and the biomedical requirements for advanced manned programs had ramifications for the management of NASA's life sciences program. Could NASA's decentralized life sciences program provide the necessary coordination among space biology, human research, biotechnology, and medical operations? Without a centralized point of contact for the life sciences, could NASA attract the active support of biomedical scientists with the knowledge and skills to make important contributions to the biomedical program?

During this period, the Life Sciences Directors Group managed to minimize internal factionalism, achieve a nominal level of coordination among NASA's decentralized life sciences components, and promote effective liaison with interested groups outside the agency. The achievements of the directors, however, were like those of the proverbial [120] Dutch boy with his finger in the dike, they could hold management problems in check for a while, but could not solve those problems. The question of the organization and management of NASA's life sciences program, dormant through most of the Gemini era, resurfaced as an issue early in 1966.

LIFE SCIENCES DIRECTORS GROUP

The Life Sciences Directors Group functioned in lieu of a life sciences program office born June 1964 to August 1968. Established by NASA Associate Administrator Robert Seamans to improve the management of the overall Life Sciences Program, the group was charged with coor dinating those Life Science matters having Agency wide implications. Seamans hoped the arrangement would fulfill the management responsibilities of a life sciences program office without impairing the functional integrity of the major program offices. The group was strictly advisory, with no authority to involve itself in the internal management of individual life sciences offices or with individual directors in their liaison et torts with external scientific- agencies in their respective areas of cognizance."¹ The members of the group were expected to establish a "coordinated and integrated" life sciences program by coordinating the planning, development and execution of life science activities"; reviewing and making recommendations concerning "problems and issues having agency-wide implications"; and proposing changes in 'program activities . . . task assignments and relative priorities."²

The directors made recommendations through their chairman to Seamans. Authority to act on the recommendations rested with Seamans or the associate administrators heading the offices of Advanced Research and Technology (OART), Manned Space Flight (OMSF), and Space Science and Applications (OSSA). Top management viewed the Directors Group as a "strictly advisory" body that should have "no authority to direct action to be taken by its individual members or others."³ Since NASA management had made no provision for a top-level life sciences administrator, above or equal to the program office associate administrators, real authority over the management of the Life Sciences Program rested with administrators who were not necessarily knowledgeable or involved day-to-day in the program.

In addition, the directives establishing the Directors Group did not specify the procedures by which they might reach a consensus on critical issues. The three directors were coequal. They were to share information related to their respective programs, eliminate program overlaps, and resolve internal jurisdictional disputes; but majority rule was not authorized [121], and the group could not force an individual director to submit to a majority decision. Disagreements could be resolved only by passing them on to higher authority.

Unanimous agreement was rarely possible, since each director naturally resisted proposals that would result in reducing the scope of his own program. This was particularly true of the directors of biosciences (in OSSA) and biotechnology and human research (OART), who were locked in conflict over a number of substantive issues.⁴ Critical issues related to program jurisdiction usually had to be passed on to Seamans and the program associate administrators for resolution.⁵

The directors were also constrained by divided loyalties. Each director was responsible both to the Life Sciences Program and to his respective program office. Subordinate to the program office associate administrators, the directors, when considering matters of significance to the life sciences, had to take into account both the needs of the Life Sciences Program, and the requirements of the respective program offices. In practical terms, the Directors Group not only had to struggle to reach a consensus relative to the Life Sciences Program, but also had to be certain that such a consensus wouId be acceptable to the associate administrators.⁶

Finally, the Directors Group had no authority over life sciences activities at Ames Research Center and the Manned Spacecraft Center, both of which had major responsibility for life sciences research and development. The life sciences managers at the centers reported to the center directors, who in turn reported to one of the program office associate administrators. Ames and the Manned Spacecraft Center had an enduring disagreement concerning jurisdiction over medical research, but the Directors Group could not resolve it.⁷

These weaknesses in the program management of the life sciences program, though enduring in nature, were obscured for some time. At the time, W. Randolph Lovelace II had the personal authority, working as he did with top management, to overcome these weaknesses. Although frequently absent from meetings of the Directors Group and involved in many activities outside NASA, Lovelace had the respect necessary to gain cooperation among the directors and ensure management backing for decisions made, with his leadership, by the group. Internal weaknesses were also obscured because the life sciences budget, although spare,⁸ continued to expand from 1962 to 1965 and was sufficient to support active Programs in each life sciences area. Finally, the Gemini program and Preparations for Apollo distracted management attention from internal Problems affecting the long-term value of the life sciences effort. For NASA management, the important life sciences issues from 1962 to 1965 were technical in nature: life support systems, inflight experiments, longrange planning.

[122] Between January 1966 and January 1967 some of the constraining factors disappeared. Lovelace, who had resigned from NASA a few months earlier, died in an airplane accident in December 1965. In March and April 1966 Congress reduced the funding for the space program, including the life sciences budget. In November 1966 the Gemini program came to a close, and NASA management began to look ahead to the post-Apollo space program, whose life sciences requirements remained to be defined Finally, in January 1967, the Apollo 204 fire raised serious questions about NASA's life sciences capabilities. Together, these factors forced an internal reassessment of the organization and management of the Life Sciences Program and the role of the Life Sciences Directors Group.

QUESTIONS OF AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION

The impotence of the Directors Group was epitomized by two issues that commanded management's attention in 1966. The growth of interest in life sciences experiments and inflight investigations was a major feature of the Gemini era. The emerging program of inflight experiments had two aspects: unmanned biological investigations in space and biomedical (i.e., man-oriented) experiments to be flown on manned missions. The former provided justification for the Biosatellite Project and required coordination between the offices of Advanced Research and Technology (DART) (biotechnology and human research) and Space Science and Applications (OSSA) (biosciences). The latter justified the Medical Experiments Program, which nominally was under the control of the director of space medicine (Office of Manned Space Flight) but, in practice, fell under the control of the director of medical research and operations at the Manned Spacecraft Center. In both cases, coordination of life sciences inflight experiments was a source of internal conflict, which the Directors Group was incapable of resolving.

Working relations between Biosciences and Biotechnology-Human Research had never been good because of biology and human research overlap. In creating the decentralized life sciences program, NASA management had not clearly identified authority over research involving primates. Biosciences viewed primate research as a natural extension of biological research; while Biotechnology and Human Research viewed the same area as a natural concomitant of human research. NASA management had assumed that the distinction between the two was clear: both divisions would support primate research, but Biosciences would have authority when the research objectives were strictly scientific in nature, and Biotechnology and Human Research when the objectives were related to advanced manned flight requirements.⁹

In practice, this distinction was not so clear. Iet alone enforceable, as [123] the history of Project Biosatellite revealed Biosciences had received authority over Biosatellite because the overall objectives of the project were scientific and the early flights were to include only biological experiments However, OART had authority to review and approve requests for funding research and technology (research and development proposals in support of approved flight projects), including those in the life sciences.¹⁰ In short, while OSSA had authority over Biosatellite planning, it was supposed to obtain approval from OART for Biosatellite development funds. In addition, OART had been promised a major role in later Biosatellite flights, which would carry primates and conduct both scientific and man-related investigations.¹¹ To satisfy these mutual requirements, NASA management placed Project Biosatellite under the general jurisdiction of the OSSA Biological Experiments Program but created a Biosatellite Project Office under the director of Ames Research Center. This arrangement was intended to ensure that Biosatellite would be responsive to the requests of both program offices.¹²

This arrangement prevented conflicts at the project level, but not at the program level. The headquarters program offices (OSSA and OART) were unable to reach agreement on their respective roles in biological flight programs for reasons that were' biopolitical."^* They were competing for the same scarce resources-funds and flight projects. Life sciences funds were severely limited compared with funds in other areas and were in jeopardy of being cut back further, since Congress had indicated unwillingness to continue previous levels of funding for the space program Likewise, life sciences flight projects were limited, Biosatellite being the only approved project for inflight biological investigations.

From the beginning of the space program, funds allocated for research and development in life sciences were minuscule compared with those in other areas.¹³ The separate life sciences programs had always been in competition for scarce resources. Quirks in the life sciences budget intensified this competition after 1965 (when Congress began to reduce the space program budget) and centered the competition between OSSA and OART. The first quirk was the elimination of space medicine as a life sciences line item in the FY 1964 and subsequent budgets. Henceforth, space medicine would receive its funds from several different sources [124] within the Office of Manned Space Flight and appropriations for space medicine would not be detailed in the budget requests. Biosciences and human factors (biotechnology and human research) would continue to appear as research and development line items The second quirk was that Congress assessed funding requirements for the life sciences in two different ways: the separate life sciences requests were examined in relation to the budget requests of their respective program offices, and the separate requests were combined and assessed as a Life Sciences Program budget. Congress, following the lead of Congressman Emilio Q. Daddario, began to do this in 1961 (when space medicine was still a line item) as a means of comparing NASA's life sciences budget requests with those of the Air Force.¹⁴ Congress continued this policy even after space medicine had ceased to be a line item.

The effect was to center competition for life sciences funds between OSSA and OART, and the former regularly received the lion's share Bio science appropriations for each fiscal year from 1965 to 1968 were twice those for human factors.¹⁵ This disparity derived in part from Congress s tendency to view human factors as an adjunct to space medicine Although space medicine was not a line item, the director of space medicine provided Congress with a survey of space medicine research and development projects as part of the Office of Manned Space Flight budget presentations, and Congress often trimmed the human factors budget request in the belief that OART was planning projects that would duplicate those already in progress in space medicine.¹⁶ The disparity also resulted from the fact that Congress was more likely to consider OART proposals duplicative of military life sciences efforts. Since the space medicine budget was not directly visible, and NASA and the Air Force were coordinating their bioastronautics programs, space medicine did not come under scrutiny in this regard after 1964. Congress assumed that the Office of Space Science and Applications would not be duplicating military programs since the services had no significant bioscience programs. The Office of Advanced Research and Technology, however, had responsibility for biotechnology and human research, an area of assumed Air Force strength. It also had responsibility for advanced research, which in the mid-1960s was directed toward requirements for a manned orbiting laboratory. Since the Air Force, but not NASA, already had approval for a manned orbiting laboratory, DART's proposals were often viewed, mostly incorrectly, by Congress as duplicative of Air Force efforts.¹⁷ This circumstance did nothing to promote harmony between OART and OSSA.

Competition between the biosciences and human factors divisions was also intensified by management decisions related to life sciences flight programs NASA management authorized only two life sciences flight programs: the unmanned, biological Biosatellite, and the man-oriented, [125] biomedical experiments program. It was assumed that the Office of Advanced Research and Technology, with its authority to review supporting research and development proposals and its ability to sponsor research and development in support of both manned and unmanned life sciences flights, would contribute to both the biological and biomedical flight programs. In addition, the office was expected to play a significant role in both the later Biosatellite flights (which would carry primates) and the Apollo Applications (Skylab) program.¹⁸ At this time OART had approval to conduct preliminary studies for a single biotechnology flight that would use the instrumented inner ear (otolith) of a frog.¹⁹

For the time, however, OART had no direct involvement in the management of life sciences flight programs It was virtually excluded from participation in the biomedical experiments program, since space medicine had moved on to conduct its own supporting research and development and already had more proposals for biomedical experiments than it could fly aboard the approved manned flights. Moreover, DART's life sciences division supported the use of animals in support of human research, while the space medicine group had little interest in animal research. This encouraged OART to view Biosatellite as a logical locus for inflight research in biotechnology and human factors. ²⁰

Personality differences and jealousies aggravated this situation. The director of biosciences, Orr Reynolds, had a strong orientation toward basic research. Reynolds and his staff of bioscientists viewed themselves as the guardians of pure bioscience against applied research, engineering, and mission operations. Since OART was an applied research and engineering office, they viewed it with suspicion and considered any extension of its authority over biological programs would lead to subordination of basic research to applied research and to the loss of the program. ²¹

Reynolds was also the only life sciences director, after Lovelace, who enjoyed a measure of personal authority within his office. In contrast to the directors of space medicine and human research, Reynolds served continuously as a life sciences director from the inception of the biosciences division and had considerable independence due to his program office associate administrator, Homer Newell. Longevity in office and program autonomy gave Reynolds confidence that he could promote the growth of a bioscience program. This made him unwilling to support decisions or agreements which, in his view, would retard progress toward this goal.²²

Biotechnology and human research had four separate directors between 1962 and 1966-Eugene Konecci, Frank Voris, Rufus Hessberg, and Walton Jones. Although the last three had experience in research and research administration and were medical doctors, none was a medical scientist. Rather, they had strong backgrounds in flight medecine and a [126] primary research interest in the application of biomedical knowledge to human factors engineering.²³ Because of their backgrounds, they were not threatened by the NASA emphasis on engineering and operations and were not concerned with creating and guarding an independent life sciences program They viewed Reynolds's efforts to safeguard the biosciences as self-centered empire building.²⁴

The OART directors also did not enjoy Reynolds's level of independence. As "acting" directors, they had limited authority. More important, their associate administrators did not give them the autonomy that Newell gave Reynolds. On several occasions Seamans asked the associate administrators for assessments of their life sciences programs Newell submitted assessments bearing Reynolds's name and covered them with memos indicating his endorsement of Reynolds's views. By contrast the OART administrators, Raymond Bisplinghoff and Mac Adams, gave Seamans their own assessments and provided no indication that they had ever consulted their life sciences directors.²⁵ This obvious disparity in influence may have aggravated tensions.

These several differences precluded a harmonious working relationship between Reynolds and his OART counterparts and made it difficult for the Directors Group to reach agreement on critical issues that affected these two divisions. Reynolds, suspecting that a greater role for OART in the biological flight program would result in Biosatellite being changed from a biological to a biotechnology project, resisted efforts to increase DART's area of jurisdiction The OART life sciences directors, believing that Reynolds was ignoring their responsibility for the review of life sciences research proposals, were suspicious of his intentions and anxious for formal agreements defining DART's role in life sciences flight programs.

The interest in life sciences flight experiments also brought to light a problem of coordination between the director of space medicine and the Manned Spacecraft Center Directorate of Medical Research and Operations. In this case, an imbalance of authority had developed between the headquarters life sciences office and the center medical office. In brief, the center medical director had more input into space medical decisions including definition and selection of medical experiments, than did the director of space medicine at headquarters. This imbalance derived from the management relationship between the Office of Manned Space Flight and the Manned Spacecraft Center and the evolution of the MSC medical directorate.

Since the beginning of the space program, the Manned Spacecraft Center (and its predecessor, the Space Task Group) had enjoyed more autonomy than the other centers. This derived from the personal authority of the center's director, Robert Gilruth, and from precedents set during [127] T. Keith Glennan s administration. During Project Mercury, NASA's top management allowed Gilruth virtual autonomy to oversee the activities of the Space Task Group, and this carried over when the Space Task Group transferred to Houston and became the Manned Spacecraft Center.

The medical research and operations division shared this autonomy The space medicine groups were initially placed under the jurisdiction of the Space Task Group director, and this link was strengthened when Office of Life Science Programs Director Clark T Randt agreed to allow the Space Task Group to remain independent of his office Following the dissolution of the Office of Life Science Programs in 1961, subsequent space medicine directors made no effort to change this arrangement. The first two directors, Charles Roadman and George Knauf, were Air Force officers on loan to NASA. Neither had any strong interest in strengthening his position at headquarters or in expanding the authority of his office. Both seemed to view the prevailing arrangement as the one most conducive to the achievement of manned spaceflight mission objectives.²⁶

Knauf, in tact, agreed to two changes that reduced the authority of the office. The first involved the elimination of space medicine as a line item in the NASA budget, which Knaut viewed as a means of improving coordination between NASA and the Air Force and of making space medicine more responsive to three separate manned flight project offices: Gemini, Apollo, and Advanced Programs. The change, however, deprived the director of space medicine of direct input into budget planning. The second change involved the statutory definition of the space medicine office's responsibilities. From 1961 to 1963 the space medicine director was designated the medical representative" of the administrator for manned spaceflight, and his responsibilities included reviewing and coordinating medical programs at the centers, coordinating NASA's medical programs with those of outside agencies, advising the manned spaceflight administrator on medical support programs, and reviewing and coordinating the total medical program. In 1963, however, the directorship of space medicine was changed from a line office in the Office of Manned Space Flight to a staff element on the OMSF administrator's staff, and it was,"relieved of management responsibility for the medical development programs in support of Gemini and Apollo." This change reduced the director s responsibilities and limited him to advisory authority. ²⁷

Knauf's successor, Lovelace, had the personal authority to change this Situation but made no effort to do so. He, too, had no compelling interest in strengthening his personal position or expanding the authority of his office. Moreover, his background in flight medicine and mission-oriented space medicine may have led him to support autonomy at the Manned Spacecraft Center.

The diminishing authority of the director of space medicine was [128] paralleled by increasing authority in the Manned Spacecraft Center medical directorate. From 1962 to 1964 the center had two separate loci for space medical activities: the Center Medical Office and the Crew Systems Division. The former was a staff element in the center director s office, with responsibility for advising the director on medical operations and coordinating overall center activities in space medicine. Medical research (a small part of the program before 1964) and life systems development fell within the jurisdiction of the director of the Life Support Systems Division, a line office. With the increasing importance of medical research and its application to life systems and mission planning, the center's management recognized the need for improved coordination of these medical activities. In 1965, Manned Spacecraft Center Director Robert Gilruth approved a proposal prepared by Center Medical Director Charles Berry and created the Directorate of Medical Research and Operations.

The directorate was established as a line office, and the director was granted authority commensurate to that of the other division directors His responsibilities included coordinating and integrating the medical research, human factors, and medical operations efforts; coordinating the space medical activities in support of the Gemini, Apollo, and Manned Spacecraft Center Advanced Program offices; preparing space medical budget recommendations; effecting liaison between the directorate and the Ames Life Sciences Directorate and between NASA and the Air Force Aerospace Medical Division; and coordinating the inflight medical experiments program.²⁸ Clearly, his authority, at least in regard to approved flight programs, exceeded that of the director of space medicine.

The Directorate of Medical Research and Operations did not have authority over medical planning for the post-Apollo manned programs. This authority remained with the Directorate of Space Medicine, which had a medical research division headed by a science-oriented physician, Sherman P. Vinograd. In contrast to the space medicine directors, Vinograd's background was in medical science rather than flight medicine, and he had strong ties to the academic biomedical community In early 1964, Vinograd proposed to manned spaceflight administrator George Mueller and Lovelace that he be authorized to bring together a committee of biomedical scientists to study NASA's biomedical requirements for the post-Apollo period. Vinograd reasoned that this committee would help justify NASA's long-range involvement in manned space programs and improve its relations with the biomedical community Mueller and Lovelace endorsed the proposal and established the Space Medicine Advisory Group. ²⁹

This advisory group had responsibility for identifying the biomedical [129] requirements of, and the appropriate experiments package for, a manned orbiting laboratory. It addressed this matter during the first six months of 1964 and presented its findings in Medical Aspects of an Orbiting Research Laboratory. However, it had an impact that extended beyond this singular effort. First, the Space Medicine Advisory Group was organized to operate as a "working group," that is, a body backed by "a clear statement of methods, goals, and anticipated end products." It was authorized to define the requirements for a specific flight program and to make recommendations that would have a direct bearing on long-range policy decisions. The only previous NASA-sponsored, external advisory group with comparable authority was the Biosciences Advisory Committee, which provided the justification for the Office of Life Science Programs.

Second, Vinograd invited into membership scientists who would bring a balance between those who had no previous experience in the space program and those who had practical familiarity with spaceflight; whose backgrounds, collectively, spanned the entire range of life sciences fields that were relevant to the manned program; and who were noted for their contributions to their specific fields, rather than for their name recognition, political activities, and stature in the aerospace community. In contrast to normal advisory committees, the medical group was not dominated by either academicians or flight surgeons and bioengineers. Nor was it a body of stellar luminaries. While all the members were well known within their fields, only Loren Carlson was a frequent scientific advisor to NASA. Among the members were Ashton Graybiel, a physician, research administrator at the Naval School of Aviation Medicine, and internationally recognized space medicine researcher; Ross McFarland, a physiologist who pioneered in the effort to bring space medicine into medical school and public health programs; and James V. Warren, a physician and medical scientist who started the second academic program in space medicine (at Ohio State University) and who had served on the President's Science Advisory Committee panel that investigated NASA's biomedical programs in 1962.³⁰

Given the eminence and diverse backgrounds of the committee members, their recommendations received serious attention from NASA officials and became the foundation for the Apollo Applications (later Skylab) biomedical experiments program. The activities of the group also enhanced the authority of the director of space medicine by providing a justification for a Medical Experiments Panel within the Manned Spaceflight Experiments Board.³¹ This panel gave the headquarters space medicine office direct input into the planning of medical experiments for manned spaceflight, an authority previously within the exclusive jurisdiction of the medical office at the Manned Spacecraft Center. After the [130] establishment of the Medical Experiments Panel, the MSC office had to submit its experiments for headquarters review, and its proposals were to be weighted against other proposals for biomedical experiments.³²

These several events pointed toward an obvious need for clarification of responsibilities and authority in the area of inflight life sciences experiments. Because the Life Sciences Directors Group lacked the authority to implement necessary agreements, the resolution of contentious issues required the direct intervention of Seamans and the program office associate administrators. On January 24, 1966 these administrators directed the life sciences directors to review the life sciences experiments program and prepare recommendations for resolving specific issues related to the incorporation of medical experiments into manned spaceflight programs, the use of primates in inflight investigations, and the life sciences requirements for advanced manned programs.³³ With this authority, the life sciences directors were able to form an agreement concerning spaceflight experiments that would satisfy the agency's long and shorter range needs" and "prescribe the procedures necessary for its accomplishment." ³⁴

The life sciences directors deliberated for three months before finally endorsing, on March 9,1966, an "Agreement for the Management of an Integrated Life Sciences In-Flight Experiments Program." Subsequently approved by Seamans and the program office administrators, this agreement divided the life sciences experiments program into three parts: medical-behavioral experiments, involving procedures performed on the spacecraft crew or passengers and designed to measure human capability or reaction; biological experiments, procedures designed to elicit an understanding of biological phenomena and functions by means of biological experimentation"; and biotechnology experiments, 'engineering procedures designed to evolve advanced life science technology for support, protection or assistance to man in space flight." The agreement made the life sciences directors executive agents" for these three areas and provided for review of life sciences experiments by the National Institutes of Health and a Medical Advisory Council. It also gave the Directors Group authority to "establish objectives, develop programs and define related efforts" relative to the experiments program.³⁵

This agreement reduced, but did not eliminate, the coordination problems described earlier While clarifying the division of authority between the biosciences and biotechnology offices, it did not resolve the issue of authority over primate experiments. By making the space medicine director the executive authority" for medical experiments and providing for review of medical experiments by the National Institutes of Health and a Medical Advisory Council, the agreement strengthened the authority of the headquarters medical director relative to the Manned Spacecraft [131] Center medical officer in relation to long-range programs, but it did not change the prevailing authorities relative to Gemini and Apollo. It was a step forward, but one that the Directors Group had been unable to take on its own initiative

The impotence of the Directors Group was also revealed in deliberations over the chairmanship of the Life Sciences Directors Group following Lovelace's death. The instructions that established the Directors Group had made provision for a permanent chairman to act as NASA's spokesman to life scientists outside NASA. The space medicine director was designated the permanent chairman both in deference to Lovelace's personal authority and as a compromise to avoid conflict between biosciences and biotechnology directors. Because the latter was a medical doctor, the biosciences director was designated as alternate chairman to ensure a balance between medical and biological authority. Here again, however, the decision treated the biotechnology director as the "odd man out."

Several problems marred this arrangement. First, since Lovelace rarely attended meetings of the Directors Group, the biosciences director, Orr Reynolds, normally presided over the meetings.³⁶ Second, although Lovelace had status within the scientific community, the Directorate of Space Medicine did not. The external scientific community tended to view NASA's space medical program as isolated from the community, unscientific in its approach, and flight oriented.³⁷ Finally, the Directors Group did not speak with a single voice, but with three voices-each director presented his own views to the external community, and each tended to seek out and address his own distinct scientific audience.

The overall effect was to further weaken confidence in NASA's life sciences program among external life scientists. For nearly two years following Lovelace's death, the space medicine directorship was filled by flight surgeons who had little standing in the scientific community and could not be considered NASA's life sciences spokesmen. The biosciences and biotechnology directors each tried to become the unofficial life sciences spokesman, with a tendency to seek support from science advisors favorable to their respective programs, in effect, using external life scientists to bolster their program positions. This led life scientists outside NASA to doubt that NASA had a serious interest in their recommendations. ³⁸

The role and authority of the Directors Group chairman emerged as an issue after Lovelace's death. Initially, Seamans appointed Orr Reynolds (the permanent alternate chairman) as acting chairman and directed Reynolds to serve in this capacity from January through June 1966, or until a permanent director of space medicine could be appointed. Possibly anticipating some disagreement from the biotechnology director, Seamans [132] directed the program office administrators to prepare thoughtful recommendations for coordination in the life sciences area."³⁹ Seamans specifically wanted suggestions concerning the role and responsibilities of the Directors Group and the procedures for designating the chairman of the group.

The program office administrators were in unanimous agreement that the role and responsibilities of the Directors Group should not be expanded, and that the group should remain a 'strictly advisory" body However, they disagreed on procedures for designating the chairman Space science administrator Newell, endorsing recommendations from Reynolds, favored retention of the permanent chairmanship concept, arguing that this was the only sure means "to sustain rapport and maintain communications with the Life Sciences community.⁴⁰ Advanced research and technology administrator Mac Adams urged that the chairmanship be placed on a rotating basis to be consistent with the tripartite division of the program. Adams may have made this suggestion to ensure that Reynolds's temporary appointment as chairman would not become permanent. Adams apparently was concerned that any increase in the authority of the biosciences director would diminish the authority of the biotechnology director. Six months earlier, he had tried to convince Seamans to authorize the biotechnology director to replace the biosciences director as alternate chairman of the Directors Group.⁴¹ Manned spaceflight administrator George Mueller initially favored retention of the permanent chairmanship; however, he later joined Adams in supporting a rotating chairmanship.⁴²

The issue of the chairmanship gave further evidence of the impotence of the Directors Group. Clearly, the authority to define the role and responsibilities of the chairmanship and select the person who would fill it was not in the hands of those responsible for the life sciences-it was held by Seamans and the program office administrators. These administrators saw no value in expanding the authority of the Directors Group or strengthening the position of the chairman. The administrators, with Seamans's backing, declined to increase the authority and independence of the group. They issued new management instructions that stressed (as early instructions had not) the "strictly advisory nature" of the Directors Group, and specifically denied the group any "authority to direct action to be taken by its individual members or by others."⁴³

THE BOLLERUD REPORT

Although Seamans and the program office administrators refused to make fundamental changes in the authority of the Life Sciences Directors Group or to promote an expanded, independent Life Sciences Program, [133] they could not ignore the reality that the life sciences program was fraught with problems. This was evident in the enduring conflicts among life sciences offices and in the difficulties in reaching agreement on medical and biological experiments and the Directors Group chairmanship. While Seamans backed the program office administrators and did not view life sciences as one of NASA's major program objectives, he did want to find a way to eliminate conflicts within the program. Accordingly, he asked the administrators to make a thoughtful review of the agency's life sciences programs

The first response came from Col. Jack Bollerud, acting space medicine director' who presented his ideas in a lengthy report, "Staff Study of the Structuring of the Life Sciences Activities within NASA.'' Although Bollerud's background was in flight medicine and he had no strong contacts with academic life scientists, his report reiterated the findings and recommendations of earlier- reports prepared by the National Academy of Sciences and the President's Science Advisory Committee.

Bollerud found the Life Sciences Directors Group totally ineffective, citing as evidence the tendency of the directors backed by their Associate Administrators" to devote more effort to the protection and fostering . . . of their own programs and interests'' than to the needs of the Life Sciences Program, and the inability of the group's chairman "to recommend actions" that did not have the prior approval of the associate administrators This encouraged the directors to become primarily concerned with "consolidating their positions and programs," which resulted in "duplicative" efforts and the tendency of the centers 'to play one office against the other to augment their research budgets." The source of these problems, he claimed, was NASA management's insistence that the life sciences be organized according to "the often arbitrary and usually obscure divisions between applied, advanced, and basic research," a form of organization stemming more from 'political considerations" and the requirements of the overall NASA organization" than from the legitimate needs of the Life Sciences Program.

Restating the views of biomedical scientists outside NASA, Bollerud recommended that NASA establish a life sciences associate administrator and authorize him to "overview" all NASA life sciences activities; serve as NASA s "interface for life sciences with the scientific community"; define "areas of responsibility for each of the NASA life sciences activities and for resolving conflicts pertaining thereto"; review program and funding requirements for NASA's life sciences and recommend changes when duplicative efforts or jurisdictional overlaps became evident; review, approve, and direct changes in the missions of the NASA centers if 'in the best interests of the total life sciences activities"; and make "final determination" of life sciences requirements for "facilities and items of [134] equipment." He also recommended that the life sciences administrator be designated the "principal biomedical officer of NASA," be hired to serve as a "career officer" of NASA on a full-time basis, and 'be selected" on the basis of his commitment to the Life Sciences Program rather than his "name recognition."⁴⁴

Bollerud's findings and recommendations did not cause any immediate change in the organization and management of NASA's life sciences programs. However, coming from within the agency and from one who was not striving to create a power base (Bollerud was a career Air Force officer on temporary assignment to NASA), the report could not be dismissed as misperceptions by ivory-tower academics or as an internal power play. Bollerud's report and subsequent events over the next six months motivated Seamans to authorize a major internal review of life sciences organization and management within the agency.

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