[23] The dawn of the Space Age, and the start of the Space Race, occurred in the darkness of the Russian night on 4 October 1957. The successful launch of Sputnik 1 opened a new front in the Cold War and turned the idea of space operations from science fiction into science fact. The expressions of "shock" by American politicians, scientists, engineers, and the public at large seem almost cliche through repetition. However shocking to the public and politicians, the Soviet achievement should not have been too big a shock to knowledgeable professionals. The Soviets announced their intent to orbit a scientific satellite as part of the International Geophysical Year more than two years before the fact.¹ American researchers realized that "going orbital" not only involved a relatively simple extension of emerging technology, but also that someone would do it soon. ABMA, NRL, RAND, various groups within the NACA (including PARD), and others, all nursed orbital visions of varying priority.² Of course, they generally assumed that the first beeps from space would be generated by an American transmitter, but after the demonstration of Soviet technical capability represented by Russia's nuclear program they largely took the success of Sputnik in stride.³

President Eisenhower also evinced little concern about the Soviet accomplishment. He placed a greater value on the program to develop an operational ICBM and, supported by a slowly growing number of military officers, determined that nothing should stand in the way of obtaining this new weapon. The importance of speedily executing this program was emphasized by the launch of Sputnik 2 on 5 November. Weighing more than half a ton and carrying a dog as one-way supercargo, this new satellite exhibited a launch capability beyond expectations.⁴ The possible substitution of a nuclear warhead for Laika the dog generated concern nationwide as Americans realized that the wide oceans no longer provided security from sudden attack. In a televised address two days later, Eisenhower attempted to calm nerves by calling attention to the strength of American forces, citing progress in the ICBM program, and appointing Dr. James Killian, Special Assistant for Science and Technology. Later that month, Eisenhower put Killian in charge of the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), and appointed William Holaday Director of Guided Missiles.⁵ Generally, though, Eisenhower down played the significance of the Russian satellites, and recommended only moderate funding increases for missile research.⁶

Political adversaries were quick to utilize the Sputniks to criticize the President and further their own agendas. Senate Majority Leader Lyndon [24] Johnson emerged as the most visible figure on Capitol Hill during the post-Sputnik scramble. Looking toward the 1960 presidential campaign, Johnson saw the opportunity to push for a boost in defense spending while playing to a national audience. On the day after Sputnik 1 went into orbit, he began organizing an "Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs," by the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee.⁷ During the Subcommittee's hearings Johnson examined a wide range of defense and space related issues, cultivating the idea that Sputnik represented a dangerous challenge to American security, and attacking Eisenhower's conservative fiscal policies. Though Johnson took care to conduct the hearings in a bipartisan manner, they clearly portrayed the Administration in an unfavorable light.⁸

Despite Eisenhower's best efforts and personal feelings, public concern with the space and missile issue grew. On 6 December 1957, in the full glare of the media spotlight, a Vanguard rocket exploded just after liftoff during the first U.S. attempt to orbit a satellite. This failure, despite the fact that the Vanguard system was still undergoing tests, combined with the previous Russian successes to confirm the nation's worst fears. The Soviets, naturally, made the most of the propaganda opportunity, and Eisenhower began to realize that the political situation could not be safely ignored.⁹ Several groups within the Administration set to work.

Widely blamed for letting interservice rivalries permit the Russians to obtain their technological lead, the Defense Department took steps to correct the problem by creating the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). This agency began the difficult task of coordinating the various military space programs.¹⁰ The Air Force portrayed space as just an extension of its operational arena. The ongoing program of heavy booster development for ICBMs and its involvement with the X-series aircraft gave the airmen powerful arguments for the assumption of all U.S. space endeavors. The Army maintained their argument that missiles represented a form of long-range artillery, and used the Vanguard accident to showcase their space abilities. On 31 January 1958 Explorer 1 ascended into orbit atop a Jupiter-C booster designed by Wernher von Braun's rocket team. This group of transplanted German scientists, a large part of the group that designed the V-2, had been working for the U.S. Army since the end of the war and represented one of the most technically advanced cadre of rocket engineers in the country. The Navy, while interested in the potential usefulness of applications satellites for its far-flung operations and stung by the Vanguard failure, seemed more interested in its Polaris program and in not allowing another service to monopolize space. Indeed, this mutual jealousy characterized all three services; none wished to be shut out of the role of space defender, a role certain to entail an increase in funding.¹¹ All jockeyed for position. Both President Eisenhower and Senator Johnson, however, had other ideas.

[25] Eisenhower, already wary of the growing "military-industrial complex," intended that there be separate military and civilian space programs. Johnson, with an eye toward political ramifications (both at home and abroad) concurred. While riding herd on various Congressional proposals, Johnson waited for Eisenhower to make the first move.¹² The task of crafting the Administration's civilian space program rested with Killian and PSAC.

The upper echelons of the NACA, long opposed to any "Buck Rogers" projects, initially felt no more concern over Sputnik than did Eisenhower. The Executive Committee had met at the Wallops Base on 19 September 1957 and obtained the latest information on the hypersonic research program.¹³ The Main Committee held its annual meeting on 10 October, one week after the Soviet launch, and did not discuss the matter.¹⁴ This lack of high level concern stemmed from a combination of factors.

For years the notion of space operations, piloted or not, received the label of science fiction from the public, politicians, and many professionals alike. An in-depth, publicly financed, space research program would not have been approved by the fiscally conservative Eisenhower or a Congress that reflected the opinions of its largely unimaginative pre-Sputnik constituency. PARD and the other interested groups within the NACA fought to justify their limited forays into astronautics to their own Headquarters, who in turn never forgot that the NACA's budget underwent severe scrutiny before the often critical Albert Thomas and his House Subcommittee on Independent Offices Appropriations.

The primary reason the hypersonic program received funding stemmed not from its scientific and engineering potential but from its obvious military significance. The military monopoly on missile research, and the attendant political maneuvers between the services, served to keep the NACA's official goals within the atmosphere, a situation not necessarily to the disliking of ranking Committee members. Technically "innovative" but by nature methodical and by necessity politically conservative, most NACA decision makers regarded space as primarily a military area, and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. If research eventually led the NACA into space the subject could be dealt with at that time; meanwhile why irritate the military, a prime customer and powerful political ally?¹⁵ Not all within the organization viewed the situation in this light however.

Many throughout the NACA disliked the clean-up research necessitated by their close relationship with the military. Some saw space research as a way to return NACA to its roots by emphasizing basic engineering research. There also existed the increasing perception that aeronautical research "was reaching a point of diminishing returns," and that if the NACA could not expand into astronautical research Congress might just decide that expanding military and industrial research capabilities made the NACA superfluous.¹⁶ Years of declining budgets and escalating criticism made many nervous.

[26] Several groups within the NACA labs quietly crafted plans for space research. Abe Silverstein and his associates at Lewis Lab began experimenting with liquid hydrogen and other potential chemical rocket fuels, and unobtrusively studying electric and nuclear propulsion.¹⁷ Ames and Langley studied lifting bodies and hypersonic successors to the X-15 that incorporated space flight capabilities.¹⁸ PARD also looked to space with some of its engineers already having done "back of the envelope calculations" pertaining to obtaining orbital velocities with their rockets.¹⁹ Robert Gilruth later wrote, "I can recall watching the sunlight reflecting off the Sputnik 1 carrier rocket as it passed over my home on the Chesapeake Bay in Virginia. It put a new sense of value and urgency on the things we had been doing."²⁰

The 18 November meeting of the NACA Committee on Aerodynamics (held aboard the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Forrestal) paid much more attention to Sputnik than had the Main Committee the previous month. "The big question to be answered now is how can these views [on accelerating space research] be put across to the NACA and to the Government in order that the NACA be recognized as the national research agency in this field, and be provided with the necessary funds.... the NACA should act now to avoid being ruled out of the field of space flight research." The Committee suggested spotlighting the hypersonics program in general and the X-15 project specifically in order to make the case.²¹

This committee, at least, recognized the need for alacrity. Eight days after this meeting, NACA Chairman James Doolittle testified before Johnson's Preparedness Subcommittee. Interestingly, Doolittle referred to Wallops as "a missile-testing laboratory," during his testimony, in contrast to a 1951 NACA press release that emphatically stated that "this is an aerodynamics range, not a proving ground for missiles."²² Throughout this period, in testimony before many committees and in public statements, Wallops was rarely referred to directly. The programs in progress there received much attention, but the potential offered by the facility and its staff seldom appeared in print. This should not be taken as a sign that Washington knew nothing of Wallops. For example, on 19 November, Acting Engineer-in-Charge John Palmer received a phone call "at quitting time," from the Executive Officer at Chincoteague Naval Air Station. He advised Palmer that a committee from Washington had conducted an inspection of the Navy base that day and wished to inspect the NACA facility next. Not familiar with the "Special Committee on Range Facilities," Palmer called Krieger. After failing to contact Gilruth, Krieger contacted Buckley and the two travelled to Wallops and met the committee on 21 November. The visitors turned out to be a high-level group from the Office of the Secretary of Defense studying the "long-range, over-all situation in regard to adequacy of test ranges in order to assure that facilities were available when needed and to prevent duplication, conflicts, etc." The group's mission also included scouting a location for a new test range as, "the services are being forced out of the [27] Delaware - New Jersey coastal area because of the density of population." This was one of several groups that visited the Station during this time.²³

The Main Committee established a Special Committee on Space Technology on 21 November chaired by H. Guyford Stever from MIT, included such luminaries as von Braun and Van Allen, and also placed Gilruth on the roster. This committee served to coordinate and champion the NACA's attempt to expand into the new arena. The perception began to grow within the organization that space research might be an all or nothing proposition. If they could not win the civilian space mission, they might be absorbed by the group that did; one way or the other, changes loomed on the horizon.²⁴ A number of studies appeared promoting the NACA and setting forth its qualifications and requirements for assuming the space program. One such study noted that, "the Pilotless Aircraft Research Station, ..., is now being used almost exclusively on hypersonic and space flight problems.²⁵ In testimony before Congress witnesses estimated PARD activities to be "90% Space Research."²⁶

The NACA won round one by convincing Killian's Advisory Committee on Government Organization that it should be assigned the space mission. "We recommend that leadership of the civil space effort be lodged in a strengthened and redesignated National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics."²⁷ The NACA's history of close relations with the military and the applicability of its programs and facilities to space research led Killian's Committee to recommend NACA over other contenders such as the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), a proposed "Department of Science and Technology," or private contractual arrangements. On 5 March 1958 Eisenhower gave the recommendation his approval. The NACA prepared for round two of the contest: winning Congressional approval.²⁸

In early February Senator Johnson oversaw the creation of the Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics, of which he became chairman, to provide an organizational vehicle for Senate input into the issue. The House established a similar committee, chaired by Majority Leader John W. McCormack, the following month.²⁹ When the administration's bill proposing the expansion of the NACA into a National Aeronautics and Space Agency went to the Hill, these committees conducted the requisite hearings. After addressing concerns about the NASA's relation to military space programs and patent rights, among other issues, the bill passed both Houses and was signed into law on 29 July 1958.³⁰ The NACA had won the space assignment, but not quite in the form it had desired.

Against their objections the Space Act replaced the old committee system with an administrative system subject to tighter executive branch control and legislative branch oversight. NACA Research Director Hugh Dryden, everyone s expected nominee for the post of Administrator, failed to impress Congress during the hearings on the Space Act and was passed over in favor of T. Keith Glennan, president of Case Institute of Technology and former [28] member of the AEC. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration comprised more than just the NACA. The Vanguard division of the NRL soon transferred in, and NASA assumed the Army's contract with the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in California. After a bureaucratic struggle, the von Braun team came over from the ABMA. The addition of these organizations, each with their own backgrounds and institutional cultures, and the assignment of an outsider to the top post (though Dryden accepted the #2 position), virtually guaranteed that NASA would not be simply a renamed NACA.³¹

The early days of any organization usually involve a fair amount of chaos, and NASA's proved no exception. Integrating established components into a new structure while in the public spotlight and under the pressures of a perceived, if undeclared, space race with national survival seemingly at stake, promised to make Glennan's task a difficult one. His early impression of the NACA seemed consistent with that of many outside the agency. "Although NACA had on its roster some very fine technical people, it had been an agency protected from the usual in-fighting found on the Washington scene." Management he described as, "reasonably able," but they, "had relatively little experience in the management of large affairs.''³² An Ad Hoc Committee on NASA Organization, chaired by Ira Abbott, had been instituted in April 1958 to formulate the NACA's vision of the new space agency. Glennan reviewed the Committee's report with Dryden and the top NACA leadership, then let a contract to a management consulting firm, McKinsey & Co., to review and expand upon it from a perspective outside the agency.³³ The McKinsey Report took fire as having "rubber-stamped" the Abbott Committee report, a critique not altogether unwarranted. One of the many similarities turned out to be the role of Wallops in the new organization.³⁴

In order to minimize interference with ongoing aerodynamic research (especially the militarily vital heat transfer and hypersonics projects) by the new space agency, the organizational plans called for placement of Langley, Ames, Lewis, and HSFS, under one branch of NASA specializing in aeronautical research. A new space research center, staffed by the Vanguard group and a substantial portion of NACA's "space enthusiasts," including Gilruth and many PARD veterans, would carry out the civil space program. Toward this end the plans called for the separation of Wallops from Langley and its situation as an appendage of this new center.³⁵ Indeed, the possibility of locating the new center at Wallops was briefly discussed. However, the lack of sufficient local infrastructure to support the proposed large facility, and the desire to keep the center close to Washington (for political and logistical reasons), doomed this prospect. Nevertheless, a facility "90%" devoted to space research could only be placed within the space portion of the agency.³⁶

The perception of Wallops' role within NASA differed from that of either the old aeronautical centers or the new space centers. Wallops and both the [29] Atlantic and Pacific Missile Ranges constituted "service centers" in the eyes of NASA leaders, bases at which the research centers could conduct experiments, rather than independent centers conducting research of their own. Wallops and the NASA facilities at Cape Canaveral therefore appeared in the organizational charts directly under the space research center's supervision.³⁷

NASA located the new space lab on a parcel of land outside Washington obtained from the Department of Agriculture. Operating first as Beltsville, then as Goddard Space Flight Center, the facility existed for several years largely as a paper organization, until the physical plant could be built. The Vanguard group continued to operate out of the Naval Research Laboratory, and Gilruth's Space Task Group remained at Langley. Though nominally a part of Goddard, "You'll find very few people today who'll realize they were working for Goddard back then, because they weren't."³⁸ Goddard, with buildings under construction and attempting to integrate disparate research programs in one organization, could not begin to direct and support Wallops operations as well. As late as April 1959 Space Center personnel were still in the process of planning their own "future activities at Wallops," and even though many researchers officially at Goddard, especially Gilruth, knew Wallops well, administration of the base could not efficiently be done from Beltsville.³⁹ NASA could not put its programs on hold to allow Goddard time to mature, and the projects at Wallops required expedition.

The first NASA staff conference, held in April 1959, devoted one session to "A Critical Examination of the Organizational Requirements of NASA." A part of this session examined the "Place of Wallops and NASA Staff at Canaveral in the Organization." NASA recognized that, "both Wallops and Canaveral will be concerned with firing the products not only of Beltsville but of other NASA activities." However, "it has not yet been firmly decided where in the organization Wallops and the NASA activity at Canaveral will report."⁴⁰ Perhaps, but the matter surely drew attention. The organizational chart released the following month shows Wallops as an independent entity, coequal with Goddard, under the direct jurisdiction of Abe Silverstein's Office of Space Flight Development at Headquarters.⁴¹ (See appendix 2)

While Wallops thus occupied a new place in the organization, Langley continued to provide administrative, logistical, and engineering support to Wallops for several years. Officially separate, Wallops for all practical purposes continued to operate much as it had all along, as an appendage of Langley.⁴² The effect of Sputnik and the NACA to NASA upheaval therefore proved to be a curious mixture of transformation amid business as usual at the Wallops Station. It has been observed that the people who left work 30 September 1958 NACA employees, returned to work on 1 October NASA employees. The launch log at Wallops does not reflect this change though; projects continued as before.⁴³

[30] Personnel from Langley and Wallops laid plans for a massive expansion of the facilities both on the island and on the Virginia mainland opposite it. The Station represented a prime national space asset at a time when such facilities seemed scarce. Congress appeared willing to fund almost anything to get the suddenly urgent program on track. PARD took advantage of this opportunity by preparing a wish list that included a causeway providing direct access to the island, launch equipment for Thor and Jupiter class liquid-fueled boosters, and service and administrative buildings requiring the purchase of over 1000 acres of land. The estimated cost of the program ran to $24 million.⁴⁴ The House quickly appropriated $1,000,000 for enough rockets to maintain the schedule of operations at Wallops, and more seemed forthcoming.45

Reality soon intruded. Neither President Eisenhower or Representative Thomas intended to allow space projects to bust the budget. Despite the fact that, in these early days, "Congress always wanted to give us more money," NACA officials in April 1958 found themselves in a familiar setting: before the Senate Subcommittee on independent Offices asking for a restoration of funding cuts made by the House.⁴⁶ Apparently some in Congress believed an incremental approach preferable to a crash program. Also, the military began to realize that NASA would not be just a re-named NACA, subservient to the armed forces' desires. Military planners originally worried that the creation of the NACA might draw funds away from their programs. NASA ignited those same concerns, only magnified, in a new generation of senior officers, who began to view the space agency as a competitor.⁴⁷

The first thing deleted from PARD's list was the capability to launch large liquid-fueled boosters from the island. The work load at Wallops remained heavy and showed little sign of abating anytime soon. The plan called for a new launch complex consisting of two pads and a centrally located blockhouse from which to control firings. If one of these pads possessed the capability to support Thor or Jupiter rockets the civilian range would gain an immediate access to orbital spaceflight without having to coordinate activities with the military controlled ranges. Purely civilian science projects could be conducted without interference with, or from, sensitive activities at the Cape.

Both the Congress and the military balked at this plan. Duplication of facilities, especially those requiring significant amounts of money to build, remained intolerable to most legislators, and with expensive complexes rising at the Cape and at Vandenberg Air Force Base, Congress saw little need for such a large scale increase in Wallops' capacity.⁴⁸ Military witnesses reinforced this argument. In response to a direct question about approval of the Wallops expansion one admiral replied, "If they want to keep it on the small sized rockets scale-fine; but if they want to put satellites into space, it should not be done from Wallops Island."⁴⁹ The officers did not want small projects, like those that generally utilized sounding rockets, interfering with [31] the operations of the large ranges, but, they also did not want Wallops to expand into a competitive position.⁵⁰

The Stever Committee, in the course of its evaluation of the NACA's space resources, examined Wallops and considered the role the base might play. They recognized that a launch site situated at a latitude of 37.5 degrees would not be practical for Lunar or interplanetary flights. Though supportive of the plan to equip Wallops for boosters "up to the size of the Redstone," the Committee believed the range best suited "for special work on techniques and components in support of the [civilian space] program." The At antic and Pacific Missile Ranges (the Cape and Vandenberg) would serve as the nation's primary spaceports.⁵¹ This Less than enthusiastic endorsement did not offset Congressional and military concerns, and the expansion underwent "re-evaluation."⁵²

Another reason for the re-evaluation came in the person of the Administrator of' the new Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Elwood Quesada. In May 1958 the Air Force Special Weapons Center approached PARD requesting help with the ARGUS program. Briefly, this experimental program sought to determine the radiation characteristics of small atomic explosions in near space; how the radiation generated by an explosion would interact with the Earth's magnetic fields, rates of decay, and questions of that nature. The program required the detonation of a series of bombs at an altitude of 300 miles. Sounding rockets launched from three locations were needed to record the data. The nature of the experiment required a tight Launch schedule as environmental readings just prior to, and immediately following the explosions (as well as a third launch after a predetermined period of time) were needed. The five stage rocket developed by PARD) for the hypersonics program fit the needs of the Air Force, and Wallops, set to work training launch crews and assembling rockets. Originally not intended to serve as a base for launchings during the operation, the fast approaching deadline mandated by an international ban on atomic air bursts (scheduled to go into force in September 1958) forced planners to forgo a second launch site outside the continental U. S., and included Wallops with Canaveral and Puerto Rico in the firing plan.⁵³

The program , conducted in August and early September, fulfilled Air Force expectations,, and impressed the officers involved with the speed and skill oft the Wallops operation. During the course of the launches, however, the military ordered civil air traffic rerouted to ensure safety and security. The usual procedures for obtaining range clearance for Wallops firings included plenty of advance notice to air traffic controllers, notice that this project could not provide. Because of this, "the pilots and the airlines 'raised the roof,'" incited a backlash not against; the Air Force , but against Wallops.⁵⁴

Difficulties concerning clearance for long-range firings had been occurring for some time as Wallops' capability grew, and the imminent expansion of the base intensified the problem. The diversion of flights during the ARGUS [32] support launches brought the matter to a head. Administrator Quesada suggested restricting future long-range operations to the Cape and scaling back the expansion at Wallops. PARD dealt with this problem m a time tested way; they invited their critics to take a tour of the facilities at the base.⁵⁵ Civil Aeronautics Administration head James T. Pyle and a group of his associates visited the island on 24 November 1958, observed two launches, and listened to Shortal and Krieger detail NASA's plans for Wallops.⁵⁶ On 8 December a NASA group which included Buckley met with Quesada and an FAA contingent which included three CAA members who had taken the tour. "The CAA decidedly was on NASA side during this discussion, ... One of the CAA men stayed after the meeting to tell General Quesada that the use of AMR for the Civilian Space Program would be far worse a problem for the CAA than if the load was divided by the use of Wallops island." Quesada, described as "versed on missile operation, aerodynamic research," relented saying, "he was not going to oppose NASA programs," but indicated that a workable system of coordinating long-range firings must be developed.⁵⁷ Such an agreement was reached in January 1959.⁵⁸

While NASA secured an amicable solution to the problem of range interference with both the FAA and the Navy (concerned about interference with their training areas), the combination of this problem and economic factors led to a decision to drop the large liquid-fueled boosters from Wallops' expansion program.⁵⁹ The planned administrative separation of the base from Langley, and the increase in programs on tap still required a large acquisition of land for offices, shops, tracking Stations, and housing, even without the Thors and Jupiters.

Even before NASA's debut, procedures commenced to appropriate acreage on the mainland opposite the island. Station personnel made contact with a number of residents to obtain permission to conduct surveys, and with local lawyers to conduct title searches.⁶⁰ Wallops' Administrative Officer Joseph Robbins recalled the bad feelings generated at me time: "These people were principally farmers, and they would tell us point blank, 'We don't want you here.'" Not only "unhappy" about losing land, the farmers believed that an expansion of Wallops' operations would drive up the cost of labor m me area.⁶¹

While the Wallops personnel tried to smooth ruffled feathers, several people contacted their Congressional representatives and wrote letters to the local newspapers. A series of polite letters passed back and forth between Administrator Glennan, various other NASA officials, and concerned politicians, including powerful Virginia Senator Harry Byrd.62 The staff both at Headquarters and at the base understood the situation and sympathized with the local resident's problems, but the NASA program lacked firm definition No one knew for sure how much land would ultimately be needed for the Station, and though assured that, "we would not be hiring farm help'', rumors about the effect of the expansion on the local economy ran wild.⁶³

[33] On 9 December 1958 letters went out to twelve individuals notifying them that NASA intended to take possession of plots of land ranging from 11 to 450 acres in size. ⁶⁴

At approximately the same time these letters went out, Wallops personnel received the unexpected news that the Navy intended to close the Chincoteague Naval Air Station (CNAS) An outpost of the Norfolk Naval Air Station, CNAS had been expanded by the Navy m November 1942 as part of the early war build-up. In October 1943 the Bureau of Ordnance arrived, and by 1946 added their Naval Air Ordnance Test Station to the base. After World War 11 the base served mainly as a carrier aircraft training facility.⁶⁵

Spread out over 2000 acres, CNAS was m the midst of renovation when the Sputniks flew. The Navy lengthened one of the three runways from 8,(100 to 10,000 feet and constructed several new test facilities, buildings, and a new hangar. A fiscal 1957 appropriation allotted $170,000 for continuing the upgrades.⁶⁶ The Bureau of Ordnance requested permanent transfer of the north end of Wallops island on 5 May 1958 in reciprocation for the naval transfer of an NACA used portion of Moffett Field to the Ames Lab, a request which the NACA denied.⁶⁷ Congress refused to allocate a requested $770,000 in fiscal 1958 for CNAS, however, and the Navy decided to economize by closing the base.⁶⁸

The potential effects of the closure on Wallops' operations and the surrounding community concerned all in the area. PARD relied on CNAS to provide emergency medical, air terminal, and weather fax services The military maintained a restricted airspace z one around Chincoteague which not only covered the NACA operations, but gave PARD an ally when attempts to alter civil air routes occurred.⁶⁹ One of the primary factors for choosing the Wallops site had been the presence of CNAS. The loss of jobs and money understandably worried local residents, and served to mute criticism of the expansion of the rocket range.⁷⁰

The advantages offered by acquiring the Navy base did not take long to dawn upon planners at NASA Headquarters. The administrative facilities, shops, and needed acreage, to say nothing of the airfield itself, could be obtained for the proverbial song After all, the Space Act authorized the transfer of facilities needed for the space program to NASA, and the obvious economy of recycling CNAS, and saving at least some local jobs would undoubtedly impress Congress. Glennan and his staff moved quickly, and found the Navy receptive to the transfer.⁷¹ On 22 January 1959 Glennan formally requested transfer of the base to NASA. At first, the Navy wished to make continued access to the airfield a prerequisite for the transfer Fearing potential electrical interference with the new, highly sensitive radars planned for Wallops, NASA refused this stipulation, the Navy relented, and the transfer officially took place on 30 June 1959.⁷²

The acquisition of CNAS shifted the perspective of many local residents. "The local newspapers were optimistic about a large influx of industry and the possibility of a second Cape Canaveral on the Eastern Shore."⁷³ Two days after the public announcement of the impending transfer NASA sent letters to most of those expecting to lose land, notifying them that, due to the transfer, NASA no longer needed their land.⁷⁴ We changed [after the announcement of the transfer] from somebody who was no good, to somebody who was real good, because all these people who got laid off all of a sudden were looking for jobs."⁷⁵ Unfortunately, many of the high expectations of the community proved premature and too optimistic NASA already realized that a "second Cape Canaveral" would not be built at Wallops. Agency officials discussed the transfer during their weekly staff meeting on 6 February 1959: -A number of private and public bodies are concerning themselves with the full utilization of Chincoteague in order to minimize the economic impact on the community .. The consensus was that NASA should firm up the specific restrictions which must be placed on other uses as required by the technical requirements of our operations. To the extent other proposed uses are consistent With these requirements, NASA should be as cooperative as possible."⁷⁶

Some resistance to the transfer arose at Wallops itself, as the amount of land and facilities to be acquired far exceeded the amount required.⁷⁷ Everyone involved knew that, for the short-term at least, NASA operations would not rival the Navy's in scope. Accordingly, Headquarters authorized Wallops' to make firm commitments for the hiring of not to exceed twenty-five [35] (25) of the Navy employees of [CNAS] " The civilian complement of the base numbered around 760.⁷⁸ This small number of hires disappointed residents, and generated a formal complaint charging racial discrimination to hoot.

The complaint, filed on behalf of an "anonymous individual" by the Worchester County (Maryland) Civil League, came to the attention of both Administrator Glennan and the President's Commission on Government Employment Policy. Maryland Congressman Thomas Johnson also took an interest in the case.⁷⁹ An investigation and subsequent report satisfied the Committee, as well as the Civic League and Johnson, for no appeal seems to have been made. Most likely the expansion of Wallops' operations created a sufficient number of jobs, "NASA 1960 plans contemplate Em increase of about one hundred in the staff at Chincoteague," to ameliorate the situation.⁸⁰ At the least, no other such charge against Wallops appears in the Administrator's Monthly Progress Report during the duration of that document's publication A number of such charges regarding other NASA facilities do appear, and the Headquarter's Office of the General Council developed an employment non-discrimination policy program in 1960. On 28 September 1960 the Administrator, submitted a report to the Secretary of the Cabinet and wrote a personal letter to the head of each NASA field installation commenting on NASA 's program and urging continued effort in this area.⁸¹

The acquisition of CNAS served to bring about the return of Robert Krieger to offices at the Station. The imminent separation of Langley and Wallops (after the TOSS of many of its "space enthusiasts" to the Space Task Group, Langley reorganized the remnants of PARD into the Applied Materials and Physics Division in December 1959), and the improving local conditions brought Krieger back to the Eastern Shore. He moved into the commanding officer's quarters of Chincoteague immediately following the transfer of the base, and set to work reorganizing his charge.⁸²

The Mechanical Services Unit, which formerly reported to the Mechanical Services Division at Langley, became the Technical Services Division with William Grant as Chief. The Administrative Unit, which likewise previously reported to Langley's Administrative Officer. also became an autonomous Division under Joseph Robbins '. The Research Section, prior to the separation, the only unit under Krieger's direct control, became the Fight Test Division with John Palmer serving as Chief.⁸³ While these new divisions continued to rely on Langley for an uninterrupted flow of support, they gradually became capable of functioning on their own. "Langley didn't just shed us, they supported us completely, ..., they didn't divorce us until we picked up our own capability,..."⁸⁴. This continuity of support proved crucial to Wallops. Events moved quickly and many important projects accelerated their pace during this period.

'The expansion project at Wallops came under the general heading of "Project 2080." This project, one of the earliest commenced by NASA, covered [36] almost all aspects of the physical buildup of the Station.85 The inheritance of CNAS allowed the reprogramming of funds from land acquisition, construction of mainland facilities, and architect's services, to road improvements around the Station, and completion and modification of buildings at the naval base.⁸⁶ This reprogramming resulted m am overall savings of $2.25 million. Scrapping plans for the large boosters saved approximately $1 million, and "lower estimates of instrumentation costs," spared another million. The cost of the expansion project finally settled at $21 million.⁸⁷ Wallops' portion of NASA's construction and equipment budget for fiscal 1959 far exceeded that of any other field center, a situation that never again occurred.⁸⁸

Two urgent parts of project 2080 began almost before the project was approved. A causeway allowing paved access to the island remained am unfulfilled dream from the establishment of the base in 1945. Wallops planners became determined that come what may, the causeway would be built, and the ferries (one of which caught fire in 1953, injuring 14 people) and seaplanes (one of which crashed m 1954, slightly injuring the pilot, and engineer Marvin McGoogan) would be retired.⁸⁹ The other task concerned the extension of the seawall protecting the equipment on the island. Only a few feet above sea level, storms easily damaged facilities on the island The NACA fought an on-going battle against the sea and held their own The expansion of launch facilities and damage to the existing seawall required NASA to move fast to protect their investment.⁹⁰ Despite the funding increase to implement Project 2050, local contractors did not experience quite the boom they had anticipated. The scale of many of the tasks involved in building up the Station simply proved too large for local businesses to handle. While smaller contracts often did go to local companies, the big construction contracts by necessity went to large engineering firms not located on the Eastern Shore.⁹¹ Also the window of opportunity for funding big contracts at Wallops turned out to be brief. NASA requested no funds for construction at the base in the fiscal 1960 budget. Hugh Dryden testified that, "At Chincoteague there are, ..., buildings way beyond anything we can foresee for the use of NASA."⁹²

Expansion at the base involved more than just expansion of the physical plant. Plans also called for modernized, more capable equipment. The important tracking and data relay equipment figured prominently m the extension of Wallops' space role. indeed, the sensitivity of the new equipment called for carefully controlling growth in the immediate vicinity in order to ensure optimum performance.⁹³ Three radars incorporating dishes 60 feet in diameter arose on the mainland opposite the island. Designed and built by MIT's Lincoln Laboratory, two of the three belonged to MIT and operated with funding from ARPA, while NASA operated the third. The NASA dish, designated "Spandar," provided an increased tracking capability required by the continuing hypersonics program and the new space projects.⁹⁴

[37] Telemetry effectiveness improved with the addition of FM/FM, high-gain, and digital systems which vastly increased the amount of data recovered from each flight, and also streamlined the data reduction process.⁹⁵ New range control equipment included a refined launch timing system, an enhanced safety command destruct system, and better optical tracking equipment (telescopes and cameras).⁹⁶

Despite the cancellation of the large boosters from Wallops' plans, construction of the new launch complex proceeded. The pad intended for Thor and Jupiter use retained its importance, albeit in a different way than originally intended. The need to meet me accelerated launch schedule provided sufficient justification for building the pad. The second pad m the new complex, intended for a different vehicle, also became an integral component in me program.

PARD researchers working on me hypersonics program successfully utilized more powerful booster designs. Their success with the five stage, Mach 15 vehicle led to a Mach 18 vehicle and studies on ways to expand capabilities further.⁹⁷ As a matter of routine PARD engineers kept abreast of new solid motor designs under development by different manufacturers, Unlike many of me payloads, Langley personnel could not produce me solid motors they depended upon. They installed electrical systems, aerodynanic structures, and coupled the motors together m a multitude of combinations, but they lacked the facilities to cast the propellant. They obtained motors, usually with the help of the military, from commercial producers. When one of these companies produced a new or uprated design, PARD checked its characteristics for applicability to the flight research program in late 1957, after analyzing several modified motors (including the X-248, slated for the Vanguard launcher), the engineers realized that a four stage combination of these existing motors could give them an orbital capability. The payload would be small, true, but in these early days me ability to put anything into orbit meant advancing knowledge. The fact that some questioned the ability of any solid-fueled vehicle to reach orbit also provided a challenge.⁹⁸

Though inexpensive compared to me large liquid-fueled systems, the new solid design represented a substantial increase in cost over the usual boosters m use at Wallops. The public competition between the Army (von Braun, Jupiter) and the Navy (NRL, Vanguard) teams working to launch a satellite made me PARD design unwelcome.⁹⁹ it stayed on Langley's drawing boards until mid-1958 when me Air Force showed interest m a new sounding rocket to exceed the performance of the existing Javelin booster.¹⁰⁰ PARD proposed the new solid booster, which could perform as either a sounding rocket or an orbital launcher, and the Air Force accepted. Although not all in NASA greeted it with enthusiasm, the "Solid Controlled Orbital Utility Test System," or Scout, became a long-term member of the agency's stable of boosters.¹⁰¹

The Air Force eventually decided to launch their version of the "poor man's rocket" (known as the Blue Scout) from Canaveral, but field level interest in [38] the booster's potential, especially among the space science planners at Goddard, solidified the program at Langley and Wallops. Work on the island's Launch Area #3, the control center, and the upgraded tracking systems necessary to control a launch to orbit, culminated with the 1 July 1960 launch of the first Scout test vehicle. A minor problem gave this first shot a "partially successful" rating, but moving from initial contracts to first launch in about twenty months represented an accomplishment in itself. The Langley engineers soon fixed the problem, and Wallops obtained a significant increase in its operational capability.¹⁰²

As a result of this new capability, a dispute arose within NASA Headquarters over just who should have operational control of the Wallops facility. NASA's original structure included an Office of Aeronautical and Space Research, to which the old NACA centers (except Wallops) reported, and an Office of Space Flight Development to which the space centers reported The transfer of von Braun's team from the Army to NASA, a decision made by President Eisenhower on 21 October 1959, caused a reorganization of the Space Flight Office. Abe Silverstein, Director of the new Office of Space Flight Programs (OSFP), retained three of his subdivisions while the fourth separated to become the Office of Launch Vehicle Programs (OLVP) under Don Ostrander, an Air Force general formerly associated with the ARPA.¹⁰³ The Administrator and his deputies felt that booster development in general, and the Saturn program in particular, needed a more prominent position within the NASA organization. The new Marshall Space Flight Center with the von Braun team, the Saturn program, and NASA's facilities at Cape Canaveral (directed by one of von Braun's associates), became Ostrander's responsibility. Silverstein controlled Goddard, the Space Task Croup (Project Mercury), and administered NASA's contract with the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Wallops' position in this structure became a matter of debated.¹⁰⁴

A 13 July 1959 Headquarters "Summary of Budget Policy Decisions" seemed to leave little doubt about Wallops. "It should be completely understood at all levels that the Wallops Station is an operational service facility and that engineering development programs are not a part of the station's mission . In view of the fact that Wallops is a service installation under the management of Space Flight Development, it is NASA policy that requirements for Wallops operation and support from A&SR or from outside NASA will be made through the SFD headquarters channel." The assumption was made that, "after the first few test Scouts, Wallops will be responsible for the assemble check out and launch of Scout vehicles. Payload check out will] be accomplished by the cognizant development group."¹⁰⁵

When Ostrander organized OLVP in November, however, the imminent acquisition of an orbital capability at Wallops indicated to him that the Office having responsibility for such launch vehicles, as well as NASA launch operations at the Cape and coordination of NASA operations at the Pacific [39] Missile Range, should also take charge of NASA's other range. Silverstein disagreed, and a 22 December meeting between the two attempted to iron-out the question of Wallops' position. "DSFD made a strong plea that W.I. operations remain research oriented and, therefore, should remain under his cognizance.... Agreement on the assignment and responsibility for W. I. was not completely agreed to without reservation by DVDO.''¹⁰⁶

Silverstein acquiesced on Scout and agreed that the Langley-developed booster, and the Goddard-developed Delta, would be transferred to the Marshall center after test flights were complete. Prior to this Scout was slated to go to Goddard after the fourth test flight. Additionally, he agreed that, "all sounding rocket developments [are] to be the responsibility of DVDO.''¹⁰⁷ The research oriented Silverstein, formerly of Lewis Lab, suddenly had to contend with a challenge from the non-NACA portion of NASA interested more in development. Though consigning such developmental issues to Ostrander, Silverstein insisted that, "Sounding rocket launchings would remain the responsibility of [Goddard]."¹⁰⁸ He fought to keep Wallops, and utilized an interesting argument in the process. "Dr. Silverstein pointed out that the launch facilities are a small part of the Wallops installation and that the installation primarily exists as an instrumented range."¹⁰⁹ Wallops neighbors, anticipating another Cape Canaveral at the base, and many civilian researchers looking to Wallops for access to space, would have found that statement curious.

Wallops remained within the OSFP jurisdiction and continued the process of establishing an independent administration. The close ties with Langley continued throughout this transition, despite the situation of the "mother lab" in a separate NASA division. Appointment of budget, claims, and safety officers, as well as officers to certify various formal actions, took precedence during the transfer. Recently hired staff from the naval base filled many of these positions.¹¹⁰ Wallops also received the manuals, rate schedules, forms, and other paper paraphernalia that fuel a bureaucracy. While the NASA employees of today may complain about the increase in their paperwork, such red tape did not spring into existence overnight. Administrative independence required the Wallops staff to execute procedures previously left to Langley.¹¹¹ The two staffs, used to working with each other, accomplished the transfer with a minimum of disruption to the research program. Langley Director H.J.E. Reid set the tone of relations in a memo to his former employee, Krieger. "Langley shares your desire, ..., to effect an orderly transitional period.... We shall be pleased to render whatever support we can during this period and for as long as necessary to insure continuance of your programs in the most efficient manner possible."¹¹² To be sure, Wallops remained small enough to escape the full onslaught of bureaucracy, and informal lines of communication still provided a quick means of resolving problems in these pre-Apollo days. Issues regarding patent and legal councils, for example, continued to be handled at Langley as Krieger [40] deemed the need for such services at Wallops insufficient to warrant full-time positions at the base.¹¹³ In March 1964, five years after formal separation of the facilities, Langley agreed to assist Wallops in the evaluation of the proposals for automatic data processing equipment.¹¹⁴

Adding to the administrative jumble was the fact that Wallops received operational direction and funding from multiple sources. While Silverstein's OSFP provided nominal oversight of the base and its flight operations, the tracking and data relay functions came under the purview of Edmund Buckley. In 1959 Buckley moved from Langley's IRD to NASA Headquarters to oversee the important tracking and data acquisition function for the space agency. As Assistant Director of Flight Operations under Silverstein, Buckley became "the contact for Wallops. at Headquarters.¹¹⁵ Buckley's office grew more autonomous until, in 1961, the Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition became an separate Headquarters division. Au the while Buckley, ever "a great friend" of Wallops, watched over the radars and telemeters at the base, cleared their funding, defended them before Congress, and generally saw to it that the equipment was kept modem and fully utilized.¹¹⁶

This meant that the Wallops staff not only provided services to a plethora of customers, but also answered to multiple segments of toe NASA hierarchy, just as they had previously answered to differing divisions within Langley. They prepared proposed budgets, and justifications, in components at the base, then worked with the appropriate Headquarters office to finalize a given component. Then Headquarters would clear the budget with the Executive branch Bureau of the Budget. Once approved by the President, the Headquarters staff went before Congress. In this early period, Wallops personnel rarely testified before Congress, hence me value of friends like Dryden and Buckley who did.¹¹⁷ The loose informal procedure (at their level) gave Wallops flexibility in planning operations. This promoted efficiency but impressed some in the established bureaucracy as an undisciplined way to operate.

Executive and Legislative desire to reign in the NACA constituted one consideration during the planning for NASA.¹¹⁸ The General Services Administration conducted a "preliminary review ... of stores operations," at several NASA installations, including Wallops, in July and August 1959.¹¹⁹ In August Headquarters audited radar usage at the base, and in December surveyed use of overtime.¹²⁰ In February 1960, an inventory control conference was held and included Ames, Lewis, and Wallops, which became the first to enact NASA's inventory control system.¹²¹ During the NACA era, Wallops would have taken little notice of such proceedings, leaving them to Langley. Now, independence required Wallops to deal with these affairs. The continued support of Langley, and the respect of highly placed "friends" helped Wallops through this hectic time.

Krieger and company needed all the support they could get. A flood of research projects, released and made respectable by Sputnik, began to pour [41] into NASA, and many of them required the utilization of the Station. The customer base, and staff, were growing so quickly that by late 1960 former PARD Chief Shortal sent Langley engineers to Wallops to acquaint the personnel at the rocket range with, "the type of research being conducted by AMPD at Wallops.''¹²² Langley projects like Scout and Trailblazer were joined by projects from other sources. Goddard initiated its space science program, Project Mercury testing began, and NASA encouraged universities to utilize the range.¹²³ Military projects did not suddenly disappear with the formation of the civilian NASA. While the creation of ARPA and the general elevation of the country's missile research facilities served to make Wallops somewhat less vital to the armed forces, military programs continued to come to the base. In 1958 the blast loads program (which utilized large explosive charges to simulate atomic airbursts) started testing an upgraded facility, which commenced operations in 1960.¹²⁴ Preflight Jet ran tests of B-58 bomber models for the Air Force, and tests of the Navy's Polaris missile also required this facility, as well as both rocket model and helium gun tests.¹²⁵ Sonic boom research flights offshore used the new radar systems that were coming on line.¹²⁶

During Congressional testimony, NASA Director of Business Administration, Albert Siepert, answered questions concerning possible adverse effects of the civilian program at Wallops on military testing by stating, "If they [the DOD] wish to use [Wallops] we would be happy to work out arrangements."¹²⁷ It would appear that NASA had plenty of practice making such arrangements. However, in November 1959 the Air Research and Development Command (ARDC, an Air Force organization) liaison at Langley recommended stationing a liaison at Wallops, and throughout this period the military continued to supply boosters and other equipment to the Station.¹²⁸

Not all proposed projects actually flew from the base, though. Safety continued to be a prime consideration in spite of the rapid pace. A Lewis proposal to test an engine utilizing hydrogen-fluorine fuel at Wallops posed a serious danger due to the toxic nature of the chemicals. Lewis researchers felt using the isolated island minimized the hazards of investigating the potential of this engine, hazards which would require the complete evacuation of the island during each test and a westerly wind to carry the dangerous exhaust gasses offshore. Concerns voiced by Krieger, and increasing research into hydrogen-oxygen engines led Abe Silverstein to cancel these test plans.¹²⁹

The culmination of Wallops expansion came with the launch of Explorer IX on 16 February 1961. An inflatable sphere designed to study atmospheric density, this satellite became the first to ride into orbit atop an all solid-fueled vehicle, and made Wallops the third U.S. range with an orbital capability.130 Enlarged, modernized, and independent, Wallops, like the rest of NASA, entered the 1960's anticipating a bright future.

1. Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York: Basic Books, inc., 1985), 60.

2. The Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA, the von Braun team) placed high priority on orbital flight, and pursued Project Orbiter. See: Frederick I. Ordway and Mitchell R. Sharpe, The Rocket Team (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1979), 374-76. The Naval Research Laboratory represented the U.S. in the IGY effort with their Project Vanguard, see Green and Lomask, 25-56. RAND Corporation, originally an Air Force study group that became an independent research corporation, produced a series of reports detailing differing types of satellites throughout the 1950's. See, for example, Merton E. Davis and William R. Harris, RAND's Role in the Evolution of Balloon and Satellite Observations Systems and Related U.S. Space Technology (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., 1988). Different NACA space aspirations will be discussed later in this chapter. It should be noted, however, that none of these projects created much interest outside of their own project offices.

3. Bulkeley, 67-g for the Soviet nuclear program Green and Lomask, 192-97; McDougall, 131; "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape 3a: 376; for professional reaction to Sputnik The reaction of those in the business seems to have been more irritation and frustration than unanticipated, out of-the-blue shock.

4. Not only the satellite went into orbit on the Russian shots, but also the spent final stage of the launch vehicles. Green and Lomask, 194; McDougall,150.

5. Enid Curtis Bok Schoettle, "The Establishment of NASA," in Knowledge and Power: Essays on Science and Government, ed. Sanford A. Lakoff (New York: The Free Press, 1966), 190. See also, McDougall, 150-) 51. PSAC had been part of the Office of Defense Mobilization until the Sputniks caused Eisenhower to move it into the White House. Killian, from MIT, had headed a Technological Capabilities Panel for the Science Advisory Committee in 1954 (Roland, I: 280); and Holaday, "had been responsible for the missile programs of the Department of Defense, ...," (Bulkeley, 10-113.

6. Schoettle, 191; McDougall, 138-48,

7. Schoettle, 185 86; McDougall, 149-56.

8. Schoettle, 222-23.

9. Green and Lomask 203-12, for the Vanguard failure. McDougall, 153-64, for Eisenhower's reactions during this period.

10. Roland, 1: 296-99; Schoettle, 193-99.

11. Schoettle, 199-212, covers the services' differing points of view. Ordway and Sharpe, 382-86, for Explorer 1. Von Braun's team lost the IGY assignment to the Navy's Vanguard team, but quietly continued working toward the goal of launching a satellite. After the Vanguard explosion, they received permission to proceed on the project. The term applications satellite refers to a spacecraft with a specific, non research mission, such as communications or navigation satellites. The Polaris program involves the development and deployment of a submarine launched nuclear missile.

12. Schoettle, 228-29; McDougall, 173. For Eisenhower's Farewell Address, in which he warns against the ''military industrial complex," see U. S., President. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 1953), Dwight D.Eisenhower, 1960 61, 1035-40.

13. Shortal, 523; Roland, I. 290.

14. Roland, l: 290.

15. Virginia P. Dawson, "The Push from Within; Lewis Research Center's Transition to Space," in A Spacefaring Nation: Perspectives an American Space History and Policy, ed. Martin J. Collins and Sylvia D. Fries, Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1991), 163. See also: Roland, 1: 252-54; Hansen, 376.

16. Schoettle, 219, for quotation. See also, Roland, l: 259 81, 290-92.

17. Dawson, 172-75.

18. Hansen, 367-81; Hartman, 266-70. A lifting body is an aerodynamic shape that integrates the fuselage and wings in the production of the lifting force; the Space Shuttle is an example of a lifting body.

19. "Spinak, et al., " OHI, Tape la: 380.

20. Robert R. Gilruth, From Wallops island to Project Mercury, 1945-1958: A Memoir," in History of Rocketry and Astronautics, American Astronautical Society History Series, vol. 7, part 2, ed. R. Cargill Hall (San Diego, CA.: American Astronautical Society, 1986), 462. Dr. Hansen also noted this quotation on page 373 of his work.

21. Minute of Meeting, NACA Committee on Aerodynamics,18-20 November 1957 in folder "Preliminary Space Flight Expansion Notes,'' Floyd I. Thompson Papers, Langley Research Center Historical Archives Quotation is on page 17. This record group is hereafter cited as FLT Papers. Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., James M. Grimwood, and Charles C. Alexander, This New Ocean: A History of Project Mercury, Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1966), 56, describes the Committee on Aerodynamics as the most influential of NACA's various technical committees."

22. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs, Hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 85th Cong. 1st sess., 5711-255, p.127, for Doolittle's testimony. Memo for the Press, "The NACA's Pilotless Aircraft Research Station, Wallops island Virginia," 17 May 1951, in folder Wallops and Related Material,- in the Milton Ames Collection, Langley Research Center Historical Archives. This record group is hereafter cited as MA Collection..

23. Memorandum, Robert L. Krieger to Associate Administrator Langley, 12 December 1957, in folder Wallops, January 55 - February 58 in RGA181 -l(C). Robert Gutheim, Chair of the Committee, "repeatedly gave assurances that because of the 'well recognized uniqueness and importance of NACA's work' nothing would be done to interfere with the NACA." For other groups see "Robbins," Oral History Interview, Tape la: 170.

24. Roland, I: 292, II: 458; Hansen, 376-77. There is a photograph of the Stever Committee on Wallops island in Shortal, 592. The Committee inspected the base on 28 October 1958.

25. Report, "NACA Research into Space," 10 February 1958, in folder "NACA Documents - 1958," in box "Administrative History: Pre-NASA Documents, NACA/DOD," in NHO. Quotation is on page 6. This report is an extract from an originally classified report with the same name issued in December 1957. A copy of this earlier report is in folder "January - December 57," Wallops box #4, WFFRC. Other pertinent reports include: "A National Research Program for Space Technology," "Resolution on the Subject of Space Flight," (both in FLT Papers); "A Program for Expansion of NACA Research into Space Flight Technology with Estimates of the Staff and Facilities Required," (reprinted in Roland, II: 730-64); and Air Mail, Floyd L. Thompson to Paul Purser, 29 January 1958, "Contemplated Expansion of Langley and W.I. Facilities Related to Space Flight Research Programs," (in folder "January - May 58," Wallops box #4).

26. U.S., Congress, House, Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration, Hearings before the Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration on H.R. 11881, 85th. Cong., 2nd. sess., 5804-15H, p.404. The chart on this page gives the 90% figure. This figure recurs throughout the period and was arrived at by classification of all rocket launches, regardless of mission, as "space related activity." See also, Shortal, 593.

27. Memorandum for the President, "Organization for Civil Space Programs," The President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization, 5 March 1958, reprinted in James R. Killian, Sputnik. Scientists, and Eisenhower (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1977), Appendix #3, quotation on page 281. See also, McDougal, 171.

28. Ibid.

29. Schoettle, 229-31; McDougal, 169-76. These special committees later became standing.

30. Schottle, 260-61. This work provides an in-depth examination of the passage of the Space Act. The Space Act is reprinted in Robert L. Rosholt, An Administrative History of NASA,1958-1963 (Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1966), Appendix A.

31. Rosholt, 40-48; Roland, I: 299-300; McCurdy, 11-25.

32. T. Keith Glennan, The First Years of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration: Events and Impressions as Recalled by T. Keith Glennan. 1st Administrator of NASA (Cleveland: 1964), I: 6, in folder 002967 "Glennan Diary (1958-January 1960)," in file "Administrators, Glennan," in NHO.

33. Rosholt, 39-42, 48-50. Copies of both the Abbott Committee and McKinsey & Co. reports are in the NASA History Office. Neither directly discusses Wallops.

34. Rosholt, 33, for rubber-stamp criticism. It would be interesting to determine whose copy of the McKinsey Report found its way into NASA's archive. There are many, often critical, handwritten marginal notes apparently written by whomever reviewed the report, one of which states, "This is text book stuff - and not worth paying McKinsey to summarize for us." (Opposite page 2-2).

35. Shortal, 615. Also, charts in the Abbott and McKinsey reports depict Wallops under the space center's jurisdiction. See also, Rosholt, 48-50.

36. "Robbing," OHI, Tape la: 190; Shortal, 616-17.

37. Rosholt, 334-37, reprints eight organizational charts dated 18 July 1958 to 23 March 1959, all of which show Wallops listed under the space projects center. The final two charts, dated 29 January and 23 March 1959, also place operations at the Cape under this center (at this time NASA rented facilities at the Cape from the Air Force). The original charts are in NHO.

38. "Spinak, et al," OHI, Tape la: 497, statement made by Abraham Spinak. See also Rosholt, 54-55. The Space Task Group will be discussed in further detail m Chapter 3, below.

39. Letter, G. E. MacVeigh to R W. Hooker, 2 April 1959, requesting "various prints of different Wallops Island activities," so that the Beltsville Space Center could "plan our future activities." In folder "Special Files, April - June 59," in RGA181-l(S).

40. Minutes of Session IV, NASA Staff Conference 2-5 April 1959, in box "NASA Staff Conferences,' in NHO. The list of attendees at this conference includes Reid and Thompson from Langley, DeFrance from Ames, Sharp from Lewis, Williams from HSFS, Pickering from JPL, and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development (Homer). None of the staff from Wallops were invited despite the fact that the meeting was held in Williamsburg, Virginia.

41. Rosholt, 338, for reprint of chart dated 1 May 1959.

42 "Spinak, et al." OHI, Tape la: 415 580; "Robbins," OHI, Tape la: 182 390; Shortal, 597-615.

43. Rosholt, 44, for observation about NASA employees. The launch log consists of two ledger books found in the Wallops Public Information Office. The entries are handwritten by John (Jack) Palmer.

44. Shortal, 596. Supporting documentation can be found in folder VIII "NASA Budget FY 1959, FY 1960," in file tray "Budget, General Policy Planning, Chronologic, miscellaneous, FY 1959, FY 1960, FY 1961," in NHO. This file tray hereafter cited as "file tray NASA Budget." See also: US., Congress, Senate, Special Committee on Space and Astronautics, Construction of Aeronautical and Space Research Facilities by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, S. Rept. 2076 m accompany H.R 13450, 85th Cong., 2nd. sess., 5807-315.

45. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Second Supplemental Appropriations Bill for 1958. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 85th Cong., 2nd sess.. 5801-27H. On page 138-9 Dryden notes that prior m Sputnik the military services had been providing motors m Wallops -without reimbursement." However, just when PARD needed more motors, "an internal accounting system in Defense," made it necessary for NACA m pay for the rockets.

46. McDougall, 201, for quotation from Glennan's diary. US., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1959. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations on H. R. 11574, 85th Cong., 2nd sess., 5804-305, 170 79.

47. McDougall, 195-206. For concerns about NACA's creation see Roland, I: 5-25.

48. U.S., Congress, House, Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration, Authorizing Construction for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Hearings before the House Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration on H.R. 13619, 85th Cong., 2nd. sess., 5808-OlH, 28-29; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1961 NASA Authorization. Hearings before the House Committee on Science and Astronautics on H.R.10246, 86th Cong., 2nd. sess., 6002-17H, 46-47, for examples of testimony regarding facilities duplication. Shortal, 147, for NACA refusal to establish a West Coast range.

49. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Astronautics and Space Science, Investigation of Governmental Organization for Space Activities, Hearings before a Senate subcommittee of the Committee on Astronautics and Space Science, S. Rept. 806, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 5908-25S, 310-11.

50. Ibid.

51. Stever Committee Working Paper, "Launching Sites for Space," 17 March 1958, in folder "NACA Committee on Space Technology Working Group Papers," in box "Administrative History: Stever Committee Report 1958/Minutes," in NHO. Note that the table of launch sites in this report does not include Wallops.

52. For evidence of the re-evaluation of Wallops' expansion see Glennan's testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Government Organization for Space Activities, page 49 of 5803-24S as cited in note 49 above. See also: Shortal, 626.

53. Shortal, 573-80, for details of "Project Jason," Wallops' portion of the ARGUS program. The atomic explosives were launched from a ship at sea, and timed to explode so that readings could also be obtained from the orbiting Explorer IV satellite.

54. Shortal, 580.

55. "Robbing," OHI, Tape la: 508-30.

56. Memorandum, J. Thomas Markley to Associate Director Langley, 24 November 1958, in folder "Wallops, March - December 58," in RGA181-l(C).

57. Memorandum with attachments, J. Thomas Markley for the Record, 23 December 1958, in folder "Wallops, March - December 58," in RGA181-l(C). See also in same folder, Memorandum, Clotaire Wood to Administrator, 18 December 1958.

58. Letter of Agreement, Wallops Station and New York Regional Center, 1 March 1959, in folder "Wallops, January - December 59," in RGA181-l(C). See also in this file letters dated 12 February, 12 June, and 9 July 1959 regarding this subject. For communications between the Navy and NASA on Wallops clearance see: Letter, Thomas B. Combs (Chief of Naval Operations) to NASA, 21 November 1958; Memorandum, J. Thomas Markley to Associate Director, 24 January 1959: Letter, Edmund C. Buckley to CNO, 20 March 1959; all in folder "Special File, January -March 1959," in RGA181-l(S). An interesting overview on the topic is found in Memorandum, H. R. Brockett for Files, 19 September 1960, in chronologic file "Judy - December 1960," in box "NASA Headquarters Organization, O.A.R.T. (cont.), O.T.D.A., O.S.C.," in NHO. Paragraph 5 states, "A final coordination procedure which Wallops handles is that of fallouts outside of U.S. control. Tab D Presents the procedure followed which is based on methods followed by the Russians. As can be seen, this has the sanction of the FAA and is followed by Wallops when it applies." This box in NHO is hereafter cited as "NASA HQ box #1."

59. See Buckley's letter to the CNO, cited Ibid.

60. There are a number of handwritten form letters dated 30 June 1958 granting the director, Langley Aeronautical Laboratory permission to conduct surveys on land near state highway 680, in Wallops box #4. For contact with local lawyers see: "Robbing," OHI, Tape la: 208.

61. "Robbing," OHI, Tape la: 208-40.

62. Letter, E. Almer Ames to Harry Flood Byrd, 31 July 1958; Letter, Harry F. Byrd to H.J.E. Reid, 5 August 1958; Letter with enclosure, H.J.E. Reid to Harry F. Byrd, 7 August 1958; in folder "Special File, May - August 1958," in RGA181I(S). See also: Letter, J.F. Victory to Howard W. Smith, 12 September 1958; Letter, T. Keith Glennan to A. Willis Robertson, 24 September 1958; Letter, T. Keith Glennan to A. Willis Robertson, 7 October 1958,: Letter, T. Keith Glennan to Harry F. Byrd, 8 October 1958; in folder "Reading File, July - December 1958," in box "1958-59 Chron. Files," in NHO. "Wallops Island Project Opposed," Norfolk-Virginia Pilot #17, 24 September 1958. Not all correspondence was negative, one man wrote offering to sell property to NASA for housing at Wallops; Letter, Paul J. Sterling to NASA, 14 October 1958; Letter, W. Kemble Johnson to Paul J. Sterling, 17 October 1958; in folder "Wallops, March - December 58," in RGA181 I(C). "What About Wallops Island," Worchester Democrat, 18 September 1958. Memorandum, Robert L. Krieger for Associate Director, 26 September 1958, in folder "January - December 1958," in Wallops box #4.

63. "Robbing," OHI, Tape la: 208-40; Shortal, 617.

64. Copies of these letters are in folder "Reading File July - December 58," in box "1958-59 Chron. Files," in NHO. See also: Letter, T. Keith Glennan to U.S. Attorney General, 30 January 1959, in folder "Reading file January 1959," box "1958-59 Chron. Files," in NHO.

65. U.S. Navy, Bureau of Yards and Docks, Building the Navy's Bases in World War II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), 237-38. Paolo E. Coletta, ed., United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Domestic (West Port, CN.: Greenwood Press, 1977), 114-16. Shortal, 616.

66. U.S., Congress, Conference, Military Construction Act of 1956, Conference Report to accompany H. R. 9893, H. Rept. 2641, 84th Cong., 2nd sess., 5607-07C, p. 6.

67. Letter, H. F. McKay to H. J. E. Reid, 5 May 1958; Memorandum, Robert L. Krieger to Associate Director, 13 May 1958; Memorandum, H. J. E. Reid to NACA, 16 May 1958; Letter, Hugh L. Dryden to H. F. McKay, 18 June 1958; in folder "Wallops, March - December 58," in RGA181-l(C). The Moffett transfer was apparently unaffected by the denial; Hartman, 316.

68. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, A Bill for Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1958, H.R. 9131, 85th Cong., 1st. sess., 5706-03S, p. 306, for funding deletion. Joseph Robbins indicated his belief that the Navy closed CNAS due to general budget cutbacks; "Robbing," OHI, Tape la: 240. See also, "Anchors Aweigh," The Washington Post and Times Herald, 14 January 1959, A 1 8.

69. Memorandum, J. Thomas Markley to M. E. Phillips, 17 April 1959; Memorandum, Robert L. Krieger to Associate Director Langley, 7 April 1959; for the effect of the CNAS closure on Wallops, both are in folder "Wallops, January - December 59," in RGA181-l(C). For Navy-NACA cooperation on range clearance see: Letter (originally classified), H. J. E. Reid to Cmdr. John F. Betak, 4 April 1958, in folder "Special File, March - April 58," in RGA181 I(S); Letter, John Betak to Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 5 August 1958, in folder "January 57 to December 57," in "Wallops box #4." Commander Betak was the Naval member of the New York Regional Airspace Subcommittee. See also a series of letters concerning meetings of this subcommittee in folder "Wallops, March - December 58," in RGA181-l(C).

70. "Robbing," OHI, Tape la: 240-323.

71. National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, sec. 302, a. Letter, Thomas S. Gates, Jr. to T. Keith Glennan, 9 January 1959, in binder "December 58 January 59," in box "Administrator's Staff Meeting Minutes (October 58 December 59)," in NHO. Gates was Secretary of the Navy. This binder includes minutes of the meeting held 19 January 1959, and contains staff paper #59-4, "Acquisition of Chincoteague Naval Air Station." The box is hereafter cited as "Staff Meetings box."

72. See minutes of staff meeting cited Ibid. Letter, T. Keith Glennan to I homes S. Gates, Jr., 25 February 1959, Letter, F. A. Bantz to T. Keith Glennan, 5 March 1959; in folder "Wallops, January - December 59," in RGA181 l(C). "License for Use of Real Property by other Federal Agencies," Noy(R) 65516, Department of the Navy to NASA, 11 June 1959, in folder "June December 59," in Wallops box #4.

73. Shortal, 617.

74. NASA Press Release, "NASA Will Acquire Chincoteague Naval Air Station," 24 January 1959, in folder OW-050000-02 "Wallops Island Flight Center (NASA)," in the Space History Collection, National Air and Space Museum. Copies of letters to seven of the twelve landowners who had received notification of NASA's intent to acquire portions of their land are in folder "Reading File January 1959," in box "1958 59 Chron. Files," in NHO. Not all of the landowners received the good news. NASA still needed some land on the mainland for the causeway and radar installations.

75. "Robbing," OHI, Tape la: 250.

76. Minutes of Administrator's Staff Meeting, "Report on the Status c>f Chincoteague Transfer," 6 February 1959, in binder "December 58 - June 59," in Staff Meeting box. See also; Memorandum, E. C. Buckley to A. F. Siepert, 2 March 1959, in folder "Wallops January 58 - December 59," in RGA181-l(C). In "Wallops Made Key Space Site," The Washington Post and Times Herald, 13 September 1958, D 2, Krieger explicitly stated, "It won't be another Cape Canaveral."

77. "Robbing," OHI, Tape la: 280; "Milliner," OHI, Tape la: 130.

78. Memorandum, Albert F. Siepert to Wallops Station, 19 May 1959, in folder "Wallops January 59 - December 59," in RGA181-l(C). Siepert was Director of Business Administration at NASA Headquarters. For the complement of CNAS see: Press Release, J. E. Robbins to George McMath, 26 January 1959, in folder "January - May 1959," in Wallops box #4.

79. Letter, James F. Gleason to Thomas F. Johnson, 27 March 1959, in folder "Special File, January - March 59," in RGA181-l(S). See also; "NASA Administrator's Progress Report, August 1959," Part 1, 16.2; "NASA APR, October, 1959," Part 1, 16.2; both in collection of "Administrator's Monthly Progress Reports," in NHO. Letter, Cecil A. Duverney to Samuel T. Daniels, 25 June 1959; Letter, Ross Clinchy to Paul G. Dembling, 16 July 1959; Letter, Paul G. Dembling to Joseph Robbins, 17 July 1959; all in folder "Special File, July - August 59," in RGA181 - I(S). Cecil A. Duverney, M.D. was President of the Worchester County Civic League. Samuel T. Daniels was Executive Secretary of the Maryland Commission on Interracial Problems and Relations. Ross Clinchy was Executive Director of the President's Commission on Government Employment Policy (which became The President's Committee c>n Equal Employment Opportunity on 6 April 1961). Paul G. Dembling was the Employment Policy Officer at NASA Headquarters.

80. For NASA hiring plans at Wallops see Gleason's letter to Congressman Johnson as cited Ibid. For hiring criteria in use at Wallops during this time see; "Robbing," OHI, Tape la: 240-323. Without compilation of a more complete set of records, such as the demographics of CNAS under Navy management or testimony from the individual making the allegation, determination of the validity of the charge can not accurately be made. Doubtless, few if any African Americans were hired from CNAS, (none of the photos that I have examined from this period show any black researchers or employees). To explain this situation as resulting from either: a conscious policy of discrimination (of which I have no evidence); an unconscious practice of discrimination (possible, owing to the nature of race relations in the U.S. in general at the time); or simply the unavoidable consequence of using a limited personnel budget to hire specialists from a few qualified applicants (few of whom would likely have been other than white due to the aforementioned tenor of racial relations) is a judgement that I can not make based on my current information.

81. "NASA APR, November 1960," Part 1, 16.2. The APR appeared monthly from July 1959 to December 1963, and hereafter will be cited by the initials APR and the date of issue.

82. Shortal, 599, 622-23.

83. Memorandum, T. Keith Glennan to Robert L. Krieger, 1 May 1959, in folder 004681, file tray "Centers, Wallops Flight Facility," in NHO.

84. "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape la: 560; "Robbing," OHI, Tape la: 345. See also: Memorandum, H. J. E. Reid to Robert L. Krieger, l 2 June 1959, in folder "Special Files, April - June 59," in RGA181-l(S).

85. Memorandum, H. J. E. Reid to Paul G. Dembling, 30 October 1958; Shortal, 624-31.

86. Memorandum, Robert L. Krieger to Ralph Ulmer, 21 July 1959; "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape la: 445-90; "Robbing," OHI, Tape la: 392-410.

87. Shortal, 624-28. The implementation of Project 2080 was delayed briefly due to the range clearance controversy. One of Edmund Buckley's assistants passed an informal note requesting permission to proceed on 2080 to Hugh Dryden during an administrative meeting. Dryden wrote, "Yes, HLD," on the note, and 2080 commenced. Shortal references this note, and Spinak produced a copy of it during our interview.

88. Data Book l, 168.

89. Shortal, 31-2, 71,628, for causeway construction. Shortal notes that the causeway was constructed along the route chosen in 1945. See also; page 197 for the boat explosion, and 200 for the seaplane mishap (Engineer McGoogan was interviewed for this project).

90. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1959, Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 85th Cong., 2nd. sess., 5802-18H, 566-71. See also, Shortal, 624.

91. "Robbing," OHI, Tape Ib: 150.

92. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1960. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences on S.1582 and H.R. 7007, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 5905-21S, 791-93, quotation is on page 792. See also: Memorandum, H. J. E. Reid to R. E. Ulmer, 18 March 1959, in folder "Wallops, January - December 59," in RGA181-l(C); U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1960, Hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on H.R. 7978, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 5907-13S, 26-29, during this hearing Senator Robertson questions Glennan, Dryden, Siepert, and Budget Office Ulmer about the affect of NASA's program on the communities surrounding Wallops.

93. Letter, E. C. Buckley to A. F. Siepert, 2 March 1959, in folder "Wallops, January 58 - December 1959," in RGA181-l(C).

94. MlT's Lincoln Lab was founded in 1951. "Funded largely by the Air Force, the Laboratory's field of work was to be the scientific and technical problems of air defense, and particularly of radar." Bulkeley, 33. "Spandar" stood for SPace rANge raDAR, Letter, Floyd L. Thompson to Robert L. Krieger, 31 October 1962, in folder "Special File October 1962 - April 1963," in RGA181-l(S). For good insights into the radar and tracking function at Wallops see: Memorandum, John C. McFall, Jr. to Associate Director,4 May 1965, in folder "Wallops, January to June 46 [sic]," in RGA181-l(C); Memorandum, Robert D. Briskman for the Record, 27 July 1960, in "Chron. File, July - December 60," in NASA HQ box #1; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1962. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 6104-19H, p. 1128-31.

95. Telemetry systems utilizing frequency modulation (FM) provided greater clarity than older systems using amplitude modulation (AM). High-gain systems allowed a large volume of data to be received, and digital recording systems began to replace old mechanical "syncro-data" recording systems allowing more data to be registered. Reduction of data took place at Langley during this initial period, with "computers" (personnel, usually female, who performed the tedious mathematics) using a mechanical calculator called a "Freeden" to convert the recorded information into usable form. The introduction of early electronic computers accelerated this process. "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape lb: 290-420. See also: Hallion, 10-11; Hansen, 84, 207; for "computers."

96. Report, "NASA Staff Conference, Monterey, California, 3 5 March 1960," 61, in box "NASA Staff Conferences," in NHO. Data Book I, 484-5.

97. Shortal, 706.

98. Shortal, 706-9. Ordway and Sharpe state that Hermann Oberth, Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, and Robert Goddard (the Big Three of rocketry), "proved that solid-propelled rockets could never be used to reach outer space," 380-81.

99. Shortal, 707.

100. The Javelin was a four stage vehicle capable of reaching nearly 1000 miles altitude. A design that developed simultaneously, designated Journeyman, was canceled by the Air Force, then revived by Goddard, but saw only limited use at Wallops. Ibid., 702-4.

101. Linda Neuman Ezell, NASA Historical Data Book. Volume II: Programs and Projects 1958-1968 (Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1988), 61-67. Cited hereafter as Data Book II. The four stage Scout as originally developed could place a 130 pound payload into a 320 mile high orbit. Used as a probe, it could lift a similar payload to a height of nearly 2000 miles; lighter payloads could be lifted higher still. Presidential Science Advisor George Kistiakowski noted in his diary that the Scout "vehicle program looked sensible enough, although it is obvious that nobody wanted to use the relatively cheap Scout and so we will probably have this vehicle developed but not used.... When [NASA doesn't] have good ideas they build expensive equipment." George B. Kistiakowski, A Scientist in The White House (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 110.

102. "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape 2b: 380-450; NASA Release #60-285, "Address by Maj. Gen. Don R. Ostrander, USAF," 25 October 1960, 6-7, in folder "Launch Vehicles, Office of," in box "NASA HQ. Organizations: O.L.V., O.A.S.T., O.A.R.T.," in NHO. This box hereafter cited as NASA HQ box #2.

103. Rosholt, 115-16.

104. Ibid., 223. See also: McCurdy, 17-20.

105. Headquarters Staff Report, "Summary of Budget Policy Decisions," undated (probably 13 July 1959), 3-4, in folder VIII "NASA Budget: FY 1959, FY 1960," in file tray NASA Budget, in NHO.

106. Memorandum, Abraham Hyatt for Files, 23 December 1959,2, in folder "Launch Vehicles. Office of," in NASA HQ. box #2. DSFD refers to Director Space Flight Development (Silverstein), and DVDO is Director Vehicle Development and Operations (Ostrander).

107. Ibid., 3.

108. Memorandum, D. D. Wyatt for the Record, 23 December 1959, 2, in folder "Launch Vehicles, Office of," in NASA HQ box #2. This memo and the one cited Ibid., provide the interesting opportunity to examine the meeting from two differing points of view. Hyatt worked for Ostrander, and Wyatt worked for Silverstein.

109. Ibid., 2.

110. "Robbing," OHI, Tape la: 182-208, Memorandum, Robert L. Krieger to H. J. E. Reid, 3 June 1959, in folder "June - December 59," in Wallops box #4; Memorandum, H. J. E. Reid to NASA Headquarters, 4 June 1959, also in that folder.

111. For views of Wallops employees on paperwork details see: "Spine k, et a 1.," OH I, Tape la: 95-140; "Robbing," OHT, Tape la: 182, Ib: 289-326; "Milliner," OHI, Tape la: 230-70, 456 98. For views of selected NASA personnel on this subject see: McCurdy, 180, questions 13 and 15. For administrative details transferred to Wallops see: Memorandum, Joseph E. Robbins to Norwood Evans, 7 May 1959, in folder "Special File, April - June 59;" Memorandum, T. Melvin Butler to Joseph Robbins, 1 July 1959, in folder "Special File, July - August 59," both in RGA181-I(S).

112. Memorandum, H. l. E. Reid to Robert L. Krieger, 12 June 1959, in "Special File, April - June 59;" Memorandum, Joseph E. Robbins to Langley, 6 August 1959, in folder "Special File, July - August 59;" Report "Physical Inventory of Stock Stores," Langley to NASA Headquarters, 5 August 1960, in folder "Special File, May - August 60;" all in RGA181-l(S). Memorandum, l. E. Robbins to T. Melvin Butler, 26 March 1961, in folder "Wallops, January March 61," in RGA181-l(C).

113. "Robbing," OHI, Tape Ib: 289. Memorandum, Robert L. Krieger to F. L. Thompson, 26 November 1962, in folder "Wallops, August 62 - February 63," in RGA181-l(C). Memorandum, Robert L. Krieger to F. L. Thompson, 10 April 1961, in folder "Special File, April - August 61," in RGA181- I(S).

114. Memorandum, A. D. Spinak to F. L. Thompson, 4 March 1964, in folder "Special File, March - December 64," in RGA181-l(S).

115. Data Book II, 522-24. Shortal, 615.

116. "Milliner," OHI, Tape la: 190, for quotation. For examples of Buckley's interest in Wallops see: Memorandum, C. R. Morrison to Assistant Director Space Flight Operations [Buckley], 5 May 1960; Memorandum, C. R. Morrison to Assistant Director, 17 June 1960, both in "Chron. File, January - June 1960," in box NASA HQ box #1. See also, Memorandum, E. C. Buckley to Directors, 19 July 1960, in folder "Special File, May - August 60," in RGA181-l(S).

117. "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape 2a: 105-74; "Robbing," OHI, Tape Ib: 289-326.

118. Roland, 1: 301-3.

119. "NASA APR, July 1959," Part IV, 5.1-2; "NASA APR, September, 1959," Part IV, 5.3, in NHO.

120. Letter, H. l. E. Reid to James B. McElroy, 24 August 1959, in folder "Special File, July - August 59," in RGA181- I(S). NASA Staff Paper, "NASA Overtime Policy," 1 December 1959, in binder "July - December 1959," in Staff Meeting box, in NHO.

121. "NASAAPR, February 1960," Section BA-5,5.1; "NASAAPR, April 1960," Section BA-5, 5.1.

122. Memorandum, Joseph A. Shortal for Files, 10 January 1960 [sic], in folder "Wallops, January - March 61," in RGA181- I(C). AMPD was PARD's successor at Langley, Shortal stayed with aeronautical research thus partially explaining why his book ends at this point.

123. Trailblazer was a project designed to launch an artificial meteor. This would provide data on both heating characteristics of materials, and a radar data base for tracking incoming objects (like warheads) travelling at high speeds. ARPA funded this project. "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape Ib: 340; Shortal, 673 p For Goddard projects see: Letter, G. E. MacVeigh to R. W. Hooker, 2 April 1959, in folder "Special Files, April -June 59," in RGA181- I(S). Project Mercury and university projects will be dealt with in chapters 3 and 4, respectively.

124. Shortal, 432-5; Memorandum, Harold B. Pierce to Associate Director, 24 October 1958, in folder "Wallops, March - December 58," in RGA181-l(C).

125. Shortal, 668-9, for B-58 fuel tank tests; 557-61, for Polaris tests. Note that both Polaris and the B-58 were nuclear delivery systems.

126. "NASA APR, July 1959," Part 11, 1.1.

127. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Missile Development and Space Science. Hearings before the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 5902-02H, 56.

128. Letter, Cecil B. Bailey to ARDC, Andrews Air Force Base, 13 November 1959. "Milliner," OHI, Tape la: 498-520. Shortal, 542-3.

129. "Milliner,"OHI, Tape Ib: 380; "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape la: 470; Shortal, 610-12.

130. "NASA APR, October 1960," Section SFP, 46.3; Data Book II, 239. Note: prior to launch Explorer IX was designated S 56a.

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