

June 16, 1975

MEMORANDUM

Chester M. Lee

TO: MA/Program Director, Apollo-Soyuz Test Project

FROM: AD/Deputy Administrator

SUBJECT: ASTP Questions

Sometime during the course of my meetings at Marshall and Johnson or during our meetings here in Headquarters, I would like to be sure that the following points are covered:

1. There seemed to be a larger than usual number of "unexplained failures" during the course of last week's FRR. Could you please cover these again, together with an explanation as to why more effort wasn't expended in trying to explain some of them. (For example, it was mentioned at KSC that the digital event timer was presumed to have failed, but the failure was not analyzed.)
2. The rationale for not opening up the launch window prior to the optimum time on the first day should be discussed.
3. There is a series of questions concerning the launch of the second Soyuz. For example, if the first Soyuz has a launch failure, how soon would the second one be launched? Or if Soyuz 1 gets into orbit but the orbit is not compatible with ours for a rendezvous, how soon will Soyuz 2 then be launched? Or suppose we have already launched Apollo but Soyuz 1 then develops a problem which makes rendezvous impossible. Will Soyuz 2 then be launched while we are still in orbit? (I would suggest you answer these questions during one of the meetings with Dr. Fletcher since he is very much interested in these answers.)

4. I have a number of questions regarding command and control and would like to pursue these in detail while I am at Houston. Basically, I would like to know who is in charge under various flight conditions. I asked these questions at the Moscow FRR, but the answers were not totally satisfactory. For example, if there is an emergency onboard the Soyuz, who decides to undock and when? If the answer to this question is that Leonov makes that decision, then how do we know that his decision in no way will hurt the Apollo and its crew? I knew that all sorts of contingency plans have been developed, but how do we handle the unexpected contingencies, or how do we handle a situation where the interpretation of whether or not one of the pre-planned contingencies exists is not clear?

Original signed by
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cc:
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