Hearing Title:

SPEAKERS       CONTENTS       INSERTS

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85–090PS
2003
SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AND THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
U.S. SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 12, 2003

Serial No. 108–2

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Printed for the use of the House Committee on Science and Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
JOE BARTON, Texas
KEN CALVERT, California
NICK SMITH, Michigan
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., Washington
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania

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JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
ROB BISHOP, Utah
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
JO BONNER, Alabama
TOM FEENEY, Florida
VACANCY

RALPH M. HALL, Texas
BART GORDON, Tennessee
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
NICK LAMPSON, Texas
JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
MARK UDALL, Colorado
DAVID WU, Oregon
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
CHRIS BELL, Texas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
ZOE LOFGREN, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California

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BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
JIM MATHESON, Utah
DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California
VACANCY
VACANCY
VACANCY

Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
JOE BARTON, Texas
KEN CALVERT, California
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., Washington
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
ROB BISHOP, Utah
MICHAEL BURGESS, Texas
JO BONNER, Alabama
TOM FEENEY, Florida
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York

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BART GORDON, Tennessee
JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
CHRIS BELL, Texas
NICK LAMPSON, Texas
MARK UDALL, Colorado
DAVID WU, Oregon
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
BRAD SHERMAN, California
DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
VACANCY
RALPH M. HALL, Texas

BILL ADKINS Subcommittee Staff Director
ED FEDDEMAN Professional Staff Member
RUBEN VAN MITCHELL Professional Staff Member
KEN MONROE, Professional Staff Member
CHRIS SHANK Professional Staff Member
RICHARD OBERMANN Democratic Professional Staff Member
TOM HAMMOND Staff Assistant

U.S. SENATE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

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HON. JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairperson

TED STEVENS, Alaska
CONRAD BURNS, Montana
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
GORDON SMITH, Oregon
PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
JOHN O. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
RON WYDEN, Oregon
BARBARA BOXER, California
BILL NELSON, Florida
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington

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FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey

FLOYD DESCHAMPS, Republican Senior Professional Staff
KEN LA SALA, Republican Professional Staff
JEAN TOAL EISEN, Democratic Senior Professional Staff

C O N T E N T S

February 12, 2003
Opening Statements

    Statement by the Hon. John McCain, U.S. Senator from the State of Arizona; Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Technology, U.S. Senate

    Statement by the Hon. Sherwood L. Boehlert, Representative from the State of New York; Chairman, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Written Statement

    Statement by the Hon. Ernest O. Hollings, U.S. Senator from the State of South Carolina
Written Statement

    Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Written Statement

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    Statement by the Hon. Ted Stevens, U.S. Senator from the State of Alaska

    Prepared Statement the Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg, U.S. Senator from the State of New Jersey

    Prepared Statement by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives

    Prepared Statement by Representative Zoe Lofgren, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives

Witness

Sean O'Keefe, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration; accompanied by Frederick D. Gregory, Deputy Administrator, and William F. Readdy, Associate Administrator for Space Flight
Oral Statement
Written Statement

Discussion
Effects of Budget Decisions on Shuttle Program
Changes Needed to Assure an Independent Investigation
Contractor Incentives and Obligations
NASA's Budget Request to OMB

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Crew Escape Systems
Questioning NASA's Goals and Objectives
History of Tile Damage and Loss
Reiterating the Need for an Independent Investigation Board
ASAP's Safety Concerns
Questioning an Aging System
Suggesting a Presidential Commission
ISS Contingency Planning
Role of Automation and Robotics
Crew Escape Systems
Replacing the Space Shuttle Orbiter
NASA Workforce Legislation
Manned vs. Unmanned Spacecraft
Thermal Tile Adhesive
Debris Assessment and Need for Imagery
Re-evaluating NASA's Mission
Lessons From the Challenger Investigation

Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Responses by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record

National Aeronautics and Space Administration Charter of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, signed and dated May 1, 2003

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SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA

FEBRUARY 12, 2003

Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,

House of Representatives,

Committee on Science,

Joint with U.S. Senate,

Committee on Commerce, Science,

and Transportation,

Washington, DC.

The Committees met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in Room SR–325, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain, Chairman of the Senate Committee, presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA

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    Chairman MCCAIN. Good morning. I welcome my colleagues from the House Science Committee and Administrator O'Keefe.

    To keep this hearing to a reasonable length, I appreciate my colleagues' indulgence in limiting opening statements only to those of the chairmen and Ranking Members of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House Science Committee.

    Following Administrator O'Keefe's statement, all Members will be recognized for four minutes to ask questions. We will alternate between Senators and House Members for questions, which is the normal procedure in joint hearings of this nature.

    On February 1st, the Nation suffered a devastating loss. As the Space Shuttle Columbia descended from orbit, it broke apart. Debris from the accident is still being collected by government agencies and volunteers with the hope that this evidence will help determine the cause of the accident.

    The Space Shuttle crew was a remarkable team of professionals. They were and will always be role models for all Americans. Their dedicated service and sacrifice to promote scientific research not only for our country, but for the world, will never be forgotten. They paid the ultimate price in pursuit of not only their dreams, but the dreams of nations. For that, we will be forever grateful.

    As we look to the future of the space program, we can pay tribute to our fallen heroes by diligently carrying out our responsibilities as legislators. In today's hearing, we hope to examine what went wrong on February 1st, the status of the investigation, and how we can ensure that an accident like this will never happen again.

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    This will be the first of a series of hearings on NASA and our space program. While today we're focusing on the Columbia, the accident also has focused our attention on the broader policy issues that perhaps we have neglected for too long. In subsequent hearings we will address the role of manned and unmanned space exploration, the costs and benefits of continuing the shuttle program, and our investment in the International Space Station and the effectiveness of NASA management. More fundamentally, we must examine the goals of our space program.

    I firmly believe that manned space exploration should continue. Its nature, however, should be and will be examined. We also must examine the extent to which Congress and the Administration may have neglected the Shuttle's safety program. A comprehensive examination necessitates a review of our own actions and those of the Administration to determine if the Shuttle program was underfunded or managed in a manner that compromised safety.

    I applaud Administrator Sean O'Keefe and NASA for their openness and availability. This has been an extraordinarily trying time for everyone in the agency. The Administrator and other officials have conducted themselves in a manner worthy of an agency that is not only a national brain trust, but is entrusted with realizing the dreams of all humanity. Many have noted the vast improvement of the release of information, as compared to the Challenger tragedy of 1986.

    I would like to assure the families of the brave men and women who died aboard the Columbia and the dedicated employees of NASA that we will do everything in our power to identify the cause of this tragedy and remedy it.

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    I thank Administrator O'Keefe and his team for appearing before us today, and I look forward to the testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK

    Chairman BOEHLERT. We usually open hearings by talking about what a pleasure it is to be here today. But, of course, that is not the case. I'm reminded of what Lyndon Johnson said when he appeared before Congress after the Kennedy assassination. He said, ''All I have, I gladly would have given not to be standing before you today.'' I'm sure that is the way we all feel with the tragic loss of the Columbia crew so fresh in our minds and in our hearts.

    But we owe it to those astronauts and their families and to the American public to work as hard as humanly possible to determine the cause of the Shuttle's breakup and to rigorously pursue all the policy questions the accident brings to a head.

    I view this hearing as a start of a very long conversation we will all be having about the Columbia incident and its ramifications. I think that it's very appropriate that we start that conversation on a bicameral basis, and I want to thank Senator McCain for being so willing to make this a Joint Hearing. The House and the Senate and NASA are going to have to cooperate as we each review the accident and the human space flight program, and our joint work today should send a clear signal that we can and will do just that.

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    We will also be coordinating with the Columbia Accident Investigation Board headed by Admiral Gehman. I've spoken to Admiral Gehman, and I am impressed with the Admiral's determination to be independent and deliberate, vowing to be swayed neither by outside pressures or artificial deadlines. And I appreciate the swiftness with which Administrator O'Keefe activated the board.

    That said, the more I've read the board's charter, the more I've become convinced that it must be rewritten. The words of the charter simply do not guarantee the independence and latitude that both the Administrator and the Admiral have sincerely promised. The charter's words need to match everyone's intent now to avoid any problems later. I also continue to believe that several more members should be added to the board to ensure that it has the appropriate breadth of experience and expertise.

    We will be working closely with the board as the Science Committee proceeds with its own bipartisan investigation, which will focus on the many policy questions raised by the accident. We're going to have to raise some tough and basic questions that have gone unanswered for too long.

    What are the true risks of flying the Shuttle, especially if it's going to remain in service for another 10 to 15 years? What are the true costs of continuing the Shuttle program at specific levels of risk? And what are the advantages of investing in the Shuttle, as compared to investing in other NASA programs, other R&D programs, and, indeed, other government programs, in general?

    But we can't begin to deal with those overarching issues until we have a better sense of what happened to the Columbia and why, and it's obviously too soon to expect to know that.

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    No one should expect any revelations at today's hearing. We are here today to get a status report. We ought to avoid pronouncements today that we may later come to regret.

    I'm reminded of an interview I once read with an executive of the utility that owned Three Mile Island at the time of the accident there. He was asked, ''What was the worst thing you did in handling the accident?'' He answered immediately. He said, ''We just didn't have the presence of mind to say, 'I don't know.' ''

    I would advise Administrator O'Keefe, who has responded magnificently in this time of crisis, don't hesitate to say, ''I don't know.'' You're still in search of elusive answers.

    Despite the best of intentions, NASA has at times already put out misleading information because it didn't check the facts. For example, information indicating that environmental rules could have contributed to the accident have so far turned out to be entirely spurious, but it's taken NASA a long time to clarify its statements.

    Today is a chance to put facts into the record, facts that will help chart NASA's future. If we are to find the facts and honor the memory of the Columbia crew, we have to approach our task in a true spirit of exploration, with open and probing minds, without preconceived notions or foregone conclusions. That should be our goal today.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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    [The prepared statement of Chairman Boehlert follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT

    We usually open hearings by talking about what a pleasure it is to be here. But of course today that is not the case. I'm reminded of what Lyndon Johnson said when he appeared before Congress after the Kennedy assassination: ''All I have, I gladly would have given, not to be standing before you today.'' I'm sure that is the way we all feel, with the tragic loss of the Columbia crew so fresh in our minds and in our hearts.

    But we owe it to those astronauts and their families, and to the American public, to work as hard as is humanly possible to determine the cause of the Shuttle's breakup and to rigorously pursue all the policy questions the accident brings to a head.

    I view this hearing as the start of a very long conversation we will all be having about the Columbia incident and its ramifications. I think that it's very appropriate that we start that conversation on a bicameral basis, and I want to thank Senator McCain for being so open to making this a joint hearing. The House and the Senate and NASA are going to have to cooperate as we each review the accident and the Human Space Flight program, and our joint work today should send a clear signal that we can and will do just that.

    We will also all be coordinating with the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, headed by Admiral Gehman. I spoke to Admiral Gehman earlier this week, as did our Committee staff on a bipartisan basis. I am impressed with the Admiral's determination to be independent and deliberate, vowing to be swayed neither by outside pressures or artificial deadlines. That's the right attitude, and we will be watching to ensure that it guides the Board's proceedings.

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    We will be working with Admiral Gehman as the Science Committee proceeds with its own bipartisan investigation, which will focus on the many policy questions raised by the accident. In the end, we must have a full appraisal and open debate about the true risks of flying the Shuttle, the true costs of continuing the Shuttle program at specific levels of risk, and the comparative advantages of investing in the Shuttle as opposed to other NASA programs, or indeed as opposed to other R&D programs or government programs, in general.

    But we can't begin to deal with those overarching issues until we have a better sense of what happened to the Columbia and why, and it's obviously too soon to expect to know that. No one should expect any revelations at today's hearing. We are here today to get a status report.

    We all ought to avoid pronouncements today that we may later come to regret. I'm reminded of an interview I once read with an executive of the utility that owned Three Mile Island at the time of the accident there. He was asked, ''What was the worst thing you did in handling the accident?'' He answered immediately. He said, ''We just didn't have the presence of mind to say, 'I don't know.''' I would advise Administrator O'Keefe, who has responded magnificently in this time of crisis: don't hesitate to say, ''I don't know.''

    Despite the best of intentions, NASA has already sometimes put out misleading information because it didn't check the facts. For example, information indicating that environmental rules could have contributed to the accident has so far turned out to be entirely spurious. But it's taken NASA a long time to clarify its statements.

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    One reason I believe that today's hearing can be useful is that with so much information is already floating around from so many sources, it's important that Congress and NASA have an opportunity to create a clear record of where things stand at this point.

    It's especially important today that we get a clear sense of how NASA will handle the investigation and what contingency plans are in place should the Shuttle be grounded for an extended period of time. I'm sure we will also examine how NASA had been viewing the long-range safety of the Shuttle prior to the accident and how this may already have changed.

    All of us are still mourning the loss of the Columbia crew, but we must now turn to planning the future. And we can do that only in a true spirit of exploration—with a full and open examination of all the facts, without preconceived notions or foregone conclusions. That process starts today. Thank you.

    Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Hollings.

STATEMENT OF HON. ERNEST O. HOLLINGS, U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA

    Senator HOLLINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling this meeting. We welcome our colleagues from the House side and my old friend, Administrator O'Keefe. We're glad to have you with us.

    Chairman Boehlert, I got the message, ''Let's don't jump to conclusions.'' I'm reading in the morning paper a similar message—Admiral Gehman said that ''the investigation with solid evidence thus far hard to come by.'' On the contrary, we have a lot of solid evidence that we've come by, and I sort of discern some kind of eery avoidance here of what really happened.

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    Here is the hard evidence. NASA's had a long history of problems with the Shuttle's heat tiles. We know that the Columbia's VERY first mission, many of the tiles flew off. That's 22 years ago. In 1994, a study entitled the Risk Management for the Tiles of the Space Shuttle, by Stanford and Carnegie Mellon University, found that 15 percent of the Shuttle's tiles account for 85 percent of the risk. And that was confirmed by a 1997 study by the National Academy of Sciences.

    Then a study by the Johnson Space Center in March of 2000 found that the leading edges of the wing, quote, ''pose the highest risk for critical failure,'' end quote. And then during the launch of the Columbia on January the 16th, we have video evidence of debris striking the Shuttle orbiter 81 seconds after launch, potentially causing a gash in the left wing of some 30 inches long, seven inches wide, and over two-and-a-half inches thick. And then 18 minutes from landing, the Shuttle was pitching and yawing due to drag on the left wing.

    And, of course, this morning's paper says that as it was coming down, and I'm quoting the Mission Control, ''FYI,'' for your information, ''I've just lost four separate temperature transducers on the left side of the vehicle, hydraulic return temperatures,'' he calmly reported.

    Again quoting, eight minutes before all communications was lost, Mr. Kling noticed the loss of data from temperature gauges on the left wing on the spacecraft as he monitored the Shuttle's descent into the atmosphere. A few moments later, Mr. Kling reported drag on the spaceship, but controllers expressed no alarm.

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    And, finally, the elevons, the picture that showed the elevons, tried to counteract that drag in engine thrusters to help it gain control, because a minute before the explosion, the U.S. Air Force captured that picture of the Shuttle showing a bulge of deformity along the front edge of the left wing. Right on down the list.

    Mr. Administrator, I would think, in the testimony, we all agree that we don't want to jump to conclusions. We all agree to be very thorough and leave no stone unturned, but we do have a rebuttable presumption here that the damage to the left wing at the time of liftoff was the cause. And let's rebut it. Let's find something. But don't all of a sudden be discovering debris all around and all of these other things that pant one way and say we have no idea what happened.

    I have been in these investigations before, and we knew exactly what happened at the Challenger. Allen McDonald said he was in the control room. They had warned not to take it off. It was going to cause a catastrophe. And he said one gentlemen said, ''There she goes.'' Another one said, ''Like a piece of cake.'' Then he said it exploded, and everyone in the room knew why. We spent years investigating to find out the same thing that we knew immediately at the time of explosion.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    [The prepared statement of Senator Hollings follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR ERNEST O. HOLLINGS

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    I would like to begin by offering my condolences to the family members of the Space Shuttle Columbia crew of mission STS–107. These heroes gave their lives in the advancement of science and all Americans should be overwhelmed by their sacrifice. The Columbia crew was on a special mission to conduct scientific research in outer space. As a strong supporter of scientific research, I'm grateful to all the men and women of NASA who undertake such endeavors to advance scientific knowledge.

    Welcome Administrator O'Keefe. You are here today to provide my distinguished colleagues and I with answers of how this tragedy was allowed to happen. There is a question as to whether this committee has consistently provided NASA with the funds it has requested for the Space Shuttle program. We want to get to the bottom of this accident so that we can ensure that it does not happen again.

    Now I know that the NASA engineers have developed this ''fault tree'' to identify all the possible causes of this tragic event. Branches are continually added, but nothing is eliminated. Investigators are exploring every lead, but the facts of the matter are:

We have video evidence of debris striking the Shuttle orbiter 81 seconds after launch. Engineers estimated the damaged tile area in the left wing to be 30 inches long by 7 inches wide, yet there was no concern for the tiles failing upon re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere.

NASA's had a long history of problems with the heat tiles. These problems date back to 1981 when the first Columbia launch came back with lost or damaged tiles.

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NASA has recognized the tile problem. Numerous studies have been conducted. In 1990 a study found that 15 percent of the Shuttle's tiles account for 85 percent of its risks and recommended that improving maintenance procedures could reduce the probability of tile related Shuttle accidents by 70 percent.

Less than 18 minutes from landing, the Shuttle was pitching and yawing due to drag on the left wing. Its elevons tried to counteract the drag and engine thrusters had fired to gain control.

    It is clear that we have a rebuttable presumption to go forward with the investigation to focus the examination on how the tiles failed causing the catastrophic failure.

    Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, Senator Hollings.

    Congressman Hall hasn't arrived yet, so we will proceed to Mr. O'Keefe, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. He's accompanied by Mr. Frederick D. Gregory, who is the Deputy Administrator, and Mr. William Reedy, the Associate Administrator for Space Flight. If you'd like to join—or they can remain where they are.

    And, again, I want to thank you for the extreme willingness on your part to share all information that you have with not only Members of Congress, but with the American people.

    Please proceed, Mr. O'Keefe, and I hope you understand that we're interested in as thorough a briefing as possible, as are Americans who are viewing this hearing today.

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    Thank you.

    [The prepared statement of Senator Lautenberg follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR FRANK R. LAUTENBERG

Mr. Chairman,

    Today's hearing on the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster and the hearings likely to follow in the weeks and months ahead will bring additional pain to that which we already feel while in a period of mourning for seven brave, exceptional human beings in the prime of life. The hearings will also bring pain because, frankly, indications are that some earlier warnings might have raised questions about whether or not presumption of risk was insufficiently reviewed.

    The Space Shuttle Columbia disaster forces us to ask difficult questions. The Federal Government has spent more than $60 billion on the Space Shuttle program, the International Space Station, and the X–33/VentureStar Space Plane (which advocates believed would replace the Shuttle). Our fleet of Shuttles is grounded at least until we determine what caused the Columbia accident and fix it; the three-person crew of the Space Station spends 80 percent of their time on maintenance; and the Bush Administration has canceled the Space Plane project. As a result of that cancellation, we now intend to continue using Shuttles at least until 2012, and possibly beyond 2020. Some of the technology on the Shuttles is 30 years old. We never intended to use them this long.

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    I want to make it clear that I feel that the Shuttle astronauts made a major contribution to our effort to assess the value to humankind of research in space, and I grieve over their deaths. The desire to reach for the stars is as old as human history and the ambitions embodied in our manned space program are noble ones. But we have had two fatal accidents in 113 Shuttle missions. Many people have become inured to the dangers inherent in sending people into space and bringing them back safely. But the fact is, it's a high-risk venture. Some risk is unavoidable—that's what makes our astronauts such brave individuals. But are we willing to divert precious resources available for other essential research and experimentation planned or in place to reduce the risks of manned space exploration to the point where they become acceptable?

    Because of the downturn in the economy that started in March 2001, the September 11th terrorist attacks, and the tax cuts enacted that year, we are facing federal budget deficits ''as far as the eye can see.'' And now the Administration proposes to reduce federal revenues even more. How can we guarantee that we can spend what it takes to make the space effort safer and successful? If we make the investment necessary, what benefits will we reap from continued Shuttle operations? What are the ''opportunity costs'' of such an investment? In other words, what other national priorities will suffer in the battle for scarce funds? Our manned space exploration program has been long on ambition but increasingly short on the hard-headed assessments needed to answer these fundamental questions.

    Manned space exploration isn't cheap. If we try to do it on the cheap, we put safety—and people's lives—at risk. I'm sure we will hear in testimony today and in the future that safety has never been compromised. But NASA has always had problems overseeing its contractors. And the National Research Council has concluded that the contract to manage the Shuttle program awarded to United Space Alliance in 1996 contained financial incentives for investments in efficiency, but not for investments in modernization and safety improvements.

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    Much of today's hearing and the hearings to come will focus on technical matters—possible causes of the Columbia accident, possible safety improvements. I am interested to know, for instance, what steps—if any—NASA took to ensure Columbia's safe re-entry after determining that debris—presumably foam insulation from the fuel tank—hit and may have damaged the left win during lift-off. I am also interested in learning from NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe what additional safety precautions might have been assured with greater funding. And I want to know what safety upgrades, if any, were made after the Columbia space flights scheduled for August 2000 and March 2002 were postponed.

    In the course of today's hearing and future hearings, we will also scrutinize NASA's relationship with its contractors. We will also review Congress's relationship with NASA. We will analyze Administration budget requests for NASA past and present.

    I hope our investigation will be more about fixing problems than fixing blame—although determining accountability obviously is important. But beyond such immediate concerns, I hope we will address the harder question about whether the benefits outweigh the risks when we send people into space at this time and in the current fashion when unmanned missions can almost entirely match the quality of human participation.

    [The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE SHEILA JACKSON LEE

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Mr. Chairman,

    Thank you for calling this hearing and bringing us all together to speak and learn about the Columbia tragedy. This is a tough time for all of us from the Houston community, but especially for the team at Johnson Space Center. To the world those astronauts were valiant heroes; to us they were also friends, neighbors, and family—or as the Houston Chronicle proclaimed them, ''The Heroes Next Door.'' I am impressed by the diligence, progress, and openness of the NASA investigators that we have all been getting to know through the press.

    Those investigators have a difficult job ahead, and it is essential that that job be done well. We must find all the available facts, and we must not jump to hasty conclusions. It seems that the data is pouring in, in the form of video, computer analysis and collection of debris. I am concerned by reports of loose foam or ice that may have damaged the left wing during liftoff, especially since this may have been a problem in a past mission. I want to know what was done to keep such chunks from detaching and striking our multi-billion dollar Shuttle, entrusted with the lives of 7 Americans.

    However, we cannot be myopic and disregard or short-change other evidence and explanations. The inquiries must be methodical and objective. The team must leave no room for suspicion of cover-up or sloppiness. The families of the seven valiant crew members that lost loved ones deserve to know why this tragedy happened, as do the American people. Most importantly, we owe it to our brave future astronauts to show them our commitment to their safety.

    I am pleased that after we Democrats in the Science Committee sent a letter to the President expressing our concerns about the independence of the investigatory board, that the hearing and make-up of the board were changed. However, I feel there is still room for improvement. I recommend the inclusion of Nobel Laureates, academicians, and depending on their interests—perhaps family members of lost crew. It is important that the team is weighted toward bright people, who are not employees of NASA, and who do not have close personal ties to NASA or the Administrator.

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    The conclusions we all reach must not only be in the form of, ''Part A broke, and part B got too hot.'' We must discern what were the factors that led to those parts being included in a vehicle entrusted with seven lives and such an important mission. What were the quality assurance protocols? Were corners cut?

    Furthermore, this investigation needs to be expeditious. We have three Space Shuttles with critical missions already planned. We also have the International Space Station, with three astronauts high up above us waiting to hear their own futures. Thankfully, we have partnered with our Russian allies and others and ensured that we have the means to get those astronauts home, even though we may need to ground our own fleet for some time. However, we cannot continually place American lives in the hands of another nation for long. Nor can we risk losing the use of the International Space Station that we have been working so hard, and investing so much, to achieve.

    [The prepared statement of Ms. Lofgren follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE ZOE LOFGREN

    I'd like to thank Congressman Boehlert and Senator McCain for convening this hearing. Over the next few months, we will be asking some tough questions related to the breakup and loss of the Columbia, and the future of the United States space program. But first, our country has paused to reflect on the heroism of the seven astronauts who gave their lives so that the dreams of humans reaching for the stars can live forever. My thoughts go out to the families of our fallen, and to the extended NASA family.

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    I am pleased the NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe has joined us here today. I look forward to hearing from and working with you and the dedicated and hard working members of the NASA employee family, as we seek answers to our concerns about the future of the United States space program. I trust that you will ask us for help, keep us informed and be prepared to make your recommendations to this committee that will help us be able to move our space program forward. I firmly believe this committee must focus on asking the difficult questions that relate to how we are best able to resume our quest to explore space.

    This committee must work in a nonpartisan manner and should not waste any time in trying to assess blame or create excuses for things that should have been done to help prevent this immense tragedy and loss. To do so would be a waste of time and money and, more importantly, would dishonor the sacrifices made of the brave Columbia crew and devalue the efforts being made by all who seek to ensure that this never happens again.

    I believe that our pursuit of answers to this tragedy would best be served by the appointment of a truly independent board of inquiry, much like President Reagan appointed after the Challenger disaster. Until that happens, Mr. O'Keefe, I am pleased that you accepted some of the recommendations contained in a letter sent to the President last week by 16 Democratic members of the House Science Committee. I am sure many of our Republican colleagues would have joined us in expressing our concerns about the composition of the review board, and I am confident they would have echoed our concerns. Without these changes, I believe the results of this work would have been viewed with great skepticism and certainly would have suffered without the added, independent expertise of the new members of the board. Just as Columbia's crew went into space seeking to expand our knowledge of space, we must do all in our power to ensure that our investigations will answer more questions than they create.

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Mr. Chairman, I am committed to sending humans into space. We are explorers by nature, and I believe we must explore our own planet and those beyond. I believe these hearings need to focus not only on investigating the policy concerns that led to the Shuttle tragedy, but where we go from here in the exploration of space.

Has NASA shifted monies to the ISS and away from the Shuttle program?

Are we going to develop the next generation of space vehicle, and should we pursue a single-stage-to-orbit program?

Should we also develop the use of expendable rockets to ferry equipment and personnel to the International Space Station?

Are we prepared to fund this program—as I think we should—in the current budget climate?

With this in mind, I believe this committee can best honor the memory of Columbia's crew by conducting an honest examination of the role, if any, of recent budget cuts played in this disaster. Should we take this opportunity to acknowledge that the Space Shuttle has never lived up to its dreams of being a cost effective way of traveling to space? Or are we better served by pursuing a new generation of space vehicles, one that can take advantage of the tremendous advances in our knowledge and our technologies than those present in the remaining Shuttle fleet?

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STATEMENT OF SEAN O'KEEFE, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION; ACCOMPANIED BY FREDERICK D. GREGORY, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, AND WILLIAM O. READDY, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR SPACE FLIGHT

    Mr. O'KEEFE. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Boehlert.

    I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this hearing of the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee and the House Science Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics to discuss the tragic loss of the courageous crew of the Space Shuttle Columbia——

    Chairman MCCAIN. Could you pull the microphone a little closer?

    Mr. O'KEEFE. —the ongoing investigation into this tragedy and the implications of the loss of Columbia to the Nation's space exploration efforts.

    This morning, 11 days after the accident, our work continues to honor the solemn pledge we made to the astronauts' families and to the American people, that we'll find out what caused the loss of the Columbia and its crew, correct what problems we find, and do our utmost to make sure this never happens again.

    We welcome the Joint Committee's interest in working with NASA to determine how we can learn from this tragic accident so that we continue advancing the Nation's research and exploration objectives in space while at the same time striving to ensure that we make human space flight as safe as possible.

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    Throughout NASA's 45 years of serving the public interest, Congress has been our partner helping us achieve the goals outlined in NASA's congressionally authorized charter. This charter compels NASA to explore, use, and enable the development of space for human enterprise; advance scientific knowledge and understanding of the Earth, the solar system, and the universe; and use the environment of space for research; research, develop, verify, and transfer advanced aeronautics, space, and related technologies.

    With the support of Congress, NASA has amassed a record of significant achievements that have tangibly improved the lives of all Americans. And when we have erred, you have helped us right our course.

    This morning, you'll be asking tough questions, and that's as it should be. Believe me, none of the questions that you will ask can be any tougher than those we're asking of ourselves. I can assure you, however, that whatever determinations are reached regarding the cause of the accident, you'll find that complacency is not one of them.

    An ethos of safety is evident throughout the agency. For example, last year we temporarily halted Shuttle flight operations when tiny cracks of less than two inches were discovered in metal liners used to direct the fuel flow inside the propellent lines on two separate orbiters. We did not fly again until that problem was corrected. In a signal of our continuing commitment to rewarding such diligence, we also made it a point to praise a very young examiner, a fellow named David Strait, the young contract employee who had actually discovered the cracks.

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    Other flight decisions made throughout the year were made with the goal of operational safety being paramount. And from working with the dedicated employees who keep the Shuttle flying safely, I know they have the utmost regard for the enormity of that duty.

    This week, at NASA centers throughout the country and in the field, with the support of more than 2,000 people from more than 20 federal agencies, state and local organizations, the important work of data analysis and recovery operations is continuing. We should all be extremely proud of the work that's being conducted by these dedicated public servants.

    President Bush observed last week, ''The people of NASA are being tested once again. In your grief, you are responding as your friends would have wished, with focus, professionalism, and unbroken faith in the mission of this agency. Captain Brown was correct, America's space program will go on.'' We intend to maintain that professionalism he referred to until we reach conclusion and beyond.

    This morning, to help frame our discussion, I'd like to review for you the significant actions NASA has taken since the morning of the accident in accord with our contingency plan. In addition to articulating notification of first-response procedures defining the roles and responsibility of mishap response and Mishap Investigation Teams, the plan specifies selections of persons outside of NASA to head an independent, seasoned, accident investigation team. Now, while we did not foresee this tragedy, our response has unfolded as we had planned and prepared for in that contingency plan that we had hoped to never have to activate.

    This plan was one of many positive outcomes from the terrible loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger 17 years ago. So we developed the plan shortly after that and have updated it before every flight. And a contingency was simulated for this very event just three months ago.

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    When we first became aware of the problems with STS–107, I was waiting at the Space Shuttle landing strip at the Kennedy Space Center, Cape Canaveral, on Saturday morning, February the 1st. At 8:59 a.m. eastern time, we lost communication with the Columbia. At 9:16, the countdown arrival clock reached zero, and there was no signal or sign of the Columbia. Captain Bill Readdy, our Associate Administrator for Space Flight and a former astronaut, declared a space flight contingency and activated the recovery control center at the Kennedy Space Center. At that point, Bill Readdy and I departed the landing strip and headed to the launch control center.

    We arrived at the launch control center 13 minutes later. At 9:29 a.m., we activated the contingency action plan for space flight operations. Through the White House situation room, we notified the President as well as other senior staff of the loss of communications. In addition, Members of Congress and the Government of Israel were notified. Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge and the National Security Council were also made aware of the situation and were present there in the situation room that morning.

    Secretary Ridge then began assessing the possibility that this situation was terrorism related. Shortly after, he made the determination it was highly unlikely terrorism was involved. Secretary Ridge then announced that the Federal Emergency Management Agency would be the lead federal agency for the recovery effort on the ground.

    Meanwhile, the family members of the Columbia astronauts were escorted from the landing strip to the astronauts' crew quarters. Later that morning, at about 11:30, we met with the families at the crew quarters at Kennedy Space Center to express our condolences, offer any and all support we could give, and assure them that we would offer that support throughout this entire ordeal, and stated our commitment to find the cause of the accident, fix the problems we find, and continue the work that their loved ones had started.

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    Data at all the NASA sites and contractors were impounded at 10 a.m., and the headquarters action team in Washington, D.C., was activated with NASA personnel moving immediately to their duty stations. By 10:30, an hour after the contingency plan had been activated, the mishap response team convened to assess the preliminary data and focus on the location of the crew compartment through the Rescue Coordination Center at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia. The rapid response team was activated for deployment to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana that day.

    The process of initiating the Columbia Accident Investigation Board began about 10:30 a.m. on Saturday, February 1st, one hour after the contingency plan was activated. I placed a call to the NASA deputy administrator, Fred Gregory, also a former astronaut, who was at NASA headquarters in Washington. Mr. Gregory then began calling the Columbia Accident Investigation Board members, which are specified by position in the contingency action plan.

    At 1:15 that afternoon, I made a brief televised statement expressing our national regrets for the tragic accident and informed the public about the appointment of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

    The Accident Investigation Board was formally activated during the NASA Mishap Investigation Team teleconference, which occurred at 5 p.m. that afternoon, Saturday, February the 1st, less than eight hours after the event.

    By 6 p.m., during a teleconference with the White House situation room, we briefed officials from the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Department of Defense, the FBI, and the Federal Aviation Administration about the current status of the accident investigation.

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    At 6:40 that evening, staff members of the National Transportation Safety Board departed Washington and traveled to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana to assist as part of the Mishap Investigation Team, that day. They were later made available to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

    On Sunday, February the 2nd, the Accident Investigation Board, chaired by retired United States Navy Admiral Hal Gehman, held its first meeting at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, less than 30 hours after the accident. We also began the practice of twice-daily briefings at headquarters in Washington and at the Johnson Space Center in Houston.

    Membership of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board consists of persons selected for their positions in heading civil and military offices with responsibility for aerospace safety, accident investigations, and related skills. Many have been chief investigators on major accidents. And between them, board members have the experience of some 50 major investigations to draw upon. Quite simply, the people who are now on the board are some of the best in the world at what they do, and they were activated immediately. You have our assurance that this distinguished board will be able to act with genuine independence.

    When the board assembled, it modified its charter to eliminate any reference to NASA directing the administration of the investigation. The framework that was contained in the contingency plan was modified and will continue to be to ensure the independence of this board. NASA accepted the changes to the charter without objection, as I will continue to do in the future, as well, for any changes they propose.

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    Further, the NASA Inspector General Robert Cobb is an observer on the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, having arrived on Monday, February the 3rd. He will help assure the independence of the board, as he reports both to the President and to the Congress under the terms of the Inspector General Act.

    There are additional details about the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and its activities that are, I think, important to note. The board has taken over hardware and software releases of NASA so that we cannot alter anything unless the board approves. We've already begun to honor document requests from the board, as we have all along, and have also supplied additional documents to the board which were not requested, but we believe might be helpful in their work as we move along. And, finally, the board has instructed NASA to conduct a fault-tree analysis that it intends to independently validate, to look at all the possible causes that could have occurred and to examine those in a very methodical way, which they will then, in turn, independently validate.

    On Sunday, the NASA Mishap Investigation Team was on the ground and working with local officials in Texas and Louisiana. The State of Texas activated 800 members of the Texas National Guard to assist with the retrieval of debris, and I am eternally grateful to Governor Rick Perry for his immediate response within hours of our request.

    By Tuesday, there were nearly 200 NASA and NASA contractor personnel working recovery operations in Texas, Louisiana, Arizona, and California. They were part of the more than 2,000 people from Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Environmental Protection Agency, the FBI, the Department of Defense, Department of Transportation, the U.S. Forest Service, Texas National Guard, Louisiana National Guard, and state and local authorities working to locate, document, and collect debris.

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    By Wednesday, the astronauts' remains were transferred to Dover Air Force Base in Delaware. At Dover, NASA Deputy Administrator Fred Gregory, and former astronaut, and ceremonial honor guard were present to pay our respect to the seven fallen astronauts.

    Throughout the week, we were able to make steady progress in our efforts to recover debris from the accident. We have, thus far, recovered upwards of 12,000 elements of debris. The search effort, as you know from our press conferences, is a large, complex, and ongoing effort with hundreds of square miles with challenging weather and terrain conditions. And, indeed, the graphic that's up now is that 500-mile swath from Dallas/Fort Worth area to just south of Shreveport, Louisiana, in and around the Lufkin, Texas, area.

    We're very grateful that no one was injured on the ground as a result of flying debris from the accident, and we're working with our agency partners to assure recovery operations remain safe as we continue this effort.

    Throughout the course of this activity, I've also briefed the President and the Vice President on a near-daily basis to advise and apprise them of all the progress we're making, as well as the cooperation of all of the federal agencies, who have been extremely participating in this effort.

    The Federal Emergency Management Agency command post was set up in Lufkin, Texas, on Saturday, the 1st of February, and has been operating nonstop since then. Debris collection activities began at Barksdale Air Force Base on Sunday, February the 2nd.

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    Yesterday, we began transporting debris on trucks to the Kennedy Space Center where they'll be assembled and analyzed as part of the comprehensive accident investigation directed by the Gehman board.

    I visited Texas and Louisiana this past Saturday to get my own assessment of the operation, but, more importantly, to personally thank the volunteers, in addition to all the federal, state, and local public servants, who have been working so tirelessly to support the debris recovery effort.

    Let me touch briefly on the Space Shuttle fleet as it is today. Discovery is continuing to undergo major inspections and upgrades, which will be completed by April of 2004. Atlantis is currently assembled and stacked in a Vehicle Assembly Building at the Kennedy Space Center for STS–114, the next mission due to have, or planned to have, been flown. The Endeavour, the third of the orbiters, is in the Orbiter Processing Facility and being prepared for STS–115, which was scheduled a couple of months later.

    The next Shuttle mission, STS–114, was to have been to the International Space Station in March, that mission commanded by Colonel Eileen Collins, United States Air Force. And I met with her on Friday to further advise that the mission is on hold until we understand the causes of the Columbia accident and are able to resolve any issues identified.

    At this time, we don't know how long it will be before we can resume Shuttle flights. We will only know when the Columbia Accident Investigation Board concludes its work and presents its findings to all of us.

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    Columbia was the first orbiter in the Shuttle fleet, having flown 28 successful missions, or just over a quarter of its certified life of a hundred flights. In February 2001, a little over a year ago, Columbia completed a major scheduled 18-month overhaul and update of its systems, a process we call ''Orbiter Major Modifications.'' The STS–107 mission was Columbia's second flight following that major overhaul. A successful servicing mission that had been conducted, the first one, was to the Hubble Space Telescope in March of 2002. So this was the second flight after it had been nearly completely rebuilt.

    Prior to the loss of Columbia and her crew, the projected Shuttle flight rate was five per year, starting in 2004, and funding is requested for that flight rate in the budget the President just submitted last week. The flight rate will be adjusted as needed, of course, once we determine when we can return to flight safely.

    The crew of the International Space Station is, of course, deeply saddened by the loss of Columbia and her crew, as are all of our partners and people around the world. I spoke with International Space Station crew members, Ken Bowersox, the commander, United States Navy, Don Pettit, who is our science officer aboard, and Nikolai Budarin, who is a cosmonaut engineer, on Sunday, February the 2nd for the first time in our discussions, to inform them of the accident and how we're proceeding. Despite the tragedy, the crew is continuing its busy schedule of work.

    The day after the loss of STS–107, our Russian partners conducted a successful planned launch of an unmanned, autonomous Progress resupply vehicle to the station. The provisions carried on Progress 10P should provide the crew sufficient supplies to maintain normal operations through June 2003, through this summer. Progress resupply flights to the International Space Station by our Russian partners will continue as scheduled. The next flight is scheduled for June 2003.

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    We're working with Rosaviakosmos, the Russian Aviation and Space Agency officials, to determine what we might want to place on that flight to make sure we have the best use of the space available. In addition, a regularly scheduled Soyuz crew transport vehicle exchange is planned already for the launch in April 2003, as it had been prior to February 1st.

    Study teams formed almost immediately after the accident to assess the impact on the International Space Station. These teams are focused on how we will, first, sustain the station, second, continue to assemble the station, as it is not yet complete, and, third, to maximize the utilization of this unique research platform.

    We have kept our International Space Station partners informed of our recovery efforts. Further, we have met with our international partners just last week, and continue to each day, to plan future meetings in the weeks ahead to develop an International Space Station partner plan.

    We can maintain a permanent crew on the International Space Station as long as it is necessary, with support from Soyuz and Progress flights. The International Space Station is stable and has sufficient propellent to maintain its orbit for at least a year without support from the Space Shuttle.

    But the nearer-term issue for crew support beyond June is water. The International Space Station cannot support a crew of three after June with the currently planned support in progress. As a consequence, we're discussing with our international partners the possibility of changing the April Soyuz flight from a taxi mission to a crew exchange mission, as well as the feasibility of adding Progress resupply flights. But I want to really emphasize that there are no decisions that have been made, and all options are being examined at present.

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    I talked to the Expedition 6 crew that Captain Bowersix commands, now in orbit, and they've expressed determination and desire to do whatever is necessary to continue the research and deal with any changes in crew rotation schedule that may be necessary.

    As we look forward to determine our nation's best course of action in responding to the Columbia accident, I'd like to point out that NASA developed an Integrated Space Transportation Plan, which was submitted by the President to the Congress in November as an amendment to the fiscal year 2003 budget. So three months ago, that plan was presented at that time. The Integrated Space Transportation Plan could help us address many of the near-term issues we're facing, even though it was developed prior to the loss of Columbia.

    The plan reflects the tight coupling required across the Space Station, Space Shuttle, and the Space Launch Initiatives. It is intended to ensure that necessary access to the International Space Station can be supported for the foreseeable future. It consists of three major program elements—the Space Shuttle, the Orbital Space Plane, and the Next-Generation Launch Technology.

    This new plan makes investments to extend Shuttle's operational life for continued safe operations. The Orbital Space Plane is designed to provide a crew transfer capability as early as possible to assure access to and from the International Space Station. And the Next-Generation Launch Technology program funds next-generation Reusable Launch Vehicle technology in areas such as propulsion, structures, and operation. This initiative will focus on the Orbital Space Plane and the Next-Generation Launch Technology, including third-generation Reusable Launch Vehicle efforts.

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    Now, the 2003 budget amendment that the President submitted last November, in 2002, also proposed adding funds to International Space Station reserves to assure that we could successfully reach the milestone of U.S. core configuration and maintain progress on the long lead items for enhanced research aboard space station and the continued buildout of that remarkable research laboratory platform.

    Space flight is a means to an end at NASA. That end is research, exploration, discovery, and inspiration. The crew of STS–107 were engaged in a wide array of scientific research that could be conducted nowhere else but in space and had significant potential benefits for the public. Columbia's crew took great pride in their research aimed at fighting cancer, improving crop yields, developing fire-suppression techniques, building earthquake-resistant buildings, and understanding the effects of dust storms on weather. As was recorded by the media, Columbia had a cargo of human ingenuity.

    The crew of International Space Station is also conducting research now that cannot be conducted anywhere else. Thus far, more than 60 experiments spanning such scientific disciplines as human physiology, genetics, plant biology, Earth observations, physics, and cell biology have been conducted on the International Space Station. From these experiments, scientists are learning better methods of drug testing and about dynamic models of human diseases, the physics of fundamental processes in manufacturing, antibiotic synthesis, and changes in Earth climate, vegetation and crops.

    The International Space Station is the centerpiece initiative of human space flight at NASA. Our objectives in this regard are very clear. First, we will keep on-orbit International Space Stations crews safe. Second, we intend to keep the International Space Station continuously occupied in order to assure the reliability of the station itself. And, third, we intend to return to assembly—as soon as we're able, to return the Shuttle fleet to safe operations and complete the research goals for ourselves and for our international partners.

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    To accomplish these aims, we need to create a long-term crew-return capability to complement and augment the Soyuz vehicles now provided by our partners. We intend to build that new return capability to create a new crew-transfer system that will allow us to rotate crews on the International Space Station independent from the Space Shuttle.

    We also firmly believe that extending the operational life of the remaining Shuttle fleet is a good investment, because it will help maximize the science return from the International Space Station.

    We designed our Integrated Space Transportation Plan to ensure that we have coordinated resources to exploit the unique research environment of space and the International Space Station in the near-, mid-, and long-term. We thought the plan was a good one when we proposed it, and we believe that it's not only valid today, but even more compelling to pursue. While we believe that this plan is a good one, we will re-examine it as necessary in light of the investigative findings of Columbia.

    Just over a week ago, although it seemed more like a lifetime, the President spoke so eloquently and powerfully at the Johnson Space Center memorial service in Houston, Texas. He said, ''The cause of exploration and discovery is not an option we choose; it is a desire written in the human heart. We're all part of a creation which seeks to understand all creation. We find the best among us, send them forth into unmapped darkness, and pray they will return. They go in peace for all mankind, and all mankind is in their debt.''

    The noble purposes described in the President's words frame all that we do and how we do it. These purposes drive our mission goals, which are to understand and protect our home planet, to explore the universe and search for life, and to inspire the next generation of explorers as only NASA can.

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    And even while our nonstop work to recover from this terrible tragedy and to continue safe operations on the International Space Station will be our chief focus in the days and weeks and months ahead, the American people should know we will also press ahead with other activities to achieve these important goals.

    This centennial flight year, we are launching the Mars exploration rovers, the Mars spacecraft, the space infrared telescope facility, and a number of Earth science spacecraft and instruments, as well as continuing our work to help improve aviation security on behalf of our homeland defense. In these activities and in all that we do at NASA, we strive for unmatched excellence. When it comes to human space exploration, those margins are razor thin, and we know we're graded on an extremely harsh curve. For us, 96 percent to 99 percent is not an ''A.'' One-hundred percent is the minimum passing garde.

    Now, despite this harsh truth, we know the lesson from this terrible accident is not to turn our backs on exploration because it is hard or risky. John Shedd once said about the age of ocean exploration, ''A ship in safe harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are built for.''

    Human history teaches us that in exploration, after accidents like this occur, we learn from them and further reduce risks, although we must honestly admit that risk can never be eliminated.

    President John F. Kennedy observed once, some 41 years ago, speaking of our fledgling space program at that time, ''All great and honorable actions are accompanied with great difficulties, and both must be enterprised and overcome with answerable courage.''

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    The immediate task before our agency is clear. We'll find the problem that caused the loss of Columbia and its crew, we'll fix it, and then we'll return to flight operations that are as safe as humanly possible in pursuit of knowledge. We have no preconceptions about what caused the failure or what it will take to make it so that it will never happen again. We have an independent Accident Investigation Board of truly outstanding and eminently quality individuals, and they, and only they alone, will determine the cause of the accident and its remedy, no matter where it leads. We're ready and willing to support the addition of any experts that Admiral Gehman deems necessary to the effective conduct of the board's investigations.

    Part of my job as Administrator is to remind folks of what NASA does and what we are capable of doing. It's a responsibility I take very, very seriously. And, at the same time, I am saddened beyond words at the loss of seven outstanding men and women of STS–107. I'm also very proud and humbled by the focus, dedication, and professionalism of the NASA family and all those throughout the country who are assisting in this challenging recovery effort.

    Today, February the 12th, is also the birthday of President Lincoln. And some of his words, spoken for an entirely different purpose, have come to mind this past week. ''It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us, that from these honored dead we take increase devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion.''

    We have an opportunity here and now to learn from this loss and renew the boundless spirit of exploration present at NASA's beginning. We will do this by being accountable to the American people for our failings and, we hope, credible and compelling in pursuit of research, exploration, and inspiration for future generations.

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    And, finally, during the 16-day STS–107 mission, we had no indication that would suggest a compromise to flight safety. The time it has taken me to present this testimony is about the same amount of time that transpired between when mission control first noticed anomalies in temperature measurements and the accident.

    (Pause.)

    I just paused for a few seconds. That's the same amount of time that transpired from mission control's last communication with the crew and our loss of signal with the heroic Columbia astronauts.

    May Good bless the crew of STS–107.

    Chairman McCain, Chairman Boehlert, thank you all very much for you attention.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. O'Keefe follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SEAN O'KEEFE

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    Good morning. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this hearing of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee and the House Science Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics to discuss the tragic loss of the courageous crew of the Space Shuttle Columbia, the ongoing investigation into this tragedy, and the implications of the loss of Columbia to the Nation's space exploration efforts.

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    This morning, eleven days after the accident, our work continues to honor the solemn pledge we've made to the astronauts' families and to the American people that we will find out what caused the loss of the Columbia and its crew, correct what problems we find, and do our utmost to make sure this never happens again.

    We welcome the Committee's interest in working with NASA to help determine how we can learn from this tragic accident so that we may continue advancing the Nation's research and exploration objectives in space while at the same time striving to ensure we make manned spaceflight as safe as humanly possible.

    Throughout NASA's forty-five years of serving the public interest, Congress has been our partner, helping us achieve the goals outlined in NASA's congressionally authorized charter. This charter compels NASA to:

Explore, use, and enable the development of space for human enterprise.

Advance scientific knowledge and understanding of the Earth, the Solar System, and the Universe and use the environment of space for research.

Research, develop, verify, and transfer advanced aeronautics, space, and related technologies.

    With the support of Congress, NASA has amassed a record of significant achievements that have tangibly improved the lives of all Americans. When we have erred, you have helped us right our course.

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    This morning you will be asking us tough questions. That's as it should be. Believe me, none of the questions you will ask can be any tougher than those we are asking of ourselves.

    I can assure you, however, that whatever determinations are reached regarding the cause of the accident, you will find that complacency is not one of them. Last year we temporarily halted Shuttle flight operations when tiny cracks were discovered in metal liners used to direct the fuel flow inside propellant lines on two different orbiters. We did not fly again until that problem was corrected. To signal our continued commitment to rewarding such diligence, we also made a point to praise David Strait, the young contractor employee who discovered the cracks. Other flight decisions made throughout the year were made with the goal of operational safety being paramount. And from working with the dedicated employees who keep the Shuttle flying safely I know they have the utmost regard for the enormity of their duty.

    This week, at NASA Centers throughout the country and in the field, with the support of more than 2000 people from more than 20 federal, state and local organizations, the important work of data analysis and recovery operations is continuing. I am extremely proud of the work that is being conducted by these dedicated public servants. As President Bush said last week, ''The people of NASA are being tested once again. In your grief, you are responding as your friends would have wished—with focus, professionalism, and unbroken faith in the mission of this agency. Captain Dave Brown was correct: America's space program will go on.''

    This morning, to help frame our discussion, I would like to review for you the significant actions NASA has taken since the morning of the accident in accord with our contingency plan. In addition to articulating notification or first response procedures, defining the roles and responsibilities of mishap response and mishap investigation teams, the plan specifies selection of persons outside of NASA to head an independent, seasoned accident investigation team.

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    While we did not foresee this terrible tragedy, our response has unfolded as we had planned and prepared for that contingency plan. This plan was one of the many positive outcomes from the terrible loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger seventeen years ago. The plan is updated before every flight and a contingency was simulated just three months ago.

First Response: Saturday February 1, 2003

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    When we first became aware of the a problem with STS–107, I was waiting at the Space Shuttle Landing Strip at the Kennedy Space Center on Saturday, February 1. At 8:59 a.m. eastern time, we lost communications with the Columbia.

    At 9:16 a.m. the countdown arrival clock reached zero and there was no sign of the Columbia. Captain Bill Readdy, our Associate Administrator for Space Flight, declared a spaceflight contingency and activated the Recovery Control Center at the Kennedy Space Center. At that point, Bill Readdy and I departed the landing strip and headed to the Launch Control Center.

    We arrived at the Launch Control Center thirteen minutes later, at 9:29 a.m., and we activated the Contingency Action Plan for Space Flight Operations. Through the White House Situation Room, we notified the President as well as other senior staff of the loss of communication. In addition, Members of Congress and the Government of Israel were notified. Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge and the National Security Council were also made aware of the situation. Secretary Ridge then began assessing the possibility that this situation was terrorism-related. Shortly after, he made a determination that it was highly unlikely terrorism was involved.

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    Secretary Ridge then announced that the Federal Emergency Management Agency would be the lead federal agency for the recovery effort.

    Meanwhile, the family members of the Columbia astronauts were escorted from the landing strip to the astronauts' crew quarters. Later that morning, at about 11:30 a.m., I met with the families at the crew quarters at Kennedy Space Center to express my condolences, offering any and all support we could give, and stated our commitment to find the cause of the accident, fix any problems we may find, and continue the work that their loved ones had started.

    Data at all NASA sites and contractors were impounded at 10:00 a.m. and the Headquarters Action Center in Washington, D.C. was activated with NASA personnel moving immediately to their duty stations.

    By 10:30 a.m., the NASA Mishap Response Team convened to assess the preliminary data and focus on the location of the crew compartment through the Rescue Coordination Center at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia. The Rapid Response Team was activated for deployment to Barksdale AFB in Louisiana.

Columbia Accident Investigation Board

    The process of initiating the Columbia Accident Investigation Board began about 10:30 a.m. on Saturday, February 1, when I placed a call to NASA Deputy Administrator Fred Gregory, who was at NASA Headquarters in Washington. Mr. Gregory then began calling Columbia Accident Investigation Board members currently listed in our contingency plan.

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    At 1:15 p.m., I made a brief televised statement expressing our ''deepest national regrets'' for the tragic accident and informed the public about the appointment of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

    I verbally activated the Columbia Accident Investigation Board during the NASA Mishap Investigation Team teleconference, which occurred at 5:00 p.m.

    By 6:00 p.m. during a teleconference with the White House Situation Room, we briefed officials from the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Department of Defense, the FBI, and the Federal Aviation Administration about the current status of the accident investigation.

    At 6:40 p.m. staff members of the National Transportation Safety Board departed Washington and traveled to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana to assist as part of the Mishap Investigation Team. They were later made available to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

    On Sunday, February 2, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, headed by retired U.S. Navy Admiral Hal Gehman, held its first meeting at Barksdale AFB, less than 30 hours after the accident. We also began the practice of twice daily briefings at Headquarters in Washington and at the Johnson Space Center in Houston.

    Membership in the Columbia Accident Investigation Board consists of persons selected for their positions in heading civil and military offices with responsibilities for aerospace safety accident investigations and related skills. Many have been chief investigators on major accidents and between them the Columbia Accident Investigation Board members have the experience of some 50 major investigations to draw upon.

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    Quite simply, the people who are now on the Board are some of the best in the world at what they do.

    You have our assurance that this distinguished Board will be able to act with genuine independence. When the Board assembled, it modified its Charter to eliminate any reference to NASA directing the administration of the investigation. NASA accepted the changes to the Charter without objection. Further, the NASA Inspector General, Robert Cobb is an observer on the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and he will help assure the independence of the Board as he reports to the President and Congress.

    There are some additional details about the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and its activities that are worth noting. The Board has taken over hardware and software releases of NASA so that NASA cannot alter anything unless the Board approves. NASA has already begun to honor document requests from the Board, and has also supplied additional documents to the Board which were not requested that we believe may be helpful to their work. And finally,. the Board has instructed NASA to conduct fault tree analysis that it intends to independently validate.

Recovery Operations

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    On Sunday, the NASA Mishap Investigation Team was on the ground and working with local officials in Texas and Louisiana. The State of Texas activated 800 members of the Texas National Guard to assist with the retrieval of debris.

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    By Tuesday, there were nearly 200 NASA and NASA contractor personnel working recovery operations in Texas, Louisiana, Arizona, and California. They were part of the more than 2000 people from Federal Emergency Management Agency, Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Defense, Department of Transportation, U.S. Forest Service, Texas National Guard, and state and local authorities working to locate, document, and collect debris.

    By Wednesday, the astronauts' remains were transported to Dover Air Force Base in Delaware. At Dover, NASA Deputy Administrator Fred Gregory and a ceremonial honor guard were present to pay our respects to the seven fallen astronauts.

    Throughout the week, we were able to make steady progress in our effort to recover debris from the accident. We have thus far recovered upwards of 12,000 elements of debris. The search effort, as you know from our press conferences, is a large, complex and ongoing effort over hundreds of square miles with challenging weather and terrain conditions. We are very grateful that no one was injured on the ground as a result of flying debris from the accident and we are working with our agency partners to ensure recovery operations remain safe.

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    The Federal Emergency Management Agency command post was set up in Lufkin, Texas on Saturday, February 1, and has been operating non-stop since then. Debris collection activities began at Barksdale Air Force Base on Sunday, February 2. Yesterday, we began transporting debris on trucks to the Kennedy Space Center where they will be assembled and analyzed as part of the comprehensive accident investigation directed by the Gehman Board. I visited Texas and Louisiana this past Saturday to get my own assessment of the operation and to personally thank the many volunteers who have worked so tirelessly to support the debris recovery effort.

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Space Shuttle Status

    Let me touch briefly on the Space Shuttle fleet as it is today. Discovery is continuing to undergo major inspections and upgrades which will be completed by April of 2004. Atlantis is currently assembled and stacked in the Vehicle Assembly Building at the Kennedy Space Center for STS–114. The Endeavour is in the Orbiter Processing Facility and being prepared for STS–115.

    The next Shuttle mission, STS–114, was to have been to the International Space Station in March. That mission, commanded by Col. Eileen Collins, U.S. Air Force, is on hold until we understand the causes of the Columbia accident and are able to resolve any issues identified. At this time we don't know how long it will be before we can resume Shuttle flights. We will only know when the Columbia Accident Investigation Board concludes its work and presents its findings.

    Columbia was the first Orbiter in the Shuttle fleet, having flown 28 successful missions or just over a quarter of its certified life of 100 flights. In February 2001, less than a year ago, Columbia completed a major scheduled eighteen month overhaul and update of its systems, a process we call Orbiter Major Modifications (OMM).

    The STS–107 mission was Columbia's second flight following OMM and a successful servicing mission to the Rubble Space Telescope in March 2002.

    Prior to the loss of Columbia and her crew, the projected Shuttle flight rate was five flights per year starting in FY 2004, and we have requested funding for that flight rate in this budget. The flight rate will be adjusted as needed once we determine when we can return to flight.

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International Space Station Status

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    The crew of the International Space Station is of course deeply saddened by the loss of Columbia and her crew—as are all of our partners and people around the world. I spoke with International Space Station crew members Ken Bowersox, Don Pettit, and Nikolai Budarin on Saturday, February 1st to inform them of the accident and how we are proceeding. Despite this tragedy, the crew is continuing its busy schedule of work.

    The day after the loss of STS–107, our Russian partners conducted a successful launch of an unmanned, autonomous Progress resupply vehicle to the Station. The provisions carried on Progress 10P should provide the crew sufficient supplies to maintain normal operations through June 2003.

    Progress resupply flights to the International Space Station by our Russian partner will continue as scheduled. The next Progress flight is scheduled for June 8, 2003. We are working with the Russian Aviation and Space Agency officials to determine what we want to place on the flight to make sure we make the best use of the space available. In addition, a regularly scheduled Soyuz crew transport vehicle exchange is already planned for launch in April 2003.

    Study teams formed almost immediately after the accident to assess the impact on the International Space Station. These teams are focused on how we will 1) sustain the Station, 2) continue to assemble the Station, and 3) maximize the utilization of this unique research platform. We have kept our International Space Station partners informed of our recovery efforts. Further, we met with our international partners last week and plan future meetings in the weeks ahead to develop an International Space Station partner plan.

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    We can maintain a permanent crew on the International Space Station as long as is necessary with support from Soyuz and Progress flights. The International Space Station is stable and has sufficient propellant to maintain its orbit for at least a year without support from the Space Shuttle. A nearer, term issue for crew support beyond June is water. The International Space Station cannot support a crew of three after June with the currently planned support from Progress. As a consequence, we are discussing with our international partners the possibility of changing the April Soyuz flight from a taxi mission to a crew exchange mission as well as the feasibility of adding Progress resupply flights.

    I should emphasize however, that no decisions have been made and we are examining all options. I have talked to the Expedition Six crew now on-orbit and they have expressed determination and desire to do whatever is necessary to continue their research and deal with any changes in the crew rotation schedule that may be necessary.

Integrated Space Transportation Plan

    As we look forward to determine our nation's best course of action in response to the Columbia accident, it is worth noting NASA's Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP), which was submitted by the President to Congress in November as an amendment to the Fiscal Year 2003 federal budget. The Integrated Space Transportation Plan can help us address many of the near-term issues we are facing, even though it was developed prior to the loss of Columbia.

    The Integrated Space Transportation Plan reflects the tight coupling required across the Space Station, Space Shuttle, and Space Launch Initiatives efforts. It is intended to ensure that necessary access to the International Space Station can be supported for the foreseeable future. It consists of three major programs: the Space Shuttle, the Orbital Space Plane, and Next Generation Launch Technology.

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The new plan makes investments to extend Shuttle's operational life for continued safe operations.

The Orbital Space Plane is designed to provide a crew transfer capability as early as possible to assure access to and from the International Space Station.

The Next Generation Launch Technology Program funds next generation reusable launch vehicle technology developments in areas such as propulsion, structures, and operations.

The SLI will focus on the Orbital Space Plane and Next Generation Launch Technology, including Third Generation RLV efforts.

    The FY 2003 budget amendment also proposed adding funds to International Space Station reserves to assure that we could successfully reach the milestone of U.S. core complete and maintain progress on long-lead items for enhanced research aboard the Space Station.

Science and Research Objectives

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    Space flight is a means to an end and at NASA that end is research, exploration, discovery and inspiration.

    The crew of STS–107 were engaged in a wide array of scientific research that could be conducted nowhere else but in space, and had significant potential benefits for the public. Columbia's crew took great pride in their research aimed at fighting cancer, improving crop yields, developing fire-suppression techniques, building earthquake-resistant buildings, and understanding the effects of dust storms on weather. As was written in the press, ''Columbia had a cargo of human ingenuity.''

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    The crew of the International Space Station is also conducting research now that can be conducted nowhere else. Thus far, more than sixty experiments spanning across such scientific disciplines as human physiology, genetics, plant biology, Earth observations, physics, and cell biology have been conducted on the International Space Station. From these experiments scientists are learning better methods of drug testing, and about dynamic models of human diseases, the physics of fundamental processes in manufacturing, antibiotic synthesis, and changes in Earth climate, vegetation, and crops.

    The International Space Station is the centerpiece initiative of human space flight at NASA. Our objectives in this regard are very clear. First, we will keep our on-orbit International Space Station crew safe. Second, we intend to keep the International Space Station continuously occupied in order to assure the reliability of the International Space Station itself. Third, we intend to return to assembly as soon as we are able to return the Shuttle fleet to safe operations, and complete the research goals set for ourselves and our international partners.

    To accomplish these aims, we need to create a long-term crew return capability to complement and augment the Soyuz vehicles now provided by our Russian partners. We intend to build on that new return capability to create a crew transfer system that will allow us to rotate crews on the International Space Station independently from the Space Shuttle.

    We also firmly believe that extending the operational life of the remaining Shuttle fleet is a good investment because it will help maximize the science return from the International Space Station.

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    We designed our Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP) to ensure that we had the coordinated resources to exploit the unique research environment of space and the International Space Station in the near-, mid-, and long-term.

    We thought the plan was a good one when we proposed it and we believe that it is not only valid today but even more compelling to pursue. While we believe the ISTP is a good plan, we will re-examine it if necessary in light of investigation findings on Columbia.

Moving Forward

    Just over a week ago—although it seems more like a lifetime—the President spoke eloquently and powerfully at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas. He said:

''The cause of exploration and discovery is not an option we choose; it is a desire written in the human heart. We are that part of creation which seeks to understand all creation. We find the best among us, send them forth into unmapped darkness, and pray they will return. They go in peace for all mankind, and all mankind is in their debt.''

    The noble purposes described in President Bush's words frames all that we do and how we do it. These purposes drive our mission goals, which are:

To understand and protect our home planet; To explore the Universe and search for life; and, To inspire the next generation of explorers as only NASA can.

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    And even while our nonstop work to recover from this terrible tragedy and to continue safe operations on the International Space Station will be our chief focus in the days ahead, the American people should know that we will also press ahead with our other activities to achieve these important goals.

    This Centennial of Flight year we will be launching the Mars Exploration Rovers, the Mars Express spacecraft, the Space InfraRed Telescope Facility, and a number of Earth Science spacecraft and instruments, as well as continuing our work to help improve aviation security on behalf of our Homeland Defense.

    In these activities and in all we do at NASA, we strive for unmatched excellence. And when it comes to human space exploration, where margins are razor thin, we know we are graded on a very harsh curve. For us, ninety-six percent to ninety-nine percent is not an ''A.'' One hundred percent is the minimum passing grade.

    Despite this harsh truth, we know the lesson from this terrible accident is not to turn our backs on exploration simply because it is hard or risky. As John Shedd wrote about the age of ocean exploration, ''A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are built for.'' Human history teaches us that in exploration, after accidents like this occur, we can learn from them and further reduce risk, although we must honestly admit that risks can never be eliminated. And as President John F. Kennedy said some 41 years ago, speaking about our fledgling space program, ''All great and honorable actions are accompanied with great difficulties, and both must be enterprised and overcome with answerable courage.''

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    The immediate task before the Agency is clear. We will find the problem that caused the loss of Columbia and its crew, we will fix it, and we will return to flight operations that are as safe as humanly possible in pursuit of knowledge. We have no preconceptions about what the cause of failure was or what it will take to make sure it never happens again. We have an independent accident investigation board of truly outstanding and eminently qualified individuals and they, and they alone, will determine the cause of the accident and its remedy—no matter where it leads.

    We are ready and willing to support the addition of any experts that Admiral Gehman deems necessary to the effective conduct of the Board's investigations.

    Part of my job as Administrator is to remind everyone of what NASA does and what we are capable of doing. It's a responsibility I take very seriously. At the same time that I am saddened beyond words for the loss of the seven outstanding men and women of STS–107, I am also very proud and humbled by the focus, dedication and professionalism of the NASA family and all those throughout the country who are assisting us in the recovery effort.

    Today, February 12, is also the birthday of President Lincoln. And some of his words, spoken for a very different purpose, have come to be in my mind this past week:

''It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion.''

    We have an opportunity here and now to learn from this loss, and renew the boundless spirit of exploration present at NASA's beginning. We will do this by being accountable to the American people for our failings and, we hope, credible and compelling in pursuit of research, exploration, and inspiration for future generations.

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    Finally, during the 16-day STS–107 mission we had no indications that would suggest a compromise to flight safety. The time it took me to present this testimony is about the same amount of time that transpired between when Mission Control first noticed anomalies in temperature measurements and the accident.

    I just paused for a few seconds. That's the same amount of time that transpired from Mission Control's last communication with the crew and our loss of signal with the heroic Columbia astronauts.

    May God bless the crew of STS–107.

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Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Administrator.

The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member of the House Science Committee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Hall.

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STATEMENT OF HON. RALPH M. HALL, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS

    Representative HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Chairman McCain, and I thank this group.

    Mr. O'Keefe, I thank you, your Deputy and your Associate Administrator for Space Flight and those valiant people who sit behind you there that contribute so much day in and day out. We're grateful to you.

    And I speak for Bart Gordon, who is the Ranking Member of the Space Subcommittee, who has the same respect I have for the leadership. And this is a day and time when we should be neither Republicans nor Democrats, but Americans. And I think it's a day in time when we come together.

    And, Mr. Administrator, you did a great job that Monday, that fateful Monday, in Houston. Thank you for that.

    I think, certainly, that this one of the most painful hearings that I've ever had the duty to try to get prepared for. It's less than two weeks now since the Shuttle broke apart in the sky up over my home in my area in Texas. I'm saddened every time I think of these seven brave astronauts and the grief-stricken families that they left behind. I knew three of them very well.

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    And the young lady from India, who had accomplished so much and came so far, came to my district on more than one occasion, had a great sense of humor, was really great for the program. In one of her speeches to one of the classes in Canton, in Vanzant, Texas, one of the students said, ''We have a hard time pronouncing your name.'' She said, ''That's all right. I have a hard time pronouncing yours.''

    (Laughter.)

    Representative HALL. She had a way with youngsters and was very helpful.

    I know that there are a lot of questions about what went wrong, and I'm going to shorten my speech here because we have so many others that really should be heard from and we have questions that we have to ask you.

    There has also been a lot of speculation as to what or who may be to blame for the accident. The reality is that it doesn't appear that a