The statement adopted by the Strategic Planning Council describes NASA’s mission, its vision, and the scope of its activities. But the next step in the process cannot be taken in the absence of a comprehensive strategy for the civilian space program. Without a coherent formulation of the United States' intentions and priorities, there is no context in which to evaluate the relevance or the importance of any proposed initiatives.
To
lay the foundation for the definition and articulation of such a strategy, NASA
is currently developing a process to systematically assess the posture of our
space program and to refine and assess candidate strategies to direct its
future. This process, strategic option development, is still in its early
stages; nevertheless, the development of the process has yielded some
interesting insights into existing and potential space strategies.
The
application of strategic option development to charting the future of the U.S.
space program initially evolved from analogies drawn from relevant aspects of
business theory. Although it is unconventional to think of space endeavors in
terms of a business, many concepts from the business world are applicable and
quite useful.
Leadership
in business is possible at any time during a product's life cycle. When a new
product is introduced (the innovator stage) there is no competition. If the
product is successful, the firm becomes the market leader by default. The
drawback, of course, is that innovators must accept the high cost and high risk
associated with being first. The space program in the early 1960s was an
innovator’s market. Nearly every successful effort produced a
"first," but the risks, as well as the number of failures, were very
high.
__________________________
The
launch of America’s first astronaut in space, Alan B. Shephard Jr., on the
Mercury Redstone II from Cape Canaveral on May 5, 1961.
In
a mature business market (the late majority stage) there exists a balance, as
many firms compete for some share of the market. At this stage, it is still
possible to be a market leader by carving out a particular niche of that market
or by delivering the highest quality or best value. The launch vehicle market,
for example, is approaching a more mature stage, and many countries will be
vying for leadership in the 1990s.
A
firm engaged in more than one market must develop an integrated strategy which
provides the flexibility to be both an innovator in a new market and the
leading competitor in a mature market; this principle should be applied to a
space program as well.
The
business of space has expanded considerably since the 1960s. The areas of
scientific research, space technology, space exploration, and space services
are still open to leadership through innovation, but some are also now open to
leadership in more mature markets. In fact, national space programs must now
look at four stages of space leadership: (1) the pioneer stage,
innovation in some particular area of research, technology, or exploration; (2)
the complex second stag6, a continuation of a pioneering effort, but
with broader, more complex objectives; (3) the operational stage, with
relatively mature and routine capabilities; and (4) the commercially viable
stage, with the potential for profit-making.
The
activities of a space program can be characterized by physical regions of
space: (1) deep space, (2) the outer solar system (the planets beyond the
asteroid belt), (3) the inner solar system (the inner planets, the Moon, and
the Sun), (4) high-Earth orbit, and (5) low-Earth orbit. Supporting
technologies, such as launch capabilities and orbital facilities, are required
to undertake all programs.
The
complex concept of space leadership may be broken down into logical elements to
form a two-dimensional matrix. The columns of the matrix are delineated by the
four leadership stages outlined previously; the rows are the five physical
regions of possible space activities, with a sixth row for supporting
technologies and transportation. Each square of the matrix defines a particular
area of possible leadership.
This
matrix analysis provides a way to conceptualize alternative courses of action
and can be used to describe and assess the space programs of spacefaring
nations. It is possible to be a leader in a single square through any of a
number of different programs. Figure 2 illustrates several programs
which, if undertaken in the 1990s, would result in leadership in one area of
space endeavor. For example, a country could be a leader in the highlighted
area of a complex second effort in the inner solar system by successfully
establishing a lunar outpost or by sending sophisticated rovers to other
worlds.
Not
all the squares will be accessible in the next decades. Technology has not
progressed to the point that any nation is able to contemplate, for example,
commercial prospects in the outer solar system. This figure does not represent
a particular strategy; rather, it represents a collection of potential
programs.
Being
a leader in one area no longer results in overall space leadership. In the
early 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union were the only competitors,
and only the cells in the lower left comer of the matrix were accessible. As
technology advanced and nations gained experience in space, the opportunities
began to expand. In the 1960s, the U. S. learned to send satellites to
geosynchronous orbit, scientific experiments to low-Earth orbit, spacecraft to
Mars, and even astronauts to the Moon. America was undeniably the leader in
space exploration, but the range of space activities was (by today’s standards)
relatively limited. In the 1980s, not only has the number of spacefaring
nations increased, but so has the range of activities that an interested nation
might undertake.
The
business of space has expanded and branched, and now encompasses such diverse
and mature fields as remote sensing, microgravity materials research,
commercial communications, and interplanetary exploration. It appears virtually
impossible for a single nation to dominate in all space endeavors. Since the
U.S. can no longer reasonably expect to lead the way in all activities, it is
now important to adopt a strategy to strive for leadership in carefully chosen
areas.
If
nations engage in similar activities (occupy the same space on the matrix) the
conditions exist for either rivalry or cooperation; if a nation engages in
distinct activities (occupies a space alone), the conditions exist for
uncontested leadership.
This
matrix was used to broadly characterize the space programs of the United States
and other spacefaring nations during two periods of the space age: (1) 1957
through 1977, illustrated by Figure 3; and (2) 1978 through 1990,
illustrated by Figure 4.
The
major programs, U.S. and non-U. S., were identified and placed in the appropriate
squares. This is by no means a comprehensive compilation, but the selected
activities are representative of space efforts during these periods. An admittedly
subjective assessment was made of whether the public perceived the U.S. or
non-U.S. efforts to be the leaders in a given square. Each square was then
shaded either blue or red: blue if the U. S. was judged the leader, red if
not.
A
comparison of the two matrices graphically displays the difference between
these two periods of time. In the early years of the space age, fewer areas
were accessible and the U.S. was the clear leader in most; the matrix
representing the 1980s illustrates the decline of U.S. leadership.
(MISSING PICTURE)
Figure 2. Possible Programs to
Capture Leadership after 1995
Examining the programs of the spacefaring nations shows the basic character of each. The U.S. space program has historically been composed of pioneering efforts—significant firsts and complex second efforts, which emphasized advanced research, technology, and exploration. The general trend can be characterized as revolutionary, producing spectacular events, rather than moderate, evolutionary advances. Even the United States Space Shuttle, though designed to be operational, was a revolutionary concept—it did not evolve from existing launch vehicles.
The Soviet space program, which is radically different from the American program, can be characterized as systematic and evolutionary. The primary focus is not on advanced research and technology, but on incrementally developed operational capabilities, achieved through a strong commitment to a robust infrastructure. The Soviets have steadily evolved toward this operational state and they are now beginning to build on that operational base to move slowly into the commercial arena.
The
Europeans and the Japanese appear to be pursuing strategies that combine
desires to pursue science in selected areas and to achieve commercial viability
in others. The launch system Ariane, the remote-sensing satellite SPOT, and the
Japanese JEM (which will be devoted to materials science research) are all
examples of elements in these strategies.
These
observations suggest that there is no one “correct” strategy; rather, there are
many distinct strategic options. Clearly, each nation should choose and pursue
a strategy which is consistent with its own national objectives.
What
should our choice be? Do we want to mature our operational Earth-orbiting
capabilities to a viable commercial enterprise? Should we continue our leadership
role in solar system and deep-space exploration? Or should we focus on venturing
ever further outward from Earth with human expeditions to the planets?
(MISSING PCITURES)
Figure 3. Leadership Matrix: Representative
Achievements, 1957 to 1977
Figure 4. Leadership Matrix:
Representative Achievements, 1978 to 1990