CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The Commission will come to order, please.
DR. KEEL: Mr. Stevenson, Mr. Davis, and Colonel Kolczynski.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Good morning.
The Commission would like to receive any information that you have after the session is over. I know you provided some information for us, and we would like to, as we go along, get any information that you have from any of your documents for our records.
Mr. Hotz and General Kutyna have some questions they would like to ask you, and we will probably not keep you too long today.
Bob, do you want to go ahead.
MR. HOTZ: Charlie, you mentioned yesterday that when you were going around the pad with your pyrometer, none of the readings you received on the pyrometer exceeded the red lines and therefore you didn't report them.
Could you explain what those red lines are and what the limits of the red line is.
MR. STEVENSON: Okay. My reply was intended to mean that we operate by certain requirements, OMRSD requirements, and certain Launch Commit Criteria requirements. And those measurements we had-let's say the vehicle was operating within those limits. As far as the particular measurements of the SRB which you were mentioning, we have no requirements as to the temperature of the SRB in the area that you were questioning, the 19 degrees.
MR. HOTZ: So you have no red lines as far as the SRB's are concerned?
MR. STEVENSON: No, sir.
MR. HOTZ: And what are the red lines concerned with the external tank or the orbiter or what?
MR. STEVENSON: The red lines as far as the ice frost goes refers to the tank itself, to the external tank, and this is mainly in terms of temperatures relating-our duties are mainly in terms of temperatures relating to the external tank. The orbiter temperatures, again, as has been stated, 31 degrees to 99 degrees.
MR. HOTZ: But that is the same as the general launch criteria?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir.
MR. HOTZ: So you didn't report these temperatures on the SRB because there is no place in the launch criteria that requires any?
MR. STEVENSON: That is correct.
MR. HOTZ: Have you ever had antifreeze freeze on the pad before this launch?
MR. STEVENSON: As far as the facility goes?
[969] MR. HOTZ: Yes.
MR. STEVENSON: STS-20 was a similar case the night before we launched, but it was not the same conditions at launch time.
MR. HOTZ: Was that the one where the facility became encased with ice?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir.
MR. HOTZ: You didn't actually launch after that one?
MR. STEVENSON: No, we did not.
MR. HOTZ: Is this the worst pad ice that you have ever encountered in your excursions out there where an actual launch took place?
MR. STEVENSON: As far as the facility goes, that is correct. As far as the launch vehicle goes, that is not correct. We have had more ice on the vehicle at a launch time than we had this time. For this particular launch, the vehicle was performing well,
and it was mostly frost.
MR. HOTZ: Now, you mentioned earlier that you, as you move around the pad, you are in constant communication with the launch control room, because they need to know where you are and what you're doing. And so, in addition to your conference reports when you come back, you are also giving real time chatter to them while you are out on the pad, is that correct?
MR. STEVENSON: We are in communication with two different groups. We're in communication with the launch, the NTD or the LTD.
MR. HOTZ: Could you spell that out for us, please.
MR. STEVENSON: Okay. We are in communications with the launch test director on the 101S net, and our responsibility is mainly to tell him where we are, where we're going, and what we're doing. He occasionally asks what conditions we are finding.
We are also in communications with the
MR. HOTZ: In this particular case, were you reporting findings back to him?
MR. STEVENSON: Not specifically, no, sir.
MR. HOTZ: You waited until you came in for your conference?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir.
There was a case where we also were reporting back through the management loop on channel 245, and we also normally carry on communications with our people back in firing room 2, who are doing the monitoring for our ice frost. We report various conditions that we say which may be different than what is being observed on the TV system, so that we can have a better understanding of the conditions.
MR. HOTZ: Thanks very much.
I have a couple of questions for Colonel Kolczynski on the weather forecast. Could you give us in brief terms when and where you made you pre-launch forecast when you predicted the hard freeze for the night of January 27th-28th?
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: We gave several briefings throughout the time period. We gave some briefings on Saturday which in the afternoon
MR. HOTZ: Could you use the dates.
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: Yes. On the 25th at 1100 local, we had a Mission Management Team briefing which we attended and presented our data, which indicated a strong cold frontal system coming down with Arctic air, strong Arctic air behind it. And we anticipated at launch time having layered clouds, approximately broken at 3,000 feet, layered up through about 24,000 feet.
Based on that, we came back in the evening on the telephone conference on the 25th at 2100 local. The system still was moving very rapidly toward the Florida peninsula, and it was still our estimate that we would have the clouds in there and potentially some rain showers or even some thunder showers to the West.
Based on that, the mission was scrubbed. We subsequently came back on the 26th at 1400 local. That was an in-person briefing to the Mission Management Team again. At that time, we talked about the cold frontal system passing through, strong winds for the Monday morning launch time period, potential crosswinds.
As an outlook which we give-we always give an outlook for the day after. We indicated that once the cold high had set in in the Florida area, that we did anticipate having some colder temperatures. At that time, we were forecasting the mid-20's to the upper 20's.
As you well know, we scrubbed for strong crosswinds again on the Monday morning. That is the 26th-I'm sorry, the 27th. So we came back, on the telephone this time, the 27th at 1400 local, and we presented again a forecast of clear conditions, basically, good winds, no precipitable kind of weather.
But we did indicate that we would have a
little colder temperature than we had predicted before. In front of you you can see-at least you could for a while-the actual weather temperature trace, which is in the blue dashed line versus our predicted temperature.
(Viewgraph.) [Ref. 2/27-1]
We started it at about 1200 to 1200 for the temperature trace, and we started our forecast trace at midnight because it was our anticipated prediction that at 12:00 midnight we would go below 32 degrees. We were about three degrees warm approximately until about 4:00 a.m., at which time we caught up with the curve, and then we were a slight bit, as you can see, colder in our prediction than the actual weather was.
Is that sufficient?
MR. HOTZ: Yes.
I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
DR. COVERT: Colonel Kolczynski, I would like to ask you a question or two if I may on the information that you had generated on the winds aloft particularly the wind shear conditions and the jet stream location at 35, 40,000 feet at the time of launch, how often that was updated and so forth.
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: I did provide a package. Unfortunately, you don't have the launch times of our
upper air sounding systems. But I do have available for the panel a listing of all of the balloons and rockets that were sent up, and I will provide that.
DR. COVERT: How often do you send up balloons?
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: The balloon that was used I believe for the loads calculations was the 3 hour and 30 minute prior to launch balloon.
DR. COVERT: That would be 8:00 a.m., roughly?
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: No, sir. The launch time-if the launch time were at 10:30, that would have been somewhere around 0700, 1 believe. And the actual time of that was-I believe that is 7:05, but I will double check that for you.
[971] Basically, that information is collected and then transmitted to the Johnson winds people, who are Marshall people. I'm sure, they go to Johnson to do the wind loads calculations.
We send up a balloon. It is my contractor Pan Am that does the launching and the data collection and the transfer of that data in automated fashion to those people. Per se we don't do wind shears, and I would defer that question to the Marshall people because they can explain that much better than I can as to how they
do the loads calculations.
All we do is the measurement of the upper air soundings and pass the information to Marshall.
DR. COVERT: That is all I am interested in at this point. About the time that balloon went through 35 to 40,000 feet, how far was it displaced from the position where the space shuttle would have penetrated that altitude?
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: I don't have that information. I can get that for you.
DR. COVERT: Would you guess it was a substantial distance?
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: I really wouldn't want to speculate. I just haven't looked at the data that closely. But I can get you that information.
DR. COVERT: Are there other ways of doing altitude soundings that would be more precise?
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: We have several techniques that we use at the Cape. One of them is a radar track mylar balloon with little conical shaped protrusions all over it. It is called a JIMSPHERE, and we track that balloon, and it has an accuracy of approximately about-we can collect data in approximately 100 foot intervals.
The balloons rise at about 1,000 feet per
minute. Then there are the rawinsondes and the windsones, and they are substantially less accurate.
There are other techniques that are being investigated, the upper air radar sounders, doppler acoustic radars, that show some potential. But again, as to the real capability of those kinds of systems, I think those questions again would be better addressed to the Marshall people, because they have folks right there that have been looking at those kinds of systems.
DR. COVERT: I guess I would just like to go back and again emphasize one point. All of these drift techniques, the balloons are launched near the pad?
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: No, the balloons are launched on the Cape Canaveral side of the complex. So they are south of the area where the shuttle is. And I'm not very good with distances, but I would estimate perhaps five miles, and that could be in error.
DR. COVERT: What kind of gradients exist in the upper air winds, so that if you have a balloon that is ten miles from where the shuttle is going to penetrate this altitude, how do you correct? Or again, is this a Marshall task and not yours?
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: We don't correct the balloons. All we do is-essentially, when it moves, it is a radio frequency kind of thing. We get radio
signal back and as the balloon drifts that gives some indication of not only the speed, but also the direction in which we at a certain level feel the wind is blowing. It's not a feeling. We measure it to the best of our ability.
DR. COVERT: Okay.
[972] COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: So if you are asking me how continuous is the atmosphere, I can't answer that question. I would-again, I'm not an upper air dynamicist, and I think you probably could find somebody who could give you a much better answer than I could.
DR. COVERT: Thank you, Colonel.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Davis, you said that the weather conditions on the pad were the worst of any launch, any previous launch, is that correct? Or maybe it was Mr. Stevenson that said that.
MR. DAVIS: We probably both said it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you want to discuss that a bit? In other words, the conditions on the launch pad themselves were the worst of any flight, any previous flight, is that accurate?
MR. DAVIS: Okay, I will give it a try. Earlier in the year before January launch, we got ice all over the fixed service structure. However, we were able to decide not to launch
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You scrubbed that launch?
MR. DAVIS: We scrubbed that launch, and it all melted off before the time of the actual launch. And so as far as launch time is concerned, it was relatively warm by the time that we did launch.
This time, however, we were in the 20's, like 24 to 26 degrees, at the time we were out there at the T minus 3 hold, and this is well below anything we had ever experienced before. And it did serve to verify our math model which we use to predict the amount of ice that we may get on the outside of the tank.
Normally, we all talk about the fact that below 32 degrees you're going to have ice. But this isn't strictly true if the ice has to come from the moisture in the air, which is the case here. So as far as the tank itself is concerned, we verified within a reasonable amount of error what the actual temperatures were, and they were well below freezing. And we also verified that the predicted amount of frost was really what was getting on it, which was practically none.
And so as far as the vehicle itself was concerned, the external tank part of it, and also the interface between the tank and the orbiter, we had less ice than we have seen before. But the weather conditions for the other things that we encountered were
much worse.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But the condition, the ice on the launch pad, was worse than any previous flight?
MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir, it was. And we can go through that in some detail. We have some charts that would show that if you like, that show where the ice was and essentially how much it was, and also I think will partly explain my remark yesterday to the effect that the sunlight would make some of it on the eastern side of the stand be more likely to fall off during launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, why don't you go ahead and do that. Do you have pictures that you could show us?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, we have them, and I guess we can have them projected on the screen up there.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Fine, go ahead, why don't you.
(Viewgraph.) [Ref. 2/27-2]
MR. STEVENSON: The first picture is just an orientation type picture showing the MLP deck, the FSS, and the RSS.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could you explain some of those acronyms so we understand them?
[973] MR. STEVENSON: The platform that the shuttle sits on is the mobile launch platform, the MLP.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You refer to that as the launch platform?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir, the mobile launch platform.
The structure off to you right with the swing arms attached which come out to the vehicle is called the fixed service structure, the FSS. And the part that is rotated back on the tracks to what we call the south is the rotational service structure. And we use that for payload changeout.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay.
MR. STEVENSON: The next chart.
(Viewgraph.) (Ref. 2/27-3]
MR. STEVENSON: Okay, this chart just shows you a different view of the FSS and the MLP and the shuttle vehicle. This chart also shows some of the projections we made as far as the trajectories for the ice that would come off of the facility.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Say that again? Now, what are the figures that you show in the chart? They are projections, you say?
MR. STEVENSON: Trajectories of the ice particles as we were predicting that they would fall off of the facility.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I see.
MR. STEVENSON: The highest level which we had ice on the facility-and I will go into those in more detail in the future charts here, but the highest elevation was at the 220 foot elevation. And if you see the-we made predictions for three size particles, a six inch by one inch by one inch particle, which is one of those traces; a 12 inch by one inch by one inch particle, which is the center trace; and the 24 inch by one inch by one inch ice particle, which is the inboard trace.
And we had predicted that they would come out on the MLP deck approximately 16 feet from the FSS toward the shuttle vehicle, based upon a 10 knot wind at 300 degrees azimuth.
DR. RIDE: Again, I think you mentioned this yesterday, but that calculation doesn't include the effects of aspiration?
MR. STEVENSON: That is correct. And there's a note on the chart up in the upper right-hand corner that says "Effects of aspiration not included." That was unknown to us.
The next chart.
(Viewgraph.) [Ref.2/27-4]
MR. STEVENSON: Okay. This is just a break across the fixed service structure at the 220 foot
level. At the 220 foot level is the first level at which we encountered ice, and the darkened area you see off there where the arrow pointing toward the north is is where the ice was on that level.
It is the first fire X hose which was let trickled to keep from freezing, and it was drained into an eye bath or an eye wash, and the hose had fallen out of the basin and the water was running on the facility. So that is the first, the highest level at which we had ice, and the darkened area is away from the vehicle to the northwest.
Next chart.
[974] (Viewgraph.) [Ref.2/27-5]
This chart is the level immediately below the 200 foot level, which we probably had the most ice. The darkened area again shows the part of the facility of the FSS at which we had ice. There is a color.
The next chart.
(Slide.) [Ref.2/27-6]
Okay, this is a color photograph that was taken at T minus 3.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What are we looking at?
MR. STEVENSON: You are looking at the northwest corner of the fixed service structure, the plumbing, the structural moments itself where you see
the icicles that have formed as a result of the water coming, running down from the level immediately above.
Icicles on this level were approximately two feet long and a maximum diameter of about three-quarters of an inch.
The next chart.
(Viewgraph.) [Ref. 2/27-7]
The previous chart, by the way, was the level of the access arm, orbiter access arm, from which the crew enters the vehicle. This happens to be the 160 foot level, and again the blackened area shows the area where we encountered ice.
This area does show a little bit more ice over on what I'm calling the east side, which is the side toward the vehicle, which would be in the top of the frame.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The last picture you say showed the area where the crew entered the vehicle?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, the same level from which the crew enters the vehicle. The photo was actually taken from the area of the slide wire, which is the emergency egress system.
The next chart.
(Slide.) [Ref.2/27-8]
MR. STEVENSON: Again, this is a color photo
taken at T minus 3 hours from the MLP deck. But it does show the 160 foot level. Icicles on this level were approximately one foot in length and approximately five-eighths inch in diameter, and you can see them on the stairways and all of the substructure of the facility.
MR. DAVIS: If I may, in this area the sun would be hitting the eastern section of it, which is right in this area, and all of those small icicles up at the top would be the ones that would be getting the sun first and would begin to loosen and would be ready to fall at the time of liftoff.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Davis, did you perform the same functions on previous launches, particularly the two previous launches?
MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Those were both launched from pad A, is that correct?
MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And this was at pad B?
MR. DAVIS: That is correct.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And this is the first time pad B had been used?
MR. DAVIS: That is correct.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did pad A have weather
protection of some kind?
MR. DAVIS: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: On pad A wasn't there some weather protection device?
MR. DAVIS: We have one, but it is not in this area, as far as protecting that structure.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But there was some weather protection equipment on pad A, wasn't there?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, there's the same freeze protection plan for both pads, the same type of protection.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: We were told, I think when we were in Kennedy, that there was weather protection equipment on pad A, but it had not been installed on pad B.
MR. DAVIS: No, I think they were referring to weather protection devices for the orbiter. That was to keep rain and so forth off the orbiter itself. It was not to protect a structure like this. The only thing that is done to protect the structure as such is like draining pipes and preparing it to handle the cold weather situation.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could you explain the equipment that was on the launch pad A that wasn't on launch pad B?
MR. STEVENSON: The equipment that is on pad A in terms of weather protection is equipment which is used to protect the orbiter from rain and hail, the weather. It is part of the rotational service structure, and for launch, of course, that is rolled back. It is rolled back at approximately T minus 20 hours, say.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What kind of equipment is it? Is it a cover of some kind that covers the orbiter?
MR. STEVENSON: Currently it is a canvas type. We call it a sail, and it also involves some hard structure. For this pad and for the future, it will all be hard structure.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But it didn't have anything to do with the external tank or the solid rocket boosters?
MR. STEVENSON: No, sir, not in this time frame. Both pads would be identical in this time frame.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I'm not sure that I know what you mean by "this time frame." I'm trying to figure out whether there was a difference in the protection against the weather in the last launch compared to this one.
MR. STEVENSON: In this time frame, the part of the weather protection for the orbiter which is attached to the RSS would not be in place, because the RSS would be in its launch position. And regardless, both pads would have the same configuration at this point in time.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, why don't we go ahead. We can straighten it out later.
MR. DAVIS: Could I just for a second? I might be able to fix it. What it is, we have batwing type things that are on the rotating service structure, and those things will fold up out of the way. And you have to rotate that service structure back away from the vehicle. That takes all of that stuff with it.
At this time, those things are not on pad B, but they would have been away anyway for this period of time. Like we're fixing to launch, so they would move it back out of the way.
[976] And any of the things that you see here, like the icicles and so forth, would have been just like they are now, regardless of what the weather protection device and so forth had been, had it been identical to pad A.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: But for the several days before launch there would have been a difference in
protection of the orbiter?
MR. DAVIS: That is correct.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now, in your mind that had no significance as far as this flight is concerned?
MR. DAVIS: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, if that is the case, why bother having the protection on the orbiter, if it made no difference?
MR. DAVIS: Well, I will try to answer it, though I am not a Kennedy person. But I will give it a shot, because of this-the real intent of that protective device that they're putting over the orbiter itself is to prevent absorption of moisture into the tiles.
Now, they did have some protection. That was to keep the orbiter from getting damaged by the fact of getting wet, and that protection is what we're talking about. That has just been moved away regardless, and between the time that that was rolled back and the time of launch there was no precipitation and nothing happened that would have made a difference one way or the other.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay. Go ahead.
MR. STEVENSON: Okay. Next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) [Ref.2/27-9]
The next chart is just a plan view, again moving down the FSS to the 140 foot level. Again, the darkened area shows the area at which we encountered ice of some form.
Next chart.
(Slide.) [Ref.2/27-10]
Again, this is a color photo showing the ice. At this time it's on the vehicle side of the FSS. The vehicle in the background is the left-hand SRB at the ET attach ring. That is the area at which we attach the tank to the SRB and the area at which we attach the orbiter to the external tank.
You see the orbiter in the background. The lower surface, the icicles here are approximately one foot in length and about one-half inch in diameter.
Next chart, please.
(Slide.) [Ref.2/27-11]
Again, this is a color photo of the same area, just taken one slice higher on the vehicle. You can actually stack the previous photo and this one together, and you will get the idea-if they were stacked in this fashion, you would get the idea of what the total level looks like on the 140 foot level.
The next photo.
(Slide.) [Ref.2/27-12]
I included one to show some of the icing conditions on some of the equipment that we were using. This happens to be a communications station which we use to communicate back to the LCC and other areas on the pad.
Icicles here are approximately one foot in length and about a half an inch in diameter. There was ice, as we mentioned yesterday, on various distribution panels and valve box panels, as well as on side walls of the structure.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Was there any concern that that ice would affect the operation of those instruments?
MR. STEVENSON: That particular instrument I couldn't use because of the ice, because I couldn't turn the knobs to get to the right channel, and I had to go to another.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Say that again so I can understand it? A little louder, please?
MR. STEVENSON: This particular box I tried to use, as a matter of fact, and I had to go to another station, because I could not turn the dials to got to the proper channel.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But that had no effect on the safety of the launch as far as you were concerned?
MR. STEVENSON: No, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: It was just an alternate source of equipment?
MR. STEVENSON: That is correct. And as a matter of fact, these units are not in operation during a normal launch except when we're on the pad, and they are usually in the inert, let's say, condition.
DR. RIDE: You said that you saw ice on other equipment on the launch pad, the distribution boxes, presumably valves and that sort of thing?
MR. STEVENSON: All of which are in the remote condition.
Next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) [Ref.2/27-13]
MR. STEVENSON: Moving down the structure, this happens to be the 120 foot level, and again the darkened area shows the area where we found ice. And in all of these, I should point out that most of the areas that you've seen the darkened area is really the north and northwest part of the facility. That is where we saw the most heavy concentrations of ice. The east side, which is in the top part of the TV screen, we actually saw the least amount of ice.
The next chart.
(Slide.) [Ref.2/27-14]
MR. STEVENSON: This is a color photograph looking at the 120 foot level from the mobile launch platform deck, that shows the icicles that were forming on the roof or on the floor, whichever may be the case, on the grating, as the water had dripped through the grating.
Again, this side is the northeast corner and it is toward the vehicle.
The next chart.
(Slide.) [Ref.2/27-15]
This photograph was taken from the 100 foot level of the FSS. It shows the orbiter in the background with a part of the external tank, and on the far left the part of the SRB. It shows one of the beams, structural moments of the FSS, with the icicles on it.
These icicles are about three inches long and less than half an inch in diameter.
The next chart.
[978] (Viewgraph.) [Ref.2/27-16]
This chart is just a plan view of the MLP deck. We are showing in the crosshatched area the 16 feet that we were predicting would be the footprint for ice which we were projecting would fall off of the FSS at ignition.
And again, this chart does not take into effect the effect of aspiration. And we will go over in the next few charts and talk about the SRB flame holes which you see in the center part of the photo.
The next chart.
(Slide.) [Ref.2/27-17]
This photo is a photo of the MLP deck looking from the FSS to east, toward the vehicle. The vehicle would be in the top part of the frame. The shiny part of the MLB deck is sheet ice approximately one-eighth of an inch thick.
Down in the bottom of the frame, you see icicles, which were running from a fire hose into the drain. Those icicles are about four feet long, and that is over the edge of the MLP deck.
Next chart.
(Slide.) [Ref.2/27-18]
You need to turn that one over.
Okay. This is the chart of what are called water troughs within the SRB flame holes to prevent overpressure. They are filled with the 6,500 gallons, roughly, of water and antifreeze. The antifreeze was put in for this launch as part of our freeze protection plan.
The water was protected against freezing down
to 16 degrees Fahrenheit. And this chart over on the right-hand side, the first four or five water bags, you can see that there is ice on the surface. This picture was taken after we had begun to remove the ice with, let's call it, a fish net. We actually broke the ice up and dipped it out.
The next chart.
(Slide.) [Ref.2/27-19]
This again is the left-hand SRB flame hole, and it shows the amount of ice we have taken out. It shows a little bit of ice that is left in there. We did come back out after this photo was taken and fish out most of the remaining ice that you see there. There's a few pieces still left in there floating, about the size of your hand.
The next chart.
(Slide.) [Ref.2/27-20]
This is just a repeat of what we've said, and again you can see a few pieces of ice were left in there. We felt we got a minimum of 95 percent to 98 percent of the ice that was available in the trough. We did fish it out.
And we did make one more attempt at T minus 20 to get out additional ice that you do see floating around in there when this photograph was taken.
The next chart.
(Slide.) [Ref.2/27-21]
This is a typical photo of the ice that was taken out of the water troughs and dumped on the MLP deck, where we later swept it off. We were estimating that the water-that the density of the ice here was approximately 25 pounds per cubic foot. It was approximately one half inch thick.
[979] The next chart.
(Slide.) [Ref.2/27-22]
The two next charts are of the aft skirt on the left-hand SRB. There was a little bit of water-or a little bit of water had gotten on the aft skirt of the SRB as a result of the overflow from the eye wash basins, and that water had turned to ice.
If you could zoom in on the blue ring on the bottom. The little white that you see on the blue ring is the ice we were referring to. We did remove that ice as best we could.
The next chart.
(Slide.) [Ref.2/27-23]
This is a closeup of the same area. We had decided in the early meetings that ice in the area and ice in the water trough was unacceptable for launch, and that is the reason we went back out a second time and
attempted to remove all of the ice in the area of the flame hole.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Would you explain that a bit. You decided earlier what, that that was unacceptable?
MR. STEVENSON: Okay. Ice in the water troughs, which we were showing, or any debris is unacceptable for launch, because we have seen in the past film analysis that some of this debris can be thrown up toward the vehicle.
And so we decided that we would have to remove the ice, particularly in the primary water bags, which could become a source of debris and impact the vehicle.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And you did that?
MR. STEVENSON: And we did that. The water bags that you've seen here in these photographs are mainly what we call the secondary water bags. The primary water bags are just below this photo, close in around the nozzles of the SRB's, and that had considerably less ice in it, and also we took more pains to make sure we fished it all out.
The next chart, please.
(Slide.) [Ref.2/27-24]
We put in about three charts to show the overall condition of the vehicle. We haven't talked
much about the vehicle, but this chart does show the frost conditions on the vehicle, and this is launch time, not T minus 3. These are pad cameras, taken at launch.
And you do see a little bit of frost on the external tank. We see no anomalies with the orbiter or the SRB.
MR. DAVIS: If I could interrupt here for just a second. If you notice, on the right side the frost is a little more evident on the back side where it's in the shade. You see the white on the tank itself, and this is the kind of frost that we were seeing earlier. And you see on the side that is next to the orbiter, it is pretty well melted off.
MR. STEVENSON: Next chart.
(Slide.) [Ref.2/27-25]
This chart is at the T zero.
The next chart.
(Slide.) [Ref.2/27-26]
This chart shows the vehicle rise of approximately 100 feet.
DR. RIDE: What time is this?
MR. STEVENSON: I would say approximately two seconds.
DR. COVERT: Mr. Chairman, could I suggest we
have copies of that picture, please?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir, I will supply you copies.
DR. RIDE: Can you pan that down just a little bit.
MR. STEVENSON: Would you pan that down just a little, please.
MR. HOTZ: Charlie, this may not be your field, but it looks like there's a little puff of smoke off on the right hand side there. Can you describe that for us?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir. That is the puff of smoke that has been released before to the press and to the world. That puff of smoke in that picture is I believe it is about 100 or so inches tall and about five feet across.
MR. HOTZ: And what is the time frame of that picture?
MR. STEVENSON: I believe it's about two seconds. I would have to go back and check the time.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Would it pay to back up one chart? Was there smoke on that chart previously?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, would you back up one chart.
(Slide.) [Ref.2/27-27]
MR. HOTZ: Is there any smoke visible in that picture, Charlie?
MR. STEVENSON: No, sir, I don't think so. They are not sequential pictures. I took them out of a string of photos, and they are not necessarily in the correct order.
MR. HOTZ: But this appears to be a different angle from any of the pictures that we have seen. I wonder if you could make a sequential series of that available to the Commission.
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir. I have 130 photographs in that area.
MR. HOTZ: Thank you very much.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could you go back to the one where the smoke appears for the first time, please.
MR. STEVENSON: I believe that is chart 24.
DR. COVERT: Could the operator focus the one, focus that to the left. Put the one back on you just had.
(Slide.) [Ref.2/27-28]
MR. STEVENSON: In one of those photographs, now that I've pulled the notes out, the cloud of smoke is 36 inches by 108 inches. And then in the larger photo it's 72 inches by 130 inches.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Have any of you made any
interpretation of these pictures as far as weather is concerned?
MR. STEVENSON: Not as far as the weather is concerned, no, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Have you any other conclusions on it?
MR. STEVENSON: Well, our conclusion would be speculation based on-but if you want that, I will speculate.
[Laughter.]
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, go ahead.
[Laughter.]
MR. STEVENSON: Engineers don't like to speculate, but based upon our photo data-and we have analyzed all of the photos-we feel that that is a leak. It may or may not be related to [981] temperature, and we feel it is coming out of-the most likely spot is the joint between the aft booster and the aft segment.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And this is the right booster?
MR. STEVENSON: This is the right booster, yes.
MR. DAVIS: And this is the area that I mentioned yesterday, where I was taking a shot of that area above it, which is the white area there, where all
of that extra frost is up there. I panned up and down that area on the tank and got the temperature readings earlier.
And so at that time we could see absolutely nothing that would indicate any kind of a leak from the tank itself, and this is in that specific area.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So your speculation would be the same as Mr. Stevenson's?
MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Armstrong.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Would you tell us again how long before the time of this picture your last reading with the IR gun was, or any other measurement?
MR. STEVENSON: That time was 7:14. Give us chart 26.
(Viewgraph.) [Ref.2/27-29]
MR. DAVIS: That was almost five hours earlier than the picture we were just looking at.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: About how long?
MR. DAVIS: About five hours. We were right at noon when we launched, and that was roughly at 7:00 o'clock.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: And have you made any attempt to project what the first-or correct your measurements to give the actual temperature of the
seal area at the time you made the measurements, and then to project what they may have been at launch time?
MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir, we have. Taking the 19 degrees corrected measurement, which is indicated on this chart in front of you there, and taking into account the change in ambient temperature and a minor consideration, which could be a major one and completely make my guess wrong in that it might be a higher temperature than I'm going to project, it comes out that the temperature should have been approximately 28 to 30 degrees at the time of launch.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Thank you.
Is that all of the charts you had?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, this is all the ones we planned to present, and we will make these available to you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much.
Mr. Armstrong.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Yes. I would like to return to your testimony of yesterday indicating your past experience with seeing leaks from the ET, not necessarily leaks but perhaps vents or whatever. And is it your conclusion, based upon your past experience, that a leakage out of the external tank, either LOX or hydrogen, would in fact be visible because there would
be associated condensation in the air and so on, or not?
[982] MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir, that is correct. And in fact, we have corroborating evidence of it in our photographs that showed the purge coming out of the hydrogen to-let's see-the hydrogen-umbilical interface between the tank and the orbiter. You can see the condensation and see the nitrogen purge coming out, and it is considerably warmer than the nitrogen itself would be.
We can also see the oxygen coming out of the oxygen vent system, and as it comes out you can see it, and we have a mixture of purged nitrogen and mixed with that oxygen, and that is dry nitrogen we are using. And so if we had a leak of hydrogen we would certainly see it, be cause very minutely it would give you a rather large plume.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: And you would both see it and, if you went over that area with your gun, you would probably see it with that. So you had two sources.
And the last time of your visual inspection of the SRB and the ET was again how long before launch?
MR. DAVIS: T minus 20 minutes, which would be about 40 minutes before launch.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Can you say that your impression is that, based upon your visual observations at T minus 20 minutes, there was no evidence of any leak?
MR. DAVIS: That is correct.
MR. RUMMEL: Was the specific charge of yours to in fact look for hydrogen leaks, or was this done more or less in passing while you were there?
MR. DAVIS: We are not specifically charged to look for hydrogen leaks as such. We are charged to look for any leaks, and any leaks to the substrate, through a crack or anything of that nature in the thermal protection system.
And as part of the interface area down there, we have a possibility of a leak always, although we have good seals. And up to this point we don't have a record of having a leak.
But we always make a specific inspection for that, and we make specific inspections, and I looked personally, as well as all the other members on the team, for any indication of a crack or a leak or anything that goes with it.
But we aren't charged to go look for hydrogen.
MR. RUMMEL: I take it there are other means,
then, as well? Are there TV cameras that continuously scan with respect to propellant leaks in the ET?
MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir, that is correct. We have them, but we don't have total coverage. We do have pretty good coverage in the area that I'm speaking of
MR. RUMMEL: And where is that reported? Is that in the control center? Where are the cameras read that continuously report?
MR. DAVIS: That is the launch control center, in what we commonly refer to as the Ice House. We have a multitude of cameras that are directable by Charlie and his people and myself on request, to look at any particular spot. We have trained observers who watch it at all times, so that we are really looking for this kind of thing. This is our basis for existence.
MR. RUMMEL: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Is there any evidence at all that you have seen that would suggest to you there is any possibility of a leak in that area on this Challenger flight?
MR. DAVIS: Absolutely none.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: There have been, as you know, stories that somehow a hydrogen leak on the external tank might have been a cause of this accident.
But so far you've had no evidence to that effect at all?
MR. DAVIS: No, sir. I can't support even a consideration of it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Dr. Ride.
DR. RIDE: I have one question on your speculation about the smoke. I was wondering to what extent you have been able to localize the origin of the smoke on the photographs? Can you pin it down to a one square foot area or five square feet or 12 square feet?
Just how close can you do that photographically now?
MR. DAVIS: Maybe we should both answer that one. I can say that it looks to me, my personal observation of it, that it is inboard of the connection of the lower strut between the SRB and the ET. And I believe that is about something inboard of 45 degrees off the centerline.
MR. STEVENSON: It is approximately 300 degrees.
DR. RIDE: Okay. I guess really my question is, how sure are you of that? What are your error bars on that? Can you say that within a couple of feet or within a couple of inches?
MR. STEVENSON: We will say it is within a foot of the joint, and it is at 300 degrees.
DR. RIDE: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That's pretty precise.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: It is my understanding that you also have as part of your responsibilities the search for debris post-launch.
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Can you tell us what the results of that search were for this occasion?
MR. STEVENSON: Okay. Normally at postlaunch we inspect the pad proper inside, let's say, the perimeter fence, unless we find flight hardware or some reason to go beyond. We have gone as far as the beach and we have gone as far as 15, 20 miles north and south of the beach, depending upon the conditions which would warrant that.
For this time, my normal inspection team was delegated the responsibility to look inside the pad, and inside the pad we found-as of this time, we have found no flight hardware or parts off of the flight vehicle. We have not found anything in the nature of facility debris that would cause damage to the flight vehicle.
GENERAL KUTYNA: May I ask, there were some
new doors on this launch pad that were supposed to slap down after launch and I was told they were fairly large springs that slap those doors down, and those springs are missing. And the last time I heard we hadn't found them.
Have you found them yet?
MR. STEVENSON: One spring was found on the MLP deck by holddown post number one.
The other three springs are still missing. The springs have a plunger mechanism. We have found two of those. The other two are still missing.
The two we found were approximately 1200 feet north of the pad, next to the perimeter fence. One was on the inside of the fence and one was on the outside of the fence. We feel that the other two are out in the lagoon and under water.
GENERAL KUTYNA: So no speculation that these might have bounced off the orbiter or something?
[984] MR. STEVENSON: We have-we are in the process of doing a film analysis, and the film analysis shows that the doors to reach their 60 degree or 57 degree position, the timing is such that the vehicle was what we consider to be far enough away that when those springs could have come out and the plunger, that the vehicle would be in a safe position.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: To follow my previous question, had there been ice impacts on the orbiter tiles, for example, and damage to those tiles, would you normally expect that you would be able to find some evidence of that in your post-launch inspection?
MR. STEVENSON: I feel that, number one, if we had any damage to the vehicle during liftoff, the high speed film, launch film that we take, in all likelihood would show us that.
Secondly, if we had lost any flight type hardware-and we have done that in the past-live would have found it, and we have found it in the past.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: For example, losing tiles, for example, you would expect it?
MR. STEVENSON: The time we lost tiles, we found nearly every single one.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Colonel Kolczynski, could you characterize for us the nature of the Cape weather and the difficulties that you encountered as a result of having to meet the launch and recovery criteria, since there are so many weather constraints on both of those areas?
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: I perceive that as two questions of a generic sense. To answer the first one, anyone that has taken an aerial photograph of the Cape
knows full well that we are surrounded by water in that particular area. We have got the Indian River and Banana River to the west, and of course the Atlantic Ocean and several lagoons around, to provide enough moisture source.
Consequently, in the winter time in early mornings we run into problems with fog. In the summer time we encounter convection thunderstorm rain shower activity, which unfortunately oftentimes builds up directly over the Cape and KSC.
As far as the second question, I believe was
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: What difficulties or how fast, really how fast does weather change, and what difficulties does that provide you in being able to meet the launch and recovery criteria that are associated with those?
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: If we could become specific with 51-L, for example, the frontal system, that frontal system seemed to move rather well as it came toward the Gulf and even midway through the Gulf. Once it got toward the Florida peninsula, it suddenly slowed down and, as you very well know, we had better than anticipated cloud conditions.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Better being?
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: There were scattered clouds, less clouds than anticipated, right about launch time.
And so I guess what I'm trying to say is it's very difficult to hold continuity, especially 12 hours in advance on a system which is moving even as rapidly as this one was. There are occasions where you're going to miss the timing a little bit, and of course we were off a little bit on the timing this time.
[985] About an hour as I recall, in terms of the relationship of all of the criteria that need to be met. As you well know, we, the Air Force, are responsible up until the launch of a vehicle. So we were responsible for the launch forecast.
The forecast post-launch up to and including the landing of the shuttle, whether that be at Edwards or at Kennedy, is the responsibility of the Spaceflight Meteorology Group down at Johnson. They are the National Weather Service people.
So we coordinate every forecast that goes out to the Mission Management Team, to the launch director, to the flight director, with Johnson. We have a very close relationship with those people because, as you well know, and as depicted in the brochure that I've given you, there are launch criteria which are different
from the RTLS criteria.
Oftentimes the weather looks extremely good over the Cape for launch in winds, for example, so that we don't have a wind constraint per se for launch, however we could have a crosswind at the shuttle landing facility, which would have to be considered by the management as to whether or not we would follow those guidelines.
So yes, there are, as you point out-and of course, we've got the trans-Atlantic abort weather criteria which have to be met, and the once around abort criteria, both at Edwards and at White Sands Space Harbor, that have to be met.
And so we have to meld all of these together in a coordinated forecast which encompasses all of those requirements, so that we can give the decision managers a better picture of what the weather looks like everywhere.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Can you characterize whether that is a difficult task in terms of being sufficiently able to accurately project the weather conditions at launch time in order to meet all of the constraints? Is it difficult, or do you have a high degree of confidence in that ability?
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: I believe the people on
my staff and the people at the Johnson staff and the weather team do as good or better job than anybody can do in predicting the weather. But anyone that has done an analysis of forecasting knows that the farther away you get from an observation in terms of time, the less precise, accurate, your forecast is, and it drops off very rapidly after about six hours.
So when you're making a 12-hour projection, the likelihood of being 100 percent accurate is relatively-or is slimmer than it would be if you were making a three-hour forecast. But with the equipment provided by NASA and the kind of people that we have supporting the mission in terms of the weather people, I think, as I said before, we do as good a job as you can get done.
DR. RIDE: The weather at KSC, of course, is very dynamic. Do you feel that there are maybe times of year at the Cape where it is difficult for you to project even say 30 minutes ahead, as you have to do for an RTLS, or an hour ahead?
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: That is especially true of the two situations that I brought up to your attention. As you well know, when you get into a situation of very light winds in the winter time mornings, you get very close dew point depression. Does
everybody understand what that means?
[986] So that the atmosphere is relatively wet. If the winds get very light, we could get a fog condition, which is a problem for RTLS. And so that is a situation where one has to very cautiously watch the weather and watch the temperatures and winds.
The same thing with thunderstorms. Because of the dynamic nature of the weather at Kennedy, we can actually have storms build up right over Canaveral or Kennedy itself. We are doing a lot of-we are acquiring a lot of equipment to try and get a better handle on that.
We are getting equipment which will tell us about the vertical motion of the air. If we see an area where the air is moving in toward the center, we know there is only one place it can go and that's up, and that is a place that we can look far for potential storm development.
And so we're trying to get a handle, for example, on hour or two or even 30 minutes, for that matter, ahead of the storm developing, to be able to tell the decision maker, we know we've got a developing system right here, it may or may not cause us problems.
Does that answer your question?
DR. RIDE: Yes. Roughly what time scale have
you seen storms, thunderstorms in particular, develop? Can you see them? Do they pop up within an hour of when you weren't expecting them, or is it-do you have an hour's warning or two hours warning?
COLONEL KOLCZYNSKI: Basically, if they are going to pop up inside an hour or 30 minutes, we have a relatively unstable atmosphere, and we would anticipate that we will have storms in the area, at least rain showers, and probably thunder storms. Otherwise, we have a relatively good handle on the fact that storms will occur within the area, and when I say within the area, within 50 nautical miles, perhaps, of the Cape, at least six hours and sometimes even 24 hours in advance based upon the flow patterns that occur, based upon the atmospheric condition, whether or not we have a frontal system in the area, the stability of the atmosphere, the predicted stability.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Stevenson, Mr. Davis, in the performance of your duties, were you called upon to make a recommendation about launch or no launch as far as weather is concerned, either one of you or both?
MR. STEVENSON: Normally that is based upon the weather predictions. We, when the weather is bad, we will go to management and say we are totally out of it, there is no reason to try to launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What happened this time on 51-L?
MR. STEVENSON: For this particular time, the weather, the conditions were such that we were
predicting that we would have frost on the vehicle, and therefore we had no reason to say not to load the tank with cryo.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But do you go to someone and tell them what your recommendation is, or your view on it?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir, starting a day to two days before launch, we start to do that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And what about the day of the launch? Did you have the occasion to make a recommendation on that day?
MR. STEVENSON: On the day of launch, whether we launched or not, yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And to whom did you make the recommendation?
[987] MR. STEVENSON: Well, as we have testified, once we came on station that night, which was roughly around midnight, we immediately began to see that we had a problem with the facility, and that was brought to the management attention starting with my Director of Engineering. It went on up the loop.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: To whom?
MR. STEVENSON: Up through the management chain, and for the next ten hours prior to launch, we spent approximately four hours on the pad as a result of
confrontations with management and our concern and their concern for what was going on out there, and we also spent approximately three or four hours in discussion with the management system discussing the results of our findings on the pad.
And so I think they are very responsive.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What was the result? Now, you've told me the system. What did you finally say to somebody at that point?
MR. STEVENSON: In the last meeting we presented the subtotal, let's say, of all of our findings. We were able to say that the facility ice, which we were all concerned with, would stay within the 16 feet or so of the FSS. We expressed concern for the effects of aspiration, which. was an unknown, and we left it at that. We were not worried about the ice that would fall off the facility if we could be assured that the ice would stay within the 16 feet of the FSS and not be drawn into the left hand SRB flame hole and thereby become, debris and be ejected into the vehicle.
The management system again wrestled with that for quite a while and made phone calls and finally decided that it would not be a safety of flight issue to launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And you made that
recommendation yourself, that there would not be a problem as far as safety of launch was concerned?
MR. STEVENSON: Once the opinion had developed that the aspiration would not draw the ice into the SRB flamehold, we had no problem with saying that it was okay to launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you make that recommendation, and if so, how did you make it, orally or in writing.
MR. STEVENSON: Orally.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: To whom?
MR. STEVENSON: To-well, starting with, let's see, Jesse and Arnie.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Moore and Mr. Aldrich?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And was the same thing true in your case, Mr. Davis?
MR. DAVIS: Yes, it was. In fact, my suggestion that if we were going to fly, that we should do it as early as possible, was picked up. Mr. Moore specifically stated that he felt that that was true, too, and they proceeded that way.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But you were both satisfied there was no safety problem as far as this launch was concerned?
MR. DAVIS: As far as the ice was concerned, yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Or any other weather problem, related problems, or did you just concern yourself with the ice conditions?
[988] MR. DAVIS: Well, in this particular case we were only discussing the ice, but I saw no other thing that would have caused me to bring up anything else.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In those discussions, did anyone express any doubt about the wisdom of flying this launch in view of the weather conditions?
MR. STEVENSON: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Who did that?
MR. STEVENSON: Rockwell.
DR. RIDE: I think it may be important to point out here that the ice team is basically coming back and reporting facts, reporting what they have seen, and then acting in an advisory capacity, and you are not really in the decision making chain for the launch.
MR. STEVENSON: We make recommendations based on what we found.
DR. RIDE: And you really don't do the analysis of what could happen to the orbiter tiles if the ice hits. You just calculate the trajectories of the ice that you have seen, is that right?
MR. STEVENSON: And again, based upon size, we know what damage would occur, yes.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: What was your reasoning in recommending the earliest possible launch?
MR. DAVIS: I believe I mentioned it yesterday, but I will go through it again. Sunlight, first of all, is pretty transparent-ice is transparent to sunlight. The substrate underneath it in the case where we are talking about here is a dark gray, and it is rather rough, and so it absorbs sunlight and turns it into heat energy right at the substrate between the ice and the mobile launch platform, for example, and this is the part I was specifically referring to, and also the handrails that had the icicles on it. So the sun makes it turn loose at the bottom, so to speak and it makes the sheet be loose so it could literally be picked up and sucked into the flame transient and flown up.
So we made every effort to get all of the even partially loosened ice off of the deck and to make sure that there is no loose ice out there.
So the longer you wait after we have done our job, obviously the longer you would have to absorb solar energy and turn some more ice loose.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: The question was,
your conclusion was that the earlier you launched, the less loose ice there would be, is that correct?
MR. DAVIS: That is correct.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Stevenson, you just referred to the fact that you heard Rockwell raise some question about the weather.
Would you tell the Commission what you recall about that and who said it and what they said?
MR. STEVENSON: Rockwell expressed concerns, they did not express a strong opposition to launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Who? Mention names if you are able to.
MR. STEVENSON: I believe it was Bob Glaysher.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And what time was that?
MR. STEVENSON: That was after the T-3 hour walkdown.
DR. RIDE: Was that the meeting at about 9:00 in the morning, or was that before you went out for the last time?
MR. STEVENSON: That was about 9:00 in the morning.
[989] MR. DAVIS: It was the same meeting we had the meeting before we went out the last time, and we discussed it at 9:00 o'clock also.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much. We
appreciate your testimony.
DR. KEEL: Mr. Petrone, Mr. Glaysher, Mr. Cioffoletti and Mr. Martin, please.
(Witnesses sworn.)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Gentlemen, will you be seated and give your names and your present employment and what your jobs are?
[Please note that some of the titles to the references listed below
do not appear in the original text. Titles are included to identify
and clarify the linked references- Chris Gamble, html editor]
[990] [Ref.
2/27-1] Possible environmental
conditions.
[991] [Ref. 2/27-2] Diagram showing shuttle on launch pad (MLP) and launch tower (FSS) and rotating structure (RSS).
[992] [Ref. 2/27-3] FSS (Fixed Service Structure) Ice Debris Trajectory During 51-L Launch-side view.
[993] [Ref. 2/27-4] Ice Drebis on FSS (Fixed Service Structure) at 220-foot level.
[994] [Ref. 2/27-5] Ice Drebis on FSS (Fixed Service Structure) at 200-foot level.
[995] [Ref. 2/27-6] Ice on Launch Pad (Northwest corner of FSS).
[996] [Ref. 2/27-7] Ice Drebis on FSS (Fixed Service Structure) at 160-foot level.
[997] [Ref. 2/27-8] Not Reproducible.
[998] [Ref. 2/27-9] Ice Drebis on FSS (Fixed Service Structure) at 140-foot level.
[999] [Ref. 2/27-10] Ice on Launch Pad (FSS). [Ref. 2/27-11] Not Reproducible.
[1000] [Ref. 2/27-12] Ice on Launch Pad (Communications Station).
[1001] [Ref. 2/27-13] Ice Drebis on FSS (Fixed Service Structure) at 120-foot level.
[1002] [Ref. 2/27-14] Icicles at the 120-foot level from the Mobile Launch Platform. [Ref. 2/27-15] Not Reproducible.
[1003] [Ref. 2/27-16] FSS Ice Trajectory During 51-L Launch-Plan View.
[1004] [Ref. 2/27-17] Not Reproducible. [Ref. 2/27-18] Not Reproducible. [Ref. 2/27-19] Not Reproducible. [Ref. 2/27-20] Not Reproducible. [Ref. 2/27-21] Not Reproducible. [Ref. 2/27-22] Not Reproducible.
[1005] [Ref. 2/27-23] Not Reproducible. [Ref. 2/27-24] Frost Conditions on the Shuttle at launch time.
[1006] [Ref. 2/27-25] Frost Conditions on the Shuttle at launch time, T zero.
[1007] [Ref. 2/27-26] Frost Conditions on the Shuttle at launch time, T+2 sec.
[1008] [Ref. 2/27-27] Not Reproducible. [Ref. 2/27-28] Not Reproducible.
[1009] [Ref. 2/27-29] Measured Surface Temperatures - Omega Scope. January 28, 1986 between 7:20 and 8:40 EST.
DR. PETRONE: Mr. Chairman, I am Rocco Petrone, President of the Space Transportation Systems Division of Rockwell International, located in Downey, California. I have been employed by Rockwell for five years. I have been in my current position for the last two years, and in the prior three with Rockwell held senior management positions in the Space Shuttle program for which Rockwell is responsible. Prior to joining Rockwell I served with NASA from 1960 to 1975.
My division is responsible for the design,
testing, certification and manufacture of the Space Shuttle orbiter, and we provide operational support to the delivered orbiters to NASA. The division is also responsible for integration support and for cargo integration into the Space Shuttle System.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
MR. MARTIN: I am Al Martin. I have been with Rockwell 33 years. My present position is I am the site director for Rockwell located at the Kennedy Space Center, and our organization provides technical advisory support to NASA, also logistic support and configuration management support. I have worked on the Shuttle Program for 13 years. I have been at the Kennedy Space Center four years, and prior to that I was the Chief Program Engineer for orbiter development at our plant in Downey, California. I also worked on the Apollo program for ten years, and one of my assignments there was Launch Director, director of launch operation for Rockwell for the Saturn S-II stage at the Kennedy Space Center.
MR. GLAYSHER: I am Robert M. Glaysher. I am Vice President and Program Manager, Orbiter Operations Support for the Space Transportation System Division, Rockwell International, based in Downey, California. I joined Rockwell 13 years ago. I have worked on the orbiter project for that entire time in various
management capacities. I have been in my present capacity for approximately two years. My responsibilities as program manager are to provide operations support direction to delivered orbiters and also to provide logistics support activities in support of delivered orbiters.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
MR. CIOFFOLETTI: I am Martin Cioffoletti. I have been with Rockwell for 20 years, approximately 13 years on the Space Shuttle program, and I am Vice President of System Integration and Cargo Integration, and the responsibilities there are to provide systems engineering support to the Level II Program Office at the Johnson Space Flight Center for both integration and cargo.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Petrone, you and I had a brief discussion on the telephone about the Rockwell participation in the events leading to the launch on January 28. The Commission would like to have you, in any order you care to, explain the participation of you four gentlemen in that process, with particular reference to the weather, who was at the meeting, what was said, because as we understand it, there was concern on your part as to weather. We would like to know exactly what was said and how that concern was
expressed, and to whom.
DR. PETRONE: I had been at the Cape since Friday, and Monday afternoon after the scrub on that morning, I returned to Downey. I left at the Cape my two program managers you have heard from Bob Glaysher and Marty Cioffoletti, and I told them that I would be in our Mission Support Room in Downey for the launch scheduled for the next morning. Al Martin is our site director and is normally stationed at the Cape, whereas the two gentlemen here traveled with me for this particular launch and supported it.
I first heard about an ice concern about 4:00 a.m. Pacific Standard Time. I had gotten up and went to the support room to support this launch. We have people monitoring consoles, and I checked in, and they told me there was a concern, and when I arrived at about 4:40 a.m. PST, I was informed we were working the problem with our aerodynamicist and debris people, but very importantly, we would have to make an input to Kennedy for a meeting scheduled at 6:00 a.m. our time and 9:00 a.m. Florida time.
We had approximately an hour of work to bring together. The work had been under way when I arrived and was continuing.
At that time I got on the phone with my two
program managers just to discuss background of where we were, how things stood, and what their concerns were locally. They described what they knew in Florida, and we also in Downey did television input, and we could oft some of the ice scenes that were shown here this morning.
We arrived through a series of meetings to a top level discussion at approximately 5:30 a.m. PST, from which we drew the following conclusions: Ice on the mobile launcher itself, it could be debris. We were very concerned with debris of any kind at the time of launch. With this particular ice, one, could it hit the orbiter? There was wind blowing from the west; that appeared not to be so fast, that ice wouldn't hit the orbiter but it would land on the mobile launcher. The second concern was what happens to that ice at the time you light your liquid fuel engines, the SSMEs, and would it throw it around and ricochet and potentially hit the orbiter.
[1012] The third aspect is the one that has been discussed here of aspiration, what would happen when the large SRM motors ignite and in effect suck in air, referred to as aspiration, and ice additionally would come down, how much unknown.
The prime thing we were concerned about was
the unknown base line. We had not launched in conditions of that nature, and we just felt we had an unknown.
As to specifically that trajectory the ice might fly, one can make estimates, but we felt that it was an unknown, condition.
I then called my program managers in Florida at 5:45 a.m. and said we could not recommend launching from here, from what we see. We think the tiles would be endangered, and we had a very short conversation. They had a meeting to go to, and I said let's make sure that NASA understands that Rockwell feels it is not safe to launch, and that was the end of my conversation.
And with that, I would like to turn it over to my program managers and my site manager.
MR. GLAYSHER: Let me pick up. I was also alerted to the ice problem about 4:00 a.m., but this is Eastern Standard Time. I received a call from the base explaining the condition that ice was on the fixed service structure. I then made sure that the necessary wheels were in motion to get the proper people in Downey brought in so that they could evaluate the ice. That was also done through Mr. Cioffoletti. I then called about 6:00 a.m. and verified what was happening,
and was informed there was a meeting going on on the subject.
I got to the base myself at about quarter to 8 Eastern Standard Time and then discussed with our Chief Engineer, Vice President of Engineering our position, and as Dr. Petrone mentioned, with him and developed a position that Rockwell would take at the 9:00 o'clock meeting that was scheduled.
At the 9:00 o'clock meeting, the ice debris team presented their report on the status of the ice. Following that, various people were asked their recommendations and their positions. When I was asked Rockwell's position, I reiterated that there were three major unknowns in evaluation of the ice. As Dr. Petrone indicated, the first event was aspiration effects. The second was ice that would ricochet from the fixed service structure and head toward the vehicle. And the third category of unknown ice was ice that was resting on the mobile launcher platform at engine ignition.
The fourth category of ice, which was ice in the trough, had already been discussed and resolved once the debris team had removed that ice. Those three categories of ice that I mentioned, however, we have no data base on which to base judgments of that. This is the first time it has occurred. It is not a design
condition for the orbiter.
We therefore felt that since we were in an unknown condition and were unable through any analytical techniques to predict where the ice would go or the degree of damage that would result should that ice strike the orbiter TPS, I then gave the following recommendation to NASA in which I said that Rockwell could not assure the safety of flight, or let me give you a better quote, if you would.
[1013] Yes, my exact quote was-and it comes in two parts. The first one was, Rockwell could not 100 percent assure that it is safe to fly which I quickly changed to Rockwell cannot assure that it is safe to fly.
We then had a discussion about what that meant and the data base that we didn't have in effect. They then moved on to Mr. Al Martin and asked for a position or an opinion from him.
So I will ask Al to pick up there.
MR. MARTIN: In the 9:00 o'clock meeting, Bob Glaysher was our spokesman, but I was asked also if I had anything to add, and statements that I made in the meeting were that I made a statement like it has already been said, meaning that Bob Glaysher had stated the Rockwell position. I also added that we do not have the
data base from which to draw any conclusions for this particular situation with the icicles on the tower, and also, we had no real analytical techniques to predict where the icicles might go at lift-off.
The other thing that I did was review the fact that prior to each launch there is great care taken to make sure that there is no debris out on the launch pad. A day or two before launch a crew goes out and they walk down the entire tower and walk down the mobile launcher surface, and also the concrete apron around the launch pad for the purpose of removing any debris such as nuts, bolts, rocks or anything that might be there.
And I drew the corollary that the icicles in this case could very well become debris, that they might become dislodged from the tower when the SSMEs ignite a few seconds before liftoff, and they could impact on the mobile launcher surface and then become debris when the solid rocket motors lifted off, and we had no way of predicting that.
So I was drawing a corollary between the care that is normally taken for debris and painting a picture, that the icicles appeared to me to be in that same category. And so those were my only comments in that meeting.
MR. CIOFFOLETTI: Similarly, I was called in
and told about the problem and came into the 6:00 o'clock meeting which you heard about a few minutes ago, and at the conclusion of that meeting I spoke with Mr. Dick Kohrs, the Deputy Program Manager from Johnson Space Flight Center, and he asked if we could get the Downey folks to look at the falling ice and how it might traverse toward the vehicle, and also, did we have any information on aspiration effects.
So I did call back to Downey and got the John Peller folks working on that problem, and they did, as you saw from Charlie Stevenson's sketches, predict that the ice would travel only about halfway to the vehicle, free falling ice carried by the winds. So we felt that ice was not a problem. However, it would land on the mobile launch platform. That we considered a problem. We also investigated the aspiration data base we had, and we had seen the aspiration effect on previous launches where things were pulled in to the SRB hole after ignition, but we had never seen anything out as far as the fixed surface tower. So we felt in fact it was an unknown. We did not have the data base to operate from on aspiration effects.
At the 9:00 o'clock meeting I was asked by Arnie Aldrich, the program manager, to give him the results of our analysis, and I essentially told him
what I just told you and felt that we did not have a sufficient data base to absolutely assure that nothing would strike the vehicle, and so we could not lend our 100 percent credence, if you will, to the fact that it was safe to fly.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: When Mr. Petrone made his statement, he didn't use the words 100 percent sure, I suppose. Nothing is 100 percent sure.
MR. CIOFFOLETTI: I didn't use those words either. I just paraphrased that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why don't you testify what you said, please.
MR. CIOFFOLETTI: I said I could not predict the trajectory that the ice on the mobile launch platform would take at SRB ignition.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And?
MR. CIOFFOLETTI: And that was the end of it.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But I think NASA's position probably would be that they thought that you were satisfied with the launch.
Did you convey to them in a way that they were able to understand that you were not approving the launch from your standpoint?
MR. CIOFFOLETTI: I felt that by telling them we did not have a sufficient data base and could not
analyze the trajectory of the ice, I felt he understood that Rockwell was not giving a positive indication that we were for the launch.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Glaysher, did you make it clear that you felt there was a safety aspect and that you were not approving the launch?
MR. GLAYSHER: Yes, we actually discussed our position and I stated more than once during the meeting Rockwell's position that we could not assure that it was safe to fly. It was stated when I first was asked to give our position, and it was also my last statement at that meeting, as the meeting wound up. I also reiterated the statement several times.
And so we felt that we had communicated Rockwell's position and that we felt it was unsafe to fly.
DR. RIDE: Had Rockwell ever taken that position before on previous launches when the launch had occurred?
MR. GLAYSHER: No, this was the first time where we had been in a position where we really had no data base from which to make a judgment, and this was the first time that Rockwell has taken an unsafe to fly position.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Dr. Petrone, you've got a lot
more experience than I have in this business, but the few launch conferences that I have been in on the question is very simple. Are you "go" or are you "no go" for launch, and "maybe" isn't an answer. I hear all kinds of qualifications and cautions and considerations here. Did someone ask you are you go or no go? Was that not asked?
DR. PETRONE: At this particular meeting, I was not in Florida, and so I cannot answer that. It had been done at earlier meetings. This was a technical evaluation of a series of problems, and we talked abou