The Commission convened at 9:40 a.m.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The Commission will come to order, please. Today the Commission will hear presentations by representatives of NASA's Johnson Space Center. We are interested in operational aspects of the Space Shuttle System with particular emphasis on the methods by which technical and safety concerns are considered.
It might be well to refer again now to the mandate given to this Commission by the President. It is: one, to review the circumstances surrounding the accident, to establish the probable cause or causes of the accident; and two, to develop recommendations for corrective or other action based upon the Commission's findings and determinations.
The matters we will discuss today may not directly relate to the cause or causes of the Challenger accident; however, they do relate to the second part of the Commission's mandate, to make recommendations on how to make future flights safer.
It is in that connection that the Commission is giving careful attention to concerns expressed by astronauts because the Space Shuttle Program will only succeed in the future if the competent and highly qualified men and women who fly the Shuttle have
confidence in the system.
One other point before we get started. The agenda for today includes a presentation by the Office of Flight Crew Operations. Dr. Ride, who works in that office, feels that it would be more appropriate for her not to take part in the questioning of witnesses from that office, and of course the Commission agrees.
Now we will proceed, Dr. Keel, with the witnesses.
DR. KEEL: Mr. Abbey, Mr. Young, Mr. Weitz, Mr. Crippen, and Mr. Hartsfield, please.
(Witnesses sworn.)
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Gentlemen, we would appreciate it if you would identify yourselves and give a little background about each of you with particular reference to the astronaut program and any flights that you have taken part in.
MR. ABBEY: I'm George Abbey, the Director of
Flight Crew Operations. I'm a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. I served in the Air Force as a pilot for 13 years and received a master's degree in electrical engineering and subsequently was assigned to various management and technical positions since that time. I was assigned to NASA in 1964; assistant to the Manager of the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office, Assistant to the Director of the Johnson Space Center, Dr. Gilruth and Dr. Kraft, and then Director of Flight Operations and more recently Director of Flight Crew Operations.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you, Mr. Abbey.
Mr. Young, would you want to move the microphone over a little bit in front of you? Thank you.
MR. YOUNG: I'm John Young, Chief of the Astronaut Office. I've been working in the Navy from 1952. 1 went to Georgia Tech, bachelor of aeronautical engineering. I've been working for NASA since 1962 and been working on the Space Shuttle since December of 1972, and been Chief of the Astronaut Office since about 1975.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Which flights did you take part in?
MR. YOUNG: Gemini III, Gemini X, Apollo X,
Apollo XVI and STS-1 and 9.
MR. WEITZ: I'm Paul Weitz. I was a Naval aviator when selected as an astronaut in 1966. I have been in Houston since then. I'm Deputy Chief of the Astronaut Office. I flew on the first Skylab flight in 1973 and on STS-6, the first flight of Challenger in 1983.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You're Deputy to Mr. Abbey?
MR. WEITZ: No, sir, to Mr. Young.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: To Mr. Young I understand. So it's Mr. Abbey is head of the office and is not an astronaut, yourself and Mr. Young, and then you are Mr. Young's Deputy, is that right?
MR. WEITZ: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Crippen.
[1408] MR. CRIPPEN: My name is Bob Crippen. I'm a Captain in the United States Navy. I received a bachelor of aerospace engineering from the University of Texas. I've been assigned at the Johnson Space Center since 1969 as an astronaut.
I served in support roles on the Skylab program, the Apollo-Soyuz program, worked on the development of the Space Shuttle, and served as pilot on STS-1, and have been commander of three subsequent Shuttle flights and missions STS-7, 41-C and 41-G, and
have spent a period of time serving as Deputy to Mr. Abbey as the Flight Crew Operations Director. I'm currently assigned as the commander of the first flight from Vandenberg.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You flew with Dr. Ride I assume?
MR. CRIPPEN: I flew with Dr. Ride on two flights, STS-7 and mission 41-G.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you. Mr. Hartsfield.
MR. HARTSFIELD: I'm Hank Hartsfield. I have a bachelor in physics from Auburn, a masters of engineering science from the University of Tennessee.
My background is in the Air Force, a fighter pilot. I joined NASA in 1970 as an astronaut. I worked in support of Apollo XVI and all the Skylab flights, in CAPCOM's support crew. I was a pilot on STS-4 and a commander of flights 41-D and 61-A.
I also participated in the developmental phase of the Shuttle.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much.
I understand, Mr. Abbey, now you have a statement that you will make and begin with?
MR. ABBEY: I thought I might clear up a little confusion relative to the organizations. I was going to tell you a little bit about
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why don't you move the mike over if you're going to do the talking for a while.
MR. ABBEY: If I could have that first chart, please.
(Viewgraph: [Ref. 4/3-4]
MR. ABBEY: I've tried to show on this chart where we fit as far as the organization is concerned. We are the Flight Crew Operations Directorate, the one outlined in the dark lines, and I am the Director of that organization.
We have two major activities within the Directorate, the Astronaut Office and then we also have the Aircraft Operations Division.
The Astronaut Office has 91 astronauts currently assigned along with supporting personnel. In the Aircraft Operations Division we operate 35 aircraft and these vary from the Shuttle carrier aircraft that ferries the orbiter after we land, if we're landing on the West Coast, to Kennedy and around the country.
We have astronauts involved, I think, in a
variety of activities, and we will try to cover that a little later, but I thought I might just touch on the fact that we have astronauts participating in nearly every phase of the program.
[1409] We have astronauts assigned at KSC doing the test and checkout work in support of the vehicle at KSC. We have other astronauts that are assigned to the Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory, where they are doing the engineering and software verification tests.
In Houston we have astronauts doing design and development work, doing engineering Simulations. We also have astronauts assigned to the flight control team when we fly the flights and as we prepare to fly the flights as CAPCOMs and in other roles supporting the mission.
So we are involved, and the Directorate is involved, I think, throughout all phases of the program.
Could I get the next chart, please?
(Viewgraph.) [Ref. 4/3-2]
MR. ABBEY: This shows the Directorate, and again we have the Astronaut Office which is headed by Captain Young. His Deputy is Paul Weitz, on John's right.
Then we have the Aircraft Operations Division. That is headed by Joe Algranti, who is
probably one of the more senior aviators in NASA, and we have an astronaut serving as his Deputy on a rotating basis, Don Williams. We have rotated a number of astronauts in that position.
I think it has been very good for the organization because that Aircraft Operations Division is primarily involved in supporting the astronauts, and I think it has given a better understanding to both the Astronaut Office and to the Aircraft Operations Division of the objectives and problems at both organizations.
So that is something that we started sometime ago, and I think it allows us to use some of the experience and talent that we have within the Astronaut Office.
We also have a Vehicle Integration Test Office, and that is primarily providing engineering support to the astronauts at KSC as we support, test and check out operations there. They are also involved in preparing to do the work at Vandenberg in support of Captain Crippen and his crew.
We also have a Payload Specialist Liaison Office. That is headed by Don Bourque, and this group is responsible for bringing in the payload specialists that fly with us, training those individuals, and integrating them into our activities and integrating
them into the flight crews. That office has been a part of our organization probably only about six months.
As far as how we operate and how we work, John is going to talk a little bit about what astronauts do other than when they fly and maybe give you a better understanding of what we do and where we have people assigned.
Paul Weitz is going to talk about our participation in all the various activities across the program; the boards, the panels, many groups that we get involved in.
Then Bob Crippen is going to talk about our involvement in the Flight Readiness Reviews and how we participate in the L-minus Reviews and then how we participate in the launch decision. They will cover that in some detail.
As far as how issues and problems get identified, we have people, as I say, involved across the program. They bring these issues and we status them. John and Paul status them in pilots' meetings at least once a week where we have-the astronauts have opportunities to raise issues.
Of course, during the course of a week daily they will come forward with problems. Usually if they can be resolved, John or P.J. will resolve those
problems. If I need to get into it, they will bring them forward to me. I will attempt to resolve them and, if necessary, if I can't I will go forward to the individual I work for, who is head of Space Operations, or I will go to the Program Manager, or I will go to the Center Director, or in certain instances I will go to the Associate Administrator for Space Flight.
We have, of course I think, a lot of inputs that come in. We are successful, I think, on getting a number of those inputs accepted. Sometimes they get fully accepted. Sometimes they get partially accepted, and of course I think sometimes they don't get accepted. Usually those are due to programmatic considerations.
Usually if they are not accepted, they are usually due to some programmatic considerations where they weigh the inputs that we give them and for other reasons decide that they would do otherwise, so we will talk a little more about the specifics I think a little later.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Abbey, I'm having a little trouble with seeing the chart. Mr. Young is Director of Flight Crew Operations?
MR. ABBEY: No. I am up in the top of the chart, and then John is in the head of the Astronaut Office.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So they've got their own chart. John is head of the
Astronaut Office?
MR. ABBEY: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Who do you report to?
MR. ABBEY: I report to Cliff Charlesworth, who is the Director of Space Operations. We are one of three elements that make up this Space Operations Directorate. There are two other organizations that are part of that organization, and we are only one part of it. We report through Mr. Charlesworth to the Center Director.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Are all of the astronauts in the Astronaut Office under Mr. Young?
MR. ABBEY: Yes, they all are assigned to that office. We do have individuals, as I say, working in other jobs as collateral duties, so they still have to keep up with all their astronaut duties and all their training but we use them in other positions.
As I say, within Aircraft Operations we have the Deputy of that division is Don Williams, one of the astronauts, and he has flown once and is scheduled to fly again as a commander.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So Mr. Crippen and Mr. Hartsfield are both involved in the Astronaut Office and they have other assignments, too?
MR. ABBEY: Yes, they are both actively
involved. Mr. Crippen is my Deputy, and then I also have other individuals that are involved as technical assistants, and we rotate astronauts through that position. So astronauts are involved, I think, in every phase of the Directorate's operation.
I think that has been very beneficial to us because they have a direct involvement in the management, and we can make use of their experience, I think that has been very good for us.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay, I think I understand now. Mr. Crippen, then, is your Deputy?
MR. ABBEY: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Weitz is Mr. Young's Deputy?
MR. ABBEY: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Hartsfield works in the Astronaut Office?
MR. ABBEY: Yes, sir, he works for Mr. Weitz and Mr. Young.
[1411] CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And he has other assignments as well?
MR. ABBEY: Yes, he does.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I think I'm clear now.
(Laughter.)
MR. ABBEY: John is going to touch on that, talk about the
different assignments and where they get involved and how Henry, as well as the other astronauts, get assigned to other duties.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Fine.
MR. ABBEY: So I will turn it over to John.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Young.
MR. YOUNG: Give me the first chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) [Ref. 4/3-3]
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I think maybe one of the -reasons I'm having a little trouble is my name tag blocks out-there.
MR. YOUNG: You can see this is a pretty straightforward requirement for astronauts, but we are providing those flight crews for NASA space vehicles and when we do that they get an awful lot of time in flight planning meetings and simulators and test and checkout and training. The commander will get about 1,000 hours probably, the pilot 500-plus, a mission specialist 500 to 700 depending upon what kind of assignments they have and training.
When the commander is assigned to a mission, no matter what it says in any book anywhere, the commander is responsible for getting that mission organized and getting it going and getting his crew trained and getting everybody ready to fly. When he is in that
machine he is responsible for that part of the thing, too, from the time it lifts off to the time it lands. All the things that he can do he will be responsible for.
When you talk about participating in design and development, what you're really talking about is hours, and hours and days of meetings and reviews and engineering simulations. You talk about operating techniques and procedures, you're talking about more days and more meetings, desktop reviews, engineering simulations, reviews of malfunction procedures, and so on and so on.
The test and checkout, more time on your back and simulators and places like that, a lot of places around the country. So the first four bullets really specify the kind of people that we really need in the Astronaut Office. We need pilots, engineers and scientists, the best people that we can get who are interested in taking care of those first four bullets, and I mean they have to be interested.
The qualities that we look for besides being pilots, engineers and scientists are desire, dedication, determination, drive and the ability to work with others. It is particularly important in flight crew teamwork because it is critical to the success of every
mission. You take a flight crew with five people in it. Those five people may know the vehicle thoroughly, and when they learn to work together as a team they can do things that people couldn't even imagine, that they wouldn't even imagine.
But most of the work that is done in the Astronaut Office, strangely enough, is desk work. Eighty to ninety percent of the time it is behind a desk somewhere, and that is just the way it is. It is studying and figuring out how they're going to do the right job, and that is the kind of [1412] people we want and that we're looking for. If they're interested in that kind of work, we can use you.
The next chart, please.
(Viewgraph.) [Ref. 4/3-4]
MR. YOUNG: This chart was made before we had the 51-L accident, and at that time you can see that we were primarily involved with flight crews assigned to missions. I'm not going to go into the second bullet because we have a lot of mission development work going on. We're always looking at new things to do, but I would like to talk a little bit about the third bullet, mission support.
You just heard we have people that are in the mission control center. They work days and nights in
integrated simulations. They work 24 hours a day around the clock when we have missions going on at Kennedy, and we have a full team of people down there, the cape crusaders who support, test and check out the vehicle and payloads 24 hours a day for as long as it takes to get them checked out.
The software in the Space Shuttle is a very interesting thing. There are about 110 pages you can call up on a cathode ray tube that you have to know the information that is on there so you can react to it.
There is also a thing called program notes, 84, at last count of program notes plus another 20 or so depending on what software drop you have, that crews have to know how to operate in real time so that they don't do something, talking to the software, that might mess up their system operations.
You have people supporting Johnson Space Center Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory. When this chart was made, they were working two shifts a day, five days a week, but they work around the clock when necessary. Our flight data file is a very interesting compilation of procedures and techniques established over the years for normal missions that weigh 85 to 95 pounds. That is a lot of books. For a space lab mission or something like a space lab mission, it could weigh as much as 108 pounds.
Ascent and entry is a separate bullet that people work on, and the reason that is so is because there are about 175 separate crew procedures involved in doing assents and entries, and people have to know those and practice them a lot. We're right now working on aim simulation in the vertical motion simulator to do some things to learn more about landing and rollout, and I will talk some more about that later.
The next chart, please.
(Viewgraph [Ref. 4/3-5]
MR. YOUNG: This is what we are doing right now. We have cut way back on flight crews. We are still working with the last four assigned.
I won't talk very much about this chart except to show you that the next to last line, the 51-L accident investigation and recovery-and that number is not right. It changes daily. I think yesterday it was 63 people, and when more people get back from spring break there will be more people on that chart.
Ninety-five percent of this work that the Astronaut Office is doing is desk work, and the part that is not, I'm sure, is not very pleasant because it mainly involves sifting through crashtype wreckage.
Let me show you the next chart, please.
[1413] (Viewgraph.) [Ref 4/3-6]
MR. YOUNG: This is what we did last year. It is called the 1985 Astronaut Activity. Last year was an incredibly good year for the space program. We flew nine Space Shuttle missions, which was four more than we flew in 1984, and we almost flew ten but we had two hold kills and one remanifest.
People say, well, that's bad luck. Well, I tell you when you have a hold kill in this vehicle the best place to have it is before liftoff. There is no doubt about it. We had to do a remanifest, and if you're not ready to fly that is exactly what you ought to do, so I think those were good luck.
But in terms of training with respect to crew requirements and almost everybody else's requirement, that was equivalent to about 11 flights. Since we have people all over the agency working in almost every area
DR. FEYNMAN: Excuse me, sir. What's a hold kill and what's a remanifest?
MR. YOUNG: That's a good question. A hold kill is when you're down there at the launch pad and you get right up to engine start, and the engine doesn't start or it starts and then shuts down because it has a problem.
A remanifest is when you roll back and decide to go with another payload, so you put a new payload in. I'm sorry.
DR. FEYNMAN: Thank you.
MR. YOUNG: There is, in terms of requirements there is an awful lot of people who make this program work, as you all know by now, in engineering, in training, in mission operations and vehicle turnaround and payload test and checkout and so forth and so forth.
With my people all over the area, I can tell you that we were working about as hard as this system can work from where I could see last year. We really did some amazing things. Because we had such good flight crew training we were able to do some of these exercises, some of which require enormous amounts of crew coordination that you would never even try.
The extravehicular activity bullets down there, for example. The first one was a try to restart a communications satellite, the LEASAT that had gone bad, and the next extravehicular was a teamwork repair of that same satellite, and then the third was a space construction demonstration, all of which required all five people on each mission to work together.
It was a very good year also from the standpoint of flying. We flew 58 seats with 54 astronauts, and we got 14 new crew people experienced in space flight, so by the end of 1985 we had a really good effort going. Right now we have 57 of 91 astronauts who
have Space Shuttle flight experience, and so right at this moment we have a lot of professional flight crews with a lot of experience.
They are ready to deliver and do all the things that we need to do in space with people, but I expect until we recover from this accident it will be a while before they get to try out those skills again.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Excuse me. May I ask, did at the end of 1985 you feel or your office feel that you had had too much to do in 1985?
MR. YOUNG: I think unless-it was hard for me to see how we could do a lot more with our people unless we do something different, and there are ongoing plans to improve that situation, [1414] but it really-we really had some people that were just working long hours and they were working long periods of time.
I would like to say that we could do more missions than that, but from an operational standpoint it would be tough unless we do something different, which people are proposing to do, and you will hear some about that.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In other words, you thought the activity in 1985 was about all you could handle, but that the pressure in 1985 was not too great, is that correct?
MR. YOUNG: I thought 1985 was a really outstanding year for the space program.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But that if you had had to do more that year, it might have been too much?
MR. YOUNG: I think we would have been pushing it, yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
MR. RUMMEL: What do you mean by new crew people? Are these people who have not flown before?
MR. YOUNG: Yes, sir. They are people who got space flight experience in 1985.
MR. RUMMEL: Would that include people like payload specialists?
MR. YOUNG: No, sir, these are just people that work in the office on a regular basis.
MR. RUMMEL: In other words, the 54 would be a total number, 54 astronauts?
MR. YOUNG: In the office, yes, sir.
MR. RUMMEL: In the office.
MR. YOUNG: Yes, sir.
MR. RUMMEL: I see. All right. Thank you.
MR. HOTZ: John, in view of your statement that 1985 was about as hard as you could push the system with nine flights, how do you view the 15 launch schedule for this year as far as the load on your system?
MR. YOUNG: It is really hard for me to assess it from where I sit, but I think that it would have been
pretty tough.
MR. HOTZ: Thanks.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay, go ahead, John.
MR. YOUNG: Well, that's about the size of what I had to say in my prepared statement.
MR. ABBEY: Paul Weitz was going to go next.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: We want to ask you some questions later on, but we'll come back to you, Mr. Young. Fine.
MR. WEITZ: If I could have my first chart, please?
(Viewgraph.) (Ref. 4/3-7]
MR. WEITZ: Mr. Chairman, what I'd like to do is, without going into detail on this again is to kind of round out a little bit what John touched on, was to point out to you, to try to give you some feel, you and the other members of the Commission, for the involvement of the Astronaut Office in the day-to-day activities at the various levels of the program as they occur.
The Program Requirements Control Board, to take the first bullet for example, is a board that is what we call level two, which is chaired by Mr. Aldrich, to whom you've already spoken and will later today. The purpose of that board is to approve most changes to the Shuttle
transportation system both as they pertain to the fleet generically or any changes that may be made to a specific unique vehicle for any particular purpose.
Another very important level is the Configuration Control Board, which is at level three, which is obviously the next level down below Mr. Aldrich. They have significant but limited authority to authorize changes of the same type that the PRCB would do. Their primary purpose in life is, as their name implies, is to maintain a record of the configuration of the vehicles so we really know what we're flying, and that is a lot more significant than it perhaps sounds.
Another, if we go down to the fourth bullet, the Orbiter Avionics Software Control Board is essentially the same type of activity and control of the software. Remember that, as you have probably been briefed, that this vehicle flies totally by wire.
Everything in it is controlled by the computers, and the software control and design is very, very important in every aspect of managing this vehicle, both on orbit and during the active assent and entry flight phases. So this is essentially the software equivalent of the PRCB, as we have referred to the Program Requirements Control Board.
Another significant one is the next to the
last bullet, the Mission Integration Control Board, which primarily its primary purpose is to assure that the Shuttle transportation system will in fact support the missions that are assigned to it.
They are the folks, for example, who decide that-and these folks work for Mr. Aldrich, and they will decide to remanifest, for example, if the situation warrants, to use John's previous example.
Could I have the next page, please?
(Viewgraph [Ref. 4/3-8]
MR. WEITZ: We have many other functions, as you can see here. For example, the Flight Operations Review is a periodic assessment of our progress toward the planned flight rate. This looks at it from an overall programmatic point of view to see that we are doing the things we can in the right manner to get to where it is we're trying to go as far as our manifest and our flight schedule.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Which one is that?
MR. WEITZ: That's the first one, sir, on the second page, the Flight Operations Review.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Just to make it a little more easy at least for me to understand, in the event of a problem with the joint that caused the trouble in 51-L, when information developed about that which one of
these groups would that information normally go to?
Would it be-in other words if you have trouble on a flight with blow-by and it was clear from that flight that there was erosion and blow-by and it became a problem, how would that information be conveyed to these panels, and who would convey it?
MR. WEITZ: I'm not, I think, well versed or qualified enough to answer that question. I would prefer, if you don't mind, that you address that to Mr. Aldrich when he is on later because that is within his organization.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: In other words, you wouldn't know how that would get-I'm trying to find out how that information gets to the astronaut community, and I gather in this case it didn't.
[1416] MR. WEITZ: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And the information about the joint that failed and we think probably caused the accident was not known to any of you gentlemen, as I understand it.
MR. WEITZ: That is true, which means, therefore, that if it surfaced at one of these activities as represented on these pages is either we were not made aware of it while we were there or we did not realize the significance of the item.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, I gather from so far in our investigation that it wasn't presented to you from an
organizational standpoint. None of these groups knew about it, or at least you didn't know about it. That is correct, isn't it? None of you knew about the problems that you had been having with this joint?
MR. WEITZ: Yes, sir, that is correct.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I guess one of the things we have been trying to find out is how that happened. How did it happen that the astronauts who are so vitally concerned with safety aspects didn't know about this problem?
MR. WEITZ: That is part of what we're trying to reconstruct, also.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I guess my question is where would you normally have expected that information to go organizationally? Which one of these groups would normally, or should have rather than normally, should have received that information?
MR. ABBEY: I think, if I might answer that, if it was a flight anomaly it usually would come up at the Flight Readiness Review, which Mr. Crippen is going to talk about in a minute.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Okay, thank you.
MR. WEITZ: Well, but as a design change I would expect it to show up, if it is recognized as a problem, and something potentially requiring a design
change, it would probably show up at the first bullet on the first page.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, let's be specific because obviously I'm having a little problem with so many suborganizations. I understand it is necessary, and you do a wonderful job, but for us to decide where it should have-where that information should have gone. In this case beginning in August of 1985 concern had been expressed to a lot of people about this joint and about this seal and about the O-ring and about putty and so forth, and at that point there were tests being made to possibly redesign that joint.
Now, what I have trouble understanding is why none of you gentlemen knew about that. That was a redesign question at that time. They were considering the redesign of it at the beginning of 1985, and they were considering the redesign of that joint even at the time the accident happened, and yet none of the astronauts were given that information.
I'm asking the question to see if we can find out what happened in the system that caused that failure, that you didn't know anything about it. Well, we will get to Mr. Crippen later. Go ahead.
MR. WEITZ: We do not have an answer to that, Mr. Rogers.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I wasn't pressing you. I'm just trying to find out why it might happen, because one of the things we're going to have to consider in our report is what can we do to recommend corrective action so that it doesn't happen again so that everyone, particularly the astronauts, are aware of these problems when they arise.
[1417] Now, we realize that you're not going to be aware of every single problem, but certainly critical ones like this that had gotten to the point where a redesign is under consideration, it is difficult for us to understand why you didn't know about it.
I can see why Mr. Young and others were upset about it, Mr. Hartsfield, I know, I noticed the same thing.
MR. WEITZ: We feel the system is in place but it broke down in some way, and I think part of the message that comes across here, perhaps, is we do not have enough people in the Astronaut Office to be intimately involved in all of these details along the way. I think from John's presentation, and you can see from some of these activities, these do not represent all of the activities of these various boards and panels that go on at the Johnson Space Center, either, and that we must in
fact have a system that does identify and correct these deficiencies.
MR. HOTZ: Mr. Weitz, do you think the joint problem is the kind of problem that should have surfaced in Flight Readiness Reviews or configuration control boards or wherever, that it ought to have come to your attention?
MR. WEITZ: I don't see how we could say otherwise, Mr. Hotz I have to say I believe that, since it turned out to be apparently a fatal flaw.
MR. HOTZ: Well, we're interested in your opinions. That is why we're asking these questions.
MR. WEITZ: Yes, sir. The answer is yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you. Go ahead.
MR. WEITZ: As we move down this page, this mainly is a representation of how we get out of the design and engineering type of activities and into the mission and flight specific planning activities.
All of these groups are related one to the other. They tie together in various ways, and we either directly or indirectly have tried to maintain awareness and cognizance of what is discussed and what will be discussed and what has been decided at these various boards. As I say, we can't always go but we are within the Space Operations Directorate.
One of the other divisions was the Mission Operations Division. Those are where the flight directors are resident, and the flight and controllers, and they are our principal representatives at many of these boards and panels.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: I'm sorry. Could you say that again, Paul.
MR. WEITZ: Yes. The folks in MOD, the Missions Operations Directorate.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Are representatives of whom?
MR. WEITZ: We often depend upon them to represent us, either directly or indirectly, at these different boards and panels when we can't make it. We lean heavily upon those folks, the flight directors and the flight controllers, to keep us up to speed and apprised of what is going on because those are the operational system experts.
If you have no further questions, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Chairman, I think I'll leave this viewgraph and turn it over to Bob Crippen, who will discuss a little bit about our involvement in the mission specific activities.
MR. CRIPPEN: Yes, as George Abbey, John Young and Paul Weitz have indicated, the Astronaut Office is intimately involved with all phases of the program.
Obviously one that you've brought out shows a breakdown somewhere, but it is not because we don't think we're involved.
What my remarks are going to be directed toward, what it takes in the final week or so prior to launch, the major milestones that we go through in deciding that we are ready to fly. There are many things that lead up to a mission, many meetings, many milestones, and I'm only going to address those that occur in the final weeks.
If we could go to chart C-2, please?
(Viewgraph C-2.) [Ref. 4/3-9]
MR. CRIPPEN: The first one is the Flight Readiness Review, which was alluded to earlier. The Flight Readiness Review occurs approximately one to two weeks prior to flight. It is a Level I, meaning the Associate Administrator for Space Flight is the gentleman that is the main leader of that particular meeting.
One of the prime things that we do in a Flight Readiness Review is review the anomalies that have occurred on previous missions and decide how we have resolved those or why we think it is acceptable to go fly with those.
Specifically in mentioning the joint problem,
I was the participant representing the Flight Crew Operations. As I indicated on the second bullet there, we normally are represented by the Director of Flight Crew Operations, George Abbey or myself; the Deputy, as his representative; and a senior member of the Flight Crew or Astronaut Office. Normally it is the one that we refer to as our Deputy for Integrated Ops.
On Mission 51-E, which was the mission that we flew right after 51-C where we did have a blow-by problem, that was presented, and it was presented that we had had a blow-by and that there was sooting. In truth, from my perception it wasn't considered that much of a big deal, and it wasn't like we had a major catastrophe awaiting in front of us. I guess the emphasis was not such that one would think that it was the major problem that it was.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Who presented that anomaly?
MR. CRIPPEN: That was presented by the Marshall Space Flight Center. In going through their stuff on the solid rocket boosters. It was presented as an anomaly and, if my memory serves me right, we had had a putty change on the joint just prior to that, and it was alluded that perhaps the putty modification may have had something to do with that but that it really wasn't that big of a deal.
That was the only specific flight that I can remember, although I think in some other Flight Readiness Reviews that perhaps was discussed.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Crippen, looking at a document that related to that Flight Readiness Review, I notice that the resolution said acceptable risk because of limited exposure and redundancy on the seal.
Mr. CRIPPEN: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you at that time realize that the Criticality One list had indicated that there was no redundancy?
MR. CRIPPEN: I did not, and I was not aware of the waiver that had changed the joint from a 1-R to a 1, and I was not aware of the rotation problem. If I had been aware of that in association with the sitting I would have taken the problem much more seriously.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
[1419] MR. CRIPPEN: So at the Flight Readiness Review we do go through all of the anomalies from the previous flights, and if it is-usually what we are addressing is the flight just prior, and since we are also rotating vehicles now, orbiters, we also go back to the last flight of the orbiter that we are just getting ready to fly.
In addition, we get essentially a go from all of the levels of the program that we are ready to go in
the mission, and sometimes it's normal that we do receive action items out of these meetings that are to be closed prior to the actual flight.
Could we go to chart C-3?
(Viewgraph C-3.) [Ref. 4/3-10]
MR. CRIPPEN: The next major milestone is addressed at the Launch Minus One Day Review, which is just that. One day prior to the flight we will hold another Level I meeting, and it is primarily a final tagup looking at the actions as have been closed from the Flight Readiness Review.
It looks at specifics like what is the weather prediction for tomorrow and any other anomalies that might have occurred in that period of a week. In general, it is more or less of a final tagup, and again every element of the program gives a final go.
We are represented again at that meeting normally by Mr. Abbey and Captain Young. Now, that is the minimum representation. We quite often have other people that will attend or be on a telecon hookup. For example, the Deputy of Flight Crew Operations normally monitors that from Houston.
Could we go to chart C-4, please?
(Viewgraph C-4.) [Ref 4/3-11]
MR. CRIPPEN: When we get into the final
launch count there are numerous people involved, obviously. The most obvious, of course, is the flight crew. The flight crew, like everybody else in the program, can only work on the basis of the knowledge that they have. They normally are kept fairly up to date regarding all details with regard to problems that are directly mission related or vehicle related.
In truth in the final count the commander and the pilot are the only two people in the Astronaut Office that actually end up giving a final go. In the final count, the launch director will ask if the commander is go and if the pilot is go, and in truth I have, nor do I think any of the other gentlemen who have flown, have ever thought that if we said we were no go I'm sure we wouldn't have lifted off.
We, of course, would have to have had a reason for doing that. For example, Dick Scobee on 51-L when they had the hatch problem wanted to make sure that the hatch was go and didn't want to take that responsibility on the crew and wanted somebody to come in and check it, and requested and received that kind of an inspection.
The Director of Flight Crew Operations, George Abbey, is located at the launch site, the place right off the launch control center called the Operations Support Room, and he is intimately aware of what is
going on in the final count.
[1420] We have a weather pilot up flying one of our Shuttle training airplanes, and that is normally John Young doing the final check of the weather in case we might be involved in a return to launch site abort.
In addition to that we also have a weather coordinator, who is an astronaut located at the landing field itself talking to both all of the Cape weather people and to Houston and to whoever is flying the weather airplane, normally John.
The Deputy Director of Flight Crew Operations will normally be back at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, available in the flight control area if there are any questions that come up that he should be making an input to.
In addition, we have a senior astronaut assigned in a support room. That is referred to as spacecraft analysis with the acronym of SPAN just off this flight control room, and that person is intimately aware of what is going on in the final count and can make inputs.
Of course, we also have the CAPCOM, who is assigned to the flight control room who is an astronaut that does do all of the communications with the vehicle.
So we definitely are intimately aware of what
is going on in the final count and have numerous means of making inputs to that.
MR. RUMMEL: I note on the first chart 2 and chart 3 that the Astronaut Office is represented by a Director of Flight Crew Operation and so on. Is that a mandatory participation?
MR. CRIPPEN: It is a mandatory participation that he is either there or his representative.
MR. RUMMEL: Well, now I note the absence of the mention of the specific flight crews that are involved in the mission being considered. Do I read that correctly?
MR. CRIPPEN: You read that correctly, and that is by intent. It is mainly that the crew is so involved in the training and the daily preparation of getting ready to go fly that it would be impossible to pull them directly into these meetings. It is always, they are always given a summary, quite often given the detailed pitches of everything that has gone on in the particular meetings involved.
It is also true that we have a health stabilization program that starts at a week prior to flight where we don't have them normally getting in large groups just to make sure they don't come down with a cold or something.
MR. RUMMEL: But of course there is TV and telecon and that sort of thing that might take the place of that. But what I'm getting at you've already touched upon, is in exercising the final judgment, which I now understand the commander has from what you said, as to whether to go or no go. Since he did not participate directly in the Flight Readiness Review or the Launch Minus One Review, he is relying on passed-on information, I take it, to the extent that he may receive it rather than direct participation?
I wonder if that doesn't raise the question of the degree of knowledge that he may have in his possession as to any potential problems or questionable areas that he may be confronted with on the flight?
MR. CRIPPEN: Sir, I can understand your concern; however, you must realize that putting the mission together to go fly is a very complicated thing that involves lots of people, and there is no way that the flight crew themselves can personally participate in everything that it takes to get ready to go fly.
They are totally reliant on being supplied information, and we have set up chains of command and funnels for doing that. I think that there has not been anything that has occurred in one of these reviews that was considered in any way significant that the flight
crews haven't heard.
MR. RUMMEL: I think I understand the inherent complexity and the difficulty of the commander being apprised of each and every item that might be brought into consideration with respect to the flight.
What I was addressing, though, were the potential hazards, those conditions, O-rings, whatever, that have existed or that may exist, but which review should shed light and make clear, so that he at least is aware of those things, with which he may be confronted with as contrasted to actual problems that have developed.
I would have thought that that category would not be limitless, that it might be contained and it might be an important item for him to consider in deciding whether or not to go or no go.
MR. CRIPPEN: In general the system is set up such that those items are brought to his attention, and they are numerous that we go through and talk about and get the flight crew's inputs as to what we should be doing about them, in the case of the O-rings again.
That isn't just true of the Astronaut Office. I might admit there are several layers of NASA management that were also apparently not aware of the O-ring problem.
DR. RUMMEL: But it is indirect information?
MR. CRIPPEN: It is indirect information, yes, sir.
DR. RUMMEL: Thank you.
MR. ABBEY: If I might, there is a system set up where we do have the systems people at KSC that do the test and checkout work. We have the flight control team go over each of the systems in a telecon, realizing that the crew is in quarantine. That is done at L-1, and we go through each of the systems and any problems are discussed over that telecon directly with the KSC test and checkout personnel as well as the flight control team in Houston.
MR. RUMMEL: Well, are those problems that have manifested themselves in the normal course of checkout or are these potential problems that maybe existed on prior flights or which analysis indicates could occur?
MR. YOUNG: They really fall into both categories. They are any concerns that any of the systems people are knowledgeable of in Houston and the flight control team or any of the system problems that they are knowledgeable of at KSC.
In addition to that we do have, as we said, the astronauts involved in the test and checkout operation, and they do the switch list and they support all of the activities before the crew comes out to the
vehicle. They are very knowledgeable of any problems that the team is aware of, and they brief the crew on any anomalies or any problems during that last day and right on until when the crew goes out to the vehicle.
MR. HOTZ: Bob, could you explain a little bit more about this authority of the mission commander on launch, the go or no go call? Is this a formal documented authority, or is this just developed over usage and tradition?
MR. CRIPPEN: It is a part of the formal OMI or the Operational Maintenance Instruction that the Cape uses to count down the launch, and so it is a formal NASA document and he is one of the-he and the pilot are the two people that have a formal go.
MR. HOTZ: Thank you.
[1422] MR. RUMMEL: How long prior to launch is that go/no go decision given by the commander?
MR. CRIPPEN: Somebody can probably help me out. It is about the nine minute point, the 0-9 minus 9 minute.
MR. RUMMEL: Prior to the automated liftoff procedure?
MR. CRIPPEN: Yes, sir.
DR. COVERT: Captain Crippen, you've been an operational pilot and a pilot in development squadron and a test pilot as well as a pilot and commander of the
Space Shuttle.
Would you sort of help me to understand some of the similarities and differences between these different kinds of operations, particularly in terms of the complexity and the decision points and the pilot's input into the activities, or is this such a broad thing that you would be here the rest of the day talking about it?
MR. CRIPPEN: I'm afraid we would be here the rest of the day talking about it.
DR. COVERT: Could you summarize it briefly, then?
MR. CRIPPEN: Flying a spacecraft, of course, is a lot more complex than taking off in an airplane. Even if you take a test flight, for example, that will have a test team behind it and usually a test conductor or a test engineer on the ground and the pilot. You are not working with as many people. You are working with-even though it can be complex, it is a simple piece of machinery. I don't think there's a vehicle anywhere in the world that is probably as complex as the total Space Transportation System when you put it together.
Consequently, the biggest. difference is you have to, as I was saying for Mr. Rummel, you have to be reliant more on people supporting you, and you have to
have confidence in the system. You have to have trust in the system, otherwise you never would go fly it.
We are normally cognizant of things that we consider significant problems, and we are intimately involved with working those. Again, if-just like a pilot would have the opportunity when he went out and ran the engines up, if something didn't look right to him or didn't feel right to him you could say no go, and the commander has an opportunity to do that; however, he is only as good as the data base that he's working with.
DR. COVERT: It is essentially the complexity of the data base here that puts the increased challenge and the increased reliance on the whole team to make this a successful decision?
MR. CRIPPEN: In truth, with most of the modern do aircraft we are flying, as they become more and more complex the pilot in the cockpit is faced with a similar situation. He really is.
DR. COVERT: Fine. Thank you very much.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: How much total flight crew personnel are assigned to each flight in addition to those that are actually going to go in?
MR. CRIPPEN: I think I might defer to Paul on that one.
MR. WEITZ: We don't have the support teams
anymore, Neil, so directly assigned to follow a flight is just the flight crew itself
MR. CRIPPEN: But we do have the CAPCOMs that are directly associated coming up on a mission; however, they rotate from flight to flight, but we do not have in a role like we used to have of a backup crew plus an astronaut support crew. We do not have that anymore.
[1423] MR. ABBEY: We do have at least four or five astronauts on a full-time basis supporting the final count and supporting the crew down at the Cape.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Other than those individuals assigned to the specific flight, who would be most knowledgeable about the specific flight consideration systems, payloads and so on for a given launch?
MR. CRIPPEN: That would be the CAPCOMs.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Is he assigned that position a substantial period ahead of time so that he develops that body of knowledge along with the crew?
MR. CRIPPEN: Normally what we have been doing is supplying CAPCOMs in for a period of at least six months to a year, and we rotate them but we use the same CAPCOMs over on each flight. The more often you are flying flights the less time they have in between them to get familiar with the payloads that are associated on
a particular mission.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: It appears as though you are dependent, to some extent, on a conduit of information from in terms of the review processes that Paul was talking about of information from whoever, Mr. Abbey or his representatives, that are in the review process getting to the commander.
So that is a conduit, but a conduit also acts as a filter and cuts down the amount of information that comes through to the most important points. I think the question that concerns the Commissioners is how do you assure that the filter doesn't filter out too much information or provides the proper amount?
MR. CRIPPEN: We do depend upon the filter, but we are flying crews of normally five people from the Astronaut Office. My personal experience has been probably the most knowledgeable people on the center with the payloads were in the crew, and I'm not sure that isn't of the vehicle. If you want to take it from an overall standpoint. It is mainly because, as John indicated, still our job is not sitting in simulators. It is sitting down and going over paper, and we are normally assigning crews like mission specialists to a flight a year ahead of time. They work in great detail with that
payload and with the payload support officers that we have there in our flight control room. Those people know that payload as well as anybody, and so I don't think that they are really dependent from a payload standpoint on that much of a filter, if you will, to get data.
From the orbiter side or the vehicle side, I think that our flight crews probably understand it as good as any person that possibly could when you have to look at the overall system. They rely very heavy, as we always have, on our systems division people who monitor each system specifically, but everyone will-is not bashful about picking up a phone and saying hey, come talk to me about this, and sit down and go over any details of any problems.
We normally have the anomaly list from a flight to go through as soon as that flight is over, and you start looking at it yourself as well as having observed what's going on in the flight.
So I don't want to leave the picture that the flight crew is off here training and they don't know anything about what is going on down in the bowels of the ship because that is not correct. Going to these formal reviews, we have to depend on other people to handle it for us.
MR. YOUNG: In the countdown demonstration tests, the people down at the Cape go through a complete listing of what's happened with that particular vehicle, what has gone [1424] wrong with it, and then when they get down there for the flight the Cape people go through another listing of what has happened with that vehicle. Each vehicle is very different.
We also get a complete listing of what has happened on the vehicle from the systems people in the Missions Operation Directorate that says what has been changed out, what are the new problems, what are the old problems, what are the unresolved problems.
This is about a five-page memo of specific things that have happened to that vehicle that people are interested in, and since they're going to be watching the machinery while it flies they are the best. They know that, and they also participate in that L-1 briefing so they know what happened to the vehicle before it launches.
It is about as good a job as you can do on this kind of thing. You really want to tell astronauts what's going on about problems that they can do something about. When you go to a Flight Readiness Review and you hear what people have said, there may be some very interesting things in there, but if the
astronaut really can't do something about it or be aware of it or take some kind of action and it's not a serious problem that anybody has brought up, the Flight Readiness Review lasts all day long, and those people are terribly busy, you probably wouldn't tell them about it. I don't recall anything coming up in the Flight Readiness Review on the solid rocket motor seals.
MR. RUMMEL: Why wouldn't what he could do something about include discussion, demands, requirements, whatever, for design improvements in cases where such appears to be the case?
MR. YOUNG: I think that's exactly what would happen, and I think if anybody in the gang had known about this business and understood it we might have said something, but really it should have been taken care of by the process long before it ever got to a Flight Readiness Review, I believe.
MR. RUMMEL: Absolutely, but in cases where it does not that would be a legitimate concern, would it not, or might not it be on the part of the astronauts?
MR. YOUNG: Yes, sir, and they would talk about it.
MR. ABBEY: Neil, I think we don't just rely upon John or I or Crip going to the Flight Readiness
Review. We also have a very formal meeting with the flight directors and the CAPCOMs, and the flight directors have been at the Flight Readiness Review, so you're getting really two inputs coming into the flight crew.
We schedule that meeting at L-, probably L-4 after the Flight Readiness Review, so they're getting an input not only from John and I but they're also getting an input from the flight directors and as well as the CAPCOMs, so they're getting kind of a redundant input there.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: George, I understand that, and I think I understand that we have a system of very complex information flow and a system that you've devised with checks and balances to make sure that information flow properly gets to the right people.
Nevertheless, we have to face the fact that somehow it hasn't. Can you be at all specific about whether you think changes are appropriate? If so, do you have any idea as to what you could recommend?
MR. ABBEY: Yes, I think we have some thoughts along that line, and we are going to cover them a little later.
VICE CHAIRMAN ARMSTRONG: Okay, thank you.
[1425] CHAIRMAN ROGERS: To be a little more specific, there was some Mission Management Team meeting
on the 27th of January, the day before the launch. Was there an astronaut at that meeting or a representative, and who was it?
MR. ABBEY: We were tied into that meeting by telecon, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: According to the testimony, as I recall the testimony Mr. Aldrich said at that time that there were weather concerns expressed.
MR. ABBEY: We were in on the meeting on the 26th. We were not involved even on the telecon on the 27th.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, to go back to it, the meeting was held at 2:00 p.m. after the launch was scrubbed that day, and it was 2:00 p.m. on January 27th.
At that time Mr. Aldrich said that there was a concern about the weather the next day, and he advised everyone at that meeting that if they had any problems with weather or any concerns about the weather to let him know.
As the testimony disclosed, he was not advised about the O-ring, the joint problem and the weather as it related to that joint, and my question was, was any astronaut present at that meeting?
MR. WEITZ: Yes, sir, I think I was, along with, as Bob said before, the Spacecraft Analysis Room representative.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Then at the 9:00 meeting the morning of the launch, were you there, too, Mr. Weitz?
MR. WEITZ: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do you remember that Mr. Aldrich advised the people at those meetings if there were any concerns about the weather that he should know about it and that he should be told about them?
MR. WEITZ: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And he wasn't, apparently?
MR. WEITZ: Well, the meeting on the
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I'm speaking about the weather as it relates to the joint, the O-rings.
MR. WEITZ: We were not aware, no, sir. We were not aware of any concern at all with the O-rings, let along the effect of weather on the O-rings.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So he was not, nor were you, advised of all of the problems that existed in the minds of the people in Thiokol and the people at Marshall about the weather? Neither you nor Mr. Aldrich were advised about that?
MR. WEITZ: Not that I remember at those meetings, no, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.
MR. CRIPPEN: Okay, if I could go on to chart C-5, please?
(Viewgraph C-5.) [Ref. 4/3-12]
MR. CRIPPEN: As you brought up, the Mission Management Team meetings are a mechanism that the Level II program manager uses to make decisions throughout a mission, and he can use that Mission Management Team meeting prior to the mission, as was done in this particular case.
[1426] Normally as I address them here, they are daily meetings that occur during a mission that give the program office an opportunity to make any major decisions that need to be made. We are well represented there, as I indicated, again as a minimum by Mr. Abbey, Captain Young, and again our SPAN representative will also be there.
Chart C-6, please?
(Viewgraph C-6.) [Ref. 4/3-13]
MR. CRIPPEN: For entry essentially it is an inverted process from what we do for launch. Of course, the flight crew is there, and any time that they elect that they might want to wave off the entry they certainly have the authority to be able to do that.
Again, we have a Shuttle training airplane checking the weather at the landing site and in general if the landing site is intended to be the Kennedy Spacecraft Center we also have one as a backup at
Edwards in case that should become the prime site. We also have our weather coordinator, an astronaut on the ground at the landing site itself passing that information back and forth.
MR. RUMMEL: Now, would these things you mentioned apply to alternate sites, for example, overseas sites?
MR. CRIPPEN: The only overseas site that we normally staff would be our trans-Atlantic abort site, and that is not normally done with an astronaut but it is done by a member of the Flight Crew Operations Directorate who is very familiar with the capabilities of the Shuttle. They do check the weather at that particular site, yes, sir, but that is the only one that we check.
DR. COVERT: Do they check that by standing there or by getting in an airplane and flying around and seeing how it looks from the air?
MR. CRIPPEN: Normally getting in an airplane and flying and checking it out, yes, sir.
We also, back in Houston, will be staffed with normally the Deputy Director of Flight Crew Operations, again in a standby mode in case he is needed, our SPAN representative and again the CAPCOMs, of which there is a prime and a backup, that are all aware of that.
Those actually conclude my formal remarks. If there are no other questions, I will pass it on to Hank Hartsfield.
DR. KEEL: Mr. Chairman, could we just ask one question here to follow up on Neil's to make sure that we do cover this?
Are your recommendations, Mr. Abbey, downstream going to apply also to improvements that you may see in the astronaut participation in the Flight Readiness Review or the Mission Management Team meetings, or is that just going to be in terms of resolving issues?
MR. ABBEY: No, they're not going to address that aspect of it.
DR. KEEL: Well, can we ask now, then, are there any recommendations you have now, any of you, with respect to improving astronaut participation in Flight Readiness Reviews or the launch decision process?
MR. CRIPPEN: Mr. Keel, from my standpoint I don't know of anything that I would recommend that we would change in that particular area.
I think that the basic system is good, but again it is only as good as the data base that you have feeding it, and I don't know how we could change that at this particular time as far as the actual participation that we have from the Astronaut Office.
DR. WHEELON: I have a question for those of you that were there the day before that fateful day. Did you detect an unusual urgency to proceed with the launching? Was it out of the pattern of prior launches that you had experienced?
MR. YOUNG: I think there's an urgency to proceed with every launch once you get a vehicle loaded and on the launch pad. I don't see anything wrong with that, but it is there. I think in the future the higher the launch rate the more that urgency exists, and I'm not sure that that's something we have a whole lot of control over, but I think we ought to watch it very carefully.
DR. WHEELON: I accept that answer, of course, but the question, granting that each launch has an urgency, was there an unusual urgency surrounding this launch?
MR. WEITZ: I did not perceive any different sense of urgency with this one as with any other. I agree with John. I think that that sense to get it off, there is a general feeling once you start into the count that a lot of work has gone to get you out there on launch morning, and we would like to within reason do those things necessary to get the launch off.
But I think that that has, you know-if
you're asking for perceived differences, I did not perceive any.
MR. ACHESON: I have a question for Captain Crippen. I would be interested in your reflections on a suggestion that some of us have heard made informally, that perhaps new problems that don't have preplanned responses ought not to be decided or disposed of after, let us say, the L-1 or at some stage fairly near the launch, but should simply be the occasion for a scrub and then a more deliberate consideration.
Would you regard that as an unmanageable approach to the problem, or would you think it had merit, or would you have some modifications on that idea of your own?
MR. CRIPPEN: There comes a point in time in any count where if you have an unusual problem develop that the answer is to go ahead and scrub. I think that if L-1, if you're talking about L-1 days, would be unreasonable myself.
There are numerous things that can happen, and quite often they are not what you anticipated but we have a crew of people, both at the Kennedy Space Center, the Marshall Space Flight Center, and the Johnson Space Center, as well as all the supporting contractors that are very knowledgeable on the vehicle.
In general, if they have time to work a problem and run it through the checks and balances that we have within our program level management and everybody is satisfied with it, then I think we ought to be able to lift off.
I personally think that the way we handle that today is reasonable.
MR. ACHESON: Thank you.
MR. HARTSFIELD: Let me make a comment on that. I think I can give you an example on flight 41-D, because this is something that came up, I think, in the thing you're talking about, something of a general nature that doesn't really apply specifically to something uncovered during the launch.
We had had a problem with some of the jet driver boxes, and we began to look at our electronics, and in the process of looking at all our electronic boxes we found a possible single point failure in the master events controller box that would cause a timing problem such that if it occurred we would not get rid of the solid rockets.
[1428] The possibility of this single point failure occurring was very, very low. There was a way to temporarily fix the problem by patching the software to open up the period in which it would give the PC less
than 50 and let the thing operate.
Well, this problem only surfaced the day before we were supposed to launch, and George and John brought the problem to me as the commander and the crew, and we discussed all the aspects of this. We could, as it was presented to me, we could accept the risk and go fly. We had flown 11 flights already with this problem and didn't know it; or we could delay a day and fix the software and verify the patch. We had the patch ready to go but it had not been verified in our avionics lab.
Our input as the crew and the commander was let's wait a day and do it right and fix the software. They took that back to the program, and as far as I know-well, we did delay. That is what happened and so that is, in my mind, the way the system works and it is supposed to work.
But again, the information has to surface. In the cam of the solid rocket motor, somewhere along the line the information didn't get to us.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I suggest we take a ten-minute recess.
(A brief recess was taken.)
MR. JOHNSON: Let's continue, please. Mr. Weitz, do you want to make a correction, please?
MR. WEITZ: Yes, sir, there were many meetings
involved with the efforts to launch 51-L, and as best I can recollect I went to more than one meeting on the 26th and 27th but apparently the particular one under question, the 2:00 p.m. Mission Management Team meeting on that date I was not present at.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: That is fine. It was only important because, in my mind, because Mr. Aldrich had pointed out to everybody at that meeting if there were any weather concerns, not just about the launch pad but any weather concerns, that he would like to be notified himself the next day.
Mr. Hartsfield, would you proceed?
MR. HARTSFIELD: Yes. sir. If I could have the first chart, please?
(Viewgraph.) [Ref 4/3-14]
MR. HARTSFIELD: What I would like to talk about here is how I think we ought to address some of the issues. You know, we know that there are certain issues that some of us have been concerned about, and we've had a lot of discussions, as you might imagine, at our office as to how we should handle these.
What I would like to present to you now are my views on the subject, and I might say that it is my opinion that the general thrust of what I am going to tell you is shared by almost everyone in the office as
to how do we get from here to flying again.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Could I say, too, before you get started again, these are the very things that the Commission is most interested in.
As I said in my opening statement, one of the things that we were asked to do was to make recommendations to the President on safety factors that should be considered and make recommendations along the lines of how can we make flight safer in the future.
[1429] So what you are about to do and what we will be asking others on the panel about are the safety factors that should be addressed by the Commission, and so we appreciate this presentation.
MR. HARTSFIELD: Well, this is going to be very general in nature, and we're going to talk about some issues when I get through here, but what I am proposing is how, I guess, that I would like to see things proceed. As I said, I think that it is shared in the office.
If I could go to the next chart?
(Viewgraph.) [Ref. 4/3-15]
MR. HARTSFIELD: All of us know that we have just suffered a great tragedy, and I think it has given me a lot of time to reflect, and I think it is time for introspection in all areas of our business, starting
right at the Astronaut Office and going on up through all of the facets of this program, to see what we should do.
Now, most of the things that I'm going to mention here are already being done, and we have astronauts, as you saw a while ago, participating in all of these things. In my mind when we go through all these things and when you read into these recommendations, safety is the watchword. That is the thing that is, of course, foremost in all of our minds because, really, if you are safe that equates to a successful mission, and after all that is what we're trying to do.
If I could have the next chart?
(Viewgraph.) [Ref. 4/3-16]
MR. HARTSFIELD: The first thing that I think we ought to do and we are doing is revalidating the design. Now, that is getting rather basic but I think we need to go back and look at what we set out to build, what our design requirements are and whether they were consistent or not.
For example, it doesn't make much sense to build a wing that is good for four G's and a tail to fall off at two G's, so we need to make sure that we've got a good basic design, that we did lay out our requirements
properly, and then look at what we built. Does it meet the design? How did we test that?
For example, if we had a spec that said a certain device was supposed to operate between two temperature limits, did we test it? If we didn't test it to those limits, how did we certify the design? Did we do it through analysis? Is it acceptable? If there are waivers, do we now still say that those were good waivers and then the end result, then, is there are constraints that have to get into our operational design? We want to review those and make sure that
MR. HOTZ: Excuse me just a minute. Could you clarify as to whether these are conceptual things that you are recommending or these are processes that are actually going on now?
MR. HARTSFIELD: Well, this one is going on. I'm giving you my personal opinion that I think is shared in the office of how we get well, and we are going to look at all facets of the program which I think Admiral Truly has started us doing.
MR. HOTZ: So what you're telling us here is basically an ongoing process and not something that you plan to do at some future date?
MR. HARTSFIELD: No, it is already started.
MR. HOTZ: Thank you.
(Viewgraph.) [Ref. 4/3-17]
[1430] MR. HARTSFIELD: We want to review the high criticality items. This is already in review. In addition, we are soliciting concerns from all elements of our organization. We have had each organization, for example, at JSC, the engineers in each speciality present up the line their concerns. What systems do I have concerns about? Those are being categorized and consolidated.
We are also reviewing this famous critical items list. We are going through those and seeing whether that list is properly validated. We're looking at each item individually. We may add to that list. We may not. When we get all through with this we're going to try to identify and prioritize our concerns and fixes.
One category, of course, is what have we got to fix before we fly? We know of one item already we want to fix before we fly again, and that's the seals. We've got to do that but, are there others? As an example, maybe the 17-inch disconnect flapper valve?
But all of these things have to be prioritized, and we have to use some good engineering judgment on which ones we need to fix. Some of them we may decide that the risk is acceptable as is; that that shouldn't be a concern for us.
GENERAL KUTYNA: You got off the design and safety chart quicker than I thought you would. Let me ask a question in that respect.
In the design stage, the Shuttle had several crew escape and survivability features that were contemplated but for one reason or another weren't put on the vehicle that we have today. In view of our experience, what crew survivability and escape provisions would you like to see on today's Shuttle?
MR. HARTSFIELD: Well, I personally would like to see some sort of a low altitude escape system. This all fits together in a package; you know, some ability to bail out of the vehicle. We have abort modes that we call contingency aborts, in which we lose two engines, and the end result of that is ditching.
I personally don't think the vehicle would survive a ditching. When you talk about smacking the water at 200 knots with an airplane that is basically an airliner type design, I'm convinced it's going to break up. If you've got a 60,000 pound payload behind you, it's probably going to come in the cockpit with you.
So I personally would like to see something along that line. Whether we can develop such a thing reasonably or not I'm not sure, but there are options I would like to see us look at and review this once again.
GENERAL KUTYNA: John, you've had some thoughts on this. Do you agree?
MR. YOUNG: I have been at this for a very long time. Back in the early 1970s, and this wasn't an idle situation, we went all over the country and we talked to people about solid rocket motors, and we talked to people about engines, and we talked to people about great numbers of things. They told us there was no way to do all these things and make them 100 percent reliable.
So at that time we did try to-we had ejection seats in for the vertical flight test phase. We got them put in for that flight phase, and then they came back out. Since then on numerous occasions we have talked to people about doing things like putting in bailout systems such as the tractor rocket system, or just plain bailout, and they have always seemed to be more than people could put up with.
But I really believe that manned space flight, manned space vehicles, if we don't do it for this one, for surely the next vehicle that we develop there should be an escape system.
GENERAL KUTYNA: But are there things you would like to see in this one?
MR. YOUNG: I would but it is not going to be
a cheap type quick fix, I don't think, to do it to give you any reasonable chance for escape.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: This is one of the things that the Commission might want to-well, but maybe this isn't the right question to ask you but certainly it is one of the things that I think the Commission should consider. If we have views on it, we should make recommendations.
One of the things we would like to see from you are your recommendations about whether money should be appropriated for that purpose or not, and how soon could it be done.
Captain Young, do you want to address that?
MR. YOUNG: Sir, I think it would be touch and go to put any escape system in there before you fly. Again, depending upon how long it takes to get back up, which I really don't have a good feel for but it would be a tough proposition.
I guess if you put the right people on it with the right money and the right effort, you ought to be able to do it pretty darn quickly, but I'm not sure that we have that kind of capability at NASA.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: What about in building a fourth orbiter? Should that be one of the things we
consider?
MR. YOUNG: Yes, sir, I believe that would be a good idea for other reasons probably, too, yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Do any other of you have views on that? We will be asked as a Commission.
MR. YOUNG: I'll tell you, there's a wide disparity of ideas on that in the Astronaut Office.
MR. CRIPPEN: Mr. Chairman, I guess, as John knows, he and I have worked this particular problem long and hard on the Shuttle, and it's more than money. It is a tough problem to solve technically with the vehicle that we have.
If you were going back from square zero and you went to some kind of concept like the F-111 cabin escape system, you might-and build it from the ground up, you might be able to do something like that. You might be able to come up with some kind of a system that would satisfy the requirement that Hank brought up of giving you capability to bail out in one of these contingency abort kind of things.
But again, I've said this before publicly and I'll say it again, I don't think I know of an escape system that would have saved the crew from the particular incident that we just went through. I don't think it is possible to build such a system.
MR. HOTZ: Are there other incidents in which a type of escape system could have saved the crew?
MR. CRIPPEN: The one that Hank alluded to is a very real possibility. We have a large portion of the assent phase where if you lose multiple engines, multiple of your main engines, the only option is a ditch which puts it in the water, and it is questionable whether that is a survivable situation.
It would be possible or potentially possible that you might have time to get all the crew bailed out. That would be a tough problem itself considering you would probably have them [1432] spread out across the ocean coming out at pretty high velocities, but it is probably more survivable than ditching the vehicle.
But that is about the main situation I think we would be talking about.
MR. HOTZ: How about your return to launch site abort mode where I know there are some concerns about whether this is really a feasible mode or not, and wouldn't some kind of an escape system like that function in the time that you might have when you were trying to make a return to, an abort and return to the launch site?
MR. CRIPPEN: That type of system would work in any kind of a landing situation if you ran into a problem where you weren't, from an energy standpoint,
couldn't make the field or something of that nature.
But with regard to the RTLS, whether return to launch site abort mode, I guess contrary to what you just voiced I think that everything that we have seen says yes, that is a doable kind of a mode.
DR. FEYNMAN: I would suggest another possibility that has never happened that I hope would never happen. It is possible that the crew, because of some gas in the cockpit or something or heart attacks or whatnot, is unable to make the reentry completely, and so would it be possible to make a backup computer-driven reentry that could back up the crew if the crew is unable to operate and therefore save both the mission and as many of the crew as are still alive?
MR. CRIPPEN: Today, in the way the vehicle is designed and the computer software put together, we do not have any kind of capability to have it all done automatically or executed from ground.
That was one of the considerations in designing the Shuttle, because there was an element of the program that thought we ought to fly it completely unmanned the first time. In fact, I think Captain Young and myself were probably two of the opponents for doing that because we thought that putting the man aboard probably gave it More of a chance for success.
I personally don't think the scenario you just raised is a reasonable one where you could have the whole crew totally incapacitated and such that they were going to end up surviving. But technically, yes, that is a feasible kind of thing to do but it is not in the current system.
DR. FEYNMAN: I think in fact it is fairly simple to do, although there are some things that are not built in that make it impossible right now that are very easy to fix up, such as the automatic lowering of the landing gear which can't be done now.
GENERAL KUTYNA: Can it be done by the ground?
MR. CRIPPEN: No, it cannot.
DR. FEYNMAN: That seems odd because it is such a simple thing to put in, and although the contingency is unlikely it is only thought of as a backup idea. I wondered what you thought of that.
MR. CRIPPEN: Any time you put in a system like that that can be automatically activated or automatically done by some other, you have built in another failure mode in it, and putting the landing gear down at the wrong time on this vehicle you can cost the vehicle. Consequently, it was a very conscious decision of ours.
Like I think it was pointed out earlier, most
of the things are done by the computer. The gear lowering is strictly a manual electrical operation that bypasses the computer totally, and it was made as simple and as straightforward as we could to preclude any additional failure modes.
MR. HOTZ: John, I believe you raised the question in one of your previous discussions about the possibility of putting a thrust terminating device into the solid rocket boosters.
Would that have had any effect if you had such a device, that is short of total destruct and I'm not talking about marine safety packages, but would that have had any effect on the 51-L incident?
MR. YOUNG: No, sir, I don't think it would have been able to do anything for them. The manned orbiting laboratory program had thrust termination based on chamber pressures in the two solid rocket motors being different, and they would thrust terminate and get off, and they had a Gemini escape module. I'm not sure that thrust termination would have helped this situation.
MR. HOTZ: What was your point in recommending it?
MR. YOUNG: I recommended thrust termination back in the early days in order to avoid the range
safety system problems that you have when you separate-when you activate the range safety package either on purpose or inadvertently.
I think the range safety package, if we have to carry one, should be one that doesn't tear up the whole piece of machinery, including the crew. I think with humans on a vehicle that the range safety package, if you have to have one, should be man-rated. That is just my opinion.
MR. HOTZ: Is this one, the one you carry now, man-rated? It is pretty destructive, isn't it?
MR. YOUNG: The solid rocket motors ride down the side and will blow up the external tank, and people are looking at that to see if we really should fly one at all on the system, I guess, through the range safety, through the range safety panels.
But I will tell you, we fought this long and hard to even have a range safety package on the vehicle in the early 1970s, and we were never successful to get it removed. In fact, we had sort of an unwritten agreement that when we took the