HHR-32 NASA Office of Defense Affairs: The First Five Years

 

XVIII. OTHER ACTIVITIES

 

[254] Preparation of Material for Speeches, Congressional Hearings, Responses to Congressional inquiries, Program Presentations, Agency Reports, etc.

 

Defense Affairs was often called upon to draft speeches, prepare background material for statements by NASA key officials, submit subject matter for inclusion in routine reports of NASA activities, etc., on matters within the purview of my Office. The material furnished by us usually pertained to NASA-DOD relations, interfaces, and coordinating mechanisms, NASA contributions to national security, and at times comparisons between the NASA and USSR aerospace programs. Program and requirements presentations made by NASA to any elements of the Defense Establishment, and vice versa, were as a rule planned, arranged, and coordinated by Defense Affairs.

Each year Mr. Webb was invited to lecture to the combined student bodies of the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Panel discussions, in which several NASA officials including myself participated, sometimes followed these appearances. Mr. Webb spoke twice at the U.S. Naval Academy and on several occasions -to groups of military officers. I spoke twice at the Naval Academy and also to several other military groups. I usually accompanied Mr. Webb when he appeared before military audiences, and on one or two occasions I was called upon to substitute for him in speaking to civilian groups.

In preparing for the Administrator's speaking engagements before military groups, it was normal procedure for Public Affairs to ask us to draft a text, but attempting to write a speech for Mr. Webb was a losing proposition. In the first place, he almost invariably spoke without a manuscript or notes and, secondly, he possessed such a facile and fertile mind and was such an accomplished and dynamic speaker that the thoughts had to be his own, and he was never at a loss for words with which to articulate them. For each occasion we -dutifully prepared west we thought would be an appropriate text, but very little of what we wrote was ever recognizable in the speech as it came out on the platform. I doubt that the box score of any other of his regular NASA speech writers was appreciably better. Mr. Webb was his own speech architect, and the same was generally true of Dr.. Dryden and Dr. Seamans.

Books of background material were assembled to assist Mr. Webb in NASA's Congressional budget hearings each year, and Defense Affairs submitted pertinent information concerning its area of cognizance. I usually accompanied Mr. Webb and other- key officials to those hearings. As normal procedure, Mr. Webb would open a session by reading a prepared statement. His comprehensive answers to the questions which followed were entirely extemporeneous, revealing an enormous capacity to retain facts and figures. He rarely called upon one of the back-up officials present to take a question for him or to expand upon his own answer.

[255] We prepared material related to items on the agendas of the Space Council, and on one or two occasions I accompanied Mr. Webb as his deputy at meetings of the Council.

The annual reports submitted by the Agency to the President for use, inter alia, in preparing the President's report to Congress on the State of the Nation always included a section on the coordinated activities of NASA and the DOD, prepared by my Office.

One effort in preparing material for the Administrator was prompted by a letter from Senator Symington to Mr. Webb, dated March 29, 1965, in which the Senator expressed concern over the size of the Soviet manned space flight program relative to that of the U.S. and stated his view that a greater proportion of the total U.S. funds available for space projects should be allocated to military space operations under the DOD. I was asked to take the lead in preparing a paper which Mr. Webb could enclose in his response to Senator Symington. Mr. Marvin Schuldenfrei, Engineering Aspect Specialist, Office of Policy Planning, who previously had written a paper on this general subject, was assigned to work full time with me on the project.

The resulting paper was titled: "Some Observations on the Threat of the Soviet Space Program to U.S. National Security." In addition to Mr. Schuldenfrei, I was assisted by Mr. Rosen of my office and Dr. Erwin P. Halpern, Special Assistant to the Administrator, in writing the paper. We drew material from a paper by Dr. Mose L. Harvey, "The Soviet Factor in U.S. Space Planning," and a memorandum by Mr. Frutkin, International Affairs, on the USSR space program in relation to ours. In reviewing this paper, I find it to be a good comparison of the objectives and general thrust of the U.S. and USSR space programs, and summary statement of NASA's contribution in space to the U.S. Military. Except in a very few particulars, the content of the paper is as valid today as when written, and therefore I am attaching a copy of the paper in its entirety (Attachment XVIII-A).

 

[256] The Geodetic Satellite Program

The original recommendations for a national geodetic satellite program had been made in connection with the International Geophysical Year of 1957. In 1959, the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences had recommended that NASA undertake such a program, and NASA had developed a program plan to meet the needs of all interested parties, including the DOD. However, in 1960, the DOD had recommended in the AACB that the information obtained from the program be classified, since it was believed by some that the data would provide a potential enemy with more accurate targeting information. While NASA felt that the degree of expected refinement over existing data would not be meaningful for military purposes, the DOD view had prevailed and the AACB had confirmed the DOD recommendation. In view of NASA's charter for the peaceful exploration of space, this had led to cancellation of the NASA plans to conduct the program. The DOD had then undertaken a classified program, having limited geodetic applications, which it called ANNA, an acronym for Army, Navy, NASA, and Air Force, but NASA did not participate.

Early in 1962, DOD had decided to declassify the ANNA program. In mid-1962, the House Committee on Science and Astronautics had reviewed the ANNA Program and recommended that NASA assume management responsibility for a follow-on geodetic satellite program, believing that the data from such a program would have broader scientific value and more general application than the military uses. This led to a "NASA-DOD Agreement on Project ANNA," effective December 13, 1962, which, in effect, transferred management and funding responsibility for continuing the program to NASA under the general designation "Geodetic Satellite Program," but with full DOD participation and technical and operational support. All of the negotiations preliminary to this agreement predated the establishment of the Office of Defense Affairs.

NASA proceeded with the preparation of plans for a Geodetic Explorer Project as part of the overall Geodetic Satellite Program, with the first launch scheduled for March 1965. In the meantime, the Army carried on its SECOR (Sequential Collation of Range) Project as part of the national geodetic satellite program. These small satellites were launched as secondary payloads when opportunities occurred.

A NASA-DOD-Department of Commerce Geodetic Satellite Policy Board, with Dr. Naugle of OSSA as Chairman, was established in 1963 to coordinate the geodetic requirements of the three Agencies. At a July 1963 meeting of the Board, the DOD indicated that it had no urgent requirements. However, in December of that year, the DOD stated in a letter to NASA that the planned NASA launch schedule would not meet its requirements and requested that the first NASA geodetic satellite launch be moved up into CY 1964.

[257] On March 9, 1964, I discussed with Dr. Hall of DDR&E the NASA-DOD interface regarding the geodetic satellite program and learned that the DOD felt it was not receiving sufficient information concerning the NASA plans and was concerned over whether the DOD needs would be met.

Dr. Seamans and I met with Dr. Brown, DDR&E, and Dr. Hall on March 13, 1964, to discuss a number of subjects, including the geodetic satellite program. We noted that the urgency of the DOD geodetic requirements appeared to have increased, and Dr. Brown explained the reason for this. Dr. Seamans stated that NASA was prepared to place more emphasis on the Geodetic Satellite Program to meet the DOD needs.

In October 1964, Dr. Seamans and Dr. Brown signed a Memorandum of Understanding in which they stated that they had reviewed the NASA Program Plan for the Geodetic Explorer Project and agreed that "this plan establishes a National Program in Satellite Geodesy which fulfills ';he requirements of each of our agencies and the Department of Commerce and allows for the necessary international cooperation, as recommended by Congress."

Participation by Defense Affairs in the NASA-DOD interface concerning geodesy was relatively minor. The technical aspects of the interface were handled by OSSA through the Geodetic Satellite Policy Board and a subordinate Working Group made up of representatives of NASA, DOD, Department of Commerce, the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, and several universities . Matters of agency policy were dealt with on the Seamans-Brown level.

 

[258] DOD-NASA Agreement - TRANSIT Navigation Satellite System

Effective February 2, 1963, NASA and the DOD entered into an agreement setting forth respective NASA and DOD responsibilities and establishing working arrangements between the Navy and NASA concerning non-military applications of the Navy's TRANSIT navigation satellite system then being used primarily by Polaris submarines. This action stemmed from a growing interest on the part of certain other government agencies in the possibility of making available an unclassified adaptation of the TRANSIT system for use by commercial ships, oceanographic and geophysical research vessels, off-shore oil exploration companies, and others.

The Agreement assigned to NASA "full responsibility for governmental determination of the suitability of TRANSIT navigation equipment to meet non-military navigation requirements," and for all government sponsored development of equipment to meet such requirements. Arrangements were established for the Navy to assist NASA by furnishing information needed in the preparation of specifications and plans and by making available complete units of equipment considered of potential value in meeting non-military navigation requirements. Such equipment would be provided on loan, on a reimbursement basis, or by authorizing direct purchases from the Navy contractor. In return, NASA agreed to keep the DOD informed of all developments in this area and results of tests and to make available to the DOD developmental sets of units as desired. Both parties agreed to coordinate future related R&D to avoid unwarranted duplication and to exchange all information of mutual interest.

NASA continued to explore the interest in and practicability of a commercial TRANSIT system, both as to the technical feasibility and economic aspects. Some unsolicited studies were made by potential manufacturers. The general finding at that time was that while a non-military adaptation was technically practicable, the cost of the shipboard equipment, about $50,000, would be too high to be attractive for any widespread commercial use. Consideration of this whole matter was included in the study by the interagency Ad Hoe Joint Navigation Satellite Committee convened in September 1964. reported upon elsewhere in this narrative.

Two specific actions did, however, stem from the NASA-DOD agreement NASA arranged with the Navy in 1965, as part of NASA s evaluation, to purchase two sets of the AN/SRN-9 equipment, the surface ship element of the TRANSIT system. This element was then classified but was subsequently declassified in July 1967. One set was placed aboard the Coast and Geodetic Survey vessel . DISCOVERER for test during operations in the Pacific, and the other was installed in the USNS ELTANIN for use during operations in high southern latitudes sponsored by the National Science Foundation in connection with the U.S. Antarctic Research Program. In both cases highly favorable performance reports were submitted.

[259] The National Academy of Sciences Summer Study of 1967-68 looked into the matter of the commercial use of TRANSIT and concluded that there was no application for the system in commercial ships or aircraft. However, I understand that TRANSIT equipment has been installed in the SS QUEEN ELIZABETH II.

 

[260] Transportation of Major Saturn-Apollo Components

The extensive and in some cases unique arrangements for the transportation of the larger components of Saturn-Apollo hardware were worked out between the Apollo Program Office of OMSF and the Transportation and Logistics Division of the Office of Administration, with assistance from Defense Affairs where DOD support was needed.

Without going into the details of the transportation plans, which were changed from time to time as the Apollo Program progressed, assistance was sought from the DOD in transporting the S-II stages from the West Coast to Michoud near New Orleans by sea-going marine transport, from Michoud up to the Mississippi Test Facility and back by barge, and thence to KSC by barge or ship; in transport-in" the S-IVB stages from the West Coast to Michoud and KSC; in moving the LEM adapters from Tulsa, Oklahoma, to test sites in the East; and in air shipping engines and certain of the smaller structural components from points of manufacture to various test and assembly sites.

Arrangements were made for the Military Air Transport Service (MATS), now the Military Airlift Command, to move those components of Saturn-Apollo hardware which could fit into the cargo holds of their C-133B aircraft. NASA paid for these shipments at the same rates as were charged to individual Military Services. Some uncertainty existed from time to time as to the ability of MATS to accomodate the NASA shipments on schedule because of the higher priority demands on MATS in support of the SE Asia war effort, but the DOD cooperated to the fullest extent possible and very few, if any, significant delays in NASA ships were experienced. On January 25, 1966, I wrote to Lt. Gen. Thomas P. Gerrity, USAF, Dep. C/S, Systems and Logistics, USAF Headquarters, to express to him, and through him to Lt. Gen. Howell M. Estes, Jr., USAF, Commander, MATS, NASA's appreciation for the outstanding support given in the movement of NASA high priority air crago.

In December 1962, MSFC shipped an S-IV stage from San Francisco to Port Canaveral as a deck load aboard a commercial freighter. The stage suffered damage front corrosion. In December 1964, an S-IVB stage was similarly shipped from Los Angeles to New Orleans. Weather conditions en route were unseasonably mild, and this shipment was successful. However, OMSF decided that the commercial shipment of these stages as deck loads should not be considered as a primary method because of the inherent disadvantages of possible, maritime strikes, unpredictability of long-tern ocean ship schedules to coincide with NASA schedules, inability of the common ocean carrier to be flexible, cargo lifting hazards, and the limited protection afforded deckloaded cargo against damage at sea.

On February 28, 1963, Mr. James McCollom, Director of NASA Transportation and Logistics, and I called on Vice Admiral Glynn R. Donaho, USN, Commander, MSTS, to explore the possibility of enlisting his aid in solving

[261] NASA's transportation problems. We had understood that two LSD's (Landing Ship Dock) being operated by MSTS might be made available on loan to NASA. Our preliminary studies had shown that these ships could be modified for roll-on/roll-off loading and unloading, and in this configuration would be highly satisfactory for coast-to-coast shipment of the large stages. When used in conjunction with roll-on/roll-off barges for shipment over inland waterways, these ships could eliminate the hazards of lift-on/lift-off handling of the Saturn stages.

We found Admiral Donaho to be highly cooperative and eager to be of service to NASA in every way possible. Two LSD's, the POINT BARROW and the TAURUS, were considered to be potentially available for modification and subsequent operation by MSTS with Civil Service crews to meet NASA's needs.

During the period March 19-21, 1963, I visited MSC and MSFC to discuss ways and means of meeting Saturn-Apollo transportation problems with the help of DOD.

After numerous internal planning conferences and discussions with MSTS representatives, in which Defense Affairs actively participated, a NASA-MSTS Memorandum of Agreement was signed, effective November 27, 1963, by Dr. Seamans and Vice Admiral Roy A. Gano, USN, who had relieved Donaho. The Agreement stated that MSTS would provide the ocean transportation services needed by NASA on a reimbursable basis and would, at NASA's request and expense, appropriately modify two U.S. Naval Service vessels for this service. MSTS recognized that the Manned Lunar Landing Program had been assigned the highest national priority and undertook not to interrupt the services to NASA unless directed otherwise by the Secretary of Defense in an emergency situation and in the interest of national security. The Agreement covered such other matters as the development of plans for ship selection and modification, cost estimates, preparation of the request for bids for the contract for modifications, selection of the contractor, award of contract, delivery schedules, installation of special equipment, ship manning and operation, security, funding and billing, restoration of the ships at end of service, etc. Provisions were included for NASA personnel to assist and participate in all phases of planning and implementation, and for NASA to assign technical personnel to be in direct charge of the cargo on each voyage. The Agreement encouraged MSTS to make use of the ships when not required by NASA, with earnings to be offset against the costs billed to NASA by MSTS.

As the Apollo schedule stretched out, and with the acquisition of the Super Guppy aircraft capable of airlifting the S-IVB stages, it was found that one ship, POINT BARROW, could meet NASA's needs. Accordingly, the decision was made not to proceed with the modification of TAURUS. POINT BARROW made some thirty round trips without a mishap, and performed invaluable services for NASA.

Arrangements were made with the Navy Department to obtain six seagoing YFNB-type barges which were surplus to the Navy's needs. These were modified to provide roll-on/roll-off cargo handling and covered deck stowage [262] for S-I, S-IB and S-II stages in river-canal-ocean transit between Huntsville, Michoud, MTF and KSC. Five were placed in service on the East Coast and one on the West Coast.

Prior to the acquisition of the Super Guppy, the transportation of the one-piece LEM Adapter from its point of manufacture at Tulsa, Oklahoma, to Cape Kennedy, Florida, or other test sites in the East, presented a unique problem. The Adapter is a hollow truncated cone measuring twenty-one feet eight inches across the base, twenty-one feet high and weighing approximately 4,700 pounds. Several methods of transportation were studied - such as helicopter, helicopter and barge, and truck and barge - and it was concluded that airlift by helicopter would be the preferred method. NASA studies also indicated that the CH-47A helicopter being operated by the Army would have the required lifting capacity and would be the most suitable type for this purpose due to its range, thus minimizing the number of fueling stops en route.

On September 28, 1964, I wrote to General Harold K. Johnson, USA, Chief of Staff of the Army, laying our problem before him and asking his help. I stated that a dummy unit would soon be available at the manufacturer's plant at Tulsa for use in a technical analysis and engineering evaluation which we felt sure the Army would require, including demonstration loadings, flight tests, verification of the flight handling quality of the system, and, hopefully, route checking between Tulsa and Cape Kennedy.

General Johnson's response was immediate and entirely cooperative. After an inquiry into all aspects of the proposed operation, the Army agreed to undertake the task. A formal NASA-Army covering agreement was signed by General Johnson and myself, effective July 9, 1965. In all, about twelve missions were flown across to MSC, MSFC, and/or KSC, without a casualty. This unique method of transportation aroused much interest in the press, and not a little consternation on the part of the people on the ground who happened to see the huge structure of the Adapter trailing at an angle below a helicopter passing low overhead.

 

[263] NASA-DOD Presentations

Following is a list, probably incomplete, of the formal and comprehensive presentations given by NASA management to elements of the DOD and; those received by NASA from the Military. Defense Affairs arranged and participated in nearly all of these meetings.

May 17, 1963

NASA (Seamans) briefed the JCS on the NASA space program.

July 1963

NASA briefed USAF "FORECAST" study group on NASA space programs.

Aug. 15, 1963

NASA briefed DDR&E on NASA's manned orbiting laboratory studies.

Feb. 6 & 7, 1964 (2 half days)

NASA briefed a JCS space study group on the entire NASA aerospace program.

March 12, 1964

Briefing by General Schriever and assistants to AF and NASA personnel on plans for -future AF developments.

Apr. 29, 1964

NASA officials exchanged briefings with AFSC regarding Aeronautics R&D programs.

Oct. 9, 1964

Air Force briefed NASA on the MOL program.

Dec. 30, 1964

NASA briefed the JCS on the NASA program.

Jan. 18, 1965

AFSC briefed NASA on latest findings, programs, and plans in the field of Composite Structures.

Mar. 3, 1965

AFSC briefed NASA on Air Force V/STOL tactical aircraft.

Mar. 5, 1965

Space Systems Division, AFSC, briefed NASA regarding survivability of space systems.

Mar. 9, 1965

NASA briefed by Continental Defense Command concerning vulnerability of space systems to nuclear detonations.

Mar. 18, 1965

NASA briefed Air Force Council on the NASA program.

Mar. 29, 1965

NASA briefed the Secretary of the Navy on NASA programs.

Apr. 19, 1965

NASA briefed AFSC on NASA's aeronautics R&D program.

June 23, 1965

NASA briefed Dr. Hall, DDR&E, on NASA support to the MOL program.

June 28, 1965

NASA-DOD meeting on MOL program.

July 19, 1965

Same.

Aug. 17, 1965

NASA briefings to Air Force officers and senior civilians on the NASA program (one half day).

Sep. 20, 1965

NASA briefing to Army officers on the NASA program.

[264] Oct. 18, 1965

NASA briefing to Navy officers on the NASA program.

Oct. 19, 1965

Air Force briefed NASA on MOL program.

Nov. 2, 1965

AFSC briefed NASA on problems of SE Asia war.

Dec. 21, 1965

USAF briefed NASA on Future Space Operations study.

Jan 11, 1966

USAF briefed NASA on MOL.

Jan. 22, 1966

NASA briefed Dr. Foster and his principal assistants on the NASA Earth Sciences and Resources program.

Feb. 9, 1966

NASA briefed USAF Scientific Advisory Board on NASA Natural Resources Program.

June 30, 1966

USAF briefed NASA on MOL.

Nov. 8, 1966

USAF briefed NASA regarding AF study HINDSIGHT.

Dec. 16, 1966

USAF briefed NASA on problems of SE Asia war.

Mar. 17, 1967

AFSC briefed NASA on aeronautical weapon systems in development stages.

June 9, 1967

NASA-DOD meeting on F-12 aircraft data.

June 20, 1967

NASA briefed AFSC on the NASA aeronautics R&D program.

Oct. 19, 1967

General Stewart and Dr. Yarymovych briefed Admiral Boone on MOL progress.

Dec. 9, 1957

NASA briefed USAF in Pentagon on the NASA programs, first half-day session.

Dec. 16, 1967

Same, second half-day session.

 

[265] Reliability of Space Systems

About mid-1963, the DOD proposed that NASA and the DOD each prepare data on the performance of their unmanned satellites, and that the data then be exchanged and jointly analyzed to develop a set of factors which would reflect the degree of reliability of various unmanned space systems. The USP was requested to explore the matter.

At the meeting of the AACB on September 17, 1963, a joint DOD-NASA Ad Hoc Working Group on Reliability of Space Systems under the USP submitted a report which detailed a proposed procedure for the collection and dissemination of individual launch vehicle and spacecraft performance and a standardized format for reporting such information. The USP recommended that the procedure be placed into effect for a trial period of six months, after which the procedure would be reviewed for possible revision.

The AACB agreed at its next meeting that the recommended procedure would be implemented for a trial period of six months commencing January 1, 1964. Mr. Robert F. Garbarini, Chairman of the USP, stated that reliability data would be collected from launch until the spacecraft is operating in orbit. The Board indicated its interest in extending the program to include data on launch pad reliability, auxiliary ground equipment reliability, and reliability in extended orbit, if the trial should warrant continuation of the program.

The Office of Reliability and Quality Assurance was designated as the focal point in NASA for the study program.

The trial period was initiated as scheduled, but after collecting data on six flight missions, three NASA and three DOD, tin Garbarini reported to the Panel on April 23, 1964, that based on experience to date it was questionable whether the process would be productive. He requested the concurrence of the Board in an evaluation of the procedure on the basis of the six flights already documented and in discontinuing the reporting of any further flights pending the evaluation. The Board concurred.

The evaluation indicated that the results of such an analysis would not be meaningful, and the procedure was not reinstituted after the trial period.

 

[266] Joint Review of the DOD and NASA Space Programs

Mr. Webb and Mr. McNamara, at a meeting on October 5, 1963, decided that there should be a jointly conducted, general review and assessment of segments of the total national space program for the purpose of delineating minimum essential elements of the program and identifying possible areas of consolidation. Five joint reviews were conducted in response to the actions proposed by Webb and McNamara. A compendium of the findings and recommendations of these reviews was prepared by Defense Affairs early in January 1964, for sign-off by Seamans and Brown to put in motion various actions recommended in the reviews.

In addition to increased coordination in certain areas, these reviews recommended several further studies relating to harmonization of policies governing supporting instrumentation networks and to possible consolidation of tracking facilities. Coordination in the areas of Launch vehicles and communication satellite programs was found to be adequate.

 

[267] Secondary (Piggyback) Payloads

As early as July 1960, the DOD and NASA were giving attention to the possibility of utilizing excess payload capacity on a launch mission of one Agency to accommodate experiments sponsored and funded by the other. A "space available'' condition existed when there was a payload capacity in terms of space, weight, power, and telemetry in excess of the requirements of the primary payload of the launch mission The matter had been discussed at the second meeting of the AACB which took place on July 26, 1960. It received added consideration in the course of discussions on the subject of the coordination of NASA and DOD space science programs, which took place from time to time in AACB meetings during 1963 and 1964. It was generally the practice in DOD to conduct its space science experiments as piggyback payloads on launch missions having some other primary purpose. This was not the usual case in NASA.

Early in 1963, NASA representatives apparently discussed with certain prospective experimenters the possibility of flying their experiments as secondary payloads on Saturn IB engineering flights.

In a letter from General Ritland to Dr. Seamans dated October 21, 1963, AFSC advised NASA of the probable availability of secondary payload space (SPS) on the developmental launches of the TITAN IIIA and IIIC launch vehicles, and invited NASA to submit candidate payloads for consideration. Ritland cautioned that, considering the primary objective of these test launches, NASA participation would, of necessity, be on a high risk basis. With the letter was furnished detailed information on vehicle characteristics, flight plans and parameters, planned launch schedules, payload constraints' etc. Detailed descriptions of any proposed secondary payloads were requested by November 4, 1963.

Although this deadline was extended to November 12, the lead time was much too short for the submission of candidate payload data in the detail required. Nevertheless, Defense Affairs convassed the Program Offices.

On November 18, I replied to Ritland, thanking AFSC for this offer to consider NASA piggyback payloads, but stating that the time limit had not permitted us to explore thoroughly all possibilities for taking advantage of the offer. We did, however, submit two candidate payloads, one estimated to cost $6,000,000 and the other $500,000 pointing out that neither experiment was part of the approved NASA program and that therefore their inclusion on a Titan III mission would be contingent upon development of a revised resources funding plan. We cited some other future possibilities and suggested the advisability of having NASA representation of the Air Force working level group that would process and evaluate proposed payloads.

In reply, Ritland advised us on December 17 that the selection procedure for secondary payloads had not been finalized that the cancellation [268] of the Dyna-Soar program required some realignment of the Titan III R&D launches, and that it would be premature to consider specific piggyback payloads for Titan III until the impact of the Manned Orbiting Laboratory Program requirements was assessed.

In a meeting with Ritland on August 19, 1964, I reminded him that we had not been informed of the status of our request to consider two secondary payloads on Titan III launches, as conveyed in our letter of November 18, 1963.

The foregoing narration points up some of the inherent difficulties in attempting to take advantage of secondary payload opportunities. Any agency or principal investigator would hesitate to invest the time and effort and up to $6 million in funds to design and fabricate an experiment if there were uncertainty as to when, if ever, the experiment could be flown. It would be generally impractical to keep a complex or sophisticated experiment on the shelf indefinitely awaiting a launch opportunity. Such experiments would normally require a lead time of six months or more for their preparation, with another six months or more required to integrate a specific payload into a particular launch mission, depending upon the complexity of the payload. Because of these uncertainties and constraints, negotiations with AFSC on secondary payload utilization lapsed for some eight months.

On August 25, 1964, Dr. E. C. Welsh, Executive Secretary of the Space Council, addressed similar letters to NASA (Dr. Seamans) and DOD (Dr. Brown) expressing concern as to whether the most effective efforts were being made to realize the maximum utilization of available excess payload capacity. NASA replied on September 29, noting the machinery in operation for the selection of experiments for both manned and unmanned NASA flights. Our letter stated we did not anticipate that there would be any excess capacity on any of our programmed flights that would be wasted for lack of deserving experiments. While indicating some of the problems involved, we expressed our belief that we were taking proper steps and stated our intention to continue to work closely with other government agencies to insure the most productive and efficient use of any available payload capacity.

The DOD reply to Dr. Welsh outlined steps it had taken to utilize all payload capacity on DOD launches. It also addressed the problems involved in taking full advantage of secondary payload opportunities and outlined some of the actions being taken to overcome the problems. DOD further advised Dr. Welsh that the Unmanned Spacecraft Panel (USP) of the AACB had undertaken an examination of the problem and would recommend appropriate procedures to permit more timely and effective utilization of excess capacity available.

By letter of September 4,1964. AFSC indicated its desire to renew discussions with NASA on this subject, but stated that DOD requirements would preclude the carrying of any NASA payloads on Titan IIIC synchronous orbit flights, an area in which NASA had shown interest.

[269] A NASA-AFSC meeting was arranged for September 18 at which it was agreed that NASA would consider taking advantage of any excess payload capacity in the Titan III launch program to conduct NASA experiments on a non-interference basis with the primary program. AFSC would provide bi-monthly flight test planning and progress reports on the Titan III experiments program and up-dated information on secondary payload capacity available, this availability being subject to change as a result of continuing studies in support of DOD programs such as MOL.

We informed AFSC on November 30, 1964, that we were studying ways and means of overcoming the basic problems involved in the utilization of excess payload capacity, and suggested that each Agency keep the other informed promptly of any secondary payload space becoming available.

On that same date, Defense Affairs circulated an internal memorandum to Program Offices stating that pending development of formalized procedures our office was prepared to receive and process any requests for utilization of Titan III excess payload capacity.

Dr. Seamans sent a letter to Dr. Brown on this subject on December 23, 1964. Referring to discussions which had taken place in the Unmanned Spacecraft Panel, Seamans expressed his belief that there should be established through the AACB appropriate procedures for coordinating secondary payload opportunities between NASA and the DOD. As a first step toward this objective, Seamans suggested that each Agency review its internal policies for utilizing secondary payload space. Dr. Brown concurred with this suggestion in a letter dated February 9, 1965.

Mr. Leonard Jaffe was designated as head of a Task Group to make an internal study of NASA policies and procedures concerning the utilization of secondary payload space. He was actively assisted in this task by Colonel Damon from Defense Affairs. Reports on progress and results of the study were presented to key NASA officials by Jaffe on April 14 and May 3, 1965. The study found that very little payload space had gone unutilized up until then, but that with the coming into use of the larger boosters, more excess space could be expected to become available in the future. By a directive dated August 25, 1965, Dr. Seamans endorsed the study results and recommendations in principle, and specified the division of lead responsibility among the various cognizant Headquarters Offices for implementation of the recommendations of the study. The responsibilities assigned to Defense Affairs were as follows:

 

"Inform the DOD that NASA had completed its review of internal policies and procedures concerning SPS and is ready to resume coordination of interagency procedures through the USP of the AACB.
 
"Cooperate with the Office of Public Affairs (AF) in developing the press advisory concept; in particular, advise AF of any publication known to W which may be of value in advertising SPS.
 
[270] "Establish an SPS Information Officer telephone number and a point of contact for DOD offers.
 
"Inform the DOD through USP that mayor DOD offers of SPS should be submitted to NASA through W. Develop the procedure for advertising to the Program Offices, and through them to the Centers, SPS opportunities offered NASA by the DOD. Receive and process acceptances of DOD offers. When more than one acceptance is received' act as the lead office in coordinating the NASA response."'

 

OSSA was assigned responsibility of preparing a publication which would contain a catalog of available payload space and invitations for experiment participation.

On September 15, 1965, Dr. Seamans informed Dr. Brown that NASA had completed its internal review and, having understood that the DOD review was nearing completion, suggested that the USP be instructed to develop procedures to insure that the secondary payload space available to both Agencies was properly utilized. Dr. Brown concurred, and the Panel was so instructed.

In the course of a discussion of this subject in the meeting of the AACB on November 9, 1965, Dr. Mueller discussed the joint DOD-NASA Gemini Program Planning Board and the Manned Space Flight Experiments Board (MSFEB), the latter a NASA-sponsored board on which DOD was represented. He explained that the MSFEB recommended experiments to be flown on NASA manned space flights and suggested that a similar mechanism be established to coordinate the experiments for the MOL, adding that he had discussed the matter with General Schriever. Mr. Fink, DOD, stated that Mr. McNamara had indicated his desire that the MOL concentrate on its primary missions and not be diverted by other secondary priority military or scientific experiments.

It was reported to the AACB on January 21, 1966, that the DOD procedure for coordination of secondary payload requirements of the three Services, prepared by AFSC, was under review by DDR&E with approval expected by January 31, and that DDR&E had reached agreement with AFSC to produce a catalog of launches and available payload space. NASA and DOD agreed to exchange payload space documents.

On April 11, 1966, the USP reported to the AACB that it had completed its assigned task. An agreement titled "NASA-DOD Procedure for the Utilization of Secondary Payload Space" had been signed, effective April &, 1966. In summary, the procedure provided that:

 

"(1) Each agency will prepare and exchange catalogs on secondary space available; this is to be done at least on a semi-annual basis.
 
"(2) The catalogs will identify payload spa-e up to three years in advance of a scheduled flight.
 
[271] "(3) The first catalogs will be issued by September 1, 1966.
 
"(4) The Unmanned Spacecraft Panel will continue to monitor this effort."

 

Following this agreement, catalogs of secondary payload opportunities were completed in both Agencies and exchanged. Arrangements were made for keeping these catalogs updated. The first edition of the NASA catalog was issued on December 5, 1966.

One or two DOD experiments were flown as secondary payloads on NASA launches during the period of this narrative, and several other cases of cross-accommodation were being planned for launches subsequent to 1967.

 

[272] Stable Ocean Platform Feasibility Study

From early in the planning and development of a national space program, persons responsible for providing tracking, communications, and data acquisition support for space operations had given consideration to the relative advantages of the use of floating platforms equipped as instrumentation facilities as compared to instrumentation ships. Such floating bases were usually referred to as stable ocean platforms (SOP). From time to time during the previous fifty years, various types and sizes of such structures had been examined, and in some cases used, for such purposes as transoceanic aircraft staging facilities, off-shore oil drilling rigs, and acoustical or marine research laboratories. Some of the advantages of an SOP which appealed to planners in the tracking support area were (1) greater stability and therefore improved instrumentation performance, (2) greater accuracy in position fixing, and (3) better habitability during protracted deployments. It appeared also that there might be positive cost-effectiveness factors. Always in mind was the possibility that one or more of the critical tracking stations located on foreign territory might be lost for political reasons, and a floating semi-permanent station in international waters would be a possible replacement.

In November 1963, NASA and the DOD exchanged correspondence on the possibilities of conducting studies on the use of SOP's in connection with T&DA programs. At that time, DOD did not foresee any requirement which would justify its initiation of a study program. In May 1964, NASA informed the DOD that situations were visualized which might develop into specific needs for SOP's.

At the request of OTDA, GSFC issued 8 Request for Proposal on December 8, 1964, for a comprehensive feasibility study of SOP's as instrumentation facilities compared to conventional ships. The work statement for the study called for examination of two sizes of platform: a "small" type, generally associated with the concept of the FLIP ship then being operated by the Scripps Institute of Oceanography; and a "large" type, generally associated with the multi-leg floating platform concept as typified by the MOHOLE platform then being designed for the National Science Foundation (NSF). GSFC's evaluation of the eleven industry proposals received was presented to the Source Evaluation Board (SEB) in NASA Headquarters on May 4, 1965.

Mr. Webb and the SEB had doubts as to the justification for spending the amount of money involved in the commercial proposals for a study of this nature. The bids ran from $100,000 to over $400,000, the wide disparity apparently being explained by the varying amounts of work which had previously been accomplished by the bidding companies. Mr. Webb asked for additional background information on the subject of SOP's, which I furnished to him by memorandum dated June 14, 1965. We found that in addition to design work on the MOHOLE platform for the NSF, the U.S. Government had either conducted or sponsored operations and/or significant research projects relating to [273] SOP's. The Navy was interested in platforms from which to perform underwater construction, to lower and raise large sonar arrays, for recovering large objects from the ocean bottom, and for launching large space boosters. The Navy and Air Force had accumulated considerable data on crew habitability and human performance on isolated stations such as radar picket ships, weather ships, Polaris submarines, and Texas Tower radar stations. All Government-sponsored data and possibly some from industry would be available to NASA, but a considerable collation effort would be required to apply the information to the specific work statement of the study proposed by GSFC.

Our consultations wish' the Navy revealed that they considered the described study to be feasible, that they would be interested in participating in such a study as consultants, and that the Navy had the in-house capability to conduct the desired study and would be willing to do so on a reimbursable basis.

Dr. Dryden, Radm. W. A. Brockett, Chief of the Bureau of Ships, Dr. J. Haworth, Director, NSF, and I met with Mr. Webb at lunch on August 2, 1965, to discuss the proposed study. Several methods of conducting the study were explored. It was generally agreed that we should investigate further the possibility of having the Instrumentation Ships Projects Office, under the Bureau of Ships, or the Navy's David Taylor Model Basin do the study, with assistance from GSFC as required. Following the meeting, I explored with Capt. A. F. Hancock, Head of ISPO, the possibility of his office's conducting the study. He stated that ISPO could not undertake it, but he felt that the Taylor Model Basin could.

In a memorandum to Dr. Seamans of August 20, Mr. E. C. Buckley, Director, Tracking and Data Acquisition, recommended that NASA proceed with the study on an industrial contract. He felt that ISPO and GSFC should not divert any substantial effort from the Apollo ship program for participation in this type of study. He pointed out that studies were then underway in DOD for modifying or increasing the fleet of instrumentation ships, and that the proposed study would be a useful decision toot for NASA and the DOD in planning any future augmentation of seagoing T&DA facilities.

OART was queried as to whether their Mission Analysis Division, located at Ames, could undertake the study, with consulting assistance from the Navy and limiting the scope of the study to an analytical comparison between a large, column-stabilized type of platform and conventional range instrumentation ships. The response was that the Mission Analysis Division was not structured to undertake a study of this nature.

Mr. Webb requested Dr. Haworth to keep us informed of the result: of preliminary studies and experiments incident to the MOHOLE Project, and of design criteria, specifications, and ultimate engineering plans as they were evolved. But not long thereafter, the MOHOLE Project was indefinitely suspended.

[274] Our discussions with ISPO and BuShips continued. On October 13 1965, Hilburn, Buckley and Bryant from OART, and Mr. Robert McCaffery, Manned flight Support Office, GSFC, who was serving as a deputy to Captain Hancock in ISPO, visited the Taylor Model Basis, together with Rear Admiral Brockett and Captain Hancock, to tour the facilities and to discuss the possibility of the Navy's undertaking the study as an in-house effort under a revised work statement.

In a telephone conversation with me on October 25, 1965, Captain Hancock indicated that his office was prepared to manage the study and was awaiting a written request from NASA to get started. Accordingly, Buckley notified the Director, GSFC, that NASA management had concluded that an. in Government study, on a reduced scale and reoriented basis, might be more advantageous at that time than a commercial contract study responsive to the original RFP and that Defense Affairs had made arrangements with BuShips to conduct the study under the management of ISPO. Buckley requested that GSFC inform the contending offerors that the RFP had been canceled. GFSC was to furnish ISPO with information as necessary for preparation of a plan for a redefined study to meet NASA's requirements, as outlined in a document dated November 2, 1965, and titled: "NASA Objectives for Stable Ocean Platform Study." The plan, which was to be submitted to ODTA for final approval, was to show the management structure for the study, the participating government elements, and an estimate of the funding required from, NASA. The study was to be completed by January 1967 7 and conducted on a basis of non-interference with the Apollo ships project work by both ISPO and GSFC.

NASA's decision to proceed with plans for an in-Government stud. was conveyed to the Chief, Bureau of Ships, by my letter dated November 4, 1965. Admiral Brockett's acceptance was contained in a letter to me dated November 22, 1965.

Notification of actions taken to date was promptly sent to B.Gen. C.J. Kronauer, Assistant to DDR&E for Ranges and Ground Support, and to the National Range Division, AFSC. The DOD was invited to add any specific requirements to the study that it might desire.

ISPO's initial plan for the study, prepared in advance of the Statement of Work furnished by GSFC, was submitted on February 25, 1966. The plan went somewhat beyond the scope desired by NASA, primarily in that it provided for analyses of three sizes of platforms and the employment of some non-Government engineers/naval architects to augment the available Navy staff. The cost of the study was estimated at $150,000 and in addition ISPO strongly recommended the inclusion of some model work at an added cost of $50,000. The estimated time of completion was one year after go-ahead.

A revised study plan, based on new guidelines developed by NASA, was submitted on October 3, 1966. It was responsive to the following ground rules:

 

[275] a. Study personnel limited to Civil Service in-house employees.
 
b. No model studies.
 
c. Study limited to a single size of platform capable of carrying the same instrumentation as the Apollo ships.
 
d. Cost to be $100,000 or less.

 

OTDA found the study plan, with but very minor revision, to be fully responsive to the NASA guidelines, and the go-ahead was given by GSFC on February 6, 1967. The final report was requested by January 1968.

Progress in performing the study was much slower than had been anticipated, probably because of the specification that it was to be conducted on a non-interference basis. NASA did not complain about the delay since there were no developments which attached any urgency to having the results available. On the contrary, the tracking accuracy being obtained from the Apollo ships was adequate, no requirement to expand the instrumentation fleet was in prospect, and no threatening political difficulties were being experienced in connection with the U.S. tracking stations located on foreign territory.

(EPILOGUE: The study report was finally submitted in April 1969. I was asked by Defense Affairs to review the study as a Consultant. The Navy report indicated that the use of a stable ocean platform in lieu of a ship for tracking support is feasible; that an SOP would offer both advantages and disadvantages compared to a ship of the Apollo type; that the cost differential between meeting a requirement for tracking support services at a sea location through the use of an SOP as compared to a ship does not appear to be so great as to rule out quality of instrumentation performance achievable, logistics factors, or habitability as the determinant consideration in making a choice. In general, I felt that, while the study report was a valuable document to have available against any of a number of contingencies which might arise, the study fell somewhat short of a complete response to the task assignment, particularly in the area of a comparison of the accuracy of tracking data obtainable from a ship and a platform, although I recognized that a quantitative performance comparison might not have been possible without a more comprehensive design study, including model tests.)

 

[276] NASA Support to North American Air Defense Command (NORAD)

A DOD-NASA Agreement in which NASA had agreed to furnish certain tracking data to NORAD had been signed in January 1961. This agreement had been supplemented by a GSFC-NORAD implementation agreement on November 7, 1961.

At the AACB meeting on March 2, 1964, the Co-chairmen concurred in a report by a joint ad hoc sub-committee dealing with the matter of the sensitivity of the use of certain NASA tracking stations on foreign territory for tracking services associated with military projects.

On October 15, 1964, Dr. Brown forwarded to Dr. Seamans a proposed NASA-NORAD agreement prepared by NORAD to replace the GSFC-NORAD agreement of 1961. Seamans asked me to review the proposed agreement in coordination with Dr. Dryden, OTDA, and International Affairs. My report to Seamans, prepared after Headquarters coordination which included consultations with GSFC and JPL, made the following points:

 

(1) The proposed new agreement goes beyond the existing NASA-DOD agreement in the matter of the priorities under which NORAD could preempt NASA stations in an emergency.
 
(2) It calls for NASA to renegotiate agreements covering tracking stations in foreign territory; this would not be in accord with the sense of the ad hoc sub-committee report on this subject concurred in by Brown and Seamans.
 
(3) The draft agreement would require NASA to furnish tracking data beyond its capability in some cases and costing considerably more money and effort in others.
 
(4) Any replacement agreement negotiated at the NASA Headquarters levels should be with DOD, not NORAD.
 
(5) The present agreement seems to be working satisfactorily; the need for a change is not evident.

 

Dr. Dryden and Dr. Seamans concurred in this evaluation, and Dr. Seamans signed a letter along these lines to Dr. Brown on December 10, 1964, which further suggested that NASA and DOD representatives meet to review the national requirements in space tracking. Dr. Brown concurred in this suggestion.

[277] Representatives of GSFC, NORAD, and NASA Headquarters, including Col. John Damon from Defense Affairs, prepared a proposed GSFC-NORAD agreement which was staffed through NASA Headquarters and , with minor revisions, approved by NASA. The revised version was presented to NORAD at a meeting between NASA representatives, including Colonel Damon, and NORAD officials at NORAD Headquarters on May 5-6, 1965. The NASA revisions were accepted and the agreement was subsequently signed, effective June 15, 1965.

 

[278] Coordination of Space Science Program

Early in 1964, the USP initiated action to establish a procedure for the coordination of space science projects conducted by NASA and the DOD, an area in which there appeared to be some unwarranted duplication. Furthermore, our people in OSSA were of the opinion that the national program in pure space science should be primarily the responsibility of NASA, at the same time realizing that the Military Services should do enough to maintain an in-house competence sufficient to apply new knowledge in space science to military needs.

Mr. F. R. Garbarini, Chairman of the USP, submitted the Panel's preliminary recommendations to the AACB at a meeting on March 2, 1964. The USP proposed a formal, annual, joint review, the results to be recorded in an annual report covering:

 

"(1) The coordinated objectives of each agency's space science program which require the expense of satellite launch vehicles, spacecraft, space probes, or piggyback delivery.
 
"(2) A coordinated plan for the effective utilization of launch vehicles, spacecraft, and piggyback capabilities.
 
"(3) The fiscal requirements needed to support the firm and projected program.
 
"(4) The unresolved areas of policy or duplication which require management attention and resolution.''

 

NASA supported the proposed procedure as being requires for effective control and avoidance of undesirable duplication of effort 'The DOD representatives (Drs. Hall and Sherwin) felt that the procedure was "too formalized," and that the exchange should be on an "information only' basis, leaving it to the scientists to prevent duplication of experiments. One problem seemed to be to define the proper level or threshold above which coordinated control would be appropriate. The Panel was instructed to give the matter further study.

I discussed the subject further with Dr. Hall on March 6. He felt that any coordination should not extend to experiments conducted by the Services and not requiring DDR&E approval or the use of an expensive booster. We agreed to await a further report from the USP.

At the next meeting of the AACB on April 23, 1964, the Panel presented a revised coordination procedure, somewhat simplified and streamlined as compared to the procedure proposed initially and containing a [279] schedule of annual reviews synchronized, as nearly as possible, with the annual budget review cycle. The Board noted that the revised procedure had been approved by the Co-chairmen and that the implementing instructions were being disseminated.

The procedure worked well in practice. The first annual review, reported upon by the USP on June 24, 1964, revealed two instances of overlapping experiments; the duplication was eliminated voluntarily.

OSSA represented NASA in this continuing activity, with Defense Affairs playing only a minor monitoring role.

 

[280] Overflights

When a booster is launched so that its trajectory passes close to or over range facilities, the launch is characterized as an "overflight " The term is also applied to any launch in which the trajectory to orbit passes over inhabited territory, domestic or foreign. On March 31, 1962, Mr. McNamara and Mr. Webb had approved an agreed "DOD-NASA Statement on the Acceptability of Overflight." The statement reviewed past experiences and considerations involved in determining a policy on authorization of overflights, such as new-pad siting, interference between launch schedules, calculated risks, flight safety rules, mission operational limitations, etc. The statement concluded that consideration of all factors leads to the position that "safety considerations alone do not categorically exclude overflight as an accepted planning factor in siting launch facilities" and set forth a procedure for making the determinations on pad siting at AMR (ETR).

The matter of overflights had an important bearing on certain decisions concerning the upgrading of NASA launch vehicles, particularly for use in polar launches. Dr. Seamans, Dr. Brown, Dr. Hall, and I discussed this matter at length in a meeting on March 13, 1964. Dr. Brown favored an arbitrary decision that no polar launches would be made from AMR because they involved overflights. Dr. Seamans was not willing to make such a sweeping determination, pointing out that a DOD-NASA decision not to overfly Cuba and Panama out of AMR might lead to restrictions in overflying other foreign territory; for example, high declination launches to the northeast from AMR. Dr. Brown said that the DOD had made a decision that all polar orbit launches would be made from PMR (WTR)

NASA found no need to raise the issue of overflights again until 1966, when it became a factor in deciding on the upgrading of certain launch vehicles and in resolving launch schedule conflicts. In a letter to Flax on May 20, 1966, Rosen said NASA was proceeding with certain modifications to launch vehicles and pads and schedule adjustments to relieve pressures at WTR, on the assumption that the DOD would approve requests for polar launches from ETR involving overflight where such requests were due to schedule conflicts at WTR. Flax replied on August 18, 1966, saying that the proposed actions described in Rosen's letter appeared appropriate to temporarily satisfy rare emergency situations which dictated high priority land overflights from ETR. He added that Rosen's assumptions that requests for polar launches from ETR would be approved must recognize that DOD and Department of State rules for obtaining land overflight approve had not changed. The Range Commander would continue to judge each request on the basis of mission importance, risk factors, and assurances that all alternatives had been explored Flax expressed his desire to assist NASA in the early solution of its polar launch requirements.

Special cases did arise later in which NASA was given authority to make dog-leg, near-polar launches from ETR which did overfly foreign territory. NASA's problem regarding polar launches was ultimately solved by obtaining a DELTA launch capability at WTR.

 

[281] DOD Support in Lunar Mapping

Being aware of DOD's extensive competence and background of experience in the development, procurement, and operational use of aerial mapping and survey equipment, NASA sought the assistance of the DOD in meeting its requirements in the similar field of lunar mapping and survey operations as part of Project Apollo.

A "DOD/NASA Agreement on the NASA Manned Lunar Mapping and Survey Program" was formalized on April 20, 1964. It stated that the Air Force, as the responsible DOD agency, would provide assistance to NASA by developing and providing, on a reimbursable basis, manned lunar mapping and survey flight equipment designed to meet NASA's needs. Under the agreed arrangement, NASA would submit to the Air Force performance goals and delivery requirements for the lunar mapping and survey subsystems. The Air Force would make the contractor selection in coordination with the responsible NASA personnel and would develop the equipment to meet the NASA specification. General management of the effort would be performed by a small joint NASA-Air Force team which would, among other things, define the detailed division of responsibilities for such matters as reliability, quality control, systems engineering, cost accountability, operations, photographic processing, etc. The arrangement worked out very well in practice.

In implementing this arrangement, however, a need developed within NASA for a small organization of persons having the experience and capability to carry on a continuing review and evaluation of the nature and extent of mapping requirements growing out of NASA programs, and of the availability of technical resources in other agencies for meeting these needs. Col. A. T. Strickland, on detail to NASA from the Army, was the only person available to discharge these responsibilities at that time.

On May 24, 1965, I wrote to Lt. Gen. W. K. Wilson, Jr., USA, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army, asking whether the Corps of Engineers could assist us in meeting NASA 's staff requirements in this area, a matter which previously had been discussed by Colonel Strickland with senior members of General Wilson's staff. As a result of this request, Mr. William H. Shirey, who had a strong background of experience in mapping and survey operations both in the Army and Air Force, was lent to NASA by the Corps of Engineers as a civilian detailee in the summer of 1965. (He is still serving with NASA in that capacity.)

After a number of interagency conferences in which Defense Affairs participated, it was determined that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was the government agency best equipped to support NASA in meeting its requirements for technical assistance, production, and management services in the general field of lunar and other extraterrestrial mapping, charting, and geodesy. Accordingly, negotiations were carried on with the DOD which led [282] to an "Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Concerning Extra-terrestrial Mapping, Charting, and Geodetic Support," signed into effect on March 8, 1966.

The Agreement provided that the DIA would be the coordinating agency within the DOD to provide, on a reimbursable basis, the support in this area requested by NASA. To permit the necessary integration by DIA of the programming and budgeting actions by the several components of DOD which would provide the support involved, NASA would, at least fifteen months in advance of the start of a fiscal year, furnish reasonably firm data on NASA's requirements and priorities for that fiscal year. DIA would, in turn, advise NASA of the DOD proposed organization, time schedules, costs, and results to be expected in meeting the NASA requirements. The necessary support to meet NASA's stated requirements would be developed by DIA in coordination with appropriate NASA personnel. DIA would exercise general management of the supporting DOD development and production effort through a small planning team which would meet with NASA representatives for coordinated planning as appropriate.

As a result of this agreement, all of the lunar grids and topographic maps needed for the selection of lunar landing sites, and all of the processing of lunar geodetic data required in the Apollo operations around the moon as well as in the scientific study of the moon, were done for NASA by the DOD. The arrangement was highly beneficial to both parties. It was efficient and economical in that NASA benefited from the skills and craftsmanship of the best experts in the field without duplicating the expensive equipment available in the DOD and without the necessity of assembling a qualified staff of its own to provide the needed products. Through active involvement in the space program, those elements of the DOD engaged in the field of mapping, survey, and the processing of geodetic data were enabled to expand their sphere of operations and experience beyond the Earth to other bodies in the solar system.

 

[283] Policy Statement on NASA Support of the Military

On July 3, 1964, in response to a request originating with Mr. Webb, Defense Affairs submitted a general statement on NASA support of the DOD titled: "The Use of the National Space Capability in Military Affairs" (see Attachment XVIII-B).

 

[284] NASA Program Reviews - Attendance by Outside Officials

As a primary management procedure, it was the Administrator's practice to schedule a series of eight, all-day Program Reviews during each fiscal year in which NASA top management would hear presentations by the Program Directors and certain of the Headquarters functional offices which, in their aggregate, covered the entire NASA programmatic and administrative on-going operations and future plans. All key officials of NASA Headquarters and the Centers and their principal assistants, to the capacity of the Review Center, were invited to attend. In addition to the primary purpose, these reviews provided an invaluable opportunity for all high level NASA officials to hear, in a general forum, the views of Webb Dryden, and Seamans regarding the activities and plans of the various segments of the Agency. Much policy, program, and administrative guidance was imparted in the course of each review, and many future action items were generated. The impromptu, philosophical dissertations by Mr. Webb were always interesting, stimulating, and enlightening as to his aims and methods of approach to the problems confronting the Agency. his exchanges with some of the Center Directors were often lively. Attendance at these meetings was always oversubscribed.

Beginning with FY 1965, it was decided to schedule a rerun of each review on the following day, to which would be invited the next echelon or two of NASA officials, who could not be accommodated at the original review, plus the top or near top level officials of all other government; agencies thought to have an interest in the NASA program. I was designated a: coordinator for the outside attendance at these repeat sessions.

It appeared to me that Webb's purpose in inviting high level officials of other agencies to attend these reviews was two-fold (1) by imparting a better knowledge and understanding of the aims, activities, and accomplishments of the whole NASA program, he hoped to establish a broader and stronger base of support for NASA in quarters from which support would weigh heavily with the Administration and Congress; and (2) such exposure would cause a greater number of able men to "wrap their minds" around our programs and problems, as Webb so often would say.

The plan was that Webb, Dryden, or Seamans, or perhaps two of them, and the presenting Program Director would he present for each rerun in recognition of the importance of the invited outside guests. Individual letters of invitation would be sent, signed by Webb, Dryden, Seamans, or myself as appropriate. The agencies represented on the invitation list included the Office of the Secretary of Defense, JCS, Secretaries and Chiefs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, ARPA, WSEG, DCA, DIA, Space Council, PSAC, NSF, NAS, State, Commerce, FAA, BuBud, Smithsonian, AEC, CIA, OST, NAE, USIA, ACDA, CAB, NCMRED. In all, forty-two invitations were issued for the first series. Each invitee who could not attend personally was encouraged to send a senior assistant as a substitute.

[285] In addition to this plan, several attempts were made by Mr. Webb to schedule special briefings on selected segments of the NASA program for Mr. McNamara and a small number of his principal assistants, but without success.

It soon became evident that the plan for the rerun Program Reviews, while serving a very useful purpose for the second and third echelon NASA officials whose attendance was high, was not working as intended with respect to outside guests, despite a considerable effort on the part of myself and other NASA officials in personally urging invitees to attend. Very few of the invited principals attended from the outset, and as the series progressed the attendance of the actual invitees became almost nil. Furthermore, the seniority of the attending substitutes steadily decreased. On the NASA side, Webb, Dryden, and Seamans could not find time to sit through an all-day repeat of a review, and the presenting Program Directors soon dropped out, sending progressively less senior officials to represent them, until I often found myself opening and presiding at the sessions.

At the end of the FY 1965 series, my Office prepared an analysis of the attendance by invited guests. It showed that in the second half of the FY 1965 series, the average attendance by invited principals had fallen to 12.5 per cent, and the average attendance by either the principal or his substitute stood at 37 per cent. Thirty-eight percent of the guest list failed to attend or send a substitute to any of the last four reviews.

On August 4, 1965, I sent a memorandum to Mr. Webb giving the results of our analysis of attendance patterns at the Program Review returns. I attributed the apathy of invited guests toward these presentations to three principal factors: (1) invitees found that the presentations included too much detail in which they were not particularly interested (i.e., budgets, organization, and schedules); (2) the attendance of NASA top management personnel had progressively decreased; and (3) the high level executives invited found that one full day a month was too much to give to hearing of the activities of another agency. I concluded that while the reruns were highly beneficial internally, they were not accomplishing their objective with respect to outside invitees. While I did not specifically say so in my memorandum, I felt that no amount of persuasion would cause the top and near-top level government officials on our list to attend the reviews under the procedure then in effect, and that a completely restructured format would have to be adopted if we were to attract the people we wanted.

To face the situation realistically, and to accomplish Mr. Webb's objectives as I understood them, I made the following recommendations:

 

"(1) Continue the program reruns primarily for the benefit of those responsible NASA officials who cannot be accommodated at the first run sessions because of space limitations.
 
"(2) On a selected basis, issue individual invitations to those key officials of other agencies [286] directly interested or involved in working with us in connection with the content of the particular program review; my office would undertake to do this.
 
"(3) Once a year, schedule an all day presentation covering the highlights of the total NASA program, which would be presided over by you, attended by Dr. Dryden, Dr. Seamans, and all of the Program Directors' and to which would be invited generally the same basic list of officials who were invited to the rerun series this last year; a buffet luncheon, hosted by you, would be scheduled between the morning and afternoon sessions."

 

Mr. Webb did not completely agree with my evaluation of the situation and recommendations (his memorandum to me of September 8), although I believe it is correct to say that nearly all of his principal advisers did. Mr. Webb felt that we should continue to invite high level officials to the full series of rerun reviews, adjust the content to the guest audience without eliminating anything that was necessary for the NASA officials. He indicated that we should be able to find new ways to encourage the invitees to attend.

Accordingly, the FY 1966 and FY 1967 Program Review series reruns were scheduled as in FY 1965, and personal invitations to attend were again issued to senior management officials of other Agencies and institutions. An attempt was made to have the Program Directors modify their presentation programs for the reruns to eliminate some of the subject matter thought to be of little or no interest to the top officials of other agencies, but this met with little success. The Program Directors found that it would take an inordinate amount of time and effort to prepare a substantially different presentation for the second day. Despite personal letter invitations signed by top level NASA officials, ample notice of the schedule and program content, personalized follow-up letters, and personal telephone calls, the attendance patterns in FY 1966 and FY 1967 remained about the same or retrogressed. Of some seventy-two officials on our outside invitation list, as a rule only two or three principals attended each review. Just before the start of the FY 1968 series of Program Reviews, the decision was made to discontinue the practice of inviting outside guests to attend the Program Review reruns.

 

[287] Ad Hoc Joint Navigation Satellite Committee (JNSC)

The JNSC was formed on September 10, 1964, by agreement of NASA, DOD, FAA, and the Departments of Treasury, Interior, and Commerce. The Committee consisted of one member from each signatory of the agreement, with the NASA member, Mr. Leonard Jaffe, as Chairman.

The terms of reference provided that the Committee should:

 

"a. Determine and evaluate the requirements, existing and estimated, for a satellite system to meet future needs in air and sea navigation, air and sea traffic control or coordination, air-sea emergency and rescue activities, and related data transmission.
 
"b. Review the potential capability of space technology to contribute significantly to the improvement of air and sea navigation; air and sea traffic control and coordination; and air-sea emergency activities of the signatory departments and agencies.
 
"c .Determine the economic feasibility and benefits and cost-effectiveness advantages of a satellite system as compared to alternative means of meeting the needs mentioned in paragraph 3a above.
 
"d. Recommend an appropriate program to develop the satellite system, if it is determined to be economically desirable, or otherwise in the National interest, considering the results of the efforts of 3.a., 3.b., and 3.c, with an appropriate division of responsibility among the signatory government agencies
 
"e. Recommend a method and organization for the coordination of the effort among the agencies participating in the program established in 3.d., with adequate safeguard against disruption of the program or the coordination due to change in position, requirement, or technology. The procedure must provide signatory agencies with a mechanism for requesting consideration of a change when deemed appropriate.
 
"f. Present all findings, conclusions, and recommendations in a final report to the signatories of this Agreement for review, acceptance, and implementation of recommended actions."

[288] The Committee completed its study and report in May 1966. Very briefly, the principal conclusions were:

 

 

The Committee recommended, inter alia, that:

 

 

The AACB was kept informed of the activities of the Committee. Mr. Jaffe presented a comprehensive report to the AACB on the origin, purpose, and status of the JNSC study on May 4, 1965. The general reaction of the representatives (Brown, Fubini, and Hall) was to question the need of an additional satellite system for non-military ; navigation, (position " fixing). They indicated that the need, if any , appeared to be primarily one of communications or on-route, transocean air traffic control. Dr. Fubini noted that the OMEGA system,, which the DOD was seriously planning to deploy, could satisfy the apparent navigational needs. He felt that the navigation and communications requirements were largely independent of each other and should not necessarily be treated as elements of a single system.

[289] In subsequent progress reports to the AACB, it was brought out that the Program Plan and Coordination Panel of the JNSC was recommending that the FAA assume the dominant role in establishing future requirements for navigation-traffic control satellites.

Mr. Jaffe, in his final report to the AACB on this subject on May 11, 1966, urged that the agencies involved look further into the future and not wait for "hardened" requirements before proceeding with system concepts.

 

[290] Ellington Air Force Base, Houston, Texas

Incident to a general campaign on the part of the Secretary of Defense to reduce the number of facilities being maintained and operated by the DOD, the Deputy for Installations, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, addressed a letter to NASA on November 2, 1964, suggesting that the Jurisdiction of the Ellington Air Force Base be assumed by NASA and that the Air Force activities to be continued at that base be accommodated on a tenant basis; otherwise, the possibility of closing the base was indicated. NASA depended upon Ellington AFB for the support of aircraft used primarily in the training of astronauts and for administrative purposes. Certain other NASA miscellaneous activities, including some space flight simulators, were located on the base. Altogether, NASA's activities there were an important segment of the national manned space flight program.

An analysis of the Air Force proposal was conducted in NASA Headquarters, with assistance from MSC. The possibility of transferring the NASA flight operations to the Houston municipal field was examined.

By letter of January 12, 1965, we informed the Air Force that NASA would be unable to justify the assumption by NASA of responsibility for maintaining and managing the base for the use of NASA and for use by the Air Force and other activities under tenancy arrangements. We pointed out that NASA was but one of some thirty-four military and civilian activities tenanted at EAFB. Of the daily work force at Ellington numbering about 2,252 personnel, only 713 were NASA employees. In addition, some 2,254 military Reservists were temporarily on duty at the base for a portion of each month. NASA/MSC accounted for only 8.1 per cent of the total flight operations (landings and takeoffs). We expressed the view that the decision concerning the continued operation of the base by the Air Force should be made independently of any consideration of NASA's projected use of facilities there.

Fortunately, the Air Force decided to continue the operation of the base. NASA-Air Force working relations at the base, and all of the services and support which MSC received from the Air Force in the Houston area, continued to be excellent

 

[291] Vulnerability of Satellites to Nuclear Detonations

In February 1 96 5, the Air Force Defense Command (AFDC) invited NASA to hear a presentation on a computer-based procedure which AFDC had developed for calculating the degree of vulnerability of U.S. satellites to nuclear detonations in space. The purpose of the AFDC initiative was to solicit the interest and support of NASA in the program. Defense Affairs arranged for the briefing to be given in NASA Headquarters on March 9, 1965, to representatives of all the Program Offices and other cognizant officials. GSFC was requested to send representatives to the briefing and subsequently to prepare a technical evaluation of the procedure presented and an estimate of the NASA effort required to provide the information desired by the Air Force. Following this briefing, there were consultations with the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), of which AFDC was a part. Colonel Damon took the lead in representing NASA in these exploratory discussions.

Later that year, NORAD officially requested that NASA participate in a DOD program for assessing the vulnerability of satellites to high altitude nuclear explosions. The purpose of the program was to provide data for - use in a National (atomic) Test Readiness Plan, the DOD portion of which the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) had been directed to prepare and keep up-dated. By a memorandum dated November 5, 1965, Defense Affairs requested OSSA, assisted by OMSF, OART, and OTDA, to take the lead in preparing recommendations as to the manner and extent to which NASA should participate in the DOD program. It was evident that a complete analysis of the vulnerability of all NASA satellites, applying the AFDC procedure, would be a very costly effort.

After a coordinated study of this matter in NASA Headquarters, with assistance from GSFC, it was decided that any attempt to analyze the survivability of individual NASA satellites in the detail proposed by NORAD would be too complex to be practicable and would not be justified in the light of the high cost in funds and manpower involved. In lieu thereof, N0RAD agreed to accept relatively coarse estimates of the effects that nuclear explosions in space would have on NASA satellites, and the periodic listing of NASA satellites in several categories indicating the relative need for protecting them against exposure to the effects of nuclear explosions.

 

[292] Liaison with the Space Panel of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee (PSAC), 1965-1967

In May 1965, Dr. Seamans designated Mr. M. W. Rosen of Defense Affairs as the NASA representative to the Space Sciences and Space Technology Panels of the PSAC. These panels were later combined into a single panel, designated the Space Sciences and Technology Panel, under the co-chairmanship of Dr. Franklin A. Long of Cornell University and Dr. Lewis M. Branscomb of the Joint Institute for Laboratory Astrophysics, Boulder, Colorado. Rosen rendered valuable services as the day-to-day link between NASA and PSAC.

The principal work of the Space Panels during this period was a comprehensive review of the NASA space program for the purpose of recommending new directions for space activity after the first manned lunar landing. Their work culminated in a report published by the PSAC in February 1967 entitled "The Space Program in the Post-Apollo Period." In connection with their broad survey, the Panels also examined the Apollo Program, the Space Astronomy Program, including the Apollo telescope (later incorporated in Skylab), the objectives and means of lunar surface exploration, and the evaluation of biomedical data from manned space flights. In connection with the last named activity, the Panel organized a working group on biomedicine under Dr. Eugene Stead of Duke University' whose work culminated later in a report entitled "The Biomedical Foundations of Manned Space Flight."

 

[293] Single-Manager concept in DOD/NASA Procurement

Below are cited two excellent examples of application of the single manager concept in procurement. These cases involved the procurement, storage, and distribution of propellants and pressurants required by the DOD and NASA in support of their space programs. Defense Affairs assisted the Office of Industry Affairs in the negotiation of two NASA-USAF agreements which resulted in greater economy and efficiency in the procurement and handling of these materials to meet the needs of both Agencies.

 

Hydrogen Support

A NASA-USAF agreement on "Hydrogen Support" was signed into effect on November 4, 1965. Its purpose was to prescribe policies, guidelines, responsibilities, and procedures under which NASA agreed to furnish liquid hydrogen to the Air Force on a reimbursable basis and on equal priority with NASA requirements.

 

Propellant and Pressurant Support

A NASA-USAF agreement was consummated, effective July 6, 1966, which prescribed policies, guidelines, responsibilities, and procedures under which the Air Force agreed to furnish to NASA, on a reimbursable basis, some twenty-two propellants and pressurants, including liquid oxygen and RP-1 fuel, required in support of NASA programs.

 

[294] NASA-USAF Agreements Covering Joint Accident Investigations

Defense Affairs was designated by the Administrator as the office to represent NASA in negotiating agreements with the Air Force establishing procedures for conducting joint investigations of space program and aircraft accidents in which there was a mutual interest. Joint agreements covering these two categories were consummated.

 

Space Program Accidents

The first such agreement was signed into effect on April 4, 1966. The stated purpose of this agreement was "to establish procedures through which NASA and the USAF may jointly investigate space program accidents in the interest of accident prevention." The agreement recognized that the joint investigation of accidents arising out of joint utilization of certain facilities, manpower, and other resources would, in many instances, avoid duplication of effort and thereby promote efficiency. Although the decision to conduct a joint investigation would depend upon the circumstances in each case, it was the intent of the agreement to create a presumption that an accident involving both NASA and Air Force resources would be investigated jointly unless good reasons were shown as to the need for separate investigations.

The agreement established procedures for the convening of joint investigations, the appointment of members, the acquiring of outside assistance, the appearance of witnesses, voting, handling of reports, etc. The chairman of the joint board would be appointed from the agency having primary responsibility, and criteria for determining primary responsibility were included in the agreement.

 

Aircraft Accidents

A counterpart agreement, covering the joint investigation of aircraft accidents involving personnel, facilities and/or equipment of NASA and the USAF, was negotiated by my Office beginning in late 1967 and was signed into effect on March 13, 1968. It was similar in purpose and content to the agreement covering space program accidents.

 

[295] Project HINDSIGHT

On September 9, 1966, I received a phone call from Dr. Donald M. McArthur, Deputy Director (Research and Technology), DDR&E. He stated he would like to obtain Dr. Seamans' reaction to the first interim report on a DDR&E study titled "Project HINDSIGHT," which had been going on for two and one-half years, before submitting the report to Mr. McNamara. McArthur said he was also soliciting comments from Dr. Horning (PSAC) and Dr. Holloman (Commerce). I suggested that he send the copy to me, which he did. He indicated the intention to release the report to the public. The existence of this study had been brought to Mr. Webb's attention some months earlier by an employee of Redstone Arsenal.

The HINDSIGHT study attempted to analyze twenty weapon systems - about half of which were second or later generation systems and only one of which was an aircraft system - to determine the sources of the scientific or technological innovations, called "events," which had contributed to the success of the weapons systems analyzed.

I read the report, which had been prepared by Dr. C. W. Sherwin and Col. R. S. Isenson, two assistants in DDR&E. My general evaluation was that the approach to the subject was narrow and the conclusions were misleading, if not invalid, and biased in favor of DOD-sponsored R&D, both in-house and contractor. "Events" were treated on a numerical basis without regard to their relative importance. For example, the development of a better relay was given the same weight as the invention of the transistor, an innovation of non-defense sponsored research. I was concerned about the effect upon government-sponsored R&D in general if the report were to be publicized.

The conclusions which disturbed me most were the following:
 
"Fourth, we conclude that the relative efficiency of production of science and technology Events which have been utilized in defense is substantially higher when funded and managed by the Defense Department or defense industry than it is when funded and managed by the non-defense sector of government or industry."
 
"Fifth, we conclude that, in the systems which we studied, the contributions from recent undirected (basic) research in science were very small."

 

Without going into a lengthy critique,, we felt that the conclusions of the report reflected the fact that the efforts analyzed were largely developmental in nature and narrowly focused on identified military needs. A study not limited to classified weapon systems would be expected to show a different set of percentages as to the sources of' innovative ideas.

[296] Regarding the fifth conclusion, it was interesting to note that at the time the HINDSIGHT report was being circulated, the Federal Council for Science and Technology (FCST) was recommending continued and increased emphasis on basic research in recognition of its importance to various practical fields, including national defense.

The Assistant Administrator for Policy, Dr. Eggers, cone the comments submitted by Defense Affairs.

The responsibility for action on the HINDSIGHT report was assigned to POLICY ANALYSIS who, in coordination with Defense Affairs, prepared comments in response to Dr. McArthur's request. These were embodied in a letter from Dr. Seamans to Dr. Foster dated September 17, 1966, in which Seamans expressed NASA's concern over the conclusions of the report.

Pursuant to a recommendation by Defense Affairs, Dr. McArthur and Colonel Isenson made a presentation to NASA on Project HINDSIGHT on October 26, 1966. Mr. Webb, Dr. Seamans, and most of the top NASA officials attended the presentation. A spirited discussion ensued in which we in NASA voiced our opinions as to the limitations of the study and the misleading nature of the conclusions.

However, Mr. Webb felt that the methodology of the report was more significant than the conclusions and evinced an interest in exploring the possibility of applying the HINDSIGHT technique to selected NASA programs.

Mr. Shapley set up a meeting on November 10, 1966, to discuss future actions related to the HINDSIGHT report. It was attended by Adams, Kerr, and myself. The general sense was that we should discourage the public release of the report.

The members of the Federal Council on Science and Technology discussed the study at a meeting on December 8, 1966, and agreed that the HINDSIGHT report could easily be subject to misinterpretation and misuse and that there were many semantic traps involved in its interpretation by the uninitiated.

Despite questions raised as to the validity of the study, DDR&E did release the HINDSIGHT report to the public. It evoked only minor interest, and the criticisms were generally not favorable.

On March 6, 1967, in response to a request by Dr. Seamans that we some specific innovations contributed by NASA laboratories to the development and improved effectiveness of DOD weapons systems, Defense Affairs submitted a paper, prepared by Mr. Rosen, which described four revolutionary innovations that arose from. the relationship between NACA and the Armed Services: the swept-back wing, identification of the characteristics of low-aspect-ratio wings at supercritical mach numbers, delineation of the zero-lift drag-rise characteristics of wing-body combinations near the speed of sound (Whitcomb Area Rule), and the combination of improved radio and inertial guidance and the blunt nose-cone concept as applied to the development of ICBM's. still other NACA innovations were cited.

[297] Mr. Webb continued to pursue the idea of applying the HINDSIGHT methodology as a means of achieving a feed-back concerning the application of NASA R&D innovations to NASA programs but, so far as I know, no formalized program or study along these lines eventuated.

 

[298] Study on Intra-NASA and NASA-DOD Relationships at Cape Kennedy

In the latter part of 1966, Dr. Seamans asked me to undertake a study of the interwoven responsibilities, functions, and activities of elements of NASA which converged in the planning, establishment, end use of launch, launch support, tracking, data acquisition and processing, and communications facilities at Cape Kennedy. These were inherently complex relationships which had been rendered more complicated and in some aspects confusing by inconsistencies in certain provisions of existing NASA directives and NASA-DOD agreements. The study was to focus on the coordination of NASA actions in communicating and working with the DOD authorities responsible for meeting NASA support requirements at ETR.

Lt. Gen. Leighton I. Davis, in his dual capacity as DOD Manager for Manned Space Flight Support Operations and Commander of the National Range Division, AFSC, and M.Gen. Vincent G. Huston, Commander AFMTS/AFETR, had made representations to NASA authorities to the effect that various elements of NASA were submitting requests for Range services which, being uncoordinated, were causing conflicts and raising questions as to priorities which it was improper to ask the Range authorities to resolve. The principal source of the difficulty lay in the overlapping needs of various NASA elements for the use of ETR facilities during training, checkout, rehearsal, and launch operations.

This situation brought to light the need to clarify certain organizational relationships within NASA, to define areas of responsibility and authority and establish internal NASA priorities in connection with support from ETR, and to relate these to channels of communication between elements of NASA and the DOD concerned with the planning and conduct of support operations at the Cape and downrange. Involved on the NASA side were OMSF, MSC, KSC, OSSA, OART, OTDA, GSFC, JPL, and the local organizations and offices representing these elements in the Cape Kennedy area.

My study of the problem involved an extensive review of the pertinent NASA and DOD directives and agreements and many exploratory talks and conferences with cognizant NASA and DOD officials. I spent several days at the Cape discussing the problem and possible solutions with the authorities of both Agencies there. As the form of a remedial arrangement began to emerge, I had numerous conferences with the responsible NASA and DOD officials to test the workability and acceptability to both Agencies of a proposed solution. In this entire process, I received a great deal of support, advice, and patient assistance from many people in both the DOD and NASA, including members of my own Defense Affairs staff.

I doubt that I could adequately describe the complex ramifications of the problem and the ultimate solution in shorter terms than ';hose of the final directive which I prepared for Dr. Seamans' signature after obtaining the concurrence of all interested parties, including the DOD, an] which was [299] issued in the form of a Memorandum to all of the NASA Associate Administrator and the Assistant Administrator for Administration, dated November 21, 1966. Accordingly, I am attaching a copy of the complete Memorandum (see Attachment XVIII-C).

On the basis of letters and oral expressions subsequently received, the solution reflected in Dr. Seamans' Memorandum was favorably received by all parties and was implemented to the satisfaction of all concerned.

 

[300] Consolidation of Photographic Facilities at KSC/ETR

On November 8, 1967, I went to the Cape to inspect the DOD and NASA photographic laboratory facilities there with the objective of determining the feasibility of effecting economies through the consolidation of some or all of these activities. NASA and the DOD were each maintaining-a large photographic laboratory, each operated by a different commercial contractor.

My observations and discussions with KSC and ETR officials and the two local contractor managers convinced me that, with some minor exceptions, the photographic work of KSC and ETR could be combined in a single laboratory at a considerable saving to the Government and with no appreciable loss in efficiency. Consolidation in the ETR facility appeared to be preferable since it was the larger installation. Upon my return to Headquarters, I recommended that a joint group be appointed to plan and implement the consolidation. With the concurrence of DOD, this was done.

 

[301] Long-Range Study of Future Aerospace Facilities Requirements

In a memorandum to Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., DDR&E, dated May 2, 1967, Dr. Alexander H. Flax, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (R&D), suggested that Dr. Foster request the AACB to organize a review of existing and planned facilities and to recommend a long-range plan for large aerodynamic and space test facilities which would reflect both the present capabilities and the requirements of the United States over the next decade. Dr. Flax had in mind a plan similar to the Unitary Wind Tunnel Plan resulting from a cooperative effort by the Army, Navy, and NACA following World War II. His suggestion apparently was prompted by a prior letter to General Ferguson, Commander AFSC, recommending such a joint study, a matter General Ferguson had informally discussed with me.

Anticipating that this matter would be presented to the AACB, Defense Affairs initiated action in Headquarters to prepare a NASA position.

At the meeting of the AACB on May 25, 1967, Dr. Flax proposed that the Aeronautics Panel, assisted by representatives of other panels as appropriate, undertake a comprehensive study along the lines he had suggested to Dr. Foster. Dr. Foster supported the proposed study. Dr. Seamans also agreed, but expressed the need to establish the boundaries of the study more clearly and stated his view that the study should look ahead twelve to fifteen years. It was agreed that the Aeronautics Panel should prepare a detailed outline for the conduct of the study.

At the next Board meeting, August 24, 1967, the Aeronautics Panel reported on the results of its initial deliberations. Working groups, devoted primarily to the transonic, supersonic, and hypersonic regimes, had been established.

The scope and nature of the study was further discussed at the meeting on October 26, 1967. It was emphasized that the ultimate objective of the study was to identify future large, ground, aerospace test facility requirements. It was agreed that the plan to be submitted should recommend boundaries of the study, the organization to conduct the study, and the schedule for its accomplishment.

While no further formal action regarding the study took place in the AACB during the period of this narrative, the study was undertaken, is still going on as of this date, and is proving to be a useful endeavor.

 

[302-311] Attachment XVIII-A. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE THREAT OF THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY.

[312-313] Attachment XVIII-B. THE USE OF THE NATIONAL SPACE CAPABILITY IN MILITARY AFFAIRS.

[314-321] Attachment XVIII-C. Memorandum: November 21, 1966. Subject: Relationships within NASA and between NASA and DOD elements in the planning, establishment, and use of launch, launch support, tracking, data acquisition and processing, and communications facilities.


previousindexnext