SP-4102 Managing NASA in the Apollo Era
 

 

Notes

 

INTRODUCTION

 

1. Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior 2d ed. (New York: Free Press, 1957).

2. Ibid., p. 79.

3. For problems of administrative feedback, see the book of that name by Herbert Kaufman, with the collaboration of Michael Couzens (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings institution, 1973).

4. Personnel figures are excerpted from tables 3-1 and 2-4 of the NASA Historical Data Book, 1956-1968 (NASA SP-4012, 1976).

5. James E. Webb Space Age Management: The Large-Scale Approach, McKinsey Foundation Lecture Series, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), especially pp. 60 65.

6. On this concept, see Richard L. Chapman et al., Project Management in NASA (NASA SP-324, 1973), p. 109.

 

CHAPTER 1

 

1. D. Brainerd Holmes to Philip Drotning, 12 June 1963. Holmes was Director for Manned Space Flight; 1961-1963.

2. Richard R. Nelson, The Moon and the Ghetto: An Essay on Public Policy Analysis (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1977), p. 144. Citation that follows is in ibid., p. 145.

3. The concept of "key decisions" was suggested by L. L. Durirch and Robert E. Lowry, "The Scope and Content of Administration-The TVA illustration," Public Administration Review 13 (Autumn 1953): 219-226.

4. Section 203(b)(5) of the Spare Act.

5. Wernher von Braun, Director, Marshall Space Flight Center, briefing of House Science and Astronautics Committee Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, 24 Jan. 1964, in hearings on 1965 NASA Authorization, 88th Cong 2d sess. (1964), p. 803.

6. Bureau of the Budget Bulletin 60 2, 21 Sept. 1959, and Circular A-76, 3 Mar. 1966.

7. Robert L. Rosholt, An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-196R (NASA SP-4101, 1966), p. 259.

8. Apollo Program Office, NASA-Apollo Program Management, vol. I (Dec. 1967), p. 2-8.

9. Dr. Mueller stressed the importance of a philosophical approach to meeting schedules which minimizes 'dead-end' testing and maximizes 'all-up systems flight tests,"' at 22d meeting, Manned Space Flight Management Council, 29 Oct. 1963. This is apparently the first official reference to the all-up concept.

10. Webb, to Heads of all Headquarters Offices and Directors of Field Centers, "Office of the Administrator," 29 Dec. 1965.

11. "Organization and Management," in "Preliminary History of NASA, 1963-1969 " final ed. (15 Jan. 1969), p. Vl 39, This unpublished manustript was reproduced for internal NASA use after preparation for the White House Administrative Histories Project, with a preface by Acting Administrator Thomas O. Paine and a foreword by James E. Webb.

 

CHAPTER 2

 

1. On NACA, see Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Policy Planning for Aeronautical Research and Development, 89th Cong., 2d sess. (19 May 1966), pp. 38-43, 166-168.

2. Arthur L. Levine, The Future of {he U.S. Space Program (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 14.

3. Policy Planning for Aeronautical Research and Development, p.. 166.

4. Ibid., p. 42.

5. Enid C. B. Schoettle, "The Establishment of NASA," in Sanford Lakoff, ed., Knowledge and Power (New York: Free Press, 1966) pp. 185-186.

6. Michael H. Armacost The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York: Columbia University Press 1969) pp. 226-233.

7. Schoettle, "The Establishment of NASA," p. 212.

8. ibid., p. 234.

9. House Committee on Government Operations, Military Affairs Subcommittee, Government Operations in Space, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (4 June 1965), p. 40.

10. Ibid. p. 53.

11. The authoritative account of the lunar landing decision is John Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Moon (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970).

12. Ibid., pp. 34-35.

13. House Science and Astronautics Committee, Defense Space interests, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (1961), p. 19.

14. Levine, Future of the US Space Program, p. 71. Emphasis in original.

15. Logsdon, Decision to Go to {he Moon, p. 62.

16. On the reasons for selecting Houston, tee Thomas P. Murphy, Science, Geopolitics, and Federal Spending (Lexington, Mass.: Heath Lexington, 1971), pp. 207-210.

17. Minutes of 1st meeting, MSF Management Council, 21 Dec. 1961

18. The first part of the quotation is from a memo of 11 July to Wiesner from Donald Horning, chairman of the Space Vehicle Panel; the second part, from PSAC, Report of the Space Vehicle Panel (On the Matter of Lunar Mission Mode Selection), 26 July 1962, p. 15.

19. Webb to Holmes, 7 Aug. 1962.

20. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965 (NASA SP-4007, 1967), p. 349.

21. Erasmus H. Kloman Case-Study of the Surveyor program (unpublished study for National Academy of Public Administration 1971) p. 110.

22. House Science and Astronautics Committee, Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, Investigation of project Ranger, 88th Cong., 2d sess.. (1964), pp. 162-163, 165-166, 168-169.

23. ibid., p. 233.

24. Webb and Dryden, revised draft of "Consideration of Supplemental Appropriation During FY 1963 for the Manned Lunar Landing Program," Jan. 1963.

25. A summary of the Phillips report was prepared by the General Accounting Office at the request of Senator Margaret Chase Smith (R-Maine) in May 1967.

26. See Astronautics and Aeronautics, 7954 (NASA SP-4005, 1965), pp. 99-100.

 

CHAPTER 3

 

1. Thus the NASA Management Instruction (NMI) describing the functions and responsibilities of the Associate Administrator for Organization and Management was issued on 14 Mar. 1968, exactly one year after the office was created

2. Oral History Exit interview with Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr. (8, 20 May; 3 June 1968), p. 55.

3. For pros and cons of study committees, see Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), pp. 207-208.

4. Robert Rosholt, An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1953 (NASA SP-4101, 1966), p. 148. Hereafter cited as Administrative History.

5. ibid., p. 153.

6. Ibid., p. 154.

7. For a very detailed account of the Kimpton report, see ibid., pp. 161-169.

8. See appendix C, "Biographical Sketches of Principal NASA Officials" for careers of Webb, Dryden, Seamans, et al..

9. Statement of Albert Siepert in House Science and Astronautics Committee, 7953 NASA Authorization, 87th Cong., 2d sess. (1962), pp. 269-270.

10. The key papers are "A Summary Look at 'The Headquarters Organization Problem,"' 27 Feb. Summary in Rosholt, Administrative History, pp. 200-201; "Clarifying and Strengthening the Role of NASA's General Management," 14 Apr. Ibid., pp. 203-206; "Reappraising NASA's Organizational Structure to Achieve the Objectives of an Accelerated Program," 12 June. Ibid., pp. 209-210; and "Organizing to Achieve the Objectives of an Accelerated Civilian Space Program," 7 Aug. Ibid., pp. 218-221.

11. ibid., p. 205.

12. Paper prepared by DeMarquis Wyatt, "Budget Formulation and Execution," 3 Mar. 1967, p. 1.

13. In the November 1961 reorganization the functions of program review were divided among the new divisions of Technical Programs and Reliability and Quality Assurance.

14. Rosholt, Administrative History, p. 221

15. Statement of Raymond Bisplinghoff, OART Director, in House Science and Astronautics Committee, 7954 NASA Authorization, 88th Cong., 1st sess.. (1963), p. 1882

16. House Science and Astronautics Committee, 1965 NASA Authorization, 88th Cong., 2d sess. (1964), p. 103.

17. This was GMI 4-1-1 in the pre-1965 NASA coding system.

18. Memorandum to Seamans through Director of Administration from Walter Hahn (Director, Management Analysis Division), "Inadequate and Conflicting Management Systems," 28 Sept. 1962.

19. Transcript of remarks by Harry Goett at Seventh Semi-Annual Management Conference, Langley Research Center (4-5 Oct. 1962), p. 7.

20. in NASA a "program" is defined as "a related series of undertakings which continue over a period of time (normally years), and which are designed to accomplish a broad scientific or technical goal.... Program responsibility is assigned to the appropriate Program Office within NASA."

A "project" is "within a program, an undertaking with a scheduled beginning and ending, which normally involves one of the following....
"(1) The design, development and demonstration of [a] major advanced hardware item
"(2) The design, construction and operation of a new launch vehicle (and associated ground support) during its research and development phase
"(3) The construction led operation of one or more aeronautical or space vehicles and necessary ground support in order to accomplish a scientific or technical objective." NASA Management Instruction (NMI) 4-1-1, 8 Mar. 1963, pp. 1-2.

21. Rosholt, Administrative History , P. 227. The Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition is counted as a program office, although it had no centers and no "programs."

22. On the problem of relieving Seamans of part of his workload, see memorandum from Webb's executive assistant R. P. Young to Webb, 30 July 1962.

23. House Science and Astronautics Committee, 7955 NASA Authorization p. 69

24. For an excellent survey of the NASA Technology Utilization Program, see Edward E. Furash, "The Problem of Technology Transfer," in Raymond A. Bauer and Kenneth J. Gergen, eds., The Study of Policy Formation (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 281-328.

25. From transcript of Webb's briefing of the Administrator's Management Advisory Panel, 19 Apr. 1968, p. 28.

26. The directive setting forth NASA policy concerning functional management is NPD 1240.1, 13 June 1966.

27. ibid., p. 2.

28. Transcript of Management Advisory Panel meeting, 19 Apr. 1968, p. 23?

29. The centers reported to the program offices as follows: Goddard JPL, and Wallops Station to OSSA; Ames, Flight Research Center, Langley, Lewis, and the Electronics Research Center that NASA proposed for the FY 1964 budget to OART; Kennedy Space Center, Manned Spacecraft Center, and Marshall Space Flight Center to OMSF. For establishment of the Launch Operations Center, see Seamans exit interview, pp. 51-52.

30. ibid., p. 100.

31. "Dr. Seamans stated this group would meet weekly to focus its attention on management problems, processes and procedures in order to insure that the new organization works effectively. Program matters would be discussed in detail at the monthly status reviews." From minutes of first Management Committee meeting, 14 Oct. 1963

32. Based on a memorandum from Wyatt to Edgar Cortright, Deputy Associate Administrator (OSSA), "Presentation Formats, Associate Administrator's Monthly Program Meetings," 9 Dec. 1965.

33. This is as good a place as any to sort out and explain the various titles of headquarters officials. The heads of the program offices were "Directors" from 1961 to 1963, when they became "Associate Administrators for -." The Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition became a program office in December 1965. Following the 1963 reorganization, the heads of the offices reporting to Webb (e.g., Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, International Programs) became "Assistant Administrators for_." Following the 1963 reorganization, the heads of the offices reporting to Seamans (e.g., Industry Affairs, Defense Affairs, Programming, Administration) became "Deputy Associate Administrators," changed to "Assistant Administrators" in the 1965 reorganization. Although it appears in early organization charts, the office of "Associate Deputy Administrator" actually dates from 1965, when it was created for Willis Shapley. The Associate Deputy Administrator had general responsibility for external affairs, especially liaison with Congress, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Department of Defense. One of the most confusing titles was "Deputy Associate Administrator." In 1962-1963 there were two such officials, one for "Manned Space Flight Centers," the other for "Other than Manned Space Flight Centers." The 1963 reorganization replaced these with a single official who acted as Seamans' deputy. The Deputy Associate Administrator from 1964 to 1966, Earl Hilburn, had a number of responsibilities for procurement, liaison with the General Accounting Office, and as all-purpose troubleshooter. Hilburn was director of two task forces that investigated the 1964 Ranger 6 failure and the relation between costs and schedule slippages in major NASA programs. The position lapsed when Hilburn left NASA but was revived in the 1970s.

34. See draft memorandum, 14 Nov. 1962, enlarging the scope of Office of Plans and Program Evaluation and giving its head special responsibility for evaluating current programs. "In this regard I |Webb?] believe we should reconsider foregoing revision of the long range plan for calendar year 1963 in order to apply maximum available effort to initiating the review and analysis outlined above."

On 13 March 1963 Webb wrote to Abe Hyatt, the office Director, that "there is no doubt that our short range planning needs increased emphasis, and at the same time should be given higher priority than updating the long range plan." In August Webb decided to disperse the functions of the Office of Plans and Program Evaluation among other headquarters divisions, and Hyatt left at the end of October.

35. Webb to James Elliott, Director of Management Analysis (Office of Administration), 7 July 1965.

36. This and the following paragraph are based on several internal memorandums, especially one from James Elliott to members of the NASA Management Committee, 20 May 1964, and a briefing memorandum for the Administrator, 5 May 1965.

37. These included policy statements (NPDs), Management Instructions (NMls), detailed handbooks (NHBs), statements of procurement procedures (NPCs), and temporary notices (NNs). Headquarters Management Instructions (HQMls) and delegations of authority (HMDs) were added later.

38. Published as NPC 107.

39. According to Seamans, Webb "wanted to have a clear-cut outline of what every responsible person's job was and who they dealt with, and all this kind of thing--which is . . . a classical way of dealing with big organizations . . . but it's sometimes harder to visualize what you do in given circumstances if there are only word-type job descriptions." Seamans exit interview, p. 60.

40. For origins of secretariat, see draft report of Adm. Rufus E. Rose (USN, Ret.), "Development and Establishment of the Executive Secretariat," 27 Jan. 1966.

41. The plan for a secretariat was outlined by Jack Young in "Plan for Keeping the Members of General Management More Fully Informed," 2 Oct. 1963, which was revised by Seamans before being forwarded to Dryden and Webb.

42. Interview with Lawrence Vogel, Director, Headquarters Administration, 13 Oct. 1976.

43. There is a good description of the State Department secretariat in a "Report on Federal Secretariat Functions," prepared by NASA consultant J. S. Patterson and submitted 17 Aug. 1961.

44. Source: Vogel interview. It must be stressed that Webb needed the secretariat to get on top of internal information and that he preferred part-time consultants like Gen. George Cabell (USAF, Ret.) or Ambassador Joseph C. Satterthwaite as contacts with other agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department.

45. Memorandum from Webb to heads of all Headquarters Offices and Directors of Field Centers, "Office of the Administrator," 29 Dec. 1965. This memorandum incorporated many of the changes recommended in "The Office of the Administrator: Evolving Concepts and Practices," prepared by Jack Young and staff in Dec.1965.

46. Minutes of the "Special Meeting of the Deputy Administrator on Reorganization," 30 Dec. 1965. Seamans was appointed Deputy Administrator on an interim basis, since the Senate was not in session, and his appointment was routinely confirmed in Jan. 1966.

47. See note 45 above. Vogel was both executive officer and executive secretary.

48. This example is cited by Assistant to the Administrator, W. H. Close, "The Secretariat," 17 May 1967.

49. Seamans exit interview, p. 79.

50. See note 46 above.

51. Briefing for Webb on Voyager program by Edgar Cortright, 8 Feb. 1967, pp. 82, 47.

52. Ibid., pp. 82-83.

53. Webb to Seamans, 5 Jan. 1967, and Webb to Finger, 6 Jan. 1967.

54. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1967 (NASA SP-4008, 1968), p. 75.

55. NM I 1130.1, "Role and Responsibilities-The Associate Administrator for Organization and Management," 14 Mar. 1968. See note I above.

56. Transcript of Management Advisory Panel meeting, 19 Apr. 1968, pp. 41, 48-49.

57. Webb memorandum, 27 Jan. 1968.

58. Newell was not made Associate Administrator in anticipation of Seamans' departure; he was offered the position before Seamans announced his intention to leave. Newell to NASA Historian Eugene Emme, 20 Sept. 1968.

59. T.E. Jenkins (Director, Program and Special Reports Division, Executive Secretariat) to Newell, "NASA Monthly Status Reviews in support of the NASA Management Council," 7 Jan. 1968.

60. This office was originally created by Webb to enable Gen. William McKee (USAF, Ret.) to serve as a troubleshooter, and it consisted of little more than an office with a secretary. It was wound up shortly after McKee left NASA in 1965 to become the FAA Administrator.

61. NMI 1156.15, 12 Feb. 1968.

62. The first quotation is excerpted from Newell's memorandum to Directors of Headquarters Program and Staff Offices, 11 Mar. 1968; the second, from a memorandum of 4? Nov. 1968, "Regularly Scheduled Meetings Chaired or Attended by the Administrator." Newell's 11 Mar. memorandum incorporated the recommendations of an Ad Hoc Group on Project Status Reviews that reported on I Mar.

63. Transcript of Management Advisory Panel Meeting, 19 Apr. 1968, pp. 28, 29.

64. On the problem of communications within bureaus, see Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, chap. 10.

65. Gen. Jacob E. Smart (USAF, Ret.) et al., "A Philosophy of Management for NASA," 23 June 1967, p. 1.

66. Ibid., pp. 16-17.

67. Leonard R. Sayles and Margaret K. Chandler, Managing Large Systems: Organizations for the Future (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 173. Prof. Sayles, of the Columbia University Graduate School of Business, was appointed a special assistant to Webb in Sept. 1966 and was a "counsellor" to the Management Advisory Panel when it was created in 1968. Emphasis added.

68. For the inspector-general concept, see memorandum from Charles G. Haynes, Director of Inspections (Office of Administration), 28 June 1966. He noted that the following headquarters offices and divisions had inspection functions: the Inspection Division, the Audit Division, and the Division of Management Analysis and Research, all in the Office of Administration; the Office of Programming; and the Office of Industry Affairs.

 

CHAPTER 4

 

1. Report of Steering Group for Study of NASA Acquisition Process, Management Study of NASA Acquisition Process, June 1971, p. 6.

2. NASA Source Evaluation Board Manual (NPC 402, Aug. 1964), p. 2-1.

3. House Committee on Government Operations, Military Operations Subcommittee, Government Procurement and Contracting, Part 2, 91st Cong., 1st sess. (25-27 Mar. 1969), p. 505.

4. Testimony of David E. Bell, Director, Bureau of the Budget, House Committee on Government Operations, Military Operations Subcommittee, Systems Development and Management, 87th Cong., 2d sess. (21 June 1962), p. 44.

5. House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Review of the Space Program, 86th Cong., 2d sess. (1960), p. 400.

6. On these institutions, see Dean Coddington and J. Gordon Milliken, "The Future of Federal Contract Research Centers," in Thomas P. Murphy, ed., Science, Geopolitics, and Federal Spending (Lexington, Mass.: Heath Lexington Books, 1971), pp. 87-110.

7. Webb to Dryden and Seamans, 25 Oct. 1963. In congressional testimony, John Young, the NASA Director of Administration, stated that it was NASA policy not to create not-for-profit corporations. See House Committee on Government Operations, Military Operations Subcommittee, Systems Development and Management-1963, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (1963) pp. 214-215.

8. In 1966, for example, 6 percent of RAND's $22 million budget was for work done under contract to NASA. Armed Forces Management (Feb. 1966), p. 71. Many RAND studies were commissioned by OMSF and the Apollo Program Office in support of long-range and contingency planning. The extent of NASA's use of "nonprofits" may be gauged by the fact that in 1964 RAND had contracts with NASA totaling $3.3 million, while M IT's Lincoln Laboratories had contracts totaling over 57 million. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1964, p. 435.

9. Interview with Kenneth Webster, Office of Assistant Associate Administrator for Center Operations (Systems Management), 31 Aug. 1976.

10. Webster interview. See also NHB 2410.1, Management Procedures for Automatic Data Processing Equipment, July 1965. The annual reports to the Bureau of the Budget on utilization of ADP equipment were standardized in the Bureau's Circular A-55, 15 Nov. 1963.

11. House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Advanced Research and Technology, 1968 NASA Authorization, 90th Cong., 1st sess. (1967), pp. 567-568.

12. In 1969 the following centers were authorized to negotiate contracts up to $2.5 million: Ames, Langley, Lewis, Goddard, the Manned Spacecraft and Marshall centers, and the Space Nuclear Propulsion Office. Up to $1 million: Kennedy, the Headquarters Contracts Division, and the NASA Pasadena Office. Up to $500 000: the Flight Research Center and Wallops Station.

13. NASA Source Evaluation Board Manual, p. 4-1.

14. Clarence Danhof, Government Contracting and Technological Change (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968), p. 95.

15. This paragraph is based on an article by Robert B. Hall, "The Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 Should Be Reformed," reprinted in House Committee on Government Operations, Military Operations Subcommittee, Government Procurement and Contracting, Part 7 (22, 26-28 May 1969), pp. 2001-2015.

16. Ibid., p. 2006.

17. Robert L. Perry, "The Atlas, Thor, Titan, and Minuteman," in Eugene M. Emme, ed., 'The History of Rocket Technology: Essays on Research, Development, and Utility (Detroit: Wayne State University Press 1964), p. 149.

18. This turned out to be the case. It took the Thor only 3.5 years and the Atlas 5.2 years to go from program approval to first operational squadron, instead of the 6-8 years first projected. By comparison, it took the B-47 7.8 years and the B-52 9.4 years to attain operational capability. John Greenwood, "The Air Force Ballistic Missile and Space Program (1954-1974)," Aerospace Historian (Dec. 1974), 195. Quote is from Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 157.

19. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation, p. 157.

20. In 1958 Ramo-Wooldridge merged with Thompson Products to become TRW, Inc., while Space Technology Laboratories (STL), which had performed general systems engineering and technical direction for the Air Force, became a separate incorporated subsidiary. In 1960 the nonprofit Aerospace Corporation was established with a nucleus of STL personnel to free TRW/STL to compete for production contracts.

21. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation, p. 159.

22 Danhof, Government Contracting and Technological Change, pp. 50-51

23. Joseph Fernandez, The Origin, Evolution, and Operation of the NASA Contractor Source Evaluation Board Process, unpublished M.Sc. thesis (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 1966), p. 11. Emphasis in original.

24. Ibid., pp. 12-13.

25. For an account of the 1959 "production of documents" controversy, see Rosholt, Administrative History,. pp. 99-102.

26. Ibid., p. 257.

27. See "Office of Procurement: Organization and Functions," July 1963.

28. House Committee on Government Operations, Government Procurement and Contracting, Part 2, pp. 475-476. The justification for noncompetitive procurement was signed by Webb in Dec. 1967.

29. House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1964 NASA Authorization, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (1963), p. 3020.

30. According to the National Science Foundation, they supplied a 90-percent average share during fiscal years 1960-1966 and 85 percent during 1967-1969. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1968, p. 333.

31. Published as Report to the President on Government Contracting for Research and Development, S.Doc. 94, 87th Cong., 2nd sess., May 1962. This report, except for two brief omissions, is reprinted in its entirety in W. R. Nelson, ed., The Politics of Science (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 193-220, from which the following excerpts are cited.

32. Ibid., pp. 200, 201.

33. Ibid., p. 216. For recommendations concerning R&D contracts, see pp. 209-210.

34. For details of Salary Reform Act, see Danhof, Government Contracting and Technological Change, pp. 121122; for Kennedy's memorandum of 2 May 1963, see House Committee on Government Operations, Systems Development and Management-1963, pp. 271-281.

35. On these and other reforms in Defense management, see testimony of Director of Defense Research and Engineering Harold Brown, in House Committee on Government Operations, Systems Development and Management, pp. 436-440, and Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) Thomas D. Morris, in ibid., p. 551.

36. House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1964 NASA Authorization, p. 463.

37. Another catalyst for DOD and NASA reforms was the publication in 1962 of Peck and Scherer, Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis. This was one of the first studies to demonstrate the inefficiencies of CPFF contracting. Peck and Scherer found an average cost production error of 220 percent in a sample of twelve CPFF programs. The study and its influence on NASA policy were discussed in a memorandum from Assistant Administrator for Industry Affairs Bernhardt Dorman to Harold Finger dated '8 Dec. 1967.

38. NASA Circular 231, 29 May 1962. Subject: Special Procurement Study Reprinted in 1964 NASA Authorization pp. 1786-1787.

39. Charles to Webb, 25 Feb. 1963. Subject: NASA Procurement. This memorandum summarizes Charles' 56-page report, "Recommendations Concerning NASA Procurement Policies," submitted at the same time. Two other reports by Charles were "Conversion from CPFF to CPIF," 7 Aug. 1963, and "Cost Reduction Incentives in Research and Development Contracts," 23 Aug. 1963.

40. On Sept. 1962 circular, see Circular 242, I Sept. 1962. Subject: Use of Incentive Contracts. Reprinted in House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1964 NASA Authorization, pp. 3009-3011. For Nov. 1963 directive, see House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1966 NASA Authorization, 89th Cong., l st sess. (1965), p. 387.

41. Webb to James E. Underwood, 27 Sept. 1966. Webb was also a member of the Commission on Government Procurement from March 1972 to the completion of its report the following December.

42. As justification for Electronics Research Center, see NASA report, "Role and Mission of the NASA Electronics Research Center," in Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 1964 NASA Authorization, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (1963), p. 1002. The entire report, at pp. 999-1009, is perhaps the most concise analysis of the rationale for maintaining a large in-house staff.

43. Report of the Survey Task Team for Study of Major Systems Contracts (JPL: 10 Nov. 1965), p. 38.

44. House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, 88th Cong., 2d sess. (executive session, 4 Mar. 1964), pp. 627, 626.

45. Testimony of Deputy Associate Administrator (OSSA) Edgar Cortright in House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1965 NASA Authorization, 88th Cong., 2d sess. (1964), pp. 1539-1540.

46. Third draft of a memorandum from Executive Secretary Lawrence Vogel to Deputy Associate Administrator for Industry Affairs William Rieke,2 Dec. 1965. Subject: Administrator's Selection of Contractors to Provide Support Services.

47. This section is based on the following sources: "DOD Contract Administration Services Support Task Group Report," to George Mueller, 5 Feb.1965; Paper, Clyde Bothmer, Office of Industry Affairs, to Rieke, 30 July 1965. Subject: The Future of Contract Administration in NASA; NASA, Office of the Executive Secretary (Program and Special Reports Division, 31 Oct. 1966), Procurement Program, pp. 32-33.

48. Seamans to Mueller, 23 Sept. 1964.

49. Memorandum, E. Z. Gray, Director, Advanced Manned Missions, 7 Apr.1965. Subject: Component/System Interaction Problems.

50. Statement of Webb in transcript of Senate Hearing Dry Run (8 June 1967), p. 6. This was a rehearsal involving Webb, Mueller, and Phillips for a hearing in executive session on the Apollo fire by the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences.

51. See note 48 above.

52. Webb to Seamans, 20 Oct. 1964. This is the source for indented quotations below.

53. Sources. Rough notes and staff papers of joint cost and schedules validation team at Marshall Space Flight Center, June-July 1963, interview with James Elliott, Office of Management Planning, 5 Oct. 1976.

54. Seamans to members of NASA Management Committee, 17 July 1964. Subject: Outline for Discussion- Probable Contributing Factors to Project Schedule Slippage.

55. First and Second Interim Reports to the Associate Administrator on Studies Relating to Management Effectiveness in Scheduling and Cost Estimating, 15 Sept. 1964 and 15 Dec.1964. The staff work underlying these reports was carried out by the Program Review, Resources Analysis, and Management Reports Divisions of the Office of Programming, with Thomas E. Jenkins as coordinator.

56. First Interim Report . . . p. 26.

57. See ibid., pp. 27-28, for specific recommendations.

58. Phased project planning was also used in studies for the Advanced Orbiting Solar Observatory (canceled in December 1965) the Hypersonic Ramjet Experiment, and the 445-newton-thrust engine for Surveyor, Voyager, and the Manned Orbiting Research Laboratory. Cited by Bernard Maggin, "Phased Project Planning," NASA Management Seminar, 12 Jan. 1966.

59. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 1966 NASA Authorization, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (1965), p. 95.

60. NPD 7121.1, 28 Oct. 1965. Subject: Phased Project Planning.

61. Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 240.

62. Report of Commission on Government Procurement, vol. 2 (Dec. 1972), p. 100, n. 11.

63. For DOD policy on program definition, see DOD Directive 3200.9, I July 1965. Subject: Initiation of Engineering and Operational Systems.

64. A personal service contract is one in which "an employer-employee relationship between the Government and contractor personnel is provided for in the contract, or actual practice in this respect leads to that conclusion." The U.S. Comptroller General and the Civil Service Commission, in decisions handed down in 1965 and 1967, ruled such contracts invalid. A contract for nonpersonal services "contemplates the furnishing of a service as an end product, rather than merely man-hours of effort. The contractor is actually independent not merely a servant, employee or intermediate agent of the Government." For these definitions, see NASA Office of Programming, Program Reports Division, Procurement Program (27 Oct. 1964), p. 27.

65. House Committee on Government Operations, Special Studies Subcommittee, A Cost Profile for Support Services, 90th Cong., 2d sess. (23 Apr. 1968), p.7. This was one of a series of hearings held by subcommittee chairman Porter Hardy, Jr. (D-Va.) in 1967 and 1968 on NASA contracting for support services.

66. These guidelines are in section 3, "Criteria for Contracting Out," in NASA Policy and Procedures for Use of Contracts for Non personal Services (N PC 401, Apr. 1964), issued after reviews by the General Accounting Office and the Civil Service Commission disclosed that the method used at Goddard in hiring technical writers and typists violated the Civil Service Act and the 1949 Classification Act.

67. The relevant guidelines are in the Bureau's Bulletin 60-2 (21 Sept.1959), which was superseded by Circular A-76 (3 Mar. 1966; revised, 30 Aug. 1967).

68. GAO Report B-133394, "Potential Savings Available Through Use of Civil Service Rather Than Contractor-Furnished Employees for Certain Support Services," June 1967.

69. Bernard Sisco, Deputy Assistant Director for Administration, Goddard Space Flight Center, to Carl Schrieber, NASA Office of Procurement, 12 Nov. 1964.

70. House Committee on Government Operations, A Cost Profile for Support Services, p. 6.

71. House Committee on Government Operations, Special Studies Subcommittee, Support Service Contract;, 90th Cong., 1st sess. (21 June 1967), p. 70.

72. However, the OMSF centers were permitted to use Boeing for "local support," for which the necessary funds would be transferred to Boeing's contract for the first stage of the Saturn V. Memorandum, Mueller to Paine, 9 July 1969. Subject: Phasedown of Boeing TIE Support . . . Following the First Successful Lunar Landing Mission.

73. Samuel Phillips to Mueller, 13 Dec. 1968. Subject: Future OMSF Engineering Requirements.

74. The discussion of the Bellcomm, General Electric, and Boeing TIE contracts is based on the following sources: inspection of pertinent files in Headquarters Contracting Office, interview with Alexander Lyman, NASA Office of Energy Affairs, 3 Dec. 1976; Apollo Program Office, "Apollo Program Office Experience with Engineering Support Contractors," 15 Sept. 1969; and Apollo Program Office, "Paper on the Boeing Technical Integration and Evaluation Contract . . . ," I Oct. 1968.

75. "Apollo . . . Experience with Engineering Support Contractors," p. 11.

76. This quotation and the Gemini-Apollo comparison are in ibid., p. A-2.

77. See, for example, House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1964 NASA Authorization, pp. 146, 376-377, 1126-1133 (Bellcomm) and 389-390, 1102-1107 (GE).

78. lbid., p 1130

79. House Committee on Government Operations, Military Operations Subcommittee, Avoiding Conflicts of Interest in Defense Contracting and Employment, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (22 Nov. 1963), pp. 81-83. Restrictions on GE are in NASA Circular 280, 16 Apr. 1963. Subject: Restrictions on contracting with the General Electric Company where competitive advantage may exist. Reprinted in House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1964 NASA Authorization, pp. 3265-3266.

80. "Paper on Boeing TIE . . ., p. 4.

81. Ibid. p. 8.

82. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

83. On a visit to the Manned Spacecraft Center in August 1968, Finger explained "that one of the reasons for selecting Boeing for the TIE contract was that North American Rockwell's interest in subcontracts with Boeing for the SST made Boeing less competitive with North American Rockwell than other large aerospace firms. [North American Aviation has merged with Rockwell Standard in September 1967.] Therefore, Boeing was in a better position to step in to manage the Downey plant if such a drastic measure had been necessary to get the Apollo spacecraft program back on its feet after the Apollo 204 accident." Lawrence Vogel, memorandum for the record, "Mr. Finger's Visit to MSC to Review Boeing TIE Activities, 20 Aug. 1968." 8 Nov. 1968, p. 7.

84. See "Paper on Boeing TIE . . . ," passim.

85. Lawrence Vogel, memorandum for the record, 8 Nov. 1968. Emphasis added.

86. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1971, pp. 41-42.

87. This is the charge made by H. L. Nieburg. "The so-called 'supporting role' of Bellcomm as a decision-making input may rather be a determining influence in the policy choices of NASA officials.... That this process is at work was revealed in the most important NASA technical decision: selection of the mode of Right for the manned lunar landing." H. L. Nieburg, In the Name of Science, revised ed. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970) p. 261.

88. Courtney J. Brooks, James M. Grimwood, Loyd Swenson, Jr., Chariots for Apollo (Comment draft, Aug. 1976), p. 137.

89. Lyman interview and memorandum, Webb to Mueller, 26 Sept. 1967. Subject: Procurement Plan for a Continuation of Systems Analysis, Study, Planning and Technical Support Performed by Bellcomm, Inc. under Contract NASW-417.

90. "Apollo . . . Experience with Engineering Contractors," p. 1.

91. Brooks et al., Chariots for Apollo, p. 152 and n.

92. Gilruth to Mueller, 9 Jan. 1969. See also letters from von Braun, 21 Jan., and Kurt Debus, 14 Jan.

93. House Committee on Government Operations, Special Studies Subcommittee, Investigation of the Boeing TIE Contract-Part 1, 90th Cong., 2d sess. (15 July 1968), pp. 3, 6, 8.

94. When the Panel on Government Laboratories of the President's Science Advisory Committee visited MSC in 1964, they could not "help contrasting the atmosphere in which NASA's Manned Spacecraft Center operates with that of the Air Force's Avionics Laboratory. While competent professionals populate both, the sense of mission in MSC is infinitely stronger.... Unlike some of the agencies previously treated, NASA has a strong line management organization for its technical effort. The NASA organization, furthermore, is relatively new and does not exhibit yet the 'agings effects observed in older organizations." Report of Panel on Government Laboratories of the President's Science Advisory Committee (}an. 1965), pp. 11, 21.

95. Merton J. Peck and Frederick M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1962), pp. 56-57.

96. Webb to Frank R. Hammill, Jr. (Counsel, House Committee on Science and Astronautics), 5 Apr. 1965.

97. Thomas P. Murphy, Science, Geopolitics, and Federal Spending, table 6-14, pp. 183-185 and 182, 186.

98. "Statement of the Administrator of NASA on Selection of a Contractor for the Saturn Stage S-11," 15 Sept. 1961, and covering letter from Webb to Seamans, 16 Oct. 1961.

99. Peck and Scherer, Weapons Acquisition Process, p. 331, n. 13.

100. Fernandez, Origin . . . of the NASA . . . Source Evaluation Board Process, pp. l 5,23. It would seem that the high cost barriers to entry into major systems development have given certain firms a lock on such programs. DOD figures on contract awards show that eighteen of twenty-five contractors in 1958 were still in the top bracket in 1969. Report of Commission on Government Procurement (Dec.1972),2:124, n. 20. NASA figures are more difficult to interpret because the ability of a contractor to remain in the top bracket year after year might owe less to its ability to compete for new contracts than for payments on major contracts already awarded, e.g., the Grumman contract for the lunar module. See NASA Data Book, tables 5-22 to 5-27.

101. Wyatt to Hilburn, 15 June 1964. Subject: Source Evaluation Boards, Draft Manual of Procedures, Comments. The examples of overruns and slippages noted above are excerpted from this memorandum.

102. This was one of the reasons for awarding RCA a contract for operating and maintaining two new tracking facilities. NASA wanted to write in a ceiling on overhead, the amount of the fixed fee, and the like; and RCA's response to these special provisions was the most satisfactory received. "Selection of Contractor for Operation, Maintenance, and Logistic Support of the New Data Acquisition Facilities near Fairbanks, Alaska and Rosman, North Carolina," 27 June 1963.

103. Peck and Scherer, Weapons Acquisition Process, p. 377.

104. Erasmus H. Kloman, "Case Study to the Lunar Orbiter Program," draft submitted to National Academy of Public Administration (June 1971), pp. 41-42, 70. One of the principal reasons for awarding North American Aviation rather than the Martin Company the Apollo command and service modules contract- although the SEB had given the latter a higher overall rating-was because of its outstanding performance in developing the X-15, F-86, and F-100. For excerpts from the SEB report, see Brooks et al., Chariots for Apollo, pp. 71-72.

105. Eldon Taylor (Director, Program Review and Resources Management, OSSA) to Bernard Moritz (Acting Associate Administrator for Organization and Management), 20 May 1969.

106. Finger to Phillip Whittaker (Assistant Administrator for Industry Affairs), 28 Jan. 1969.

107. Herbert Kaufman, The Limits of Organizational Change (University of Alabama Press, 1971), pp. 33, 35

108. Procurement Program (31 Oct. 1966), p. 8.

109. Management of NASA Study of NASA Acquisition Process, p 25.

110. Edward B. Roberts, "How the U.S. Buys Research," in David Allison, ed., The R&D Game (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969), pp. 292, 294. See same author's "Questioning the Cost/Effectiveness of the R&D Procurement Process," in M.C. Yovits et al., eds. Research Program Effectiveness (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1966), pp. 93-113, which was based on research supported by NASA Grant No. NaNSG 235-62.

111. Roberts, "How the U.S. Buys Research," p. 289. In a study of forty-one Defense contracts, ranging from $100 000 to $8 million, and ten non-DOD (NASA?) awards, from 51 million to $40 million, Roberts found that "about 60 percent of the R&D awards were made on a sole-source basis-without formal competition " Ibid., p. 284.

112. Management Study of NASA Acquisition Process, p 6.

113. Memorandum, Dorman to Finger, 18 Dec. 1967, and Procurement Program (31 Oct. 1966), p. 17. In FY 1966, ninety-two incentive contracts, totaling $4.3 billion, were cost-plus-incentive-fee; fifty-one ($447 million) were award fee; thirty-two ($222 million) were fixed-price incentives; and fifteen ($306 million) were mixed.

114. Mueller said this at an executive session of an OMSF program review, 20 Apr. 1965. Transcript, p. 10.

115. Dorman to Finger, 18 Dec. 1967.

116. Mueller to Morton Henig (Assistant Director, Civil Division, GAO), 23 May 1968.

117. See note 114 above, p. 10.

118. Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Inc., .Study of the Effectiveness of NASA Incentive Contracts, vol. 1. This study was done under NASA contract NASW-1277. The final report, on which the remainder of this section is based, was submitted on 5 Aug. 1966; a summary report was submitted on 15 Sept.

119. The contracts (and the prime contractors) were as follows: Pioneer spacecraft, Orbiting Geophysical Observatories, and Follow-on Orbiting Geophysical Observatories (TRW Systems Group); Gemini spacecraft (McDonnell Aircraft); biosatellite spacecraft (General Electric, Re-entry Systems Department); Orbiting Astronomical Observatories (Grumman); Delta vehicles (Douglas Aircraft); Lunar Orbiter spacecraft (Boeing); instrumentation units and prototype guidance computer and data adapters (IBM Federal Systems Division); ST-124M stabilized platform (Bendix Corporation); crawler transporter for launch complex 39, KSC (Marion Power Shovel Company); Manned Spaceflight Tracking Network operation and maintenance (Bendix Field Engineering Corporation); base support services for KSC launch complex (Trans-World Airlines); support services for MSC (Brown & Root/Northrup).

120. Summary Report, pp. 2-3.

121. Study of the Effectiveness of NASA Incentive Contracts, p 51.

122. Procurement Program (31 Oct. 1966), p. 20.

123. Study of the Effectiveness of NASA Incentive Contracts, p 72.

124. Sapolsky has noted the same contradiction in the development of weapons systems. "Unlike cost-plus contracts, the targets and their rankings in incentive contracts are supposedly fixed for the length of the contract and, thus, can reflect only the conditions that exist at the beginning of the development effort or that can be then anticipated.... Yet, unpredictable changes in political conditions affecting major weapon acquisitions seem to require constant alterations in project targets and their rankings.... It seems unrealistic to expect the development and procurement targets of major weapon systems . . . will remain fixed." Harvey Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development, p 214.

125. Study of the Effectiveness of NASA Incentive Contracts, pp. 80-94.

 

CHAPTER 5

 

1. From 57 500 at the end of June 1961 to 115 500 one year later and to 218 000 one year after that. NASA Data Book, table 3-26.

2. This is the figure given by Seamans for the third quarter (Jan.-Mar.) of FY 1966. House Science and Astronautics Committee, 1968 NASA Authorization, 90th Cong., 1st sess. (1967), p. 111.

3. NASA Personnel Division, Personnel Division Report: The In-House Work Force, Sept.1969, p.3. All figures are as of 30 June. The employment figures are divided between contractor and in-house employees as follows: 1966, 360 000 contractor and 36 000 in-house; 1967, 273 000 and 34 000; 1968, 235 000 and 33 000; 1969, 186 000 and 32 000. The 11-percent decline in the NASA work force from 1966 to 1969 conceals the variations between one center and another in personnel reductions.

4. NPD 1240.1, "Functional Management," 13 June 1966.

5. Memorandum, Ray Kline to members of NASA Personnel Management Review Committee, 21 Feb. 1968, "Consolidation of Comments on Items in the Civil Service Inspections Report," p. 2. These comments were omitted in the Committee progress report of Apr. 1968.

6. The remainder of this and the whole of the next paragraph are based on a paper by Leonard Carulli, management analyst in the Organization and Management Planning Division, "Establishing and Filling Excepted and Super-Grade or Key Positions," 5 May 1967. The quotation immediately below is from p. 4.

7. Ibid., p. 6. Adams is Mac Adams, who succeeded Raymond Bisplinghoff as Associate Administrator for Advanced Research and Technology in 1965. Holmes is Brainerd Holmes, Director of Manned Space Flight from 1961 to 1963. Harry Goett was fired as Director of Goddard in July 1965 in the wake of disagreement with general management over the proper amount of supervision of the center by headquarters. Goett thought that there was too much supervision, if not downright interference; Associate Administrator for Space Science Newell and Seamans, that in the existing external climate they could do no less.

8. This section draws extensively on the notes and memorandums assembled by Howard N. Braithwaite, staff assistant to the NASA Executive Salary Committee from 1958 to 1967. Two items were particularly useful: "A Summary of Major Developments . . . ," Jan. 1967 (cited as "Summary"), and a paper addressed to Associate Deputy Administrator Willis Shapley, 23 Apr. 1968, titled "History of Super-Grade Positions, NACA/NASA" (cited as "Super-Grade Positions"). I would also like to thank Bill Lee, of the NASA Personnel Office, for making less mysterious the intricacies of NASA's use of excepted positions.

9. Braithwaite, "Super-Grade Positions," p. 4. "P-8." on the old civil service professional scale, was equivalent to GS-15 on the new "general schedule."

10. Ibid., pp. 4 3. Italics and inverted commas omitted.

11. Victor K. Heyman, "Government by Contract: Boon or Boner?" Public Administration Review 21 (Spring 1961): 63.

12. Ibid.

13. These were the positions from grade GS-16 and above that were actually filled, rather than simply authorized. There were 341 nonquota GS-16 positions, 355 excepted positions (out of 425), and 11 Public Law 313 positions for a total of 707 positions filled. One important point is that all nonquota positions were filled at the GS-16 level. As a matter of policy, NASA used its allotment of excepted positions to appoint at grades GS-17 and GS-18 in order to avoid having to justify such appointments to the Civil Service Commission.

14. Braithwaite, "Summary," p. Vll.

15. Braithwaite, "Processing of Actions for Excepted and GS-16/18 Positions," 15 Nov. 1963, p. 1.

16. Braithwaite, "Executive Personnel Program," p. 46.

17. Braithwaite, "Summary," p. IV.

18. Memorandum from John W. Macy, Jr., Chairman, U.S. Civil Service Commission, 14 Oct. 1966, to heads of executive departments and agencies.

19. Macy to Webb, 29 Aug. 1966.

20. Braithwaite memorandum, 22 Feb. 1968, p. 10.

21. Comparisons of employment figures for different agencies are notoriously difficult because of the lack of uniform definitions of occupational groups. For what they are worth, the data collected by the National Science Foundation (NSF) show that in 1969 the 7 Federal agencies employing the greatest number of scientists and engineers were DOD (76 026), Agriculture (25 783), Interior (15 340), NASA (13 918), Commerce (6 293), Health Education, and Welfare (6 123), and Transportation (5 049). Thus NASA employed more scientists and engineers than all but three Federal agencies, and these three had much greater total employment than NASA. Source: National Science Foundation, Scientific, Technical and Health Personnel in the Federal Government, 1969 (NSF 70-44), table 6. Even more remarkable is that the percentage of NASA scientists and engineers actually engaged in R&D has been consistently higher than that of any other Government agency. The data collected by NSF at two-year intervals from October 1967 to October 1973 show that the percentage of NASA scientists and engineers in R&D has ranged from a low of 51.7% in 1967 to a high of 53.3% in 1973. By comparison, the figures in those years for DHEW and DOD, with the next highest percentages were DHEW, 45.9% and 44.5%; and DOD, 33% and 33.8%. Figures for other agencies are much lower. l am indebted to Joseph Gannon of the NSF Manpower Utilization Studies Group for this information.

22. This definition is included as part of NASA's reply to a series of questions submitted by Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.), chairman of the Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. NASA assembled a number of papers and tables and titled the collection Reply to Sen. Gaylord Nelson (1965). This definition is taken from the Reply, p 12-1.

23. Rosholt, Administrative History, p 267.

24. Ibid, pp. 267-268.

25. Reply to Sen. Gaylord Nelson, p. 12-3, which is based on the same source as that for table 3.

26. Ibid, p. 12-6. The last figure is an estimate from budget projections for FY 1966.

27. Executive Order 11246, "Equal Employment Opportunity," p. 1.

28. U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on HUD, Space, Science, Veterans and Certain Other Independent Agencies-Part 1, 93rd Cong., 2d sess. (1974), pp. 108-109. See pp. 1-156 for a general review of NASA policy on EEO. The remainder of this paragraph and the whole of the next are based on material submitted at these hearings.

29. See Adm. W. Fred Boone (USN, Ret.), NASA Office of Defense Affairs: The First Five Years (NASA HHR-32, Dec. 1970), pp. 42-60, for an account of NASA's use of military detailees. See also Edgar E. Ulsamer, "USAF Professionalism-A National Resource," Air Force Magazine (Dec. 1967): 101-106. Retired military officers who have worked for NASA include Adm. Boone, Lieut. Gen. Frank Bogart (USAF), who was Deputy Associate Administrator (OMSF) before becoming Associate Director of MSC; Maj. Gen. Robert Curtin (USAF), who became the first Director of Facilities in May 1968; and Lieut. Gen. Duward Crow (USAF), who was appointed Associate Deputy Administrator of NASA in 1975.

30. NASA Data Book, table 3-6.

31. Boone, NASA Office of Defense Affairs, p. 55.

32. For information on astronaut selection, see note 28 above, pp. 122-131.

33. Memorandum for the record, 5 Feb. 1968. Subject: Trip by [Personnel Management Review Committee] to Lewis Research Center on January 26, 1968. Memorandum was written by Ray Kline, executive secretary to the Committee.

34. For material on patterns of support service contracting at the Manned Space Flight centers, see Office of Programming (Program Reports Division), Procurement Program, 27 Oct. 1964, pp. 21-23.

35. House Government Operations Committee, Military Affairs Subcommittee, Missile and Space Ground Support Operations, 89th Cong., 2d sess. (21 Mar. 1966), p. 63.

36. Webb to Kermit Gordon, Director, Bureau of the Budget, 14 Dec. 1964.

37. Annual Report of the Comptroller General of the United States for Fiscal Year 1964 (Washington: USGPO, 1964), p. 19.

38. Interview with Walter Shupe, Director, GAO Liaison Activities, 6 Dec. 1976.

39. Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1964), p. 141. Emphasis added.

40. House Committee on Government Operations, Military Affairs Subcommittee, Government Operations in Space, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (4 June 1965), p. 14.

41. Annual Report of the Comptroller General . . . 1964, pp. 291-292, 436. In Aug. 1971 the Pratt & Whitney Division of United Aircraft Corporation filed a formal protest with the GAO against the award of the contract for the main engine of the space shuttle to the Rocketdyne Division of North American Rockwell. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1971 (NASA SP-4016, 1972), pp. 218, 233.

42. These reports are drawn from the lists of audit reports published in the annual reports of the U.S. Comptroller General.

43. In a memorandum of I Apr. 1966, Deputy Associate Administrator Earl Hilburn notes that "a high percentage of the GAO draft reports have been cancelled (dropped) because of NASA's replies. Recent examples are the case with respect to the Douglas fee on subcontractors' work in connection with the Delta, the Nerva case dealing with the contracting arrangement between Westinghouse and Aerojet, and several cases involving reasonableness of costs at contractor's operations (LTV, Rocketdyne, Douglas, etc.)."

44. Office of the Executive Secretary (Program and Special Reports Division), Audit Program, 31 Oct. 1966, pp. 15-16.

45. Transcript of taped meeting of Webb, Seamans, and all the center directors, 28 Sept. 1966, p. 35. Staats, of course, had recently left the Bureau of the Budget, of which he was Deputy Director, to head the GAO.

46. "Considerations in the Management of Manpower in NASA," p. 1.

47. On the "Marshall problem," see ibid., pp. 3-4.

48. Ibid., p. 10.

49. Ibid., p. 13. See section on "Aligning Manpower and Program Requirements," pp. 13-20.

50. Ibid., p. 15.

51. Ibid., p. 18.

52. U.S. Comptroller General, "Report on Potential Savings Available Through Use of Civil Service Rather Than Contractor-Furnished Employees for Certain Support Services, National Aeronautics and Space Administration," June 1967, Code B-133394. This report was submitted to Congress, and copies were sent to Webb. For figures on Marshall and Goddard contracts, see tables, pp. 9, 23.

53. Ibid., p. 34

54. Aviation Week and Space Technology (30 Oct. 1967), p. 20.

55. For NASA response to the GAO report and the Pellerzi decision, see House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, Support Service Contracting by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 90th Cong., 2d sess., (Apr. 1968), pp. 5, 7-8, 19, 23-25.

56. NASA News Release, "NASA Contractor Conversion Plan," 27 Dec. 1968.

57. Annual Report of the Comptroller General . . . 1969, pp. 146-148. For changes at Marshall, see briefing by von Braun for the Administrator's Management Advisory Panel, 11? Apr. 1969, pp. 14-15.

58. For 1962 review, see Rosholt, Administrative History, pp. 268-269.

59. From cover letter, Macy to Webb, 10 Oct. 1967.

60. Memorandum for the record by Ray Kline, "Discussion of Personnel Management Review Committee with Mr. Webb on January 8, 1968," 9 Jan. 1968.

61. NASA Personnel Division, Personnel Division Report: The In-House Work Force, Sept. 1969, pp. 52-55. A "high" or "low" rate was one higher or lower than the NASA-wide percentage. In FY 1969, Langley had the lowest accession and the lowest separation rates in NASA.

62. NMI 1152.26, sec. 3.

63. Personnel Management Review Committee, Progress Report, Apr. 1968, p. 23.

64. Ibid., p. 2.

65. For these recommendations, see ibid., pp. 19, 22, 15, 3.

66. Ibid., p. 2.

67. James E. Webb, "NASA As An Adaptive Organization," John Diebold Lecture on Technological Change, Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration (Boston: 30 Sept. 1968), pp. 47-48.

68. Briefing by von Braun for Management Advisory Panel, p. 8.

69. Considerations in the Management of Manpower in NASA," p. 4.

70. Von Braun briefing, pp. 8- 11.

71. Personnel Management Review Committee, Progress Report, p. 21.

72. The average age of permanent employees had risen to 41, up 1.6 years since 1968. The greatest net loss had been for those under age 25. NASA Office of Personnel, The In-House Work Force, Sept. 1970, pp. 20-21.

73. Paine to Mayo, 18 Aug. 1969, pp. 2-3.

74. Ibid.

75. Finger to Assistant Administrator for Administration William Lilly, 25 Sept. 1968.

76. See note 73 above.

77. MSC, "Background . . . of the Reduction-in-Force at the Manned Spacecraft Center during FY 68 . . " (n.d.), pp. 5-6.

78. See note 33 above.

79. Paper in files of Personnel Management Review Committee, based on discussion by Seamans with the Committee, 18 Jan. 1968.

80. Seamans Exit Interview, p. 51.

81. Memorandum for the record by Ray Kline, " Discussion with OSSA Top Management on January 29,1968," 30 Jan. 1968.

 

CHAPTER 6

 

1. Webb to Chet Holifield (D-Calif.), 20 May 1964.

2. Joins DOT-NASA Report, Civil Aviation Research and Development Policy Study (Mar. 1971), pp. 25/2-6. Italics omitted.

3. NASA Headquarters Management Seminar, Unit 11, "The Planning and Approval Process" (Nov. 1964), p. 5.

4. "Report on Excepted Positions in the Office of Programming," 12 Mar. 1965.

5. Exit interview with DeMarquis Wyatt, conducted by Eugene Emme, John Sloop, and William Fleming, 21 June 1973, p. 97.

6. This paragraph and the next are based on a memorandum from Fleming to Seamans, 11 Sept. 1964.

7. "Staff Paper on Proposed Space Science Data Center Concept," 8 Nov. 1965.

8. Seamans to Newell, 15 Nov. 1965.

9. Raymond A. Bauer and Richard F. Meyer, NASA Planning and Decision Making-Final Report (typescript contractor report, Jan. 1970), vol. l, p.111-12. On the problems involved in assigning the Saturn IB/Centaur to either Lewis or Marshall, see draft memorandum, Seamans to Mueller, Newell, and Bisplinghoff, "Considerations Concerning Management of Saturn IB/Centaur," 2 Feb. 1965.

10. Seamans to Program Associate Administrators, "Selection of Contractors for Advanced Studies," 24 Oct.1963.

11. The varied nature of these studies should be stressed. A study might be exploratory, which systematically analyzes an idea for a new program or system; it might be an examination of feasibility to determine "the practicability of accomplishing, within a specified period, a given space project, program or major component"; it might be parametric, a study of tradeoffs between the different elements of a program; it might be a preliminary design study, which makes detailed assessments of the assumptions underlying earlier study phases; or it might be a detailed engineering design, in which the design could be specified to the point where it was possible to let contracts for hardware production. Citation is from the Office of Plans and Program Evaluation, "Review of NASA's Advanced Study Program," Oct. 1963, p. 7.

12. NASA Data Book, table 4-23. See also a staff paper, "NASA Advanced Studies Mission," 1 May 1963.

13. For further guidelines, see Seamans to Program Associate Administrators, "Award of Contracts for Advanced Systems and Mission Studies," 14 Apr. 1966.

14. Interview with William Fleming, 8 Feb. 1977.

15. Transcript of tape, "Meeting with Mr. Webb on Budget Discussion, 11 Aug. 1967, pp. 28-29.

16. Bauer and Meyer, NASA Planning and Decision Making, vol. 1, pp. 111-31/32.

17. At a staff meeting in the summer of 1967, Associate Deputy Administrator Willis Shapley announced that "Dr. Seamans has authorized a major in-house study on the space station concept. OSSA wants this study and considers such a station as NASA's most important potential contribution. This view is not shared by others." From notes of functional staff meeting taken by NASA Executive Officer Lawrence A. Vogel, 20 July 1967.

18. This account is based on Adm. W. Fred Boone (USN, Ret.), NASA Of lice of Defense Affairs (NASA HHR-32, Dec. 1970), pp. 88-96, and House Committee on Government Operations Committee, Military Affairs Subcommittee, Government Operations in Space, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (4 June 1965), pp. 84-91.

19. Government Operations in Space, p. 90.

20. Boone, NASA Office of Defense Affairs, p. 88.

21. Ibid. p. 92.

22. Government Operations in Space, p. 90.

23. Office of Plans and Program Evaluation, "Review of NASA's Advanced Study Program," Oct. 1963, pp. 3, 13.

24. Seamans to Program Associate Administrators, "Guidelines for FY 1965 Contract Advanced Mission Study Program," 12 Oct. 1964.

25. Fleming to George Trimble, Director, OMSF Advanced Manned Mission Program, 19 June 1967.

26. Seamans to Program Associate Administrators, "Advanced Mission Studies," 30 Aug. 1967. This action was preceded by a memorandum from Fleming to Webb dated 22 Aug., recommending that he withdraw approval, and by the discussion of advanced studies cited in note 15 above. On the MSC study contract for a Mars-Venus flyby, see Science 158 (24 Nov. 1967): 1028.

27. The Air Force approach to R&D planning is set forth in the Air Force Systems Command 375 series of manuals.

28. NASA Headquarters Management Seminar, Unit 111, "Budget Formulation and Execution" (Nov. 1964), p.26. It should be noted that the 506 green was issued by Seamans to the program offices; they, in turn, issued a 506 white authorizing resources to the centers.

29 Wyatt to headquarters offices, 29 May 1963. Subject: Revision of Project Approval Document System.

30. See note 28, p. 24.

31. This paragraph is based on the following sources: Memorandum, Hilburn to Seamans, 30 Aug.1965. Subject: Establishment of Office of Finance; Program Review Document, Financial Management Program, 31 Oct. 1966; and NASA, Management Effectiveness Report to the President of the United States for Fiscal Years 1971 and 1970, submitted to the Office of Management and Budget, 13 Oct. 1970, to meet the requirement of the Office's Circular A-44.

32. See Hilburn memorandum cited in note 31.

33. Wyatt to Paine, 10 Apr. 1969. Subject: NASA Cost Projections.

34. Ibid. In a study of twelve major weapons projects, Peck and Scherer found that average costs exceeded estimates by a factor of 3.2. Peck and Scherer, Weapons Acquisition Process, table 16.1, p. 429.

35. See note 33.

36. Harvey Sapolsky, The Polaris Systems Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 125, 246.

37. Erasmus Kloman, Case Study of the Surveyor Program (typed manuscript, June 1971), p. 216.

38. Memorandum, T. Hechler, Jr., to Fleming, 4 Mar. 1965. Subject: Cost Relationship Study, Project Gemini. Also, interviews with Fleming, Bernard Maggin dated I Feb. 1977, and DeMarquis Wyatt, 9 Mar. 1977.

39. Notes and daily logs of Cost Validation task force members. June 1963.

40. For an account of NASA costing techniques, see DeMarquis Wyatt, "Cost Models for Complex Programs," a lecture delivered at the National Conference on the Management of Aerospace Programs at the University of Missouri, Columbia, 17 Nov. 1966, and issued as a NASA news release.

41. Memorandum, Dixon Forsythe to J. L. Mitchell, 27 May 1965. Forsythe was program manager of the Advanced Orbiting Solar Observatory. Emphasis in original.

42. Assistant Administrator for Industry Affairs Bernhardt Dorman to Wyatt, 9 June 1967, citing a letter from von Braun of 27 March.

43. The principal management instructions were NPD 7000.1, "Authorization and Control of Agency Programs and Allocation of Resources," issued 16 Mar.1968; NPD 7121.1A, "Phased Project Planning," 2 May 1968; NHB 7121.2, "Phased Project Planning Guidelines," final draft, 28 Feb. 1968, issued Aug. 1968; and NMI 7100.4, "Authorization and Control of Research and Development Programs, Projects, Other Activities, and Resources Related Thereto," 15 Aug. 1968.

44. As illustration of the confusion in defining and authorizing projects, consider the anomalies of facilities planning. To avoid the cumbersome authorization process, many centers funded their facilities out of R&D money by distinguishing between nonseverable facilities, which were funded out of "construction of facilities" (COF) money, and severable facilities, which could be funded out of R&D money. The flooring or heating ducts of a building cannot be severed from the building itself; the chairs and furniture can. A center could build a shell for $100 000 under COF and then install millions of dollars worth of equipment under R&D because the equipment was severable from the building in which it was contained. One reason for reestablishing the Facilities Office in May 1968 was to control such construction funding.

45. Transcript of Webb's remarks at meeting of Management Advisory Panel, 19 Apr. 1968, p. 58.

46. Exit interview with Harold Finger, 16 Apr. 1969, p. 24.

47 Finger cited a Centaur PAD sent up by OSSA. "Here we were in the middle of a budget reduction process. We were cutting money out of the Centaur program . . . and a PAD change comes in that includes a budget number for fiscal year 1970 that I know is higher than the one that we're going to be handling. So I said I'm not going to sign the PAD. So the Office of Space Science and Applications got very upset. Well, we don't know that's the final number.... I said yes we do, you know darn well it isn't going to be the right number. And I said I'm not going to ask the Administrator. In fact, l won't allow the Administrator to sign something that he knows is wrong." See Finger exit interview, p. 32.

48. Ibid., p. 33.

49. This section is based on interviews with Frederick Bryant and Richard Stock (3 Feb.1977) and Robert Rapp (11 Feb. 1977), all of OTDA, and Review of Tracking and Data Acquisition Program, hearings before the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Aeronautics and Space Technology Subcommittee, 93rd Cong., 1st and 2d sess. (Oct. 1973-Jan. 1974). I have used the present tense for most of this section, since OTDA's current organization and operating philosophy are very close to what they were in the mid-1960s.

50. For background of the decision to build one large antenna, see testimony of DSN Director Eberhardt Rechtin, in House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Manned Space Flight Subcommittee, 1967 NASA Authorization, 89th Cong., 2d sess. (1966), pp. 762-763.

51. Source: Rapp interview.

52. See chapter 4, note 59.

53. Review of Tracking and Data Acquisition Program, p. 58.

54. House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1964 NASA Authorization, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (1963), p. 1882.

55. See Edwin P. Hartman, Adventures in Research (NASA SP-4302, 1970), especially pp. 397, 399, 404-407, 411-412

56. Finger to Ray Romatowski (Director, Organization and Management Planning Division), 22 May 1967. Subject: OART Management and Control System Proposal for SRT.

57. Richard L. Chapman et al., Project Management in NASA (NASA SP-324, 1973), pp. 28-30.

58. Program Review Document, Mission Analysis Division Programs, 21 Sept. 1967.

59. Information supplied by Assistant Associate Administrator for Center Operations Paul Cotton, 22 Feb.1977. Cotton was Director of the Program and Resources Division from 1967 to 1970.

60. Memorandum, Bisplinghoff to OART Division Directors and Staff, 28 May 1964. Subject: Organizational Changes in OART.

61. See minutes of 3rd meeting of NASA Management Committee, 27-28 Oct. 1963, section on SRT-Revised Assumptions.

62. Memorandum, Associate Administrator for Advanced Research and Technology James Beggs to Finger, 27 June 1968.

63. Memorandum, Dr. Leo Packer (special assistant to Associate Administrator, OART) to Willis Shapley, 7 Aug. 1969. Subject: Observations on OART.

64. See note 62 and Chapman, Project Management in NASA, p. 41.

65. Principal sources for this section include a Program Review Document, Science and Applications Management, and an interview with Dr. Homer E. Newell, I Feb. 1977.

66. Norriss P. Hetherington, "Winning the Initiative: NASA and the U.S. Space Science Program," Prologue (Summer 1975): 105.

67. See briefing by Newell to Science Advisory Committee, 8 July 1966; Report of the Committee of the Administrator, 15 Aug. 1966; memorandum, Newell to Seamans, 20 Dec. 1966, commenting on the report; and Interim Response to the Report of the Ad Hoc Science Advisory Committee, 7 June 1967, which incorporated most of Newell's criticisms.

68. Report on Advisory Boards, 15 Jan. 1968, p. 41.

69. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Scientists' Testimony on Space Coals, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (10-11 June 1963), especially comments of Dr. Philip Abelson at p. 11 and Prof. Martin Schwarzschild at pp. 160-161.

70. See statement of Dr. John Naugle in Science and Applications Management, p. 46.

71. House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Space Science and Applications Subcommittee, 1966 NASA Authorization, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (1965), p. 1054.

72. Newell, draft of "Functions and Authorities of Program Managers and Project Managers in Office of Space Science and Applications Flight Programs," 10 Feb. 1966. This followed by one week a reorganization of OSSA that established a Program Review and Resources Management division in each program office and set up a Manned Flight Experiments Office to work with OMSF.

73. See transcript of briefing for Webb by Goddard officials on OAO-I failure, 4 Nov. 1966, p. 53.

74. Presentation by Goddard officials to NASA Headquarters management as part of an "Institutional Base Study," 12 June 1971, p. 83.

75. Sources: Newell interview and memorandum, Hilburn to Seamans, 21 July 1965, in which Hilburn said that after a long discussion with Newell the consensus was to "remove Harry at once." And they did.

76. Science and Applications Management, p. 45.

77. The following sources have proved useful: the 1966 Apollo Program Development Plan and the 14-volume survey of Apollo Program Management issued by the Apollo Program Office, Nov. 1967-Jan. 1968.

78. Seamans exit interview, p. 53.

79. Open-ended missions "are designed to continue so long as astronauts' safety is not impaired, until a series of objectives are reached with the option at each step of terminating the mission." Statement of George Mueller, House Science and Astronautics Committee, Apollo Program Pace and Progress, staff study for Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, 90th Cong., 1st sess. (17 Mar. 1967), p. 3.

80. Seamans exit interview, pp. 115-116.

81. Ibid., p. 115.

82. 21st meeting of Manned Space Flight Management Council, 24 Sept. 1963.

83. Apollo Program Office (KSC), Apollo Program Management, vol. 4, Kennedy Space Center (15 Jan. 1968), p. 3-1.

84. Apollo Program Office, Apollo Program Management, vol. 3, Marshall Space Flight Center (Dec. 1967), p. 1-2.

85. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1963 (NASA SP-4004, 1964), pp. 190, 420.

86. House Science and Astronautics Committee, 1965 NASA Authorization, 88th Cong., 2d sess. (1964), p. 447.

87. Gilruth to E. Z. Gray, 5 Aug. 1964. Emphasis added.

88. Seamans to Program Associate Administrators, "Management Responsibilities for Future Manned Flight Activities," 26 July 1966.

89. Although the evidence is not conclusive, the decision to develop the supersonic transport (SST) was probably of this sort. The pressure for an SST program came from within Government rather than from the civil aviation industry, which insisted that the Government foot the bill for proving the concept. The prime movers for an SST-the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, NASA, and FAA officials (together with DOD officials)-signed an agreement in June 1961 to study the feasibility of a supersonic transport, which was two years before President Kennedy, in June 1963, authorized Congress to fund an SST program.

 

 

CHAPTER 7

 

1. Senate Committee on Government Operations, Financial Management in the Federal Government, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (13 Feb. 1961), p. 131.

2. Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964), pp. 11-13, 57-60. When this was published, the Budget Bureau had not yet metamorphosed into the Office of Management and Budget.

3. Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, p. 251.

4. For a history of these and other proposals, see financial Management in the Federal Government, and Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1964), pp. 104-127.

5. For an account of the Bureau's reorganization and its powers and authorities prior to 1970, see Lewis Fisher, Presidential Spending Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 44-51, and Peter Woll, ed., Public Administration and Policy (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), Part 111.

6. William S. Beller, "Decision-Making in Washington," Space/Aeronautics (Dec. 1967): 83-98, and Donald F. Hornig, "The President's Scientist: A Private Diary," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Apr. 1977): 62-64.

7. BOB staff paper, "FY 1966 NASA Budget Review," 12 Nov. 1964, p. 1-4.

8. House Government Operations Committee, Military Operations Subcommittee, Government Operations in Space, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (4 June 1965), p. 106.

9. House Science and Astronautics Committee, Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, hearing on CAO Report on Analysis of Cost of Space Shuttle Program, 93rd Cong., 1st sess. (26 June 1973), p. Vll.

10. As shown by NASA Administrator James C. Fletcher's reply to U.S. Comptroller General Elmer Staats, reprinted in ibid., pp. 94-97.

11. On NASA's use of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness studies, see Senate Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee, Hearings-Part 1, 93rd Cong., 1st sess. (1973), pp. 510-512. This includes NASA and GAO correspondence pertaining to such studies, and selected lists of cost-benefit studies at pp. 511, 513, and 518-519. Note that the difference between cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses is that the former are those "in which benefits are measurable in terms of dollars." The GAO study concluded that while "only certain NASA programs are susceptible to cost-benefit analysis involving dollar-measurable benefits . . . we believe that all NASA programs are susceptible to cost-effectiveness analysis." Ibid., pp. 511-512.

12. NASA Assistant Administrator for Administration William Lilly to Elmer Staats, 16 Nov. 1967.

13. House Science and Astronautics Committee, Authorizing Appropriations to NASA, 89th Cong., 1st sess., Rep. No. 273 (3 May 1965), p. 118.

14. Without citing an authority, Lewis Fisher has noted that $35 000 in R&D funds was set aside as a contingency fund for national security purposes. See Presidential Spending Power, pp. 207-208. This is apparently an erroneous reference to sec. 1(f) of the 1969 and 1970 NASA Authorization Act, which permits the Administrator to use up to $35 000 in R&D appropriations "for scientific consultations or extraordinary expenses . . . and his determination shall be final and conclusive upon the accounting officers of the Government." This is the Administrator's "champagne money" and has nothing to do with national security.

15. NHB 7330.1, "Approval of Facility Projects" (July 1966), p. 25.

16. Paine to Speaker of the House, 15 Jan. 1969, enclosing copy of draft bill to authorize appropriations for NASA.

17. 1966 NASA Authorization Act, sec. 4(3). Emphasis added. However, the act did provide that such programs might be funded if the Committee was notified in advance and gave approval.

18. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 1966 NASA Authorization, pp. 947-950.

19. Wyatt to William McCandless (Assistant Director for Budget Review, BOB), 12 Mar. 1964.

20. Memorandum for the record by Adm. Rufus E. Rose (USN, Ret.), "General Management Involvement in Formal Budget Process," I Sept. 1965.

21. Donald Crabill (Economics, Science, and Technology Division, BOB) to BOB Director Charles Schultze, 27 Oct. 1967.

22. BOB Director Robert Mayo to Paine, "1971 Budget Appeal Procedures," 20 Oct. 1969.

23. NASA staff paper (draft), "The NASA Programming Process," 24 Jan. 1966, p. 8.

24. Minutes of NASA Management Committee meeting, 17 Jan. 1966, and paper on "NASA Incremental Funding Study," 20 Apr. 1966.

25. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Space Launch Vehicles, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (2627 Jan. 1965), pp. 10-17, 25-30.

26. Logsdon, Decision to Go to the Moon, p. 91.

27. Transcript of meeting of Webb, Seamans, and all the center directors, 28 Sept. 1966, p. 35.

28. PPBS generated an enormous literature between 1965 and the early 1970s. Besides the sources cited below, two compendia are especially useful: "Planning-Programming-Budgeting-System: A Symposium," Public Administration Review 26 (4) (Dec. 1966); and U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Economy in Government, The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PPB System, 3 vole., 90th Cong., 2d sess. (1969).

29. In a 21 June 1971 memorandum accompanying its Circular A-11, the Office of Management and Budget stated that "agencies are no longer required to submit with their budget submissions the multi-year program and financing plans, program memoranda and special analytical studies . . . or the schedules . . . that reconcile information classified according to the program and appropriation structures."

30. This was Public Law 84-863 (1 Aug. 1956), for which see Financial Management in the Federal Government, pp. 92-97.

31. Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense System, 1961-1969 (New York: Holt, Harper and Row, 1971), p. 25.

32. Harvey Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development, pp. 180-181.

33. Enthoven and Smith, How Much is Enough? p. 48.

34. Ibid., p. 52.

35. The phrase is Allan Schick's in his "A Death in the Bureaucracy: The Demise of Federal PPB," Public Administration Review, 33 (2) (Mar./Apr. 1973): 146.

36. Milton Margolis and Stephen Barro, "The Space Program," in David Novick, ed., Program Budgeting, 2d ed. (New York: Holt, 1969), pp. 125, 127. This essay is an attempt to apply PPB techniques to NASA. Among the authors' proposals are the amalgamation of NASA and DOD space budgets, the introduction of a new Launch Capability category, and the elimination of aircraft technology from the budget. NASA officials were understandably unenthusiastic about these proposals.

37. Shapley to William McCandless, Harry Rowen, Samuel Cohn, "Notes for discussion of approach for NASA on proposed revisions to the budget process," 14 May 1965. This memorandum was written shortly before Shapley transferred to NASA.

38. Novick, Program Budgeting, p. XIX.

39. Joon Chien Doh, The Planning-Programming-Budgeting System in Three Federal Agencies (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 154.

40. Webb to Schultze, 13 July 1966.

41. Doh, The Planning-Programming-Budgeting System, p. 155.

42. Schick, "A Death in the Bureaucracy," p. 148.

43. Richard R. Nelson, The Moon and the Ghetto: An Essay on Public Policy Analysis (New York: Norton, 1977), p. 34.

44. BOB Bulletin 66-3, "Planning-Programming-Budgeting," 12 Oct. 1965. More detailed guidelines were issued as Bulletin 68-2, 18 July 1967, and Bulletin 68-9, 12 Apr. 1968.

45. See BOB memo cited in note 21 above.

46. Schultze and Califano to Johnson, 19 Aug. 1967. On 21 Aug. Johnson signed the bill and issued the statement.

47. Schultze to Webb, 7 Aug. 1967.

48. Schick, "A Death in the Bureaucracy," p. 151.

49. Richard F. Fenno, Jr., The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), pp. 71-73.

50. Two other subcommittees deserve a passing mention: the Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, which, among other things, investigated the Ranger 6 failure and the Apollo fire; and the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, established in 1963 to examine the policy issues created by Federal R&D spending. This subcommittee was chaired by Representative Emilio Q. Daddario (D-Conn.) from 1963 to 1970.

51. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Report on 1970 NASA Authorization, 91st Cong., 1st sess., Rep. No. 91-282 (26 June 1969), pp. 86-87, and authorization hearings for 1970, pp. 128-131. For elimination of excess authorizations, see 1970 Authorization Act, sec. 1(i); for prior notice of facilities spending, see sec. 1(d).

52. Sec. 5 of 1964 and subsequent NASA authorization acts.

53. Shapley to Wyatt, "NASA Responsiveness to House Reports," 18 May 1966. Report itself is dated 25 May. Except where noted, all examples in this and the next paragraph are drawn from this paper.

54. James R. Kerr, "Congress and Space: Overview or Oversight?," in Nelson, The Politics of Science, pp. 176-189.

55. Murphy, Science, Geopolitics, and Federal Spending, pp. 207-210.

56. Ibid., p. 218.

57. Beller, "Decision-Making in Washington," p. 98.

58. Remarks of Congressman Joseph Karth (D-Minn.), Chairman, Space Science and Applications Subcommittee, in House Science and Astronautics Committee, 1964 NASA Authorization, 88th Cong., 1st sess., (1963), pp. 1662-1664.

59. See note 27, p. 37.

60. National Science Foundation, National Patterns of R&D Resources: Funds and Manpower in the United States, 1953-1976 (NSF 76-310), p. 1.

61. National Science Foundation, An Analysis of Federal R&D Funding by Budget Function (NSF 71-25), p.1.

62. Ibid., p. 24.

63. Ibid., p. 6.

64. James L. Penick, Jr., Carroll W. Pursell, Jr., et al., eds., The Politics of American Science, 1939 to the Present (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1972), p. 343.

65. Charles L. Schultze, "Federal Spending: Past, Present and Future," in Charles L. Schultze and Henry Owen, eds., Setting National Priorities: The Next Ten Years (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 335.

66. Analysis of Federal R&D Spending, p. 2.

67. Ibid., p. 4.

68. Ibid., p. 11.

69. Data cited are from Fleming to Newell, 24 Oct. 1968. We do not touch on the related question of how the NASA budget might have been affected by changes in the budgets of other agencies, e.g., that portion of the Atomic Energy Commission for the jointly run Space Nuclear Propulsion Office. There were also programs funded as NASA line items that were to all intents and purposes in support of DOD, e.g., the XB-70 flight research program, at least part of the entry for "supersonic aircraft technology," and the item for "Special Support (OSS & A)" for NASA's "Limited Warfare Program" discussed in chapter 8.

70. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1967 (NASA SP-4008, 1968), pp. 189190. Also Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 1966 NASA Authorization, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (1965), pp. 605-606.

71. This is discussed in chapter 9. The Report of the Future Programs Task Group is printed in the Senate hearings cited in note 70, at pp. 1029-1102, with the Committee's criticisms at p. 1015.

72. NASA officials knew this quite well. At the Administrator's staff luncheon of 6 July 1966, it was agreed that " 'preeminence in space' has probably outlived its usefulness as a main argument to make in support of NASA programs. We are possibly entering a period where 'uses of space' should rather be emphasized." From notes taken by NASA Executive Secretary Lawrence Vogel.

73. A memorandum from Seamans to Finger, the Program Associate Administrators, and other key headquarters officials, 15 Sept. 1967, announced that Saturn IB production would end with the sixteenth vehicle and that there would be no Saturn V production beyond the fifteenth in 1968. The final decision to discontinue Saturn V production was announced in Feb. 1970. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1970 (NASA SP-4015, 1971), p. 37.

74. Another problem during the late 1960s was the exceptional length of the later stages of the budgetary cycle. The 1970 Independent Offices Appropriations Act was not signed by the President until 26 November 1969. In August 1970 President Nixon vetoed the FY 1971 Independent Offices Appropriations bill, and the revised bill was not signed into law until 17 December. Because of the delays, NASA was under a "continuing resolution," an interim appropriation limiting the agency to the rate of operation of the previous fiscal year, effectively prohibiting new starts until appropriations were voted.

 

CHAPTER 8

 

1. Space Act, sec. 102(b) and 102(c) (6).

2. Willis H. Shapley, "United States Space Program," in Hugh Odishaw, ed., The Challenge of Space (Chicago: Praeger, 1962), p. 166.

3. Milton Rosen, "Military Significance of Surveyor," 15 June 1966. Rosen was senior scientist, NASA Office of Defense Affairs (changed to Office of DOD and Interagency Affairs in Jan. 1968), 1963-1972.

4. Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 231.

5. House Government Operations Committee, Military Affairs Subcommittee, Government Operations in Space, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (4 June 1965), p. 54.

6. For a history of Project Advent, see House Government Operations Committee, Military Operations Subcommittee, Satellite Communications (Military-Civil Roles and Relationships), 89th Cong., 1st sess. (17 March 1965), pp. 123-158, from which this account is drawn.

7. Ibid., p. 16.

8. Ibid., p. 17.

9. Government Operations in Space, p. 103.

10. Satellite Communications (Military-Civil Roles . . . ), pp. 13-15.

11. Theodore W. Bauer and Harry B. Yoshpe, Defense Organization and Management (Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1971), pp. 72-73.

12. Satellite Communications (Military-Civil Roles . . . ), pp. 148, 152-153.

13. This was DOD Directive 5160.32, reprinted in House Science and Astronautics Committee, Defense Space Interests, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (1961), pp. 2-3.

14. Testimony of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Charles J. Hitch in ibid., p. 82.

15. Bauer and Yoshpe, Defense Organization and Management, p. 127.

16. DOD Directive 5030.18, 24 Feb. 1962. Subject: Department of Defense Support of National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

17. A list of eighty-eight major NASA-DOD agreements for the period 1 Oct. 1958-31 Dec. 1964, with brief descriptions of each, is printed in Government Operations in Space, pp. 123-133. Except where noted, agreements for that period discussed in the text are excerpted from this list.

18. The 1959 agreement states, "When either agency places a contract through the other, reimbursement is limited to direct costs.... when either assigns a contract to the other for administration, the direct costs involved are reimbursable.... construction undertaken by DOD for NASA is charged directly to NASA funds; when either agency is a tenant on an installation of the other, all direct costs attributable to such tenancy are reimbursed, but rent or depreciation are not charged for the use of each other's facilities." House Government Operations Committee, Military Affairs Subcommittee, Government Operations in Space, p. 101.

19. The full text of this agreement is reprinted in House Science and Astronautics Committee, Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, The NASA-DOD Relationship, 88th Cong., 2d sess. (26 March 1964), pp. 10-11.

20. Government Operations in Space, p. 126.

21. Ibid., p. 129. For the earlier agreement of 24 Aug. 1961, see p. 127.

22. Provisions of the Gemini agreement are in Adm. W. Fred Boone (USN, Ret.), NASA Office of Defense Affairs: The First Five Years (NASA HHR-32, Dec. 1970), pp. 83-84. Hereafter cited as NASA Office of Defense Affairs.

23. Aviation Week (22 July 1963): 25.

24. NASA Office of Defense Affairs, p. 28.

25. Ibid., p. 35.

26. House Government Operations Committee, Military Affairs Subcommittee, Missile and Space Ground Support Operations, 89th Cong., 2d sess. (21 Mar. 1966), p. 28.

27 Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1964 (NASA SP-4005, 1965), pp. 430-431.

28. The National Range Division was established in January 1964 as a division of the Air Force Systems Command and was charged with planning and management of the Eastern Test Range and that portion of the Western Test Range previously transferred from the Navy to the Air Force. The commander of the National Range Division was designated as DOD's point of contact with NASA for manned spaceflight support. For details, see NASA, Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1964, pp. 3, 164; and House Government Operations Committee, Military Affairs Subcommittee, Missile and Space Ground Support, p. 18.

29. Harvey Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 224.

30. See NASA Office of Defense Affairs, pp. 122-162, for an extremely detailed account of the funding issue, and pp. 163-195 for NASA and DOD policy statements.

31. In practice, most of DOD's space launches, especially those using the Titan 111, took place at the Western Test Range. The breakdown of the NASA-DOD workload at the Eastern Test Range in 1966 was about fifty-fifty, even though three-quarters of the launches there were missiles. House Government Operations Committee, Missiles and Space Ground Support Operations, pp. 20-21.

32. On the funding of NASA laboratories, see Webb to Schultze (9 Aug.1967), which sets forth the NASA position on reimbursement for services at the Eastern Test Range. NASA's viewpoint on supporting other agencies is set forth in encl. B.

33. Ibid., encl. A, p. 7.

34. NASA Office of Defense Affairs, p. 144.

35. Ibid., p. 150.

36. Ibid, p. 205.

37. See statement of OTDA Director Edmond C. Buckley in Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 1966 NASA Authorization, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (1965), p. 447.

38. This was the position of the House Government Operations Committee in Missile and Space Ground Support, p. 49.

39. NASA Office of Defense Affairs, pp. 207-209.

40. For details of the agreement, see ibid., pp. 74-76; Government Operations in Space, p. 131; and Missile and Space Ground Support, pp. 37-38.

41. See note 37, p. 448.

42. NASA Office of Defense Affairs, p. 66. Emphasis in original.

43. See, e.g., Webb's statement in Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Space Launch Vehicles, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (26-27 Jan. 1965), pp. 17-18.

44. PSAC, Report of the Ad Hoc Booster Panel on Large Rocket Boosters for Space Exploration, 5 June 1961.

45. Summary Report, NASA-DOD Large Launch Vehicle Planning Croup, 24 Sept. 1962. This was also known as the Golovin report, after Nicholas Golovin, NASA cochairman, and subsequently a staff member of the Office of Science and Technology. One of the most important results of the group's work was its October 1961 recommendation that DOD proceed to develop the Titan Ill launch vehicle to meet its own and NASA's needs.

46. On the history of LLVPG, see foreword to LLVPG Summary Report, and Courtney Brooks et al., Charriots for Apollo: A History of Lunar Spacecraft (comment draft, Aug. 1976), pp. 80-87.

47. It should be noted that the Webb-Gilpatric agreement applied only to development of new vehicles or stages, not to studies of proposed improvements. How far it applied to modification of existing stages was less certain. The usual procedure was for AACB cochairmen to decide whether such improvements came within the terms of the agreement, and then to invoke it or not, as the case determined.

48. These were the four-stage Jupiter C; the improved Jupiter C, known as Juno 11; the Thor-Able, which combined the Thor booster with the second and third stages of the Vanguard; the Thor-Hustler, which had a liquid-propellant upper stage using the Hustler engine; the Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile; and the Atlas-Able, combining the Atlas and Vanguard second and third stages. The only nonmilitary vehicle, the Vanguard, was built by the Navy for the International Geophysical Year. From Homer E. Newell, Space Science in NASA, Ch. 11, work in progress.

49. Statement of Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance in Space Launch Vehicles, p. 43.

50. See, e.g., minutes of 29th AACB meeting, 28 Aug. 1964; minutes of 30th AACB meeting, 20 Oct. 1964; and paper by Rosen, "Statement of Launch Vehicle Cost Effectiveness," 26 Jan. 1965, especially pp. 2-3.

51. See Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 1966 NASA Authorization, pp. 605-606, and Space Launch Vehicles, pp. 124-125, for a chronology of the large-solid-motor program.

52. Space Launch Vehicles, pp. 16-18, 28-30.

53. On guidelines for launch vehicle study, see Seamans and Brown to Chairman, AACB Launch Vehicle Panel, "Guidelines for Study of NASA and DOD Launch Vehicle Requirements," 19 June 1964. For interim summary of the study, see Hilburn to Seamans, "Brief Summary of Findings to Date on Launch Vehicle Cost Study," 4 Nov. 1964. The unclassified portion of the final report was summarized by Assistant Air Force Secretary (R&D) Alexander Flax in Space Launch Vehicles, pp. 81-89, 95.

54. Space Launch Vehicles, pp. 8-9.

55. Government Operations in Space, p. 100. Of 900 space medicine tasks reviewed, 335 were found valid, 55 were canceled, 2 were assigned further examination, and 488 "were considered outside the scope of mutual interagency decision since they were necessary to the peculiar needs of the respective agency." Ibid.

56. "NASA/DOD Coordination of FY 1970 Facility Projects," encl.1 of minutes of 49th AACB meeting, 30 Jan. 1969.

57. Minutes of 50th AACB meeting, 29 May 1969, item 4.

58. Minutes of 51st AACB meeting, 3 Oct. 1969, NASA Status Report to AACB.

59. Ibid., p. 5 of minutes.

60. See especially the memorandum for the record prepared by Albert J. Evans, Acting NASA Director of Aeronautics (OART), "XB-70 Research Program . . . ," 27 Feb. 1964. One passage (crossed out in pencil) stated that "the Air Force had come to the conclusion that the XB-70 can no longer be justified on the basis of a weapon system, and believed that a study should be made to insure that the large investment of the Air Force in the program would produce research results of the maximum value possible." On 1967 agreement, see Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1967 (NASA SP-4008, 1968), pp. 74-75.

61. On this program, see NASA Office of Defense Affairs, pp. 249-253; Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1967, p. 366; and Boone to Seamans, "Assumption of Your Limited Warfare Support Role by Dr. Adams," 7 Dec. 1967.

62. NASA Office of Defense Affairs, p. 9.

63. The NASA position is set forth in a "talking paper" on Project Gemini drafted by Boone, 9 Jan. 1963.

64. Webb to Seamans, 18 Jan. 1963.

65. Barton C. Hacker and James Grimwood, On the Shoulders of the Titans: A History of Project Gemini (manuscript draft, Oct. 1973), p. 208.

66. Webb to Johnson, 30 July 1963.

67. Webb to NASA Executive Officer Col. R. P. Young (USA), 1 Mar. 1963.

68. New York Herald Tribune, "The Death of the Dyna-Soar Project," 26 Dec. 1963.

69. Missile/Space Daily, 11 Dec. 1963, p. 4.

70. Donald Hornig, PSAC subcommittee chairman, to President's Science Advisor Jerome Wiesner, "PSAC Space Panels' Evaluation of the Requirements for a Manned Space Station," 22 Nov. 1963.

71. Draft "Discussion Paper" on MOL and extended Apollo, forwarded from Shapley to Seamans, 19 Nov. 1964, pp. 5, 6, 7

72. Ibid., p. 7.

73. Missiles and Rockets, 16 Dec. 1963, p. 15.

74. See NASA MOL paper summarized in Space Daily, 6 Jan.1964, p.20. Also memorandum prepared by M/G David Jones (USAF), Deputy Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight (Programs), "MOL Congressional Hearings," Jan. 1966; and memorandum prepared by William Schneider, Director, Apollo Applications Program, "Answers to Questions from Congressional Hearings," 18 Mar. 1969.

75. See attachment to memorandum, Boone to Seamans, "NASA-DOD Coordination with Respect to the MOL Program," 16 Nov. 1965.

76. Memorandum, E. Z. Gray, Director, Advanced Manned Missions Program, to Mueller, "Space Station Programs " 31 Aug. 1964.

77. See, for instance, the draft responses to questions circulated by Vice President Hubert Humphrey at Space Council meeting, 9 July 1965. Moreover, one year after the MOL was finally approved, a top official told Webb at a meeting of NASA center directors that "I think that it is the military that needs to justify the position and they could be put in a rather awkward position with respect to MOL. MOL is a rather poor program at best and they have never justified it properly. Now, you haven't wanted to attack them . . . because I don't think McNamara is a nice guy to attack, he is rough." Webb: "Well, hell, he has attacked MOL worse than I have." Official: "Well, my point is that MOL is a very poor program. At one time it would have been a halfway decent program but it is way out of date now.... I was trying to get rid of a program that they got rid of later which was no good, Dyna-Soar, because I said that program was no good a long time ago. I say it right now that MOL is no good. They are always too late." Transcript of tape of meeting on budget changeover, 28 Sept. 1966, pp. 59-60.

78. See draft responses to question of why Saturn/Apollo was not being used for MOL, Space Council meeting, 9 July 1965.

79. Gordon's memorandum is summarized in memorandum from Boone to Seamans cited in note 75. Note that the "Discussion Paper" cited in note 71 had been drafted only three weeks earlier.

80. Aviation Week and Space Technology (7 Dec. 1964): 16.

81. NASA News Release, "Decisions on Manned Orbiting Laboratory and Other Matters," 25 Jan. 1965.

82. Government Operations in Space, p. 17.

83. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965 (NASA SP-4006, 1966), p. 396.

84. Another reason for the delay was a struggle between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Air Force over who would exercise mission control. Donald E. Fink, "CIA Control Bid Slowed Decision on MOL," Aviation Week, 20 Sept. 1965. The charge was officially denied by the Air Force on 5 Oct. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965, p. 463.

85. Information supplied by Willis Shapley.

86. Hilburn to Seamans, "MOL Decision," 24 June 1975.

87. Missile and Space Ground Support, p. 46.

88. Boone to Webb, Seamans, Dryden, 12 July 1963, p. 3.

89. Sapolsky, Polaris System Development, p. 204.

90. Boone memorandum cited in note 88, p. 4.

 

CHAPTER 9

 

1. U.S. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Policy Planning for Aeronautical Research and Development, 89th Cong., 2d sess. (19 May 1966), p. 8.

2. For a summary of research on space stations up to 1969, see Compilation of Papers Presented at the Space Station Technology .Symposium (NASA Langley Research Center, 11-13 Feb. 1969), especially the paper on MSC studies by Maxime Faget and Edward Olling, pp. 43-98, and the historical sketch of Marshall studies at pp. 99-120.

3. Ibid., and Space Station Requirements Steering Committee, The Needs and Requirements for a National .Space Station-Summary Report, 15 Nov. 1966.

4. Boone, NASA Office of Defense Affairs, pp. 324-325.

5. Task Team on Management and Integrated Information Systems, "Outline of Interim Report," 16 Sept.1963, pp. 11-2/11-3. See also draft of "The NASA Programming Process," 24 Jan. 1966, p. 2.

6. Frank W. Anderson, Jr., Orders of Magnitude: A History of NACA and NASA, 1915-1976 (NASA SP-4403, 1976), p. 65.

7. Arthur L. Levine, The Future of the U.S. Space Program (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 118-119.

8. The group's summary report is reprinted in Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 1966 NASA Authorization, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (1965), pp. 1029-1102. The President's letter is at ibid., pp. 1016-1017, and Webb's interim replies are at pp. 1017-1029.

9. Ibid., p. 1015.

10. Transcript of tape of briefing on Apollo Extensions Systems, 22 Sept. 1965, pp. 48, 50-51, 52-53.

11. See e.g. "Ground Rules for Apollo Extension," 20 Oct. 1964, which were confirmed by Seamans' memorandum for the record, "Apollo Program Decision-Manned Apollo Flights and Apollo Applications Program Plans," 17 May 1967.

12. E. Z. Gray to Gilruth, 18 Aug. 1964.

13. Mueller to Francis Smith, 28 Apr. 1964, and Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, National Space Coals for the Post-Apollo Period, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (23-25 Aug. 1965), pp. 76-104.

14. Mueller to Charles Townes, Chairman, Science and Technology Advisory Committee, 14 Jan. 1966.

15. W. David Compton and Charles D. Benson, History of Skylab (Comment edition, May 1977), pp. 53-55.

16. Gray to Gilruth, 18 Aug. 1964.

17. Compton and Benson, History of Skylab, pp. 112-115.

18. Minutes of Science and Technology Advisory Committee (STAC) meeting at JPL, 30 Oct. 1964, p. 3.

19. See speech of Dr. Harry Hess to a joint PSAC/STAC meeting at KSC, 20 May 1969.

20. Compton and Benson, History of Skylab, pp. 112-115.

21. Adams, Mueller, and Newell to Seamans, Dec. ? 1965, and summary minutes of Planning Coordination Steering Group, 17 Jan. 1966.

22. This was the design approved by Seamans on 29 Aug. 1966. For further details on the origins of the orbital workshop, see Compton and Benson, History of Skylab, chapters 2-4.

23. NASA Program Review, Apollo Applications Program (15 Nov. 1966), p. 21.

24. Compton and Benson, History of Skylab, pp. 186-187.

25. "Manned Space Flight: Summary of Roles and Missions Agreements," Aug. 1966.

26. Newell and Cortright, 13 June 1966. Subject: NASA Future Program Planning.

27. House Committee on Government Operations, Military Operations Subcommittee, Missile and Space Ground Support Operations, 89th Cong., 2d sess. (21 March 1966), pp. 46-47.

28. Schultze to President Johnson, I Sept. 1966. Also, memorandum for the record by Wyatt, 27 July 1965. Subject: Director's Review with Bureau of the Budget (July 26).

29. This paragraph is based on a NASA report, "Evolution of Advisory Counsel Structure and Practice," 15 Jan. 1968, prepared by a task force under the Office of Organization and Management.

30. Newell to Webb, 6 Oct. 1965.

31. Ray Romatowski (Director, Organization and Management Planning Division) to Harold Finger, 21 Apr. 1967.

32. Bruce Murray (CalTech) to PSAC Space Panel, 10 Apr. 1967. Subject: NASA Science Management in the Planetary Program. Murray succeeded William Pickering as JPL Director in 1976.

33. On NASA's reasons for rejecting the Ramsey report, see Newell to Seamans, 20 Dec. 1966; and "Interim Response to the Report of the Ad Hoc Science Advisory Committee," 7 June 1967.

34. The remainder of this paragraph and the whole of the next are based on Barry Rutizer, "The Lunar and Planetary Missions Board" (NASA HHN-138, 30 Aug. 1976).

35. Ibid., p. 15.

36. Newell, "Notes on Science in NASA," 14 Nov. 1969, pp. 5-6. Newell, of course, was describing a position with which he did not agree.

37. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1966, pp. 17, 39, 53.

38. Hess to Webb, 29 July 1966.

39 President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), "The Space Program in the Post-Apollo Period," Feb.1967, p. 14.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid., p. 16.

42. Quotation is from Newell, "Notes on Science in NASA," pp. 8-9. PSAC criticism of the Apollo Telescope Mount is in "The Space Program in the Post-Apollo Period," appendix C, especially pp. 73-74.

43. PSAC Space Science and Technology Panel, "U. S. Strategy for Space Research and Exploration: Fiscal Year 1969 Program Decisions," 19 Dec. 1967.

44. Milton Rosen to Seamans, 2 Sept. 1966. Rosen, the senior scientist in the Office of Defense Affairs, was the NASA observer to the PSAC space panels.

45. PSAC Space Science and Technology Panel, "U.S. Strategy for Space Research and Exploration," p. 28.

46. Finger to Romatowski, 28 Dec. 1967.

47. Webb to Finger, 28 June 1968.

48. Milton Rosen, "Information on NASA Activities with Respect to Titan Launch Vehicles.... " 24 July 1967.

49 Newell to Webb, 22 Dec. 1967.

50. Draft memorandum by Milton Rosen, "Launch Vehicle Working Group: Task Definition," 17 Apr. 1968. See also a memorandum by Alexander Flax, chairman of the AACB Launch Vehicle Panel, 11 June 1968.

51. Memorandum by Rosen, 21 Mar. 1969.

52. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Policy Planning for Aeronautical Research and Development, 89th Cong., 2d sess. (May 1966).

53. Bernard Moritz (Acting Associate Administrator for Organization and Management) to NASA Deputy Administrator George Low, 23 Dec. 1969. Low had been sworn in as Deputy Administrator three weeks earlier.

54. The members of the Post-Apollo Advisory Group were Floyd Thompson, chairman; Edmond Buckley, former Associate Administrator for Tracking and Data Acquisition, vice chairman; Goddard Director John Clark; KSC Director Kurt Debus, LRC Deputy Director Charles Donlan; MSC Director Robert Gilruth; Charles Mathews, Director for Apollo Applications; George Mueller; John Naugle, Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications; LRC Director Abe Silverstein; and MSFC Director Wernher von Braun. The staff assistant was Ray Kline, and James Long was executive secretary.

55. Newell, paper on "NASA Planning System," 13 May 1968.

56. "PSG Guidelines: Center Participation in NASA PPB Process," 26 Mar. 1968.

57. "NASA Planning System" p. 1.

58. Some of the more important groups included the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences; the Lunar and Planetary Missions Board and the Astronomy Missions Board; the Post-Apollo Advisory Group chaired by Floyd Thompson; the Group for Lunar Exploration Planning, a NASA group chaired by Wilmot Hess; the Manned Space Flight Science and Technology Advisory Committee; a Saturn Workshop study group directed by Douglas Lord of OMSF; and a NASA Life Sciences Directors Group. This list is adopted from minutes of the STAC meeting at KSC (27-28 Mar. 1968), pp. 4-5.

59. On the role of Bellcomm in supporting the PCG, see memorandum from W. G. Stroud to Newell, 15 Apr. 1968. Stroud, who had been the Nimbus project manager at Goddard, was PSG secretary during the 1968 planning cycle.

60. Minutes of executive session of STAC, 12 Oct. 1968.

61. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1968 (NASA SP-4010, 1969), p. 213.

62. "Post-Apollo Advisory Group: Summary of Proceedings" (20 July 1968), p. 13.

63. See Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1969 (NASA SP-4014), p. 167.

64. Paine to Presidential Science Adviser Lee DuBridge, 6 May 1969. Emphasis in original.

65. Minutes of STAC meeting at NASA Headquarters, 22-23 Mar. 1969.

66. Briefing for the Apollo Executives Group by LeRoy Day at KSC, 15-July 1969, p. 26. Day was in charge of a group responsible for developing material for a report on space shuttles to the President's Space Task Group.

67. NASA News Release, "AAP Orbital Workshop," 22 July 1969, and Compton and Benson, History of Skylab, pp. 297-302.

68. See source cited in note 66, pp. 34-35.

69. Newell, memorandums for the record, 18 Nov. 1968 and 11 Dec. 1968.

70. For NASA reports prepared for the STG, see "America's Next Decade in Space" and "Goals and Objectives for America's Next Decades in Space," both dated Sept. 1969.

71. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1969, p. 224.

72. President's Space Task Group, "The Post-Apollo Space Program: Directions for the Future" (Sept. 1969), pp. 19-23.

73. Thomas O'Toole, "Nixon Rejects Big Outlay for Space in '70s," Washington Post (11 Jan. 1970), p. A1.

74. Newell to Low, 9 Feb. 1970, p. 5. Subject: Evolution of NASA's Long-Range Planning.

75. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

76. Seamans to Mueller, 20 July 1967.

77. Briefing by Newell for the Administrator's Management Advisory Panel, 25 Oct. 1968, pp. 40-41.

78. Newell to Low, 9 Feb. 1970, p. 3.

79. Moritz to Low, 23 Dec. 1969.

80. See especially his memorandum to Newell and Paine, 18 June 1968, and the summary of notes from his discussion with the Administrator's Management Advisory Panel, 16 Sept. 1969.

81. Moritz to Low, 23 Dec. 1969.

82. Ad Hoc NASA Manpower Utilization Committee, "Considerations on the Management of Manpower in NASA," 8 Sept. 1966, p. 4.

83. This paragraph is based on a briefing by Goddard officials for the Associate Administrator for Organization and Management, 12 June 1971, one of a number held at the centers as part of an "Institutional Base Study."

84. Ibid., p. 47.

 

CHAPTER 10

 

1. Raymond Bauer et al., Second-Order Consequences: A Methodological Essay on the Impact of Technology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), p. 21.

2. For examples of the "legislative veto," see Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1964), chap. 8.

3. Harvey Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 244.

4. Summary report of "General Management Discussion of Policy and Management Matters During the General Management Program Review," 22 Sept. 1964.

5. William J. Normyle, "Post-Apollo Space Plan Drafted," Aviation Week & Space Technology 81 (21 Oct. 1968): 26.

6. Alan Dean and staff of Federal Aviation Administration, "The Decentralization of the Federal Aviation Agency," pp.77-78. This unpublished study was presented as the subject of the third meeting (19 June 1968) of a study group of the National Academy of Public Administration.

7. From notes of Mueller's discussion with the Administrator's Management Advisory Panel, 16 Sept. 1969.

8. On the analogy between the space program and social welfare programs, see Richard R. Nelson, The Moon and the Ghetto: An Essay on Public Policy Analysis (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1977).

 

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