[ix] Early in the morning of 4 October 1957, T. Keith Glennan went to work, just as he had for more than a decade, at the president's office of the Case Institute of Technology (CIT) in Cleveland, Ohio. As president of CIT, he had been instrumental in transforming it from a small commuter school turning out journeymen engineers and other technicians into one of the top 20 technical institutions of higher learning in the United States.1 He was pleased with the results of his presidency, and quite happy to continue those efforts, but on that Friday Glennan's career path changed sharply. Because of the events of that day he soon became caught up in the vortex of superpower rivalries and projects to enhance international prestige. Less than a year later he would be in Washington, D.C., serving as head of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), a newly-constituted, federal research and development agency charged with helping to define and execute a far-reaching space exploration effort.2
Glennan's move from CIT to NASA came about because of the Soviet Union's successful launch of Sputnik I on 4 October 1957, as part of the scientific activities associated with the International Geophysical Year (IGY). When news of the Soviet success became known, U.S. congratulations for the technical accomplishment followed, but what President Dwight D. Eisenhower and others feared was that the Soviet Union could now legitimately claim leadership in a major technological field. The international image of the Soviet Union, thus, was greatly enhanced overnight. More importantly, Sputnik I meant that longstanding rivalries between the United States and the Soviet Union had entered a new plane, one where Americans were at a disadvantage. Americans were shocked and incredulous about this achievement by a communist country, and the result was increased spending for aerospace endeavors, technical and scientific educational programs, and the chartering of new federal agencies to manage air and space research and development.3
One of the most important results of this event was the establishment of NASA on 1 October 1958. Glennan headed NASA from its inception until the [x] change of presidential administrations in 1961. During this period he oversaw the definition of U.S. policies for operations in space, contributed to the development of goals and programs to further those policies, and consolidated the resources needed to carry them out. In the process he set the stage for both NASA's future accomplishments and its failures, established most of the methodologies and many of the strategies employed in America's exploration of space, and created the infrastructure that still supports NASA's space efforts.
Glennan came to the leadership of NASA naturally enough, perhaps, but his earlier career also shaped many of the priorities, limitations, and accomplishments of his tenure as NASA Administrator. He was born in Enderlin, North Dakota, on 8 September 1905, the son of a train dispatcher. His early life was not so very different from those of the other boys raised in the upper Midwest. He spent most of his youth in Eau Claire, Wisconsin, where he attended public schools. There, Glennan found he had a knack for mathematics; worked at a variety of jobs including one at Continental Clothiers, a local store; and in 1922 graduated from high school. After a short stint at the Wisconsin State Teacher's College, in September 1924 Glennan entered Sheffield Scientific School of Yale University as a sophomore. During his junior and senior years, Glennan received the Lord Strathcona Scholarship recognizing achievements of the children of railroaders. While in New Haven he made the acquaintance of Dr. Thomas Sewell Adams, a noted economist on the Yale University faculty, and began working for him as a driver, which also helped him offset the costs of his Yale education. He graduated cum laude with a B.S. in electrical engineering in 1927. This was his last earned degree, although he received several honorary Ph.D.s over the course of his career.4
Keith Glennan's experience at Yale University was important to him in several ways. Without question, his Midwestern background and the necessity of working his way through school provided important perspectives that shaped his later career. At the same time, a Yale education ensured that he would have more ready entrance to many opportunities - employment and public service as well as business - that might not be afforded to individuals educated at less prestigious institutions. Similarly, the contacts that he made there, with both students and faculty, provided the beginning of a web of relationships that lasted a lifetime. Indeed, Thomas Sewell Adams became something of a mentor and friend, as well as Glennan's father-in-law on 20 June 1931 when he married Ruth Haslup Adams (Vassar College, 1931). Opportunities undoubtedly availed themselves because of Glennan's Yale background; what he made of them was up to him, but his working-class roots fostered driving ambition.5
[xi] Immediately after graduation in June 1927, Glennan hitched his fortunes to a rapidly expanding technology, the "talkie" motion picture industry. In one way or another he was connected to the film industry for the next 14 years. Most of that time he worked for Electrical Research Products, Inc. (ERPI), a subsidiary of Western Electric Co., which installed sound motion picture recording and reproducing equipment in theaters all over the world. His first installation was in an elegant Philadelphia theater, but after a year he was transferred to Great Britain where he served as the regional installation manager for Western Electric Company, Ltd. (WECO). In this position, Glennan had a staff of 85 engineers and technicians from the United States and another 200 British employees. As a 23-year-old, he was in his first management position, and he found he had both a taste and a talent for the administration of complex technical organizations. Even as the worldwide depression was deepening in early 1930, Glennan was assistant manager for continental WECO, setting up and running installations and services operations with about 1,000 employees in ten countries of the British Commonwealth and on the continent of Europe. He finally returned to the United States in March 1930 to head a succession of ERPI offices in New York City. Among them, significantly for his later career, Glennan served as assistant manager of the ERPI educational picture project, which produced educational films on science. He also managed the Audio Cinema (originally the Edison studio in the Bronx), when ERPI took it over on default during the depths of the depression. This was his introduction to commercial motion picture production, which he was involved in throughout the rest of the decade.
Glennan got more directly involved in feature-length motion pictures in March 1934 when he went to Hollywood as ERPI's vice president and general manager of General Service Studios, Inc. (GSSI). The next year he left Electrical Research Products to take a job as operations manager of Paramount Pictures in Hollywood. Four years later he became the studio manager, a position of considerable importance where he was responsible for budgeting productions, lighting, sound, set construction, wardrobe, art, and film processing. During his five and a half years at Paramount Glennan provided the logistics necessary to allow the studio's creative teams to stage their productions. He worked with such Hollywood notables as Cecil B. DeMille. Glennan was also credited with important innovations in the film industry during his time at Paramount, including the first full-fledged engineering department in the business and the first recognized industrial relations department. However, in one of the typical moves in the picture business, he was fired in 1940. After a short stint with the Vega Airplane Corporation in Burbank during the summer of 1941, Glennan became the studio manager of Samuel Goldwyn Studios.6
A major change to Glennan's career came, as it did for most other Americans, with the U.S. entry into World War II in December 1941. The summer thereafter he left Goldwyn to enter defense work, taking a position with the Navy Underwater Sound Laboratory, operated by Columbia University at New London, [xii] Connecticut. This laboratory reported to the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), an agency organized by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941 to coordinate scientific research and development on behalf of the war effort.7 Under the overall direction of Vannevar Bush, the MIT scientific research organizer par excellence, the OSRD exercised broad influences over national defense research efforts until the end of the war.8
In working for the Underwater Sound Laboratory, Glennan became part of the science and technology team that went to war, the "Scientists against Time" of later fame. It also brought him into contact for the first time with the whole milieu of scientific research as a public service, and it fundamentally affected his outlook during the rest of his career.9 He embodied the progressive trend in U.S. politics that emphasized professionalism and scientific or technological expertise over politics in the solving of national problems.10
When he became director of the laboratory in December 1942, Glennan found himself appointed to a variety of OSRD and other government committees, working closely with such eminent scientific leaders as Vannevar Bush and James Bryant Conant, a prominent chemist who was president of Harvard University. He enjoyed the public service aspects of his work, and at the same time made important contacts with people and agencies that he periodically tapped for assistance in working on the varied challenges he faced in later positions. Glennan performed well in his assigned responsibilities and won the respect of those with whom he worked. It was [xiii] some of these same people, of course, who later recommended him for positions of responsibility at Case, the Atomic Energy Commission, and NASA. The mutually beneficial relationship cannot be underestimated in either preparing Glennan or helping him secure his later positions of trust.11
On 1 June 1945, just as World War II was coming to an end and demobilization was beginning, Glennan resigned from his directorship of the laboratory to return to business. He went to work as an assistant production manager of the Ansco Division, General Aniline and Film Corporation of Binghamton, New York. Less than a year later he was named manager of administrative services for Ansco. This, and a host of civic activities - chair of the advisory committee for the schools of applied arts and sciences in the Binghamton area, trustee of the YMCA, etc. - kept him busy for another year. But he was not content, and looked for new challenges.12
He found one in the vacant presidency of the Case Institute of Technology in April of 1947. A few days before Glennan was to attend a reunion in New York City of those who had worked at his laboratory during the war, he received a call from Chuck Williams, his wartime co-worker and a graduate of Case. Williams told him that Case was in need of a new president and suggested that Glennan had the right skills and temperament to fit the position. They agreed to meet at the Yale Club in New York just before the reunion to discuss the issue. Thereafter, Williams arranged a meeting between Glennan and several trustees of Case in Cleveland. At a luncheon at the Cleveland Athletic Club Lee Clegg, an important Cleveland businessman and a trustee of Case, asked Glennan "how I would go about raising money. I told him I had no idea. I had never raised a nickel in my life, but on second thought I said I guess it would be clear that unless I fully believed in what I was trying to sell, I couldn't raise any money." If he believed in the product, however, Glennan thought he could be an effective fund raiser. He made a positive impression, and the Case Board of Trustees offered Glennan the presidency in the summer of 1947. He accepted and moved to Cleveland in time for the beginning of the fall semester.13
When he arrived at Case Glennan found a somewhat down-at-the-heels engineering school with some 1,585 full-time undergraduates, 205 full-time graduate students, most of whom were commuters, studying under the G.I. Bill, and 702 part-time (evening) students, mostly undergraduates . Many of the buildings were [xiv] old and dilapidated and the coffers for refurbishment and rejuvenation were empty. The institution itself had a certain measure of respect as a tough engineering school, however, and Glennan was prepared to build on that foundation. He had a vision, expressed to a friend from Hollywood less than six months after his arrival, of remaking CIT into one the top five or six engineering schools in the country. While conceding leadership in the discipline to MIT and Caltech, he opined:
Based on what he found in this survey Glennan identified needs, prioritized initiatives, and set out on an expansion of Case's plant, program, and people.
Glennan, always active, aggressively raised funds to support this expansion. Among his other fund-raising techniques was one he borrowed from Robert A. Millikan, president of Caltech. Millikan had set up an associates program in which one hundred contributors gave $1,000 a year for ten years. Glennan recalled in 1976:
This program became a huge success and Glennan followed it with other fund-raising efforts to finance CIT's rapid post-war expansion.
These efforts made it possible for Glennan to begin an aggressive development program on campus. During his tenure Case built twelve new buildings and remodelled virtually all the earlier buildings. He also increased CIT's programs and enhanced its reputation as a scientific and technical institution through reorganizations of the curricula and departments on campus, the creation of an Engineering Division without as much of the normal separation of the discipline into subfields [xv] as was usual elsewhere, the establishment of interdisciplinary research centers, and the expansion of the core undergraduate program emphasizing mathematics, physics, and chemistry. At the same time the enrollments increased, rising to 1,726 undergraduates and 879 graduate students in 1965-1966. Between 1947-1948 and 1965-1966 at Case, the institution grew rapidly in size, endowment, and prestige. Its budget rose from $1.95 to $14.9 million, its endowment more than doubled, and annual gifts and grants increased fifteen-fold. By almost any measure that could be applied to a college president, Glennan had been enormously successful in directing CIT's affairs.16
At the same time that Glennan was heading CIT in the late 1940s, he continued to take a strong interest in public service activities. In addition to a number of significant privately-organized civic activities in the Cleveland area, he was intensely interested in what was happening on the national scene. A moderate in politics who supported both Democratic and Republican candidates depending on the issues, he usually took a conservative stance toward larger questions of national importance. Two became immediately apparent during his early years at Case. First, he was an ardent "cold warrior," distrusting Stalin's Soviet regime and debating with others the propriety of the U.S. president treating the Russian leader the same way that he dealt with other heads of state. He also spoke up for the forceful prosecution of the war in Korea. "The lesson we are learning" in Korea, he confided to Rufus Day, a Cleveland community leader, in 1951, "is a costly one but I am hopeful that the results will be such as to make this nation so strong that attack by others is unthinkable. I am afraid that I am not at all optimistic about our ability to avoid war even though it may be delayed."17 He advocated building a formidable defense capability and constructing a powerful nuclear deterrent force as the best hopes for ensuring the nation's peace.
Second, Glennan espoused a role for government in American society that was limited and less proactive than what was rapidly becoming the norm on the post-war scene. He challenged the rising amount of governmental regulation and direction in the affairs of individual Americans, and expressed a desire for a return to a less intrusive federal state. He told an audience in Akron, Ohio, in March 1950 that a new cold war was raging "between democratic practices and philosophies on the one hand and the practices and philosophy of a powerful central government on the other." He commented that "the area left to the exercise of private responsibility had steadily dwindled as government has been given control over more and more of our economic and personal affairs."18
[xvi] Glennan also believed that it was the responsibility of the private sector to take the lead in a variety of areas, rather than abdicating responsibility and allowing government to fill the vacuum. One of those areas was the development of science and technology, perhaps a particularly appropriate area of concern for Glennan because of his background and position at Case. He told the president of a scientific research-oriented corporation in 1952, for instance, that "unless industry moves much farther and faster along the road of social responsibility (much fine progress has been made to date), I am inclined to believe that the omnipresent politician and big government man will step in with costly promises."19 In concert with this position, Glennan deplored what he called the expansion of the "welfare state," and argued for a strong showing among private institutions so that government leaders would not feel compelled to get involved in too many aspects of people's lives.20 Accordingly, he expressed well the apparent attitudes of many white middle-class, slightly conservative Americans who went to the polls in 1952 and elected Republican candidate Dwight D. Eisenhower as president. Both of these guiding beliefs in Glennan's life helped to shape his actions and contributed fundamentally to the direction he charted for NASA as its first administrator.
While Glennan had strong beliefs about limiting the federal government's role in daily life, he tempered those ideological leanings with a certain pragmatism, informed by principle, that recognized some regulation and some activity was required by the federal government to ensure the safety of the citizens and the advance of the nation's technological and scientific base. One of those areas where he had little difficulty accepting the federal government's preeminence was in the management of nuclear power. This same area also afforded Glennan his first important opportunity to offer public service at the national level in the postwar period.
That occasion came while he was on vacation in the summer of 1950, when Glennan called back to CIT and learned that the White House had been trying to reach him. Glennan found that outgoing Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) member Lewis L. Strauss had given his name to Donald Dawson, a Truman aide who was looking at candidates to serve on the AEC. Strauss had been Herbert Hoover's private secretary in the World War I era, became a successful Wall Street businessman in the 1920s, and turned his attention to philanthropic enterprises associated with scientific research in the latter 1930s. A member of the Naval Reserve since 1925, he had served as a Rear Admiral in World War II as a special assistant to Navy Secretary James V. Forrestal. During the war he had also learned of Glennan's work at the Naval Underwater Sound Laboratory, and when the time came to seek a replacement for his own seat on the AEC, Strauss remembered the [xvii] 45-year-old Case president. While some of the Democratic congressmen involved in the search preferred the appointment of AEC General Counsel Joseph A. Volpe, Jr., Strauss used his connections in the White House and the Pentagon to gain Glennan's appointment. Glennan brought to the job, as the official history of the AEC commented, "a solid business background, some experience in Government, and a great interest in the role of science and technology in modern industry."21
After speaking with Dawson, Glennan visited Washington to learn more about the AEC position. He recalled that he met Dawson in the White House, where he was briefed on the activities of the Commission. Glennan told Dawson that he would wait to hear from him about whether or not President Truman wished him to serve. As he was preparing to leave, however, Dawson said, "wait a minute, Mr. Glennan, I think the president wants to see you." Dawson took Glennan into the Oval Office where he met the president and they spoke briefly about the AEC. Glennan allowed that he was not particularly well-qualified for the post, but Truman responded with a "I'm not sure you're the best judge of that."22
Following this discussion, Truman sent Glennan's name to the Senate for confirmation as one of five commissioners for the AEC. Glennan testified before the congressional committee handling the nomination on 16 August 1950, was confirmed handily, and began work for the AEC in Washington on 1 October. He served on the AEC for the next twenty-five months. Probably the most significant issue the AEC became involved in during Glennan's tenure was the development of the hydrogen bomb. Glennan resigned from the AEC on 30 October 1952, and the first hydrogen bomb test took place at Eniwetok Atoll in the Pacific Ocean on 1 November 1952.23
During the time that Glennan was at AEC, he was officially on a leave of absence from the presidency of Case Institute of Technology. Acting in his stead during those two years was Elmer Hutchinson, a CIT alumnus and an old Glennan associate from World War II. Glennan, never one to sit and vegetate, continued to assist Hutchinson in managing the affairs of Case. He often spent his weekends in Cleveland, especially early in his AEC tenure since his family remained behind to allow his children to remain in their schools. Whenever he did so, Glennan typically spent some time with Hutchinson discussing CIT business, usually answering questions about fund-raising strategies and plans underway.
[xviii] The result was that Case did not suffer materially during its president's absence, often the case whenever an "acting president" heads an institution of higher learning. In fact, it may actually have benefitted the institution, for Glennan's experience broadened both his perspectives and his contacts with other influential people. It also brought renown to him and by extension to the school. "When I came back," he recalled of his experiences at AEC and later at NASA, "I could get hold of almost anybody in the industries which had been associated [with the AEC and NASA] and that meant most of the industries in this country: space and atomic energy. I kept up those relationships very well and I think they did us a lot of good at Case."24
During the years between the conclusion of his AEC service in 1952 and his acceptance of the NASA administrator's post in 1958 Glennan continued his expansion program at Case Institute of Technology and dabbled in public policy issues. In the later arena, he participated in several government committees and task forces relative to higher education and to nuclear power. In 1955 he began serving on a committee under the direction of a Joint Committee of Congress on Atomic Energy, and helped to prepare a study on "The Impact of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy." While on this committee Glennan developed additional associations with members of Congress, among them Senate wheelhorse and science and technology benefactor, Clinton P. Anderson (Democrat-New Mexico).25 He also provided advice to Lewis Strauss, by that time back as chair of the Atomic Energy Commission, on policy direction and energy for peaceful purposes.26 He was appointed to the board of the National Science Foundation in 1956. He joined with several other college and university presidents in an 18-day visit to the Soviet Union to study the educational programs of the USSR under the sponsorship of the Scaife Foundation in 1958.27 Because of this sort of activity, when the Eisenhower administration sought a person to head up the newly created NASA, Glennan was quite well known in business, higher education, science and technology, and public service circles.
When Sputnik burst onto the national scene, there was a rapid and sustained whir of public opinion condemning the Eisenhower administration for neglecting the American space program. The Sputnik crisis reinforced for many [xix] people the popular conception that Eisenhower was a smiling incompetent; it was another instance of a "do-nothing," golf-playing president mismanaging events.28 G. Mennen Williams, the Democratic governor of Michigan, even wrote a poem about it:
It was a shock, creating the illusion of a technological gap and providing the impetus for a variety of remedial actions.
The more serious reaction to Sputnik came from Senator Lyndon B. Johnson (Democrat-Texas), who opened hearings by the Senate Armed Services Committee's preparedness subcommittee on 25 November 1957 to review the whole spectrum of American defense and space programs in the wake of the Sputnik crisis. One of Johnson's concerns, of course, was that a nation capable of orbiting satellites was also capable of developing technology to support the arms race. This subcommittee found serious underfunding and incomprehensible organization for the conduct of U.S. space activities, and that worried it all the more. It blamed the president and the Republican party. Johnson spoke for many Americans when he remarked in two speeches in Texas that the "Soviets have beaten us at our own game - daring, scientific advances in the atomic age." Since those cold war rivals had already established a foothold in space, Johnson proposed to "take a long careful look" at what had gone wrong in the U.S. space and missile program and to chart a course that would lead to U.S. parity in space.30
[xx] Emerging from this investigation was a policy to make space exploration a concerted effort both for technological development and for the national prestige it would engender in the context of the cold war. Johnson's subcommittee assessed the nature, scope, and organization of the nation's long-term efforts in space, and was so disappointed that the Senate voted on 6 February 1958 to create a Special Committee on Space and Aeronautics whose charter was to frame legislation for a permanent space agency. The House of Representatives soon followed suit. With Congress leading the way, it was obvious that some government organization to direct American space efforts would emerge before the end of the year.31
While this was taking place in Congress, Eisenhower was not inactive. Asking his new science advisor, James R. Killian. Jr., to convene the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), established in the wake of Sputnik, to come up with a plan, in March 1958 the PSAC proposed that all non-military space efforts be assigned to a strengthened and renamed National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). Although established in 1915 to foster aviation research in the United States, the NACA had already moved into space-related areas of research and engineering. Its civilian character; its recognized excellence in technical activities; and its quiet, research-focused image all made it an attractive choice. It could fill the requirements of the job without exacerbating cold war tensions with the Soviet Union.32
President Eisenhower accepted the PSAC's recommendations and a new National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) emerged from this action by the administration as further shaped by congressional responses to it. The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 set forth a broad mission for the agency to "plan, direct, and conduct aeronautical and space activities"; to involve the nation's scientific community in these activities; and to disseminate widely information about these activities. An administrator, appointed by the president would head the new agency. Lyndon Johnson inserted into the proposed legislation language that provided for the creation of a Space Council of no more than nine members charged with working out "the aeronautic and astronautic policies, programs and project of the United States." Required seats on the Council included the head of NASA, the secretaries of State and Defense, and the chief of the AEC. Eisenhower signed the act into law on 29 July 1958. The new organization started functioning on 1 October.33
[xxi] Even before Eisenhower signed this act creating NASA, individuals within his administration began a search for the agency's first administrator. Most people on the Washington scene thought that the NACA's Director, Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, would be named to the post. Dryden, a career civil servant and an aerodynamicist by discipline, was also considered one of the government's top science and technology managers. He had frequently incurred the wrath of Congress in the post-Sputnik era, however, for his cautious stance on competing with the Soviets in any space race. Congressmen and senators saw NASA as a weapon to be wielded in order to "leapfrog" the cold war rivals, if only its head had the ability and the will to employ it effectively. Several sources reported that Dryden's candidacy was "vetoed" early in the search process by the House Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration because he did not seem to possess either that ability or will.34
Since Dryden was not an acceptable candidate to head NASA, Killian looked elsewhere and quickly hit on Glennan as a possible candidate. Glennan recalled that Killian asked him to come to Washington early in August 1958 and took him to meet Eisenhower, to whom he had been introduced for the first time in 1955. The president told him that he needed a person to run NASA who would not be spooked by the cold war crisis atmosphere present in the nation but would build a firm foundation upon which to carry out a far-reaching, reasonable program aimed at the exploration of space using "cutting-edge" technology. Eisenhower asked Glennan to accept the job, and Glennan agreed provided that Dryden was named as his deputy. After weathering a senatorial hearing on the two nominations on 14 August 1958, they were confirmed by the whole Senate the next day, and were sworn in on 19 August. Glennan then worked out another leave of absence from Case and reported for duty in Washington on 9 September 1958.35
Glennan fit perfectly into the Eisenhower administration. He was a Republican with a fiscally conservative bent, an aggressive businessman with a keen sense of public duty and an opposition to government intrusion into the lives of Americans, and an administrator and an educator with a rich appreciation of the role of science and technology in an international setting. His values and perspectives found themselves replicated in NASA as he began to direct its affairs in the fall of 1958. First, Glennan worked for the development of a well-rounded space [xxii] program that did not focus on "spectacular" missions designed to "one-up" the Soviets. While he was an ardent cold warrior and understood very well the importance of the space program as an instrument of international prestige, Glennan emphasized long-range goals that would yield genuine scientific and technological results. Second, he believed that the new space agency should remain relatively small, and that much of its work would of necessity be done under contract to private industry and educational institutions. This was in line with his concerns about the growing size and power of the federal government. Third, when it grew, as he knew it would, Glennan tried to direct it in an orderly manner. Along those lines, he tenaciously worked for the incorporation of the non-military space efforts being carried out in several other federal agencies - especially in the Department of Defense - into NASA so that the space program could be brought together into a meaningful whole.36
About 170 employees of the new space organization gathered in the courtyard of the Dolly Madison House near the White House on 1 October 1958 to listen to Glennan as he charted the course for the space agency. The newly-appointed NASA administrator announced the bold prospects being considered for space exploration. Glennan was presiding over a NASA that had absorbed the NACA intact; its 8,000 employees and an annual budget of $100 million made up the core of the new NASA. When Glennan arrived NASA consisted of a small headquarters staff in Washington that directed operations, plus three major research laboratories - the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory established in 1917, the Ames Aeronautical Laboratory activated near San Francisco in 1939, and the Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory built at Cleveland, Ohio, in 1940 - and two small test facilities, one for high-speed flight research at Muroc Dry Lake in the high desert of California and one for sounding rockets at Wallops Island, Virginia. The scientists and engineers who came into NASA from the NACA brought a strong sense of technical competence, a commitment to collegial in-house research conducive to engineering innovation, and a definite apolitical perspective.37
[xxiii] Within a short time after NASA's formal organization, Glennan incorporated several organizations involved in space exploration projects from other federal agencies into NASA to ensure that Eisenhower's desires for a viable scientific program of space exploration could be reasonably conducted over the long-term. One of the important ingredients consisted of the 150 personnel and resources associated with Project Vanguard at the Naval Research Laboratory, located along the Potomac River just outside of Washington. Officially becoming a part of NASA on 16 November 1958, this project remained under the operational control of the Navy until 1960 when it was transferred en masse from Navy facilities to a newly established NASA installation, the Goddard Space Flight Center, in suburban Maryland. Those who had been associated with the Naval Research Laboratory brought a similar level of scientific competence and emphasis on in-house research and technical mastery to that of the NACA elements.38
It would be superfluous to add further details about the early history of NASA because Glennan tells that story himself in the diary that follows. He relates, for example, how in December 1958 NASA acquired control of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, a contractor facility operated by the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) in Pasadena, California. A contractor for the Army, this oddly-named institution had been specializing in the development of weaponry since World War II.39 He also explains the struggle with the Army leading to NASA's acquisition of the development operations division within the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) - a part of the Redstone Arsenal, located at Huntsville, Alabama - and its Saturn rocket program, presided over by one of the nation's foremost space advocates, German postwar immigrant Wernher von Braun. This rocket team brought to NASA a strong sense of technical competence, a keen commitment to the goal as defined by von Braun, and an especially hardy group identity.40 Glennan also explains some of the background behind the founding of the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston in 1961 (after he left NASA) and of the later Kennedy Space Center at Cape Canaveral soon thereafter.41
[xxiv] In the course of the diary, Glennan narrates among other things the history of the Mercury program and its astronaut corps.42 The diary reveals how clearly Glennan understood the tenor of the cold war atmosphere of the latter 1950s and the seemingly life-and-death struggle between the two superpowers. He believed that Project Mercury was more a means to an end than something to be done because it would yield important scientific results. "I came to realize," he recalled in 1990, "that we wouldn't have a program at all if we didn't have one that was exciting to people. That was the reason for manned space flight. But I was interested in what the law required us to do for the benefit of all mankind. And I think that what has been done without man is much more for the benefit of mankind than all we did in getting ahead of the Russians [with human spaceflight]."43 As a result he fashioned a program that incorporated a healthy human spaceflight element with a solid space science and applications base. In this, he had the strong support of Dryden.
The two of them opted for a deliberate program with clear objectives and a long timetable. The Eisenhower administration's goal, as Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Walter A. McDougall concluded, was to refrain from beginning a race against the Soviets that "might kick off an orgy of state-directed technological showmanship that would be hard to stop, might spill over into other policy arenas, and would relinquish to the Soviets the initiative in defining the fields of battle for the hearts and minds of the world."44
In 1960 Senator John F. Kennedy (Democrat-Massachusetts) ran for president with Lyndon B. Johnson as his running mate. Using the slogan, "Let's get this country moving again," Kennedy charged the Republican Eisenhower administration with doing nothing about the myriad social, economic, and international problems that festered in the 1950s. He was especially hard on Eisenhower's record in international relations, taking a hard-line position on a supposed "missile gap" (which turned out not to be the case) wherein the United States lagged far behind the Soviet Union in ICBM technology. The Republican candidate, Richard M. Nixon, who had been Eisenhower's vice president, tried to defend his mentor's record but when the results were in, Kennedy was elected by a narrow margin of 118,550 out of more than 68 million popular votes cast. The change in administration ensured that Glennan would be released from his work at NASA and be allowed to return to CIT. He resigned effective 20 January 1961, the day of Kennedy's inaugural, and moved back to Cleveland after spending 28 months in Washington.45
[xxv] During the time that Glennan headed NASA he worked to assure the viability of the space agency as an organization that could carry out an exceptionally complex and arduous set of scientific and technological tasks. In an irony of massive proportions, Glennan was in large part responsible for positioning NASA to be able to accomplish the type of large-scale, federally-operated technological enterprise that he believed was not in the nation's best interests. He also positioned NASA so that it could serve as the vehicle for competing with the Soviet Union in a so-called space race, which he also believed was not in the nation's best interest. In some respects, Glennan had succeeded too well in establishing NASA as a viable agency, for it was his organization that accomplished a goal he had eschewed - an accelerated Project Apollo to race the Soviets to the Moon. In some respects he was a tragic figure; he played Frederick Wilhelm I (who built the Prussian Army into the finest fighting force in Europe in the early eighteenth century but was reluctant to use it) to successor James E. Webb's Frederick the Great (who used the Prussian Army to conquer and defend Silesia in the middle decades of the eighteenth century, thereby raising Prussia to great power status).46
[xxvi] From his seat at Case Institute of Technology Glennan watched the activities at NASA during the Kennedy administration with great interest. For a time Kennedy seemed quite happy to allow NASA to execute Project Mercury at a deliberate pace, but that changed in April 1961 because of two important events. On 12 April Soviet Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin became the first human in space with a one-orbit mission aboard the spacecraft Vostok 1. The effort to place a human in space before the Soviet Union did so had now failed. Glennan wrote a letter to Robert Gilruth, the head of NASA's Space Task Group, offering consolation. "Even though we all expected the Russians to get there . . . first," he commented, "I am sure that each of us had a fervent hope that Mercury would make the grade in time." Even so, he urged Gilruth "not, under any circumstances, [to] deviate from the path you have chosen. There is now even greater reason for applying your engineering judgment to all phases of the project. . . . Keep your chin up!"47 Within a few days, the aborted invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs heaped international censure on the U.S.
While Gilruth and company succeeded in launching Alan Shepard on a 15-minute suborbital flight on 6 May 1961, that did not salve the open wound to U.S. pride. The perception of American technical inferiority to the Soviet Union worried the Kennedy administration because of what it would mean in the larger cold war environment. To reestablish the nation's credibility as a technological leader before the world, Kennedy unveiled an accelerated Project Apollo among other proposals in a 25 May 1961 speech on "Urgent National Needs." After clearly laying out the cold war origins of the project, he stated, "I believe that this Nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the earth. No single space project in this period will be more impressive to mankind, or more important for the long-range exploration of space; and none will be so difficult or expensive to accomplish."48
Glennan's reaction was immediate. He began corresponding with several people who had been members of the Eisenhower administration, including Ike himself, and expressed misgivings about the commitment to race the Soviets.49 For instance he told Eisenhower, then in retirement at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, that "this is a very bad move - that we are entering into a competition which will be [xxvii] exceedingly costly and which will take up an increasingly large share of that small portion of the nation's budget which might be called controllable."50 Glennan harped on this concern throughout the rest of the year, never quite able to accept the view of the Kennedy administration that large expenditures for science and technology in the form of a race to the moon against the Soviets could have much positive benefit for the nation.
Glennan also maintained contact with his successor at NASA, James Webb, and expressed to him his dismay at Kennedy's mandate. He told Webb in July 1961:
Years later Glennan was still sending letters to Webb, congratulating him on successes and commending him when he took positions that seemed broadly based and not simply oriented toward racing to the moon with the Soviet Union. He never wavered in his support for the accomplishments of NASA, even though he disagreed with the policies of the Kennedy administration, and often wrote to Webb or his former NASA colleagues thoughtful statements recognizing successful launches or other space-related activities. Like many others he was pleased with the successful lunar landing mission in 1969, although it was the capstone of a project he believed had been ill-advised.52
While he watched the direction of NASA and the space program during the 1960s, it did not consume his interests. He continued to direct the affairs of Case Institute of Technology, building its infrastructure, resources, and student body. When the opportunity came in the early 1960s to move toward an affiliation with CIT's sister institution, Western Reserve University, he and Western Reserve President John S. Millis took it and began a long process that resulted in federation of the two schools. Case's science and technology program coupled with Western Reserve's liberal arts, law, and medical schools ensured the success of both in the long term. The two presidents pushed for a linking of the two schools, finally achieving the goal with the beginning of the 1967-1968 academic year, after [xxix] Glennan's retirement.53 For unfortunately, Glennan did not remain as Case president to see this federation to completion. He had developed health problems in the early 1960s, especially diabetes, and decided to retire after eighteen years of service in the summer of 1965. When it took the search committee longer than anticipated to find a suitable replacement, however, he remained another year and retired on 30 June 1966 at age 61.54
After leaving Case, Glennan spent two years as president of Associated Universities, Inc., a Washington-based institution involved in technical issues.55 From his position in Washington he watched the student unrest on the nation's campuses during the latter part of the 1960s and was deeply troubled by what he saw. He could never fully understand what was taking place, although he made an effort to do so. He wrote to a friend, Polycarp Kusch, a Nobel Prize-winning physicist and alumnus of CIT, in May 1968 about the riots at Columbia University where Kusch was on the faculty. "The troublesome aspects of the Students for Democratic Society as an advocate of disruption and even of violence bother me very greatly," he confided, and asked for Kusch's analysis of why young people who were the most well-educated and provided for in the history of the United States could seek to destroy the society that had nurtured them so well.56 Kusch was more sympathetic to the student demonstrators and tried to explain that oppression by his university had been allowed to go unchecked. "To my mind," he wrote, "we require a new mood or spirit or style; this is not going to be forthcoming through a readjustment of statutes. . . . What puzzles me now both personally and in more formal roles is how all the pieces can be put back together again into a university that may flourish in this age."57 Glennan continued to watch the uproar on the campus but failed to [xxx] recognize until much later that a social transformation was underway that reshaped the structure of the U.S. in the latter 1960s and early 1970s.58
Since the early 1970s Glennan has been involved in a variety of public service and civic activities. As of this writing (May 1993) he is 87 years old but still available to lend advice and support on a broad front to those who ask. He presently lives in Mitchellville, Maryland.
The document that follows was dictated by T. Keith Glennan to record for his own children his observations and priorities while head of NASA during the Eisenhower administration. The first part of it is actually a memoir, consisting of [xxxi] a summary of major events in which he participated during his early years at NASA in 1958 and 1959. Most of the rest is in a diary format, made up of daily summaries of events, including his personal reflections from 1 January 1960 through the end of the Eisenhower presidency over a year later. There also follows a postscript written by Glennan in 1963 to record his thoughts on the space program during the presidency of John F. Kennedy. The actual document was assembled by Glennan in the early 1960s, after his return to Case, typed up, and then bound in two volumes in 1964. He made copies of the diary for each of his children, kept one for himself, and placed one (restricted for a time) at the Eisenhower Presidential Library for research purposes. Later he made a copy available to the NASA History Division for incorporation into its reference collection. For many years historians have recognized the importance of this diary in charting the early history of NASA and the U.S. space program. It has been studied by historians and quoted at length in several historical texts, but until now the diary itself has been accessible to only a few people who could travel to Abilene or Washington to use it.
Since the diary was dictated into a tape recorder rather than written and was never prepared for formal publication, Dr. J. D. Hunley, who has done most of the editing for this version of the diary, has corrected spelling, punctuation, and grammar in some places, shortened many sentences without changing their sense or general flavor, and omitted certain sections of the diary that contained purely family-oriented comments not germane to understanding Glennan's role at NASA. Dr. Hunley took over the editing responsibilities when other demands of my job made it clear that I could not finish the project in a reasonable amount of time. I had done the preliminary editing on the first three chapters, but he has revised those and done all of the editing for the remaining chapters. In every case we have shown the results of the editing to the author before committing them to print. To a very real extent, therefore, this published version of Glennan's diary represents his statement. We have not changed any of the observations or conclusions he reached in the unpublished version, although Glennan suggested that perhaps some of them did not prove to be valid and that he might have changed his mind over the course of the last quarter century, especially in relation to some of his hard comments about individuals with whom he dealt. He agreed, however, that the diary accurately represents his position as it crystallized in the early 1960s and that in itself makes it an exceptionally valuable historical document.
Throughout the document, footnotes provide background information about matters that Glennan brings up in the diary but does not elaborate upon. The notes also add supplemental information about budgetary data, organizational matters, and the like, as well as occasional identifications of individuals mentioned in the diary but not fully identified. Where it is brief enough, sometimes we have provided identifications in brackets right in the text of the diary, and brackets sometimes also indicate where material from the original diary has been deleted. This latter practice is a rare one, however, used only when needed for transition. We have deleted a great deal of personal material and shortened some sentences without specific indication of the omissions because otherwise, the text would have been [xxxii] littered with ellipses. At the end of the diary, a biographical appendix provides sketches of the lives of the major figures Glennan talks about.
Throughout this project Keith and Ruth Glennan have been exceptionally supportive and helpful. Without their assistance the project could not have been completed. I also wish to acknowledge the help of R. Cargill Hall, who shared his wealth of knowledge about the space program of the Eisenhower administration; Lee D. Saegessor, who helped track down illustrations and sources for footnotes; Robert H. Ferrell, who generously read several chapters of the diary and offered us his excellent editorial advice; and J.D. Hunley, who besides doing most of the editing, read and edited various drafts of this introduction, and provided valuable advice. In addition to these individuals, I wish to acknowledge and thank the following people who aided us in a variety of ways to complete this editorial assignment: Donald R. Baucom, Virginia P. Dawson, Andrew J. Dunar, Aaron K. Gillette, Michael R. Gorn, Adam L. Gruen, Richard P. Hallion, Mark Hayes, Marianne Hosea, H. C. Hunley, Sylvia K. Kraemer, Theresa Kraus, Beverley Lehrer, Cathleen S. Lewis, John L. Loos, Howard E. McCurdy, F. Mark McKiernan, Jerry Meyer, H. C. Erik Midelfort, Jeffrey Michaels, Jennifer Mitchum, John E. Naugle, Allan L. Needell, Michael J. Neufeld, Stephanie Pair, Tricia Porth, John L. Sloop, Joseph N. Tatarewicz, Joyce Thompson-Stipe, Dennis Vetock, William C. Walter, Mary Weyant, and Bruce Wolf. My thanks also go to Ellwood Anaheim and Ray Falvo for their persistence in preparing this manuscript for publication. Finally, I extend my thanks to the people at NASA's Printing and Graphics office, especially Kathy Jackson who served as copy editor and Frank Stewart who cropped and sized the photos, for their help in bookmaking. Needless to say, since we have not always followed all of the advice these people have kindly offered, Dr. Hunley and I retain responsibility for any errors in the book.
T. Keith Glennan was responsible, probably more than any other single person in the early history of the agency, for creating a National Aeronautics and Space Administration that could carry out a broad-based scientific and technological program. As such, he left an enduring legacy to the agency. His personality and beliefs, fiscally and socially conservative in some ways but progressive in others, also helped to shape NASA. His diary leaves a valuable legacy to historians, scientists, engineers, and public policy analysts seeking to understand the evolution of the U.S. venture into space. Glennan left a remarkable account of his work at NASA, and his record of meetings with President Eisenhower, the National Security Council, and other bodies as well as of the evolution of NASA as an institution provides important perspectives not only for those specifically interested in NASA but also for students of the recent history of science and technology in the United States.
Roger D. Launius
Washington, D.C., 11 August 1993
1. On the success of Glennan's presidency at Case Institute of Technology see C.H. Cramer, Case Institute of Technology: A Centennial History, 1880-1980 (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University, 1980), pp. 171-208.
2. On NASA's creation and early years see, Robert L. Rosholt, An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963 (Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration SP-4101, 1966); Enid Curtis Bok Schoettle, "The Establishment of NASA," in Sanford A. Lakoff, ed., Knowledge and Power (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 162-270; Rip Bulkeley, The Sputniks Crisis and Early United States Space Policy: A Critique of the Historiography of Space (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991).
3. The standard work on how international rivalries between the United States and the Soviet Union were played out in the two nations' space program is Walter A. McDougall, . . . The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York: Basic Books, 1985).
4. "Interview Highlights on T. Keith Glennan," 21 June 1947, Biographical Files, Collection 7PI, University Archives, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, and T. Keith Glennan to Roger D. Launius, Chief, NASA History Office, 8 May 1993.
5. G. Edward White has described the formation of an eastern establishment in the late nineteenth century as a male order in which the progression from brahmin stock, to prep school, to Ivy League college, to men's clubs played a central role in defining an elite core of American leaders. While Glennan entered this world only at the Ivy League college level, his capabilities helped him to maintain and flourish as part of this establishment. See G. Edward White, The Eastern Establishment and the Western Experience: The West of Frederic Remington, Theodore Roosevelt, and Owen Wister (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 11-30.
6. "Interview Highlights on T. Keith Glennan," 21 June 1947, Biographical Files, Collection 7PI; letter cited above in note 4.
7. The predecessor of this organization had been established as the National Research Advisory Committee on 27 June 1940, following a conversation between Vannevar Bush and one of Roosevelt's key advisors, Harry Hopkins, over concerns the scientists had about the nation's lack of preparedness for war. In that meeting, Bush offered to take charge of an effort to organize scientific activities for victory. He was motivated to this end, he recalled, by "the threat of a possible atomic bomb [that] was in all our minds, and time might well determine whether it became ours or a means for our enslavement" (Vannevar Bush, Pieces of the Action [New York: William Morrow and Co., 1970], p. 34).
8. The history of this organization is documented in James Phinney Baxter III, Scientists Against Time (Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1946). On earlier scientific activities in the Federal Government see, A. Hunter Dupree, Science in the Federal Government: A History of Policies and Activities to 1940 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957).
9. Glennan's commitment to public service was consistent throughout his career. When he was serving as a commissioner for the Atomic Energy Commission in he early 1950s, one of his friends wrote to ask if there was a way he could help his son avoid the draft (Ed Frawley to T. Keith Glennan, 18 January 1951, Glennan Personal Papers, 19DD4, Case Western Reserve University Archives, Cleveland, OH). Glennan responded that he was not inclined to use his public position to influence such matters, but added, "frankly, I think the best thing to do is to let him take his chance with the Selective Service or whatever else is decreed as the normal course for all young men. It is my opinion that all of these youngsters are going to have to give some of their time to government service whether it be in the armed forces or in some other field." Such service should not be considered onerous, but was a responsibility all should be pleased to bear (T. Keith Glennan to Ed Frawley, 23 January 1951, Glennan Personal Papers, 19DD4).
10. See Susan Curtis, A Consuming Faith: The Social Gospel and Modern American Culture (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 270-85; Wayne K. Hobson, "Professionals, Progressives and Bureaucratization: A Reassessment," The Historian, 39 (August 1977): 639-58; Brian Balogh, "Reorganizing the Organizational Synthesis: Federal-Professional Relations in Modern America," Studies in American Political Development, 5 (Spring 1991): 119-72.
11. Vannevar Bush, Director, Office of Scientific Research and Development, to T. Keith Glennan, 27 October 1942, 4 December 1943; T. Keith Glennan to Fern Sullivan, Office of Scientific Research and Development, 22 November 1944, all in President's Files, Collection 19DB4, Case Western Reserve University Archives.
12. "Interview Highlights on T. Keith Glennan," 21 June 1947, Biographical Files, Collection 7PI; telephonic interview of T. Keith Glennan by J. D. Hunley, 8 July 1993.
13. Interview of T. Keith Glennan by Ruth W. Helmuth, 19 April 1976, President's Collection, 19DB4, Case Western Reserve University Archives, Cleveland.
14. Ibid.; T. Keith Glennan to Charles Boren, 24 January 1948, T. Keith Glennan Personal Papers, 19DD4; T. Keith Glennan to J. D. Hunley, 28 June 1993.
15. Interview of T. Keith Glennan by Ruth W. Helmuth, 19 April 1976, President's Collection, 19DB4.
16. T. Keith Glennan to William E. Barbour, Jr., President, Tracerlab, Inc., 3 March 1952, Glennan Personal Papers, 19DD4; Cramer, Case Institute of Technology, pp. 171-200; "He Did It All," CWRU Magazine, February 1990, pp. 9-15; T. Keith Glennan to J. D. Hunley, 27 June 1993.
17. T. Keith Glennan to Rufus Day, Jr., McAfee, Grossman, et al., 16 January 1951, Glennan Personal Papers, 19DD4.
18. "Nurturing Paternalism," Huntington (WV) Advertiser, 23 March 1950.
19. Glennan to Barbour, 3 March 1952, Glennan Personal Papers, 19DD4.
20. J.M. Telleen to T. Keith Glennan, 15 November 1956; T. Keith Glennan to J.M. Telleen, 19 November 1956, both in Glennan Personal Papers, 19DD4.
21. Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield, 1947-1952: Volume II, A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1969), p. 468.
22. "He Did It all," CWRU Magazine, February 1990, p. 12.
23. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearing on Confirmation of Thomas Keith Glennan To Be a Member of the Atomic Energy Commission, August 16, 1950 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950); Albert L. Baker, President, Kellex Corp., to T. Keith Glennan, 2 November 1950, Glennan Personal Papers, 19DD4; "He Did It All," CWRU Magazine, February 1990, p. 13; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, pp. 542-45.
24. Interview of T. Keith Glennan by Ruth W. Helmuth, 19 April 1976, President's Files, Collection 19DB4; Cramer, Case Institute of Technology, pp. 200-202.
25. Walter Hamilton, Secretary to the Panel, of Congress' Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, to T. Keith Glennan, 30 June 1955; T. Keith Glennan to Walter Hamilton, 1 June 1955; T. Keith Glennan to Senator Clinton P. Anderson, 9 February 1956, all in Glennan Personal Papers, 19DD4.
26. T. Keith Glennan to Lewis L. Strauss, 21 January 1957, 25 February 1957; Lewis L. Strauss to T. Keith Glennan, 15 February 1957, with enclosure; all in Glennan Personal Papers, 19DD4.
27. Report On Higher Education in the Soviet Union (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958); Alan T. Waterman, Director of National Science Foundation, to T. Keith Glennan, 11 July 1958, President's Collection, DB14; Glennan to Launius, 8 May 1993.
28. This proved incorrect, however, and Fred I. Greenstein demonstrated the fact in The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York: Basic Books, 1982). He argued that Eisenhower worked behind the scenes while giving the appearance of inaction, and in most instances his indirect approach to leadership was highly effective. This has been extended to Eisenhower's space program in R. Cargill Hall, "Eisenhower, Open Skies, and Freedom of Space," IAA-92-0184, paper delivered on 2 September 1992 to the International Astronautical Federation, Washington, D.C.
29. G. Mennen Williams, quoted in William E. Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 94-94. See also Derek W. Elliott, "Finding an Appropriate Commitment: Space Policy Under Eisenhower and Kennedy," Ph.D. Diss., George Washington University, 1992.
30. Speeches of Lyndon B. Johnson, Tyler, TX, 18 October 1957, and Austin, TX, 19 October 1957, both in Statements file, Box 22, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, TX. On the preparedness subcommittee, see McDougall, Heavens and the Earth, pp. 142, 151-155, 162, 166, 214, 387; Robert Dallek, Lone Star Rising: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1908-1960 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 529-531.
31. Alison Griffith, The National Aeronautics and Space Act: A Study of the Development of Public Policy (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1962), pp. 19-24.
32. Rosholt, Administrative History of NASA, pp. 8-12. On the history of the NACA see, Alex Roland, Model Research: The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 1915-1958 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA SP-4103, 1985).
33. "National Aeronautics and Space Act," Hearings before the Senate Committee on Space and Astronautics, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 91, 258; Griffith, National Aeronautics and Space Act, p. 93; Rosholt, Administrative History of NASA, pp. 10-17; U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration, Astronautics and Space Exploration, Hearings on H.R. 11881, 85th Cong., 2d. Sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 3-5, 11-15, 967-69; Schoettle, "Establishment of NASA," pp. 229-39; "Analysis of S.3609 with Proposed Modifications," 8 May 1958; Senate Special Committee Memo, 11 April 1958, both in Richard B. Russell Papers, ser. 9, A, box 3, Johnson Library; Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971), p. 277; James R. Killian, Jr., Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977), pp. 137-38.
34. On the "leapfrog" concept see, U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration, Establishment of the National Space Program, H. Rprt. 1770 on H.R. 12575, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 4. U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration, Authorizing Construction for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Hearings on H.R. 13619, 85th Cong., 2d. Sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 9, 12; New York Times, 6 August 1958; Washington Post, 9 August 1958.
35. Rosholt, Administrative History of NASA, pp. 40-42; "He Did It All," CRWU Magazine, February 1990, p. 13; McDougall, Heavens and the Earth, p. 196; Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics, Hearing on Nomination of T. Keith Glennan To Be Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Nomination of Dr. Hugh L. Dryden to Be Deputy Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, August 14, 1958 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1958); Washington Post, 9 August 1958, 11 August 1958; Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, pp. 138-40.
36. These themes are well developed in T. Keith Glennan's diary that follows. See also, "Glennan Announces First Details of the New Space Agency Organization," 5 October 1958, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, D.C.; Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, pp. 141-44; James R. Killian, Jr., Oral History, 23 July 1974, NASA Historical Reference Collection. Eisenhower's concerns about this aspect of modern America are revealed in "Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People," 17 January 1961, Papers of the President, Dwight D. Eisenhower 1960-61 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 1035-40.
37. On these institutions see, Roland, Model Research, I:283-303; James R. Hansen, Engineer in Charge: A History of the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 1917-1958 (Washington, D.C.: NASA SP-4305, 1987); Elizabeth A. Muenger, Searching the Horizon: A History of Ames Research Center, 1940-1976 (Washington, D.C.: NASA SP-4304, 1985); Virginia P. Dawson, Engines and Innovation: Lewis Laboratory and American Propulsion Technology (Washington, D.C.: NASA SP-4306, 1991); Richard P. Hallion, On the Frontier: Flight Research at Dryden, 1946-1981 (Washington, D.C.: NASA SP-4305, 1984); Joseph Adams Shortal, A New Dimension: Wallops Island Flight Test Range: The First Fifteen Years (Washington, D.C.: NASA Reference Publication 1028, 1978). On the technical culture of the NACA see, Howard E. McCurdy, The Two NASAs: High Technology and Organizational Change in the U.S. Space Program (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Nancy Jane Petrovic, "Design for Decline: Executive Management and the Eclipse of NASA," Ph.D. Diss., University of Maryland, 1982.
38. The transfer of several DOD programs to NASA was ordered in William J. Hopkins, White House Executive Clerk to T. Keith Glennan, 2 October 1958, w/enclosures, NASA Historical Reference Collection. On Goddard's creation see, Alfred Rosenthal, Venture into Space: Early Years of Goddard Space Flight Center (Washington, D.C.: NASA SP-4301, 1968).
39. On JPL's history see also Clayton R. Koppes, JPL and the American Space Program: A History of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).
40. See McCurdy, Inside NASA, esp. pp. 16, 36; U.S. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA Authorization Subcommittee, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., Transfer of Von Braun Team to NASA (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960); Rosholt, Administrative History of NASA, pp. 46-47, 117-20.
41. On the creation of the Houston center see Henry C. Dethloff, "Suddenly Tomorrow Came . . .": A History of the Johnson Space Center (Washington, D.C.: NASA SP-4307, 1993). On the Kennedy Space Center see, Charles D. Benson and William Barnaby Faherty, Moonport: A History of Apollo Launch Facilities and Operations (Washington, D.C.: NASA SP-4204, 1978).
42. "Glennan Looks to Moon, But With Purpose in Mind," Times Herald, 4 February 1960. See also "Space Death Wouldn't Halt U.S. Effort, Glennan Says," Baltimore Sun, 11 April 1960; "Glennan Has Goal in Space," New York World Telegram, 5 February 1960; "Capital Circus," New York Times, 30 December 1959.
43. "He Did It All," CWRU Magazine, February 1990, p. 14.
44. T. Keith Glennan to James R. Killian, Jr., 27 May 1959, NASA Historical Reference Collection; McDougall, Heavens and the Earth, p. 202.
45. T. Keith Glennan to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 28 December 1960; President Dwight D. Eisenhower to T. Keith Glennan, 29 December 1960, both in NASA Historical Reference Collection; "NASA Post is Resigned by Glennan," Baltimore Sun, 30 December 1960.
46. This story is told in Gordan A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 11-14; Sidney B. Fay, The Rise of Brandenburg-Prussia to 1786, revised by Klaus Epstein (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1964), pp. 101-111; and E. J. Feuchtwanger, Prussia, Myth and Reality: The Role of Prussia in German History (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1970), pp. 52-73.
47. T. Keith Glennan to Robert Gilruth, 16 April 1961, Glennan Personal Papers, 19DD4.
48. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Documents on International Aspects of the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space, 1954-1962, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963, Senate Document 18, pp. 202-204; Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy . . ., 1961 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 396-406, quotation from p. 404. The standard work on this decision, while more than twenty years old, remains John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National Interest (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970).
49. Richard E. Horner, Northrop Corp., to T. Keith Glennan, 1 June 1961; T. Keith Glennan to J.B. Lawrence Chair, International Fact Finding Inst., 16 May 1961; T. Keith Glennan to Richard M. Nixon, 14 June 1961; T. Keith Glennan to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 14 June 1961, 13 November 1961; T. Keith Glennan to George Kistiakowsky, 4 December 1961; T. Keith Glennan to James R. Killian, Jr., 4 December 1961; James R. Killian to T. Keith Glennan, 19 December 1961; T. Keith Glennan to Neil McElroy, 22 September 1961, all in Glennan Personal Papers, 19DD4.
50. T. Keith Glennan to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 31 May 1961, Glennan Personal Papers, 19DD4.
51. T. Keith Glennan to James E. Webb, 21 July 1961, Glennan Personal Papers, 19DD4.
52. T. Keith Glennan to James E. Webb, 6 November 1962; T. Keith Glennan to Hugh Dryden, 20 November 1964; T. Keith Glennan to M.S. Rowan, Rand Corp., 26 March 1968; T. Keith Glennan to Richard E. Horner, Senior Vice President, Northrop Corp., 3 June 1968; all in Glennan Personal Papers, 19DD4.
53. "Case-WRU Joint Calendar Committee," 4 January 1960-1967; "Appointment of Presidential Committee on Plans, Programs and Resources," 1 May 1964; "Joint Statement of Dr. T. Keith Glennan and Dr. John R. Millis," 1 November 1965; "Resolution Adopted by the Board of Trustees of Western Reserve University," 8 September 1966; Henry F. Heald, et al., "Second interim Report of the Case-W.R.U. Study Commission," 22 November 1966; "Resolution on Federation," 10 January 1967, all in Case Central Files, 19DC, Case Western Reserve University Archives; Ruth Fischer, "Case Western Reserve: Federation Fever," Change: The Magazine of Learning, 10 (October 1978): 38-43; Lawrence S. Finkelstein, "Case-WRU Study Commission at Work," Western Reserve University Outlook, 4 (Winter 1967): 3-5.
54. T. Keith Glennan to Thomas P. Murtaugh, 16 March 1962, Glennan Personal Papers, 19DD4; "Glennans Cherish 18 Years Here," Cleveland Plain Dealer, 27 March 1965; T. Keith Glennan to Dr. Raymond L. Bisplinghoff, Alexandria, Virginia, 24 June 1965; Case Institute of Technology Faculty Announcement, 25 June 1965; Elmer L. Lindseth, Chair, Board of Trustees, to Willia C. Treuhaft, 13 August 1965; "Action of Trustees Without a Meeting," 20 August 1965, all in Central Files, 19DC.
55. T. Keith Glennan to Harry S. Rowen, Rand Corporation, 21 August 1967; T. Keith Glennan to Lewis L. Strauss, 1 October 1968; T. Keith Glennan to Franklin A. Long, Cornell University, 25 January 1968; T. Keith Glennan to Cong. Emilio Q. Daddario, 24 July 1967; T. Keith Glennan to James R. Schlesinger, 1 May 1968; T. Keith Glennan to Kingman Brewster, President, Yale University, 16 Oct 1968, all in Glennan Personal Papers, 19DD4.
56. T. Keith Glennan to Polycarp Kusch, Department of Physics, Columbia University, 13 May 1968, Glennan Personal Papers, 19DD4.
57. Polycarp Kusch to T. Keith Glennan, 17 May 1968, Glennan Personal Papers, 19DD4.
58. T. Keith Glennan to Polycarp Kusch, 23 May 1968, Glennan Personal Papers, 19DD4. For a discussion of this transformation see, Allen J. Matusow, The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Harper & Row, 1984).