SP-4218 To See the Unseen


- Chapter Three -

Sturm und Drang


[55] The period between 1958 and 1964 saw the explosive growth of planetary radar astronomy in terms of the number of active facilities and investigators. Investigators in three countries (the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union) attempted to detect Venus in 1961, and three facilities in the United States alone (Lincoln Laboratory, JPL, and RCA) succeeded. During the 1962 conjunction, the Jicamarca Radar Observatory, a National Bureau of Standards ionospheric facility in Peru, made radar observations of Venus at 50 MHz (6 meters). At the same time, the Lincoln Laboratory solar radar facility at El Campo, Texas, completed in the summer of 1960, observed Venus at 38 MHz (8 meters).1 Thus, by 1964, five American facilities had performed radar experiments on Venus.

The creation of radar astronomy courses, a textbook, and a conference dedicated solely to radar astronomy also signalled the emergence of a new and rapidly growing scientific field. As it had in carrying out planetary radar experiments, Lincoln Laboratory took the lead in shaping the new field. In addition to organizing radar astronomy courses and a textbook, Lincoln Laboratory sponsored the first, and only, radar astronomy conference and undertook, in association with the Cambridge astronomical community, a campaign to design and build a new radar research instrument.

MIT routinely offered summer courses and asked Lincoln Laboratory to propose some. As John Evans explained, "Radar astronomy was in vogue, we were just entering the Space Age, and Sputnik had been launched." So Lincoln Laboratory agreed to run a summer school in radar astronomy beginning in August 1960. In all, about twenty people gave lectures. Evans talked about lunar radar astronomy. Jack Harrington, head of the Radio Physics Division of Lincoln Laboratory and in charge of the summer course, promised lecturers that the talks would be organized into a book. As it turned out, Evans recalled, "the lecture notes weren't that good. We were all asked to rewrite them."2

In August 1961, Harrington and Evans ran the radar astronomy summer course again. The topics and lecturers were somewhat different; the course of 15 lectures lasted only one week. Among the lecturers were Paul Green, Bob Kingston (who had designed the maser for the 1958 Venus experiment), Gordon Pettengill, Bob Price, Herb Weiss (who had built Millstone), and Victor Pineo (formerly of the National Bureau of Standards). Von Eshleman (Stanford), a guest lecturer, discussed solar radar experiments. The week ended with a 2-hour tour of the Millstone Hill Radar Observatory led by Pettengill, Pineo, and Evans "to observe firsthand a modern space radar facility and to witness a representative experiment in radar astronomy."3

[56] The radar astronomy summer course was not given again, "largely because the people concerned have been occupied with other commitments," Evans later wrote.4 Price and Green were no longer involved in radar astronomy, and Pettengill had left Lincoln Laboratory. Harrington himself became Director of the MIT Center for Space Research, which he founded with funding from NASA, in 1963.

At the end of the 1961 summer course, the lecture notes were assembled into a three-volume tome. Yet, as Evans explained, "We didn't have a good set of course notes that would constitute a book."5 Paul Green became irritated with the lack of progress on the book project, announced that he would no longer contribute any material to the book, and nominated Evans to take over the project from Harrington. Evans found himself in an awkward situation; Harrington was his boss. Fortunately, Wilbur B. Davenport, Jr., one of the Assistant Directors of Lincoln Laboratory, had an interest in radar astronomy and pressured Harrington to get the book done quickly.

Evans recalled: "So my arm got twisted very hard by said Davenport. I really didn't want to do it. I was quite busy, and I didn't want to take over Jack's project, so I resisted. I eventually capitulated after enough pressure on the condition that a) I had somebody to help me, and b) I had a secretary assigned to do typing and nothing else, because part of the problem was just getting material out of rough draft form and into typed form. They agreed to both of those conditions." Tor Hagfors, a graduate of Scandinavian technical schools and the Stanford University electrical engineering program, edited the book with Evans.

Next, the project met difficulty at the publisher. The McGraw-Hill editor who had been handling the project left, but no one at Lincoln Laboratory knew. "The manuscript sat in his drawer for almost two years," Evans related. "Meanwhile, we were thinking that the manuscript was going through proofing and so on. Finally, we got a letter from some guy who had inherited this desk and found this manuscript. He got it printed fairly quickly, but in sort of photo-offset form rather than nice copy. At least it came out, belatedly."

Once McGraw-Hill published Radar Astronomy in 1968, radar astronomy had a textbook, parts of which are still used to teach radar astronomy. Nonetheless, neither MIT nor Lincoln Laboratory (which is not a teaching institution) offered a course in radar astronomy until 1970. 6 Although the Evans-Hagfors textbook and the MIT summer course might have served to train a generation of radar astronomers, they did not. Planetary radar astronomy was the child of a research center (Lincoln Laboratory), not an educational institution (MIT). As a result, Lincoln Laboratory radar astronomers did not reproduce themselves in a traditional academic fashion through graduate education, but through employment.

Three radar astronomers came to Lincoln Laboratory during the 1960s through employment: Stanley H. Zisk, Richard P. Ingalls, and Alan E. E. Rogers. Zisk, who created lunar radar images for NASA in support of the Apollo program, and Haystack Associate Director Dick Ingalls, who had been a Lincoln Laboratory employee since 1953, both had degrees in electrical engineering. Alan Rogers, born in Salisbury, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), earned a Ph.D. in electrical engineering from MIT in 1967, and was trained in radio astronomy, before carrying out radar astronomy experiments.7

As far as defining the field of radar astronomy, and particularly in terms of defining actual and potential patrons, the most important step taken by Lincoln Laboratory was [57] the organization of a conference on radar astronomy. Never again did another such conference take place, mainly because radar astronomers located themselves within existing professional organizations. Moreover, the small number of radar astronomers never justified the creation of a separate society or journal.

The conference underscored the Big Science environment in which radar astronomy was evolving. Only a few attempts at Venus had been made by Lincoln Laboratory and Jodrell Bank when the conference convened; lunar, meteor, and ionospheric radar studies were well established. Those radar studies were part of growing civilian and military programs in ionospheric and communication research. More importantly for planetary radar, a new civilian space agency, NASA, had been created only the year before. Its creation, and the prospect of participating in space research, eventually shaped the new field of planetary radar astronomy more than any other Big Science patron.


The Conference on Radar Astronomy


The National Academy of Sciences, through its Space Science Board, underwrote the radar astronomy conference. Established in 1958, the Space Science Board maintained liaisons with the National Science Foundation, NASA, ARPA, the Office of the Science Advisor to the President, and other federal agencies participating in the country's space program. The Space Science Board solicited the opinions of scientists through discussions and summer studies and recommended space programs to federal agencies.8

Bruno B. Rossi, a member of the Space Science Board and a leading MIT physics professor, organized the radar astronomy conference. Rossi had undertaken experimental research on cosmic rays in the 1930s, before working at Los Alamos Laboratory during World War II. He joined MIT in 1946. In 1958, coincidentally with the creation of NASA, Rossi began to consider the potential value of direct measurement of the ionized interplanetary gas by space probes.9

Thomas Gold, recently hired to head Cornell's Center for Radiophysics and Space Research, the parent organization for its radio and radar telescope, and MIT's Philip Morrison, both members of the Space Science Board, assisted Rossi in organizing the conference; however, the brunt of the actual work fell on Rossi's shoulders. He reserved MIT's Endicott House in Dedham, Massachusetts, for 15 and 16 October 1959. Endicott House had a dining area, meeting rooms, large gardens, and accommodations for 8 people; the remainder were lodged at a nearby hotel.

Rossi saw the conference as a small group meeting to develop concrete recommendations for consideration by the Space Science Board at its October meeting. The original conference title, "Reflections and Scattering of Radar Signals Beyond Several Earth Radii," by definition excluded ionospheric radar. However, the revised name, "Conference on Radar Astronomy," was less unwieldy and did not appear to exclude those interested in ionospheric research.10

Holding a different vision of the conference was Stanford professor of electrical engineering Von R. Eshleman. Seeking to exploit the creation of NASA, Eshleman proposed radar studies of planetary ionospheres and atmospheres from spacecraft. Such studies were a logical extension of Stanford's ionospheric radio and radar work of the 1950s, which included a pioneering solar radar experiment.

[58] In 1959, contemporary with the first radar attempts at Venus, Eshleman and Philip B. Gallagher of Stanford, with Lt. Col. Robert C. Barthle of the U.S. Army Signal Corps, a Stanford graduate student, attempted to bounce radar waves off the solar corona. The Air Force Cambridge Research Center (AFCRC) underwrote the Stanford experiment, and the Office of Naval Research funded the 46-meter (150-ft) dish antenna constructed for ionospheric research under the direction of Oswald Villard. Although Eshleman claimed success, a comparison of his results with those obtained shortly afterward by the El Campo solar radar cast serious doubt about their validity, which some radar astronomers continue to express.11

As planning for the radar conference was underway, Eshleman was preparing the solar radar experiment and was on the point of campaigning NASA to underwrite studies of planetary ionospheres from spacecraft. It was a pivotal moment for calling attention to the Stanford radar work. Eshleman saw the conference as a Stanford opportunity. In a letter to Rossi, he claimed that Stanford already "had begun to plan some kind of a meeting to bring together all who are active in this field. However these plans had [sic] not progressed very far." He proposed a larger conference with Stanford and the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) "as co-hosts." If the AFCRC were invited to cosponsor the conference, Eshleman suggested, part of the travel expenses for foreign visitors might be covered. Conference papers could be published as a group in the Proceedings of the Institute of Radio Engineers.12

The conference, however, was solely an MIT affair sponsored only by the National Academy of Sciences. The spectrum of United States civilian and military scientific radar research facilities was represented: MIT and Lincoln Laboratory, Stanford and SRI, Cornell University, the NRL, and the National Bureau of Standards CRPL. In addition, radio astronomers were invited from Harvard University, Yale University, the University of Michigan, and the National Radio Astronomy Observatory (NRAO), Green Bank, West Virginia, the country's major radio astronomy center. ARPA and the AFCRC represented the military.

In addition to representatives of the Space Science Board, Rossi invited the National Science Foundation program director for astronomy and NASA Space Science chief Homer E. Newell, Jr. Unable to attend, Newell recommended Nancy G. Roman in his place: "Although we have no program which directly involves radar astronomy, Dr. Roman will be happy to discuss those aspects of our Astronomy and Astrophysics Programs which are related to this field. I am sure that the results of the discussion will be valuable in our program planning."13 Roman was a felicitous choice; she had carried out lunar radar studies at the NRL.14

[59] Invitations to foreign radio and radar investigators went to Jodrell Bank, the Royal Radar Establishment (Malvern, England), the Division of Radiophysics of the Australian Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO), the Chalmers University of Technology Research Laboratory of Electronics (Gothenburg, Sweden), and the Canadian Defense Research Board Telecommunications Establishment. No Soviet scientists were invited.

The conference program highlighted the work of Lincoln Laboratory. After a talk by Thomas Gold (Cornell) on the scientific goals of radar astronomy, Jack Harrington (Lincoln Laboratory) explained certain experimental techniques and Herb Weiss (Lincoln Laboratory) spoke on transmitters, receivers, and antennas. Next Paul Green (Lincoln Laboratory) discussed signal detection and processing, and James Chisholm (Lincoln Laboratory) talked about electromagnetic propagation phenomena. In another session, organizations represented at the conference described their research programs. General discussion and the formulation of recommendations took up the second day.15

These recommendations defined radar astronomy as a field especially useful to NASA and the rapidly growing space effort. The arguments set forth appeared as attempts to garner the patronage of the new space agency. The first recommendation, for example, spoke directly to NASA and argued the value of radar astronomy for planetary exploration. Launching spacecraft required precise measurements of interplanetary distances and knowledge of planetary surface and atmospheric conditions, all of which radar astronomy was capable of providing. "The importance of radar astronomy to the efficient development of space science must not be underestimated," the recommendation exhorted.

Additional recommendations urged the construction of new radar astronomy facilities operating at a variety of frequencies, as well as the design and construction of large dish and array antennas, high-power high-frequency transmitters, and signal detection and recording techniques. The construction of radar telescopes, the conference recommendations argued, would be far less expensive than building and sending planetary probes.

Conference recommendations also addressed the military and radio astronomy. Planetary radar astronomy at Lincoln Laboratory would not have existed without the construction of the Millstone Hill radar, which the military funded. However, planetary radar experiments officially did not exist; military research was the first priority. Radar astronomy, the recommendations pleaded, needed facilities of its own, where it would receive top priority and be "viewed as pure science."

Conference recommendations also targeted radio astronomers. "Where large radio telescopes are being planned or built," one recommendation proposed, "serious consideration be given from the beginning to the incorporation of provisions for a high-powered transmitter, even if a transmitter were not actually installed." The recommendation further suggested specifically that a radar transmitter be installed on the 10-GHz (3-cm) 43-meter (140-ft) NRAO antenna, thereby offering "an excellent opportunity for radar investigations at very high frequencies." While recognizing that the dissimilar needs of radar and radio astronomers often gave rise to conflict, one recommendation stated, compromise could resolve them.16 As we shall see later, however, those dissimilar needs were beyond compromise.

Bruno Rossi submitted the conference draft recommendations to the Space Science Board at its October 1959 meeting. After some editing and checking that left the [60] recommendations unaltered, the Space Science Board endorsed them for distribution to funding agencies and other interested groups.17 Endicott House was the last conference dedicated solely to radar astronomy, though radar astronomers continued to meet under an existing organizational umbrella, one dedicated not to planetary science, since such specialized organizations did not yet exist, but to radio astronomy and electrical engineering.


L'Union Radioscientifique Internationale


Although much of the earliest radar astronomy work grew out of an interest in ionospheric questions, ionosphericists and planetary radar astronomers soon went separate ways. Planetary radar astronomers grew closer to their colleagues in radio astronomy, with whom they shared techniques and technologies, such as antennas and low-noise receivers. The shift of planetary radar astronomy from the ionospheric to the radio astronomy community was manifest within the Union Radioscientifique Internationale (URSI), which quickly became the premier forum for planetary radar astronomers.18

URSI was an international radio science organization founded in France in 1921 by Gustave Ferrié and other French radio pioneers.19 Its big tent sheltered a range of fields, including ionospheric and radio astronomy science, united by a common technical interest in what might be called radio science. Lacking telescopes committed entirely to their field, planetary radar astronomers worked side-by-side with radio astronomers at the same observatory. As radar astronomer Donald B. Campbell has observed, "There is a tremendous amount of cross-fertilization between planetary radar and radio astronomers in terms of techniques and equipment."20 These shared technical interests and instruments brought planetary radar and radio astronomers together at URSI meetings.

Radio astronomers had had their own commission within URSI since shortly after World War II. In 1946, at its General Assembly meeting in Paris, URSI created a special subcommission on Radio Noise of Extra-Terrestrial Origin, which became Commission 5, Extra-Terrestrial Radio Noise, when URSI revised its commission structure at its 1948 Stockholm meeting. On the proposal of the U.S. National Committee, Commission 5 became the Commission on Radio Astronomy two years later at the General Assembly meeting in Zurich. Commission 5 concerned itself with radio astronomy, as well as observations of meteors and the Moon "by radio techniques," meaning by radar. Thus, for example, at the Paris URSI symposium on radio astronomy held in July 1958, a number of papers featured the latest lunar radar work by U.S. and British investigators.21

The first URSI meeting at which planetary radar astronomers gave papers took place in San Diego, California, between 19 and 21 October 1959, immediately following the Endicott House Conference on Radar Astronomy. The meeting included a first-of-its-kind symposium on radar astronomy. However, presenting the panel discussion was not Commission 5, but URSI Commission 3, Ionospheric Radio.

[61] The seven panel members, all of whom had participated in the Endicott House conference, were practicing radar astronomers at the NRL, Jodrell Bank, Stanford, Lincoln Laboratory, Cornell, and the National Bureau of Standards. Von Eshleman was the panel moderator. The speakers covered lunar, solar, meteor, auroral, and planetary radar, as well as radar studies of the exosphere and the interplanetary medium. The symposium was of some historical importance: Paul Green described planetary range-Doppler imaging, which later became a central planetary radar technique.22

By the URSI Tokyo meeting of September 1963, planetary radar astronomy had moved to the newly renamed Commission 5, Radio and Radar Astronomy. Twenty institutions reported on recent U.S. developments in the two fields. The meeting also brought together individuals from related areas, such as Commission 7, Radio Electronics, where investigators reported on parametric amplifiers, masers, and other microwave devices of interest to planetary radar astronomers.23

Although the electronic side of planetary radar astronomy drove it to attend URSI meetings and to publish in such journals as the Proceedings of the IRE, the astronomy side pulled it toward meetings of the International Astronomical Union (IAU) and the American Astronomical Society (AAS) and to publication in astronomy and general science journals, primarily The Astronomical Journal, Science, and Nature. These institutional and publication forums, though, did not meet the need for specialized discussion of planetary topics.

Sporadic workshops provided only limited forums. For example, the 1962 inferior conjunction of Venus furnished the occasion for a symposium on radar and radio observations of Venus. Although planetary radio astronomers delivered most of the symposium papers, radar astronomers Roland Carpenter, Dick Goldstein, and Dewey Muhleman described the latest radar research on Venus.24 Aside from a preliminary report by National Bureau of Standards ionospheric researchers on their one-time-only radar attempt at Venus, the symposium was strictly a JPL affair.

Starting in 1965, the need for a specialized forum for presenting and discussing radar research began to be met through a joint URSI-IAU Symposium on Planetary Atmospheres and Surfaces held at Dorado, Puerto Rico, 24-27 May 1965. The Organizing Committee included radar astronomers John Evans, Dewey Muhleman, and Gordon Pettengill, while Evans and Gordon Pettengill chaired sessions on lunar and planetary radar astronomy. The latter session brought together practitioners from Lincoln Laboratory, JPL, Cornell's nearby observatory at Arecibo, and the Soviet Union.25

A conference on lunar and planetary science held during the week of 13 September 1965 and organized by Caltech and JPL also had its share of planetary radar papers. Researchers from JPL, Jodrell Bank, and Cornell's Arecibo Observatory spoke on Venus, while JPL and Arecibo representatives read papers on Mars. Noticeably absent, however, were researchers from Lincoln Laboratory, which was still a major planetary radar research center.26

[62] Planetary radar astronomy is at the convergence of science and engineering. Attendance of radar astronomers at both IAU and URSI meetings during the 1960s reflected the dichotomous nature of radar astronomy, perched between radio engineering (URSI) and astronomical science (IAU). The dichotomy arose from the fact that radar astronomy is a set of techniques (engineering) used to generate data whose interpretation yields answers to scientific questions.

Just as vital to the growth of radar astronomy as meetings and journals was access to instruments, for without them there would be no science to discuss or to publish. The very availability of radar instruments capable of detecting echoes from Venus had given rise to planetary radar astronomy, and the field has remained a technology-driven science to the present. However, radar astronomers did not seek their own instruments. In league with the Cambridge astronomical community, Lincoln Laboratory campaigned to design and build a large new radar and radio astronomy research instrument. It was radio astronomers, not radar astronomers, who performed the entrepreneurial task of promoting the new facility and who carried radar astronomy interests with it. The same radio astronomers also urged opening to outside researchers the Haystack antenna built by Lincoln Laboratory for military communications research.

During the 1960s, radio astronomy underwent the kind of rapid growth rate that typifies Big Science. With fewer facilities and researchers than Australia or Britain, the leading countries in the field, the United States saw radio astronomy balloon into Big Science as funding requests and antenna construction proposals increased in size and number. Radio astronomy thus provided an emerging Big Science onto which radar astronomers piggybacked their search for instruments free of military priorities and where radar astronomy, as recommended at the Endicott House conference, would be "viewed as pure science." The potential rewards of piggybacking were great, but the price of pursuing Big Science patronage was equally great. In the end, the effort proved troublesome and futile.


Needles and a Haystack


The decade of the 1960s was the era of Big Science and the Big Dish in radio astronomy. The period of large telescope construction between 1957, when the Jodrell Bank 76-meter (250-ft) telescope reached completion, and 1971, when the 100-meter (328-ft) radio telescope near Effelsberg (about 40 km from Bonn) began operation, has been dubbed "the age when big was beautiful" in radio astronomy.27 As the first Venus experiment took place at Lincoln Laboratory in 1958, a host of new radar research instruments of unprecedented size were on the drawing board or under construction thanks chiefly to the largesse of Cold War military spending on scientific research and secondarily to the National Bureau of Standards and NASA.

The NRL was breaking ground on a 183-meter (600-ft) antenna at Sugar Grove, West Virginia. With funding from ARPA, Cornell had completed initial design studies of a 305-meter (1,000-ft) dish. Lincoln Laboratory had plans for a 37-meter (120-ft) antenna at Haystack Hill, Massachusetts, as well as a solar radar facility at El Campo, Texas, both of which were to be built with defense funds.28 Stanford and SRI were soliciting military backing for a 244-meter (800-ft) antenna.29 In the civilian sector, the National Bureau of [63] Standards was building a three-station radar at its Long Branch Field Station, Illinois, and a huge array antenna at Jicamarca, Peru, to study the ionosphere. NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory started designing a large antenna system for its Deep Space Network. In Europe and Australia, additional large antennas were on the drawing board or under construction.

No less a part of the Big Dish era were the Haystack and CAMROC/NEROC antennas. Lincoln Laboratory designed and built Haystack for military communications research. Cambridge-area astronomers, organized as the Cambridge Radio Observatory Committee (CAMROC), then as the Northeast Radio Observatory Corporation (NEROC), campaigned to open Haystack to outside researchers. CAMROC/NEROC, again in collaboration with Lincoln Laboratory, also sought funding for the design and construction of a new large radio and radar telescope.

Designing and building those big dishes was a nightmarish introduction to Big Science politics for radio astronomers. Bernard Lovell, the veteran planner and builder of several radio telescopes at Jodrell Bank, not to mention one or two never built, in 1983 wrote to Ed Lilley, the Harvard astronomer who headed efforts to build the new CAMROC/NEROC dish and to open Haystack to outside researchers, and asked him to summarize his experience. Lilley replied that the story presented an "excellent example of the mix of politics, power struggles, fiscal problems, technology and dealings with Congress, and, ultimately, defeat from a few scientific luminaries," and that he would "need a cabin overlooking a thunderous sea to stimulate the mood to undertake writing a history of the CAMROC/NEROC campaign."30

The campaign began with the construction of the Haystack antenna, which replaced Millstone as the Lincoln Laboratory planetary radar. On 12 April 1962, Millstone stopped operating, so that Lincoln Laboratory could upgrade it to 1,320 MHz (23 cm; L-band) and increase overall system capability, as part of the Space Surveillance Techniques Program. Over the years, Lincoln Laboratory expanded the Millstone location. Near the Millstone planetary radar was the Lincoln Laboratory Communications Site, established in 1957 to test communication equipment. Upon completion of the tests, the antennas were torn down, and the site given over to construction of an X-band transmitting dish for use in Project West Ford, commonly known as Project Needles. A similar X-band station was built at Camp Parks, outside San Francisco.31

On 10 May 1963, Project Needles launched nearly 500 million hair-like copper wires into Earth orbit, thereby forming a belt of dipole antennas. Lincoln Laboratory then sent messages coast to coast via the orbiting copper needles between Camp Parks and Millstone at Westford, Massachusetts (hence the name Project West Ford). British radio astronomers, such as Martin Ryle and Lovell, as well as optical astronomers, objected fervently to Project Needles, and the Council of the Royal Astronomical Society formally protested to the U.S. President's Science Advisor.32 Haystack was intended officially as a state-of-the-art radar for Project Needles.



Figure 9. Project Needles planned to launch nearly 500 million hair-like copper wires into Earth orbit, thereby forming a belt of dipole antennas.

Figure 9. Project Needles planned to launch nearly 500 million hair-like copper wires into Earth orbit, thereby forming a belt of dipole antennas. Haystack Observatory originally was built as part of Project West Ford, which was commonly known as Project Needles. (Courtesy of MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, Massachusetts, photo no. P201-229.)


[65] Project Needles and the Haystack radar exemplified the new research directions taken by Lincoln Laboratory. The Laboratory had pioneered three major air defense systems: the DEW Line, the SAGE System, and the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. With the formation of the MITRE Corporation in 1958, Lincoln Laboratory divested itself of manned bomber defense activity and engaged in new research programs that addressed military problems in ballistic missile re-entry systems and ballistic missile defense radars; military satellite communications; and the detection of underground nuclear explosions (Project Vela Uniform). The joint services and ARPA funded this work and supported Lincoln Laboratory's program of general research, which included radar and radio astronomy.33

Besides Project Needles, additional applications proposed for Haystack were tracking communication satellites and radar astronomy, the former justified as an adjunct to communications research. The facility's X-band operating frequency ruled out meteor studies. Radio astronomy also was not among the initial proposed uses but emerged later in the earliest funding proposals submitted to the Air Force.34

The design of Haystack was an in-house Lincoln Laboratory effort for about a year and a half before the Air Force lent its financial support. The design progressed through several evolutionary stages. The initial March 1958 design called for a 37-meter-diameter (120-ft-diameter) parabolic reflector with a Cassegrainian feed, low-noise maser receivers, and operation in the X-band, all characteristics of the earlier West Ford antennas. The price tag was estimated to be about $5 million, which was too high for Air Force approval.

The problem was to reduce the facility's cost, while designing a reflector that would maintain the high tolerances required for the short X-band wavelength. Exposure to wind and the Sun would warp the dish too much to be effective at X-band. One solution would have been to select a lower frequency range, say S-band, but participation in Project Needles dictated an X-band operating frequency. The solution was to place the antenna inside a radome, which not only protected the antenna from the Sun and wind, but also reduced the weight and power needed to drive the antenna. The radome design was significantly cheaper, too, lowering the estimated cost from $5 million to between $1.5 and $2 million. Adding the radome raised a new design issue, however, because radomes had never been used before at X-band.

Lincoln Laboratory had developed a radome for L-band Millstone-type radars, but it could accommodate a dish no larger than 26 meters (85 ft) in diameter. To enclose the Haystack 37-meter (120-ft) antenna, Lincoln Laboratory engineers raised the radome above ground level and enlarged it from five-eighths to nine-tenths of a complete sphere. Electrical tests carried out in March 1959 determined that a reduction in panel thickness would permit the radome's use at X-band.

In November 1959, Herb Weiss became Haystack project engineer. The following month, the Air Force committed financial support to the project. Lincoln Laboratory took bids on the radar's construction and signed a contract with North American Aviation (Ohio Division) on 1 December 1960. A separate Air Force contract procured the radome and base extension.

Haystack was dedicated on 8 October 1964, at Tyngsboro, Massachusetts, about 30 miles northwest of Boston, but only a half mile up the road from Millstone. Haystack was unique in its use of special plug-in boxes. Each box was 2.4 by 2.4 by 3.7 meters (8 by 8 by 12 ft) and could hold up to 2 tons of equipment. One box contained a 100-kilowatt...



Figure 10. Exterior view of the Haystack Observatory in 1964, when the facility was dedicated.

Figure 10. Exterior view of the Haystack Observatory in 1964, when the facility was dedicated. There, MIT and Lincoln Laboratory radar astronomers imaged the Moon and Venus and conducted a test of General Relativity. At the time of its dedication, Haystack was one of only three large antennas conducting radar astronomy research on a regular basis. (Courtesy of MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, Massachusetts, photo no. P10.29-783.)


....continuous-wave X-band (7,750 MHz; 4 cm) transmitter, cryogenic low-noise receivers, and associated microwave circuits for planetary radar research.35

As Haystack construction was underway, a key meeting of Harvard University astronomers, Donald Menzel, director of the Harvard College Observatory, Leo Goldberg, and Ed Lilley, took place on 24 May 1963. They came together in order to seek access to this new, more sensitive telescope. As a secondary objective, they sought to design and build a larger radio telescope in collaboration with Lincoln Laboratory. [67] Lincoln Laboratory radar and radio astronomers already enjoyed relatively free access to Haystack, and Lincoln Laboratory radio astronomers often collaborated with their colleagues at Harvard Observatory's Agassiz Station as well as at the NRAO. The Agassiz Station had been training graduate students in radio astronomy for about ten years under a National Science Foundation grant.

Gaining limited use of Haystack was not difficult. Lilley approached Lincoln Laboratory regarding use of Haystack in July 1964. In September 1965, Lincoln Laboratory and the Air Force reached a mutually agreeable policy on Haystack as well as Millstone. The Air Force encouraged use of the two facilities by scientists outside the Department of Defense and made Lincoln Laboratory responsible for scheduling time. Lincoln Laboratory had to report all outside use of Millstone and Haystack to the Air Force, which had final approval on all requests. Finally, outside agencies would have to pay an hourly fee, to be determined by Lincoln Laboratory, to defray operating and upkeep costs.

At the same Harvard meeting of 24 May 1963, Lilley also suggested that Harvard, MIT (including Lincoln Laboratory), and the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory (SAO) jointly undertake a cooperative, regional effort to build a large dish antenna free of military limitations for radio astronomy research. The project sought to marry the strength of Lincoln Laboratory in radar astronomy and the thriving Harvard program in radio astronomy.

The proposed large antenna also would serve the interests of radar astronomers. Although Haystack's greater power and sensitivity outclassed Millstone, Lincoln Laboratory radar astronomers realized that radars then under construction, namely Cornell's 305-meter (1,000-ft) antenna and JPL's 64-meter (210-ft) Mars Station, would outperform Haystack. Lincoln Laboratory radar astronomers therefore sought a telescope with Arecibo's sensitivity, but operating at a higher frequency.36

New enthusiasm for the construction of the large telescope ignited upon the release of the Whitford Report, which had endorsed the construction of large dish telescopes for radio astronomy. The Whitford Report grew out of Congressional reaction to the Navy's disastrous attempt to build an enormous steerable dish antenna in West Virginia.


Sugar Grove


The specter that haunted all large radio telescope dish projects was Sugar Grove. In the words of a report of the Comptroller General of the United States to Congress, "The complexity and unique character of the Big Dish [Sugar Grove] were underestimated from the inception of the project."37 As late as 1965, Harvard astronomer Ed Lilley wrote his colleagues, "International radio scientists still regard the U.S. Navy 600-foot [68] paraboloid as a 'radio telescope' fiasco, even though the project had minuscule association with basic research."38

As early as 1948, NRL scientists devised a plan for a large steerable telescope for detecting and studying radio sources. By 1956, the NRL had developed an initial proposal which called for a reflector 183 meters (600 ft) in diameter with accurate maneuverability and precision positioning controls. The huge dish would be able to turn a full 360 degrees in the horizon and tilt to any angle of elevation from the zenith to the horizon. If completed, the 183-meter steel-and-aluminum antenna would have stood taller than the Washington Monument, weighed about 22,000 tons (the weight of an ocean liner), and been the largest movable land-based structure ever constructed in the world.

The Navy began breaking ground for the U.S. Naval Radio Research Station, Sugar Grove, West Virginia, telescope in June 1958. As construction got underway, the price tag rose. The initial cost estimate was $20 million, but climbed to $52.2 million in February 1957, when the Department of Defense submitted requests for fiscal 1958 military construction funds to Congress. Later in 1957, coincidental with the launch of Sputnik, the Navy expanded the project concept and included certain (still) classified military surveillance tasks. The nature of those tasks, nonetheless, was an open secret. The Navy planned to listen to Soviet radio communications as they were reflected from the Moon, an idea that grew out of the lunar radar work carried out by Benjamin Yaplee's group at the NRL. Solar, planetary, and ionospheric radar experiments followed.

These new tasks inflated the estimated price tag to $79 million, and the decision to redesign and build the telescope at the same time further ballooned the estimated cost to more than $200 million ($300 million in some estimates), which was the total estimated cost when the Department of Defense canceled the project in July 1962. The fatal decision to design and erect at the same time was an acknowledged "calculated risk" in order to save roughly three or four years of construction time. The emerging new design called for an antenna that was far too heavy for its support structure, which was already under construction. Further complicating the project was an internal turf battle between the Bureau of Yards and Docks and the Naval Research Laboratory. By the time the Department of Defense canceled Sugar Grove, the Navy had spent $42,918,914 on the project, but with the settlement of termination claims included, the secretary of defense estimated that the total expenditure for the telescope amounted to between $63 and $64 million.

An investigation by the comptroller general concluded that the Navy had incurred unnecessary costs in the construction and cancellation of the big dish.39 The Sugar Grove fiasco raised serious questions about the spending of military research and development dollars. As Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.) pointed out in August 1962, Sugar Grove had "many of the earmarks of other research and development projects which turned out to be 'white elephants.'"40 The next month, Sugar Grove came under Congressional scrutiny.

[69] The Subcommittee on Applications and Tracking and Data Acquisition of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics opened hearings on radio and radar astronomy in September 1962. The Sugar Grove fiasco motivated the hearings, at which radio astronomers defended their telescope projects. Witnesses discussed alternatives to large dishes, such as arrays, in which a number of small antennas electronically linked to each other acted as a single large antenna. Common to the witnesses' testimony was the assertion that the United States lagged behind Australia and Britain in radio astronomy.41

American backwardness in radio astronomy was widely accepted in the 1960s by those involved in its funding. For example, in a speech marking the dedication of the NRAO 43-meter (140-ft) radio telescope in 1965, Leland J. Haworth, director of the National Science Foundation, emphasized the Australian, British, and even Dutch lead over the United States in entering the field.42 While this was neither the first nor the last time that a scientific community would use backwardness to argue for financial support, Cold War competition was not mentioned.

As the federal agency underwriting much of the country's astronomy research, and as the sponsor of the NRAO, the National Science Foundation (NSF) took an avid interest in radio astronomy and its telescopes. In December 1959, well before the Congressional investigation of Sugar Grove, the NSF had appointed an Advisory Panel for Radio Telescopes to appraise current and future needs for radio telescopes. Its report, released in 1961 before the Sugar Grove fiasco was generally realized, did not favor the construction of large dish antennas. Instead, the Panel endorsed arrays using aperture synthesis, a new technique first developed by Martin Ryle in Britain. The endorsement of arrays led immediately to initial design studies of the Very Large Array (VLA), located eventually in New Mexico. The NSF Panel report had more bad news for radar astronomy dishes. Its first resolution stated that antenna requirements for radio and radar astronomy were so different, that radio astronomy antennas "should be primarily designed to meet the needs of passive [radio] astronomy."43


The Whitford Report


Radio astronomers clamored for more telescopes. Anyone interested in building a new radio and/or radar telescope dish had to take into consideration the question of parabolic dishes versus arrays, which were still quite experimental and untested, at least in the United States. The NSF was on center stage as the primary civilian funding agency for radio astronomy, and all design concepts and funding requests had to deal with the omnipresent wake of the Sugar Grove disaster. The future of large radio and radar dishes seemed precarious.

Into this situation came the Committee on Government Relations of the National Academy of Sciences. At the suggestion of Harvard astronomer Leo Goldberg, the Committee created the Panel on Astronomical Facilities on 14 October 1963, in order to outline a planned approach to radio and optical telescope construction. Panel membership comprised prominent optical and radio astronomers; Albert E. Whitford of Lick Observatory served as chair.

[70] The Panel assembled radio astronomers at a meeting held in Washington on 1 and 2 November 1963 in order to build a consensus. The result of the meeting and the Panel's deliberations was an ambitious, 10-year plan of optical and radio telescope construction. Nonetheless, the result of the Panel's work, known as the Whitford Report, omitted radar and solar astronomy. Solar astronomers protested the neglect in letter after letter.44

The Whitford Report specifically rejected solar radar as too costly, but completely neglected planetary radar astronomy. Radar astronomers did not protest. NASA's internal evaluation of the Whitford Report, which Nancy Roman prepared after consulting with those NASA committees and subcommittees responsible for developing the agency's astronomy program, advised NASA to continue its support of radar astronomy. Nonetheless, she wrote, "We do not, at present, foresee NASA support for the construction of new radar facilities, although further experience with radar exploration of the solar system may modify this conclusion." In general, Roman concluded, "Support of astronomy is the province of the National Science Foundation," and the program of telescope construction proposed by the Whitford Report was "within the traditional province of the National Science Foundation which should continue to retain responsibility for them." Although Roman suggested that NASA deep space communications instruments "should incorporate potential use by radio astronomers in their design,"45 curiously she did not mention lending their use for radar astronomy experiments.

Roman's evaluation summed up what became, for all practical purposes, the NASA position on funding radar astronomy. The construction of ground-based facilities was the responsibility of the NSF; NASA would fund mission-oriented research at existing facilities. The NSF embraced its role as the federal agency with primary responsibility for ground-based astronomy. But full implementation of the Whitford Report construction program required substantial increases in NSF spending on ground-based astronomy, and the Foundation already was the country's major underwriter of ground-based astronomy. In fiscal 1966, of the total federal expenditure of $46.2 million for ground-based astronomy, the NSF share was $21.0 million (46 percent), compared with $9.4 million (20 percent) for NASA, $8.0 million (17 percent) for the Air Force, $4.5 million (10 percent) for the Navy, and $3.3 million (7 percent) for ARPA.46

The Whitford Report proposed to spend $224 million (about the cost of Sugar Grove) over 10 years on a number of regional and national facilities. It endorsed 1) a large array as a national facility under the NRAO (the VLA); 2) enlargement of Caltech's Owens Valley Observatory (another array); 3) two fully-steerable 91-meter (300-ft) dishes as regional facilities; 4) a design study of the largest possible steerable dish; and 5) smaller, special purpose instruments.47

[71] The Whitford Report favored neither arrays nor dishes, but saw a need for both. As for large dishes, the Report recalled the Sugar Grove fiasco: "The design and evaluation of these solutions are costly and very time-consuming, as has been shown in the unsuccessful attempt at Sugar Grove to build a 600-foot [183-meter] paraboloid." The Report expressed the need for "a thorough-going engineering study" to ensure the construction of large radio telescopes and recommended spending $1 million on design studies for the largest feasible steerable paraboloids "at an early date."48


In Dish/Array


The Whitford Report understandably excited both Harvard radio astronomers and Lincoln Laboratory radar astronomers with its endorsements of design studies for large steerable antennas and a regional 91-meter (300-ft) dish. In order to seize the opportunities created by the Whitford Report, Harvard, MIT, and the SAO agreed to undertake a joint study of a large radio and radar telescope, and in August 1965, the group adopted the name Cambridge Radio Observatory Committee and the acronym CAMROC.49

In October 1965, when CAMROC drew up a research agenda for the regional telescope, planetary and lunar radar astronomy were featured uses. As Ed Lilley argued: "American radar astronomers have also made major contributions, but in many instances their work has been accomplished by 'borrowing time' on antennas which were mission oriented. In the Cambridge group there are radar scientists who are keenly interested in basic radar astronomy. They, too, need an instrument as powerful and timely as the Palomar 200-inch, where radar astronomy can flourish as a basic science with transmitters and data analysis systems developed for optimum performance on ionospheric, lunar, planetary, and solar problems."50

On 29 October 1965, Harvard, MIT, Lincoln Laboratory, and the SAO signed a Memorandum of Agreement, authorizing CAMROC to solicit up to $2.5 million to support design studies for the telescope. MIT would hold, administer, and disburse the funds and act as CAMROC's administrative agent. CAMROC funding was to come from a variety of sources, mostly federal. Of the estimated $2.7 million needed for fiscal 1966 and 1967, the NSF, NASA, and the Smithsonian Institution were to award $1.57 million (58 percent). MIT, Harvard, and private foundations (Kettering and Ford) would provide additional funding.51

The NASA money was to come through the Electronics Research Center in Cambridge. Unaware of NASA's evaluation of the Whitford Report, CAMROC submitted a grant proposal to NASA for design studies of the large steerable radio and radar antenna in February 1966. NASA rejected the proposal. As William Brunk, acting chief of Planetary Astronomy, explained, "Support for a project such as this is within the domain of the National Science Foundation and it is recommended that they be approached as a possible source of funding." NASA Deputy Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., [72] repeated the message: "The type of effort you proposed is clearly the responsibility of the National Science Foundation."52

Despite the clear and consistent reply from NASA, Joel Orlen of MIT and executive officer of the CAMROC Project Office (which was in charge of day-to-day activities) wrote to Jerome Wiesner, MIT provost, "I believe NASA should be pushed on hard to reverse this decision." CAMROC members came to believe that any argument made to NASA had to take into account the risk of offending the advocates of the JPL dish design, that is, the 64-meter (210-ft) Mars Station.

Wiesner wrote to Seamans, requesting that NASA reconsider the rejected proposal; he argued that the technology would be needed in the space effort. Seamans replied that NASA was studying a variety of antenna designs, including arrays, "Because we foresee, in an active and continuing space program, that our ground facilities will be required to support multiple simultaneous flight missions, it may turn out to be more effective to rely on a grouping of antenna systems that can be arrayed together as needed but that can also operate independently for independent missions."53

Seamans' reply threw CAMROC plans into disarray. From the beginning, the telescope was to be a large steerable dish. But arrays were gaining popularity and were considered a viable alternative to large radio dishes. The Whitford Report had endorsed both the Owens Valley array and the VLA. In 1955, Caltech began building a pair of 27-meter (90-ft) dishes at Owens Valley, California, with money from the Office of Naval Research; now Caltech proposed expanding the facility. The VLA was to consist of 27 radio telescopes mounted on railroad tracks in a Y formation whose arms were each 21 km long. When completed, each telescope would have a diameter of 25 meters (82 ft).54 Now, NASA appeared interested in arrays. But were arrays effective in radar astronomy?

Believing that the CAMROC effort would raise questions about the merits of arrays versus dishes, radar astronomer and CAMROC member Gordon Pettengill tackled the question in a memorandum of 9 June 1966. He concluded that arrays had a number of advantages over a single large dish, including the ability to deliver more power to a target. Arrays stretched technology less, promised more reliable capability, and cost less to build. If some array elements were out of service for whatever reason, the deficiency would hardly affect overall performance. Moreover, if full array capability were not needed, the primary array could be divided into several smaller arrays and assigned to different experiments. The major design challenge of arrays, Pettengill pointed out, arose from proving the practicality of phasing a number of elements together. A minor drawback was the need for numerous low-noise receivers and antenna feeds.55

Lilley deflected the argument away from the merits of arrays versus dishes by emphasizing the use of the radome. The radome set the design apart from all other radio and radar antenna proposals before the NSF. If the results of the radome tests were satisfactory, Lilley claimed, the CAMROC studies would provide radio and radar astronomy with a "breakthrough in antenna technology," and the CAMROC position would be unique. "Unfortunately," he lamented, "only a small fraction of the radio and radar [73] professional scientists in the United States understand this, and it is unlikely that the National Science Foundation administrators have a clear understanding of the implications of the CAMROC studies."56

Although later, in April 1967, the NSF did judge the telescope's unique design feature to be its radome,57 in the meantime, the ability of the NSF to fund the CAMROC telescope was limited. Lilley foresaw "a dramatic expansion of demand" for federal funding, especially from the NSF, during the summer of 1967 for large radio astronomy telescopes.58 Nonetheless, the NSF became the largest underwriter of the CAMROC design studies. As of 26 April 1966, total CAMROC funds amounted to $410,000. The largest share, $300,000, came from an NSF grant, with additional money from Harvard ($25,000), the SAO ($20,000), MIT Sloan Funds ($40,000), and the MIT Space Center ($25,000). An earlier attempt to raise money from the Kettering Foundation failed. The Foundation was shifting its funding away from "science" to "education," and the CAMROC telescope was "marginal to their interests." The likelihood of Department of Defense support was equally bleak.59

In 1966, the NSF again faced a considerable number of large radio telescope proposals, prompted this time by the large-scale spending proposed by the Whitford Report. In addition to the CAMROC, VLA, and Owens Valley antennas, other projects included "WESTROC," a joint Caltech, Stanford, and University of California at Berkeley telescope. WESTROC was to be a 100-meter (328-ft), fully-steerable S-band radio dish located at the Owens Valley site.

In order to campaign for their telescope, CAMROC held a Conference on Radomes and Large Steerable Antennas on 17 and 18 June 1966. Over 70 persons attended the conference, which dealt exclusively with the proposed CAMROC dish. Participants came from industry (North American Aviation, Rohr Corporation, ESSCO), the NSF, the NASA Electronics Research Center, and the NRL, as well as from MIT, Harvard, the SAO, and Lincoln Laboratory. Lilley also suggested using political pressure.60 Ultimately, CAMROC did apply political pressure, but not until after employing other tactics, including the expansion of CAMROC into a regional organization.




At least as early as February 1966, CAMROC was considering ways of transforming itself into a regional association. The chief reason for the undertaking was to solicit funds for the design, construction, and operation of a regional radio and radar telescope. A regional base, moreover, would be useful in competing for funds against the Very Large Array or WESTROC.61

[74] CAMROC reached out to the entire Northeast to establish itself as a regional organization with regional interests, and with justifiable claims to funding for a regional radio and radar telescope. One of the first steps was to choose a name, one which expressed this regional character. The new organization, called the Northeast Radio Observatory Corporation (NEROC), incorporated in Delaware on 26 June 1967. CAMROC also considered a number of corporate arrangements, including the possibility of remaining limited to only Cambridge schools. After lengthy discussion and analysis, CAMROC settled on a corporate structure that combined a "reasonable regional image" with local management. A committee representing qualified users would determine scientific policy, while actual management would remain in the hands of the Cambridge group.62

After a detailed study of university astronomy departments in the six New England states, the five adjacent Midatlantic states (New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Delaware), and Washington, DC, NEROC recruited its first members: Boston University, Brandeis University, Brown University, Dartmouth College, Harvard, MIT, the Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn, the Smithsonian Institution, the State University of New York at Buffalo and Stony Brook, the University of Massachusetts, the University of New Hampshire, and Yale.63

Among the universities declining the NEROC invitation was Cornell, which in 1967 managed the world's largest radio and radar antenna at Arecibo, Puerto Rico. Franklin A. Long, vice president for Research and Advanced Studies at Cornell, replied to the MIT invitation to join NEROC on 27 June 1967. Cornell radio astronomers supported the NEROC initiative, he explained, but they did not feel the telescope deserved top priority. The greatest need was for increased resolution, which the VLA promised to deliver. Moreover, they were "still uncertain about the relative advantages of a large steerable dish in the Northeast as compared to the same dish in the Southwest (or Southeast)." Having their own dish as well as an international agreement to use facilities overseas, Cornell was "concerned as to whether formal participation in NEROC would not carry the air of excessive Cornell greediness in this field."64

As CAMROC transformed itself into NEROC in 1967, the business of securing additional funding continued. In January 1967, NEROC won a third NSF grant ($675,000) for telescope design studies, bringing the amount of total NSF support to $1,115,000. Nothing guaranteed the continuation of NSF support, however; the Foundation was faced with a multitude of design and construction proposals, and its budget was limited.65

In April 1967, the NSF Advisory Committee for Mathematical and Physical Sciences had four radio astronomy projects, including the CAMROC design study, under consideration with a total price tag of $120 million. Funding for all four was not available; the Foundation had to establish which ones to fund. The NSF had no general way to budget for major projects; usually, it treated requests for instrumentation, design studies, or facilities as special cases.66

[75] In order to evaluate the four radio telescope proposals, the NSF appointed the Ad Hoc Advisory Panel for Large Radio Astronomy Facilities, called the Dicke Panel after its chair, Robert H. Dicke of Princeton University. By June 1967, when the Panel convened, the NSF had five proposals to consider: the Owens Valley array, the VLA, the Arecibo upgrade, the NEROC antenna, and the WESTROC dish.

The Dicke Panel met in Washington between 24 and 28 July 1967 and listened to technical presentations from members of the proposing institutions. NEROC was asking for $28 million over five years for design and construction of a fully-steerable, radome-enclosed, 440-ft (134-meter) parabolic dish operating at 6,000 MHz (5 cm). Gordon Pettengill wrote the NEROC presentation section on radar astronomy. The NEROC telescope was not the only combined radio and radar astronomy facility looking for money. Thomas Gold, Frank Drake, and Rolf Dyce of Cornell University advocated renovating the Arecibo dish so that it could operate at 3,000 MHz (10 cm) or higher.

Although the Dicke Panel had focused on radio astronomy, it was not blind to radar astronomy. The Panel recognized, for example, that "the use of radar techniques in astronomy has for the first time enabled man to establish direct contact with the planets and to set his own experimental conditions." In contrast to Pettengill's memorandum on radar astronomy arrays, the Dicke Panel judged that "an array cannot be used effectively for spectroscopic work or radar astronomy...without introducing great complications in the electronic system."

Following its deliberations, the Dicke Panel submitted its report to the Director of the NSF on 14 August 1967. The report approved the Owens Valley array, the VLA, and the Arecibo upgrade. To say the least, the Dicke Panel was impressed, perhaps too impressed, by the potential of the spherical Arecibo dish. The Arecibo "type of antenna seems to show great promise for the future and should be considered along with the very large, fully steerable antenna for the next step forward," the Panel ruled. It urged appraisals of Arecibo's performance and suggested that both the WESTROC and NEROC proposals be deferred until more was known of the performance of spherical dishes.67 As we shall see in the next chapter, the Arecibo antenna was considerably inefficient.

The Dicke Panel report devastated NEROC plans, not to mention planetary radar astronomy at Lincoln Laboratory. The only radar telescope available to Lincoln Laboratory investigators was the Haystack antenna. The Arecibo 305-meter (1,000-ft) dish and JPL's 64-meter (210-ft) Mars Station, moreover, already outclassed Haystack. NEROC tried to salvage its antenna project. MIT physics professor Bernard F. Burke suggested that NEROC consider a smaller, 101-meter (330-ft) dish. "We should not be so beguiled with the idea of being temporarily the master of the world's biggest radio telescope," he wrote, "that we cannot accept an instrument that is only one of the biggest."68

Technical reports and symposia papers, though, continued to support the feasibility and desirability of the 134-meter (440-ft) design. The International Symposium on Structures Technology for Large Radio and Radar Telescope Systems, sponsored by MIT and the Office of Naval Research and held at MIT on 18-20 October 1967, saw participants from the United States and six other countries discussing the latest designs for large [76] telescopes in Europe, the 100-meter (328-ft) Effelsberg antenna and the proposed 122-meter (400-ft) dish at Jodrell Bank.69

Design studies for the NEROC radio and radar telescope continued. During an 18-month period in 1966 and 1967, an interim agreement between MIT and the Air Force partially underwrote the studies. Funding at Lincoln Laboratory tightened, however, and Herb Weiss learned that Lincoln Laboratory no longer could pay for personnel doing NEROC studies after 1 January 1968. The design work carried on thanks to modest support from its Cambridge backers. The three original NEROC members, the SAO, MIT, and Harvard, contributed $121,241, of which MIT and Harvard gave 84 percent.70

The NEROC project had relied on the technical expertise and financial largesse of Lincoln Laboratory, plus a few not inconsequential NSF grants worth over $1.6 million. At this critical point, as Lincoln Laboratory "soft" money melted and the Dicke Panel advised deferring the NEROC telescope, getting more time on the Haystack telescope became a higher and urgent priority.




In October 1967, Lincoln Laboratory asked NEROC if it were interested in assuming responsibility for Haystack. NEROC was interested and wanted to study costs and use management, but without impairing progress on the design of the 134-meter (440-ft) antenna. As funding for the big dish design studies slowed to a trickle in 1968, NEROC management of Haystack began to look ever more desirable. The matter was the first item of business at NEROC's 25 May 1968 meeting. After some discussion, NEROC unanimously voted to begin negotiations with Lincoln Laboratory and to explore sources of financial support to turn Haystack into a regional observatory.71

Air Force support of Haystack paid for a single "shift," meaning five eight-hour days a week. NEROC radio astronomers wanted more observing hours, a second and, if possible, a third "shift," that is, additional increments of time averaging forty hours a week. In response to the NEROC interest, Lincoln Laboratory offered a large portion of its current Haystack schedule to NEROC users at no charge, with "overtime" hours at minimal cost beginning January 1969. In stages, NEROC would assume responsibility for antenna management and for securing operating funds, as available observing time increased incrementally toward a maximum schedule of four and a half shifts (three eight-hour shifts each day plus weekends for a total of about 2,000 hours per year for each shift). Lincoln Laboratory still would be an important user of the antenna and would continue to provide substantially to the operating budget.

NEROC established subcommittees responsible for estimating costs, for drawing up mutually agreeable plans between Lincoln Laboratory and its sponsors and between NEROC and its sponsors, for laying out a management structure, and for pursuing funding. Among the funding sources explored were the NASA Electronics Research Center and the state of Massachusetts, both of which encouraged further discussions but cautioned that eventual support, if any, would be in modest amounts. In addition, NEROC [77] approached MIT, Harvard, the University of Massachusetts, and the Environmental Science Services Administration (for a very long baseline interferometer with their dish at Boulder). The NSF was not left out of the search.72

Meanwhile, the NEROC 134-meter (440-ft) antenna project had languished. Now, though, the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory stepped in. The SAO had not contributed technically to the design of the big dish, nor had it contributed significantly to its financial support. But the SAO, through its parent organization, the Smithsonian Institution, could rally political support and make claims for the NEROC/Smithsonian telescope being a national, not a regional, facility.

The possibility of the Smithsonian Institution obtaining Congressional authorization for the NEROC telescope was first summarized in a memorandum to the NEROC Board on 3 September 1967. During the summer of 1968, NEROC and Smithsonian Institution representatives discussed the possibility of the Smithsonian Institution leading the drive to obtain funding for the NEROC telescope. The discussions led to an understanding, which included management of the project during the design, construction, and operational phases of the facility.73

As a pivotal preliminary step, the Smithsonian Institution organized a meeting of radio and radar astronomers to marshall agreement on the need to build the NEROC telescope. If the meeting of radar and radio scientists endorsed the NEROC telescope, then the Smithsonian Board of Regents would be asked to approve the attempt to obtain Congressional authorization for it. The meeting took place at the Museum of History and Technology, as it was then called, at Constitution Avenue and 14th Street, NW, on 30 November and 1 December 1968. About three dozen invited radio and radar astronomers and a handful of NSF and NASA officials attended, in response to an invitation from the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, S. Dillon Ripley.

After Fred Whipple (Harvard) opened the meeting with a review of the Smithsonian Institution's "historical role" in astronomy, John Findlay (NRAO) explained the purpose and plan of the meeting and pointed out that five years after the Whitford Report, none of the recommended facilities had been built. Talks and discussions covered the gamut of telescope questions, including the Arecibo spherical dish and the issue of using arrays for radar astronomy.

James Bradley, assistant secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, laid out the plan that his institution might follow and assuaged worries about staying on the good side of the NSF. MIT's Edward M. Purcell reviewed the basic design concept: a 134-meter-diameter (440-ft-diameter) dish, enclosed in a 171-meter (560-ft) radome, the whole costing about $35 million. Whipple explained that the telescope would be a national, not a regional, facility, and assured the gathering that the SAO would "absolutely not" dominate the telescope's planning and policy committee.

On the last meeting day, Findlay sought to bring the participants together in agreement around common issues. The formal "Conclusions and Recommendation," by majority vote of the participants, declared that there was "an urgent need for a large filled-aperture radio-radar telescope in the United States to assist in the solution of a wide range [78] of important problems in astronomy and astrophysics." The telescope was to be operated as a national facility and located "primarily on the basis of scientific and technical criteria." The meeting resolved that the Smithsonian Institution should submit a proposal to the appropriate federal agencies and carry general responsibility for the funding, design, construction, and operation of the telescope. Finally, participants approved that the "NEROC design for a 134-meter (440-ft) telescope in a radome is close in size and general specifications to a feasible optimum design," and endorsed it as the basis for the final design of the Smithsonian telescope.74

The meeting was an unqualified success. James Bradley wrote to Ripley after the meeting: "We have succeeded in gaining the support of thirty astronomers for our legislative proposal to authorize the design and construction of a large-diameter, radio-radar astronomical antenna."75 The conference was only the first step in preparing to go directly to Congress. In the following weeks, the Smithsonian Institution and NEROC assembled materials for the campaign. Among those materials was a publicity packet that included a photograph of a model of the completed dish.


Figure 11. Artist's drawing of the proposed NEROC 440-foot (134-meter), radome-enclosed, fully-steerable antenna.

Figure 11. Artist's drawing of the proposed NEROC 440-foot (134-meter), radome-enclosed, fully-steerable antenna. This and other drawings and models were prepared to raise funding for the radio-radar telescope. Its radar was to operate at 5 cm (6,000 MHz or 6 GHz), which was lower than Haystack Observatory's wavelength of 3.8 cm (7,750 MHz). (Courtesy of MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, Massachusetts, photo no. 259646-1.)


Herb Weiss estimated the cost of the facility and compared the costs presented in the NSF proposal of June 1967 with projected costs based on June 1969 and June 1970 starting dates.

[79] On 3 January 1969, STAG (Smithsonian Telescope Advisory Group), the radio astronomy advisory committee to Dillon Ripley, met at Lincoln Laboratory and reviewed detailed drawings of the design and the latest cost estimate. Meanwhile, the Smithsonian Institution Board of Regents approved requesting an initial $2 million for completing the NEROC design and authorized acquiring land for a site. The next step was to ask the Bureau of the Budget (BoB) for approval to include the $2 million request in the Smithsonian Institution budget for fiscal 1970. On 20 January 1969, Ripley submitted the proposed radio telescope legislation to the director of the BoB.76

Although the intention of approaching Congress directly was to circumvent the NSF review process, the Smithsonian Institution kept the Foundation informed. Meanwhile, in August 1968, NEROC submitted a proposal to the Foundation for expanded radio astronomy research at Haystack. The purpose of the proposal was to increase radio observing time to three shifts. It also included a three-year plan for shifting management and financial responsibility to NEROC, as well as a suggested management structure. The Haystack Scientific Advisory Committee, consisting of MIT and Harvard scientists, would assist the observatory director in approving experiments. Any qualified radio astronomer in the United States could request time.77

During what Haystack director Paul B. Sebring characterized as "the long, silent interval following the August 68 submission of the transfer plan" on 14 March 1969, Lincoln Laboratory, MIT, and NEROC concluded an interim agreement on the transfer of Haystack to NEROC and established the Haystack Observatory Office to evaluate and coordinate experiment proposals and to serve as a conduit for non-Lincoln Laboratory auxiliary funds for Haystack.78

The National Science Foundation turned the NEROC proposal over to the second Dicke Panel, which met in June 1969, nearly a year after NEROC submitted its proposal. The Panel recommended supporting Haystack radio astronomy. The blessing of the Dicke report turned into a one-year NSF grant effective 15 September 1969. The grant paid for wages, computer time, and other costs associated with adding two more shifts of observing time. Under the conditions of the grant, moreover, the Haystack telescope was opened to all qualified radio astronomers in the United States, subject to the approval of the Haystack Scientific Advisory Committee.79

The orderly transition of Haystack into a civilian radio observatory appeared on track, until a military auditor balked at the disparity between the Department of Defense and NSF shares of Haystack support. The NSF had bought two-thirds of the observing time for $200,000, while the Air Force paid about $1.3 million for only one-third. The [80] arrangement conflicted with a Bureau of the Budget circular, and the auditor requested a written release from the Air Force before he would pass on the funding arrangement. Brig. Gen. R. A. Gilbert, Air Force Systems Command director of laboratories, refused to sign a written release; such a waiver, he judged, might commit the Air Force to underwriting Haystack through the end of fiscal 1970, a position he felt he could not take.80

The Mansfield Amendment cut this Gordian knot. Formally known as Section 203 of the Fiscal 1970 Military Procurement Authorization Act, the Mansfield Amendment compelled the Pentagon to demonstrate the mission relevance of basic research financed through its budget. Specifically, the Amendment stated: "None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be used to carry out any research project or study unless such project or study has a direct or apparent relationship to a specific military function of operations." Sen. Mike Mansfield's goal had been to rechannel public funding for science through civilian rather than military agencies.81

The Air Force announced its intention to terminate operation of Haystack no later than 1 July 1970. The Mansfield Amendment was a key factor in that decision. Although the Air Force expressed its willingness to cooperate with the NSF in an orderly transfer, the decision brought chaos. With no Air Force money after 1 July 1970, Haystack was in a perilous financial situation. Sebring, as Haystack director, obtained NSF consent to reprogram its grant funds to defray the entire cost of Haystack radio astronomy operations. A small grant from the Cabot Solar Energy Research Fund supplemented the NSF money.82

The early withdrawal of the Air Force hastened agreements on Haystack ownership, management, and finances. The Air Force transferred Haystack to MIT, which already owned the land. Haystack personnel remained employees of MIT. The NEROC Board of Trustees appointed the observatory director, who reported to them through the board chair. NEROC took responsibility for Haystack research and financing.

To continue support of radio astronomy after 1 October 1970, NEROC submitted a new proposal to the NSF in May 1970. The proposal presented three alternative funding levels, but the NSF awarded less than that requested for a minimal program.83 Subsequently, the NSF annually renewed its support of Haystack radio astronomy. The successful transition of Haystack from military to civilian funding and monitorship ultimately had an impact on the NEROC/SAO effort to fund the 134-meter (440-ft) telescope through Congress.


The Big Dish Bill


On 28 January 1969, Senators Clinton P. Anderson (D-N.M.), Hugh Scott (R-Pa.), and J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), all three regents of the Smithsonian Institution, introduced a bill in the Senate (S.705) "to authorize the Smithsonian Institution to acquire lands and to design a radio-radar astronomical telescope for the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory for the purpose of furthering scientific knowledge, and for other purposes."84

[81] A STAG meeting of 2 April 1969 decided the site for the NEROC telescope. After settling upon a number of site criteria, STAG limited the site candidates to the continental United States, a decision, Fred Whipple pointed out, which led "almost inexorably to a final selection somewhere in the southern border states from western Texas through New Mexico and Arizona into California."85

The Smithsonian legislation, known popularly as the "Big Dish" bill,86 requested $2 million for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1970. The bill was read twice, then referred to the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. On 17 November 1969, Morris K. Udall (D-Arizona) introduced the legislation in the House (H. R. 14,837), where it was referred to the Committee on House Administration.

The Big Dish bill picked up approvals from NASA and the NSF. In February 1969, John Naugle, NASA associate administrator for Space Science and Applications, gave his blessing to the bill: "The addition of such a radio-radar telescope as a national facility would satisfy a need for the future of radio astronomy in the United States."87 On 17 March 1969, Ripley asked Leland J. Haworth, director of the NSF, for his institution's support of the Smithsonian legislation. The NSF's reply came in the form of an invitation. Robert Fleischer, head of the NSF Astronomy Section, wrote that the Dicke Panel would reconvene, on 9-11 June 1969, and invited NEROC to prepare a 30-minute presentation on the current status of its radome design.88 If the Dicke Panel again deferred or rejected the NEROC design in favor of another project, passage of the Smithsonian Institution bill would be jeopardized.

Two years had passed since the first Dicke Panel met. "A need that was then urgent has now become critical," the second Dicke Report declared. "While our country has stood still, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, and India have started new, large radio telescopes and several are essentially complete and ready for operation." The Panel reaffirmed the need to upgrade the Arecibo dish and supported the Owens Valley array and the Very Large Array. As for the NEROC antenna, the second Dicke Panel found it "clear that this instrument is not only feasible, but ready for final design and construction." The Panel recommended that "the final design and construction...be started now...with the utmost dispatch." The Panel suffered amnesia, too; its report claimed that it had "highly recommended for continuation" of the NEROC design study two years earlier. In its conclusions, the second Dicke panel declared: "The urgent need for such a telescope is proven beyond doubt. The instrument is ready to go into the construction phase." Whether funded through the Smithsonian Institution or the National Science Foundation, "it is evident that this instrument should be operated as a national facility."89

The Dicke Panel report was released on 15 August 1969. Although Congress interpreted the report as supporting the Big Dish, the Dicke Panel recommendations neither changed the playing field in Congress nor clarified the issues. After a two-hour hearing on 10 September 1969, Rep. Frank Thompson, Jr., (D-NJ), chairman of the Subcommittee on Library and Memorials, deferred the Big Dish legislation. He insisted on having reports [82] from NASA, the NSF, and the Department of Defense before holding hearings. After the submission of the reports, hearings were set for 15 September 1969,90 but the question was not settled before the end of the Congressional session.

House hearings took place on 29 July 1970, after Rep. Thompson reintroduced the legislation (H. R. 13,024) on 22 July 1970. The primary hurdle facing the bill was the tight budget, although money was available for the war in Vietnam. As Rep. Thompson quipped: "Maybe if we could get this [telescope] in the Defense budget it would be all right, but then I would be against it." In April 1971, Lilley and the Smithsonian Institution in fact did consider an amendment to the Big Dish bill that would include classified Navy research among its duties.91

During the 19 July 1970 hearings, astronomers argued that the telescope was needed because the United States was behind the rest of the world in radio astronomy. At no point, however, did anyone defend the telescope's radar research program. The bill went to the Subcommittee on Library and Memorials, which unanimously voted to report the bill to the Committee on House Administration with the recommendation that it be reported to the Congress for enactment into law.

The BoB torpedoed the Big Dish bill, however, citing the findings of a special NSF review committee, which had assigned higher priority to two other projects. The proposed expenditure, moreover, was not consistent with Nixon Administration efforts to limit fiscal 1970 funding to items of the highest priority and to avoid commitments for fiscal 1971 and beyond. Among other issues, the BoB pointed out that the bill raised basic questions about the appropriate roles of the Smithsonian Institution and the NSF.92

The Big Dish bill returned to Congress in March 1971. On 31 March 1971, Rep. Thompson told Dillon Ripley that the bill would go through the House "with no trouble."93 The Greenstein Panel, however, stopped the bill. Ripley wrote to Sen. Clinton Anderson on 23 June 1971 advising him to postpone action on the bill. The latest incarnation of the Dicke Panel, chaired by Jesse Greenstein, Caltech astronomy professor, was going to recommend three facilities: the VLA, a large centimeter-wave antenna, and a large millimeter-wave antenna. It also was going to recommend that the VLA be started first. "In view of the priorities to be established by the Committee," Ripley wrote, "it does not seem wise to seek authorization now for the Smithsonian telescope. The three projects are all of great value to radio-radar astronomy and should not be put into a competition for limited Federal funds. If the array project is authorized on a reasonable time-scale, we look forward to a timely resumption of our efforts with you on the large Smithsonian telescope."94

The saga of the NEROC radio-radar telescope ended not in Congress, but within NEROC itself. Once Haystack was opened to radio astronomers from NEROC and other institutions, thanks to funding from the NSF, pressure to build the NEROC telescope eased. NEROC board members had come to realize, too, that the Big Dish bill was a lost [83] cause. In addition, radio astronomy was changing; millimeter frequencies were the newest frontier. So at an ad hoc meeting of 25 April 1972, Ed Lilley and the other NEROC members voted to terminate the Big Dish project. Instead, NEROC would concentrate on an NSF proposal to upgrade Haystack, so that it could operate at a wavelength of three millimeters.95

In retrospect, Herb Weiss, who voted at the ad hoc meeting, reflected on the demise of the NEROC project: "It's very difficult to judge the absolute priorities; it's a moving territory. I really felt that the country made the wrong decision not to pursue NEROC. Even though they might have dragged it out, they might have done something, but it's such small money and such a great step in the right direction, and not the ultimate. I mean you can go beyond that, but it'll take a long time; you've got to get new materials."96

For planetary radar astronomy, here was a lesson in Big Science. The need for the NEROC telescope, the decision to design and build it, and the entrepreneurial skills and energy to push the project all came from radio astronomers, not radar astronomers. Piggybacking onto a Big Science (radio astronomy) telescope helped to overcome many obstacles, but in the end, the loss of control that is inherent to piggybacking cost radar astronomy the telescope. Also, the episode illustrated that ultimately the instrument needs of radio and radar astronomers can be inharmonious.

Literally, they operate at different wavelengths. Whereas radio astronomers found a wavelength of three millimeters exciting, planetary radar astronomers could not operate at such short wavelengths. The generation of sufficient power to conduct radar experiments at millimeter wavelengths was, and remains, an insurmountable technological obstacle.


The Nadir of Radar


Three years after NEROC voted to terminate the Big Dish bill, all planetary radar stopped at Haystack; Lincoln Laboratory was out of the planetary radar business. The last Haystack planetary radar transmission traveled to Mercury on 22 March 1974.97 The NSF supported radio astronomy at Haystack, but planetary radar depended on mission-oriented NASA grants. Topographical studies of the Moon and Mars supported the Apollo and Viking missions. In an exceptional move, when the hasty departure of the Air Force imperiled the telescope's finances, NASA patched together the required amount from the NASA Planetary Astronomy, Viking, and Manned Spacecraft Center program budgets.98

The obvious explanation for the end of planetary radar at Haystack is that the upgraded Arecibo telescope outclassed it. Yet reality was neither so obvious nor so simple. The upgraded Arecibo radar, in fact, was not operational until almost a year and a half after Haystack carried out its last planetary radar experiment. Although the upgraded Arecibo telescope was far more sensitive, it could look at a target for only two hours and forty minutes at best. With an ability to track targets for many more hours, Haystack could [84] compensate for its lack of sensitivity by increasing signal integration time. Hardware alone was not the only reason for the end of planetary radar at Haystack.

Haystack radar use, heavy at first, did not stop suddenly in 1974, but declined gradually over the years. In 1970, radar accounted for about a third of observing time,99 far more than at Arecibo or JPL. An optimistic NEROC proposal submitted to the NSF in 1971 stated: "It is believed that, for the next several years, the Planetary Radar instrumentation should continue to occupy the Haystack antenna for roughly 40 to 50 percent of the available time."100 In fact, the actual total antenna time (exclusive of maintenance and improvements) for planetary radar observing fell from 17 percent in 1971 to 14 percent in 1972, then to 12 percent in 1973.101

Part of the problem was intense competition among radio astronomers for telescope time. The search for molecular spectral lines was frenetic and intensely competitive.


Figure 12. The Haystack Observatory planetary radar box.

Figure 12. The Haystack Observatory planetary radar box. Technicians preparing the box for an experiment suggest the size of the box. A large forklift truck raised the box into position on the telescope. (Courtesy of MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, Massachusetts, photo no. P10.29-1785.)


[85] Although Haystack installed radio astronomy equipment on the planetary radar box in early 1970 to increase observing time for radio astronomers, complaints about the box continued. Indeed, the planetary radar box could sit on the antenna for months at a time. In the second half of 1972, for example, planetary radar work kept the box on the antenna from 13 July to 24 September and from 9 October to 12 November.102 As radar astronomer Gordon Pettengill reflected, "It wasn't convenient to make a change for a few hours from one box to another, and that's what really did it [Haystack] in I think."103

Another factor was NASA's decision to not fund research facilities. As the Air Force began withdrawing financial support from Haystack, NASA seemed to be a natural source of at least some operational funding. In his reply to the Air Force, NASA Deputy Administrator George M. Low explained that at NASA, "We consider, however, that within the present budgetary limitations and compared to other ongoing programs, the research programs that could be performed at the Haystack Facility have too low a priority to claim NASA support of the overall operational cost of the Facility." If another agency were to provide general operational support, NASA would be happy to underwrite specific, mission-oriented research, such as the topographic studies of Mars and the Moon.104

The Haystack radar transmitter klystron tubes, without which planetary radar could not be carried out, suffered from internal arcing on occasion. "At times," Haystack Associate Director Dick Ingalls explained, "it was hairy."105 In 1973, Haystack asked NASA for a replacement klystron tube. NASA refused, accepting the risk that klystron failure meant the end of planetary radar research.106 Of the two NASA missions for which Haystack conducted planetary radar research, Apollo and Viking, Apollo was over by 1973. Once Haystack radar data ceased serving the needs of the Viking mission, NASA no longer had any mission interest in Haystack planetary radar research.107

Thus, temperamental klystrons, complaints from radio astronomers, the end of NASA mission funds, and NASA's policy of not funding facility operations all contributed to bring Haystack planetary radar to its nadir and demise. Despite that demise and the fate of the NEROC telescope, planetary radar astronomers at Lincoln Laboratory and MIT were not without an instrument. The future was at the Arecibo Observatory.



1. W. K. Klemperer, G. R. Ochs, and Kenneth L. Bowles, "Radar Echoes from Venus at 50 Mc/sec," The Astronomical Journal 69 (1964): 22-28; Overhage to Lt. Gen. James Ferguson, 28 March 1963, MITA; Jesse C. James, Richard P. Ingalls, and Louis P. Rainville, "Radar Echoes from Venus at 38 Mc/sec," The Astronomical Journal 72 (1967): 1047-1050.

2. Evans 9/9/93. MITA does not have a copy of the 1960 summer course lecture notes.

3. Brochure, MIT, Radar Astronomy: Summer Session 1961 August 14-18 (Cambridge: MIT, 1961), LLLA; MIT, Radar Astronomy: Summer Session MIT, August 14-18, 1961, Lectures 1-15, 3 vols. (Cambridge: MIT, 1961), MITA.

4. Evans and Tor Hagfors, eds., Radar Astronomy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. viii.

5. Evans 9/9/93.

6. Campbell 9/12/93; E-mail, Pettengill to author, 29 September 1994; Rogers 5/5/94.

7. Pettengill 28/9/93; Rogers 5/5/94; NEROC, "Technical Proposal: Radar Studies of the Moon (Topography)," 12 November 1971, SEBRING.

8. Space Science Board, Proposal for Continuation of Contract NSR 09-012-903, 28 October 1965, "NAS-SSB, 1965," NHO; Joseph N. Tatarewicz, Space, Technology, and Planetary Astronomy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 38.

9. Rossi biographical information, MITA; "President's Report Issue," MIT Bulletin vol. 82, no. 1 (1946): 137-138.

10. "Conference on Radar Astronomy Program," n.d., and George A. Derbyshire, Memorandum for the Record, 29 May 1959, "ORG, NAS, 1959 October Space Science Bd, Conferences Radar Astronomy, Dedham," NAS. Hereafter, Conference Program and Derbyshire Memorandum, 29 May 1959, respectively.

11. Eshleman, telephone conversation, 26 January 1993; Eshleman 9/5/94; Eshleman, Barthle, and Gallagher, "Radar Echoes from the Sun," Science 134 (1960): 329-332; Eshleman and Allen M. Peterson, "Radar Astronomy," Scientific American 203 (August, 1960): 50-51; Barthle, "The Detection of Radar Echoes from the Sun," Scientific Report 9 (Stanford: RLSEL, 24 August 1960); Pettengill 28/9/93.

The possibility of obtaining radar echoes from the solar corona had been suggested earlier by the Australian ionosphericist Frank Kerr in 1952 and by the Ukrainians F. G. Bass and S. I. Braude in 1957. Kerr, "On the Possibility of Obtaining Radar Echoes from the Sun and Planets," pp. 660-666; Bass and Braude, "[On the Question of Reflecting Radar Signals from the Sun]," Ukrains'ky Fizychny Zhurnal [Ukrainian Journal of Physics] 2 (1957): 149-164.

12. Eshleman to Rossi, 13 May 1959, "ORG, NAS, 1959 October Space Science Bd., Conferences Radar Astronomy, Dedham," NAS.

13. "Preliminary List of Invitees;" "Draft Recommendations of the Conference on Radar Astronomy," Appendix A, "List of Participants;" Newell to Rossi, 18 June 1959; Derbyshire Memorandum, 29 May 1959; and Derbyshire, Memorandum for the Record, 2 June 1959, "ORG, NAS, 1959 October Space Science Bd, Conferences Radar Astronomy, Dedham," NAS.

14. For Roman's lunar radar work at the NRL, see, for example, Yaplee, Roman, Craig, and T. F. Scanlan, "A Lunar Radar Study at 10-CM Wavelength," in Bracewell, ed., Paris Symposium on Radio Astronomy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 19-28, and Ch. 1, note 69.

15. Derbyshire Memorandum, 2 June 1959; Conference Program; Rossi to Derbyshire, 10 June 1959, "ORG, NAS, 1959 October Space Science Bd, Conferences Radar Astronomy, Dedham," NAS.

16. "Draft Recommendations of the Conference on Radar Astronomy," pp. 5-8, "ORG, NAS, 1959 October Space Science Bd, Conferences Radar Astronomy, Dedham," NAS. Emphasis in original text.

17. Memorandum, E. R. Dyer, Jr., to Participants, Space Science Board Conference on Radar Astronomy, 30 October 1959, and "Report and Recommendations of the Conference on Radar Astronomy," "ORG: NAS, 1959 October Space Science Bd: Conferences Radar Astronomy: Dedham," NAS.

18. Pettengill 29/9/93.

19. URSI actually dates back to 1913 and the creation of the French Commission Internationale de TSF Scientifique. TSF (Télégraphie Sans Fil) is French for wireless radio. Albert Levasseur, De la TSF à l'électronique: Histoire des techniques radioélectriques (Paris: ETSF, 1975), pp. 79 & 87.

20. Campbell 9/12/93.

21. Edge and Mulkay, p. 44; Bracewell, Paris Symposium, passim.

22. Ray L. Leadabrand, "Radar Astronomy Symposium Report," Journal of Geophysical Research 65 (April 1960): 1103-1115; Green 20/9/93. P. Green to author, 21 December 1994, states that Green described range-Doppler mapping in his earlier talk at the Endicott House conference, but the talk was not published.

23. "URSI National Committee Report, XIV General Assembly, Tokyo, September, 1963: Commission 5. Radio and Radar Astronomy," Journal of Research of the National Bureau of Standards, Section D: Radio Science 68D (May 1964): 631-653; "Commission 7. Radio Electronics," ibid., pp. 655-678.

24. The symposium papers were published in The Astronomical Journal 69 (1964): 1-72. The Astronomical Journal is the publication of the American Astronomical Society.

25. William E. Gordon, "Preface," Journal of Research of the National Bureau of Standards, Section D: Radio Science 69D (July-December 1965): iii. This was a special issue containing the symposium papers.

26. Harrison Brown, Gordon J. Stanley, Duane O. Muhleman, and Guido Münch, eds., Proceedings of the Caltech-JPL Lunar and Planetary Conference (Pasadena: Caltech and JPL, 15 June 1966).

27. Robertson, pp. 285-291 has a section called "When Big was Beautiful."

28. The El Campo facility later was transferred from Lincoln Laboratory to the MIT Center for Space Research and was funded by a National Science Foundation grant. MIT, Radar Studies of the Sun and Venus: Final Report to the National Science Foundation under Grant No. GP-8128 (Cambridge: MIT, June 1969).

29. Eshleman 9/5/94; Leadabrand and Eshleman, A Proposal for an 800-foot Radar Astronomy Telescope (Stanford: Stanford Research Institute, 9 October 1959), Eshleman materials.

30. Quoted in Lovell, The Jodrell Bank Telescopes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 249-250. Lovell has described his experiences in Jodrell Bank and The Jodrell Bank Telescopes.

31. Overhage to Ferguson, 21 May 1962; Overhage to Ferguson, 28 December 1962; Overhage to Roscoe Wilson, 30 June 1961; J. W. Meyer, "The Lincoln Laboratory General Research Program," paper presented at the Joint Services Advisory Committee meeting, 19 April 1962, pp. 5-6; and W. H. Radford to B. A. Schriever, 6 May 1964, 1/24/AC 134, MITA; Lincoln Laboratory, "Millstone Hill Field Station," April 1965, LLLA.

32. Overhage to Ferguson, 26 June 1963, 1/24/AC 134, MITA; Overhage and Radford, "The Lincoln Laboratory West Ford Program: An Historical Perspective," Proceedings of the IEEE 52 (1964): 452-454; Folder "Project West Ford Releases and Reports," LLLA. Much of the Proceedings of the IEEE 52 (1964): 452-606, deals exclusively with Project West Ford. For antagonism of radio astronomers to Project Needles, see Lovell, Astronomer by Chance, pp. 331-334; Martin Ryle and Lovell, Interference to Radio Astronomy from Belts of Orbiting Dipoles (Needles)," Quarterly Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society 3 (1962): 100-108; D. E. Blackwell and R. Wilson, "Interference to Optical Astronomy from Belts of Orbiting Dipoles (Needles)," ibid., pp. 109-117; and H. Bondi, "The West Ford Project," ibid., p. 99.

33. Lincoln Laboratory, The General Research Program, Report DOR-533 (Lexington: Lincoln Laboratory, 15 June 1967), p. 1.

34. John Harrington, The Haystack Hill Station, Technical Memorandum 78 (Lexington: Lincoln Laboratory, 13 October 1959), pp. 1 & 5-7, LLLA.

35. Overhage to Ferguson, 14 November 1962, Overhage to B. A. Schriever, 27 January 1964, and brochure, "Dedication Haystack Microwave Research Facility," 1/24/AC 134, MITA; Memorandum, J. A. Kessler to Radford, 30 September 1964, LLLA; "Millstone Hill Field Station;" Harrington, Haystack Hill, pp. 2-3; Weiss 29/9/93. For a discussion of the design and construction of Haystack, see Weiss, "The Haystack Microwave Research Facility," IEEE Spectrum 2 (February 1965): 50-69; Evans, Ingalls, and Pettengill, "The Haystack Planetary Ranging Radar," in L. Efron and C. B. Solloway, eds., Scientific Applications of Radio and Radar Tracking in the Space Program, Technical Report 32-1475 (Pasadena: JPL, July 1970), pp. 27-36; and Weiss, W. R. Fanning, F. A. Folino, and R. A. Muldoon, "Design of the Haystack Antenna and Radome," in James W. Mar and Harold Liebowitz, eds., Structures Technology for Large Radio and Radar Telescope Systems (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), pp. 151-184.

36. "Ad Hoc Committee on Large Steerable Antenna, Report, 8/7/63," 5/1/AC 135, Memorandum, Lilley to File, n.d., 10/1/AC 135, Memorandum, Lilley to Sebring and Meyer, 28 July 1964, 11/1/AC 135, Memorandum, 27 September 1965, "A Policy for the Use of the Millstone Hill and Haystack Facilities by Agencies outside the Department of Defense," 6/1/AC 135, and "Ad Hoc Committee on Large Steerable Antenna, Report, 8/7/63," 5/1/AC 135, MITA; Lincoln Laboratory, General Research Program, Report DOR-533, p. 25; MIT Research Laboratory of Electronics, Annual Research Review and Twentieth Anniversary Program, 10-12 May 1966, 23 March 1966, pp. 7-8, 13-14, NHOB.

37. Comptroller General, Report to the Congress of the United States: Unnecessary Costs Incurred for the Naval Radio Research Station Project at Sugar Grove, West Virginia. (Washington: GPO, April 1964), p. 7. For additional background on the Sugar Grove dish, see Edward F. McClain, Jr., "The 600-foot Radio Telescope," Scientific American 202 (January 1960): 45-51; James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America's Secret Agency (New York: Penguin, 1983), pp. 218-221; and Daniel S. Greenberg, "Big Dish: How Haste and Secrecy Helped Navy Waste $63 Million in Race To Build Huge Telescope," Science 144 (1964): 1111-1112.

38. Memorandum, Lilley, August 1965, "Comments on a Regional Radio and Radar Research Facility for the New England Area," p. 2-1, Box 7, UA V 630.159.10, PAHU.

39. NRL, Careers in Space Communications (Washington: NRL, n.d.), p. 3, NRL, Radio Astronomy and the 600-foot Dish (Washington: NRL, n.d.), n. p., and "The Big Dish," typed and edited manuscript, NRLHRC; Comptroller General, pp. 2-4, 6 & 11. Early specifications for Sugar Grove did not include radar experiments. See, for example, Specifications for the Naval Radio Facility, Sugar Grove, W. Va. (Washington: NRL, December 1957), and Specifications for the U.S. Naval Radio Research Station Sugar Grove, W. Va. (Washington: NRL, September 1959), NRLHRC. Later specifications, though, did indicate radar experiments. P. Green to Robert Page, 14 April 1960, and other documents, Green materials; Eshleman, "Sun Radar Experiment," in MIT, Radar Astronomy, vol. 3, lecture 15, p. 10. Fiscal irresponsibility was not the sole factor leading to the termination of the Sugar Grove project; the availability of satellites to perform its espionage functions was certainly another.

40. Congressional Record, 87th Cong., 2d sess., 1962, Vol. 108, pt. 12, pp. 16175-16178.

41. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Applications and Tracking and Data Acquisition, Report on Radio and Radar Astronomy, 87th Cong., 2d sess., 1962.

42. "Dedication of new 140-foot radio telescope at the National Radio Astronomy Observatory, Green Bank, West Virginia," remarks by Dr. Leland J. Haworth, 13 October 1965, "Speeches, Leland J. Haworth," NSFHF.

43. Geoffrey Keller, "Report of the Advisory Panel on Radio Telescopes," The Astrophysical Journal 134 (1961): 927-939.

44. Material in folders "Committees & Boards, Committee on Science and Public Policy, Panels, Astronomical Facilities, 1963," "ADM, C&B, COSPUP, Panels, Astronomical Facilities, Radio Astronomers, Meetings, Agenda, Nov," "Committees & Boards, Committee on Science and Public Policy, Panels, Astronomical Facilities, 1964," and "Committees & Boards, Committee on Science and Public Policy, Panels, Astronomical Facilities, Report, General, 1965," NAS; Gerard F. W. Mulders, "Astronomy Section Annual Report," 25 June 1963, pp. 1-2, and Harold H. Lane, "Astronomy Section Annual Report," 1 July 1964, p. 1, NSFHF; Panel on Astronomical Facilities, Ground-Based Astronomy: A Ten-Year Program (Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1964), p. 57.

45. Memorandum, Roman to Associate Administrator, Office of Space Science and Applications, 16 March 1965, "ADM, C&B, COSPUP, Astronomical Facilities Rpt Recommendations, Assessment by NSF," NAS.

46. Haworth to Donald F. Hornig, 5 April 1965, "Committees & Boards, Committee on Science and Public Policy, Panels, Astronomical Facilities, Report, Recommendations, Assessment by NSF, 1965," NAS; "Astronomy Section Annual Report, 1966," p. 1, "MPS Annual Reports," NSFHF.

47. Harold H. Lane, "Astronomy Section Annual Report," 1 July 1964, p. 2, NSFHF; Ground-Based Astronomy, pp. 50-57. In 1955, Caltech began building a radio interferometer consisting of 2 90-foot dishes at Owens Valley, California, funded by the U.S. Office of Naval Research. Robertson, pp. 120-121; Marshall H. Cohen, "The Owens Valley Radio Observatory: Early Years," Engineering and Science 57 (1994): 8-23.

48. Ground-Based Astronomy, pp. 56 & 75; "Assessment of the recommendations of the Whitford Report, entitled 'Ground-Based Astronomy: A Ten-Year Program,'" Table V, "ADM, C&B, COSPUP, Astronomical Facilities Rpt Recommendations, Assessment by NSF," NAS.

49. J. A. Stratton to S. Dillon Ripley, 14 May 1965, and Nathan M. Pusey to Stratton, 2 June 1965, 5/1/AC 135, and Minutes of Meeting, 26 August 1965, 14/1/AC 135, MITA.

50. Lilley, "Comments," p. 2-1, PAHU.

51. Memorandum, 26 October 1965, "CAMROC Support and Budget," and other documents in 6/1/AC 135 and 12/1/AC 135, MITA.

52. "Proposal to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for Support of Design Studies for a Large Steerable Antenna for Radio and Radar Astronomy," February 1966, 55/1/AC 135, and "Project Office Report to CAMROC, Number 2," 30 August 1966, 5/1/AC 135, MITA; William E. Brunk to Director, Grants and Research Contracts, 28 July 1966, NHOB.

53. Memorandum, Joel Orlen to Jerome Wiesner, 7 September 1966, Wiesner to Robert C. Seamans, Jr., 3 October 1966, and Seamans to Wiesner, 15 November 1966, 55/1/AC 135, MITA.

54. For background on the VLA, see David S. Heeschen, "The Very Large Array," Sky and Telescope 49 (1975): 344-351; and A. R. Thompson, R. G. Clark, C. M. Wade, and P. J. Napier, "The Very Large Array," Astrophysical Journal Supplemental Series 44 (1980): 151-167. The initial theoretical development of arrays is discussed in Bracewell, "Early Work on Imaging Theory in Radio Astronomy," pp. 167-190 in Sullivan. See also P. A. G. Scheuer, "The Development of Aperture Synthesis at Cambridge," pp. 249-265 in ibid.

55. Memorandum, Pettengill to CAMROC Project Office File, 9 June 1966, 18/1/AC 135, MITA.

56. Memorandum, Lilley to Edward M. Purcell and Wiesner, 1 August 1966, 22/1/AC 135, MITA.

57. "Report of the Meeting of the Advisory Committee for Mathematical and Physical Sciences," 13-14 April 1967, p. 6, NSFHF.

58. Memorandum, Lilley to Purcell and Wiesner, 1 August 1966, 22/1/AC 135, MITA.

59. CAMROC Funds, 26 April 1966, 7/1/AC 135, Orlen to Wiesner, 24 November 1965, 6/1/AC 135, and various documents in 56/1/AC 135, MITA. NSF Grant GP-5832 was awarded to MIT for the project "Design Studies for a Large Steerable Antenna for Radio and Radar Astronomy." For materials relating to the proposal, see 12/1/AC 135 and 57/1/AC 135, MITA.

60. Memorandum, Lilley to Purcell and Wiesner, 1 August 1966, 22/1/AC 135, and various documents, 49/1/AC 135, MITA. The Institution of Electrical Engineers (London) sponsored a Conference on Large Steerable Aerials for Satellite Communication, Radio Astronomy, and Radar, on 6-28 June 1966. Herb Weiss, William Fanning, and John Ruze from Lincoln Laboratory presented five papers: "Antenna Tolerance Theory: A Review," "Design Considerations for a Large Fully Steerable Radio Telescope," "Performance Measurements on the Haystack Antenna," "Mechanical Design of the Haystack Antenna," "Performance and Design of Metal Space-Frame Radomes." 23/1/AC 135, MITA.

61. Memorandum, Orlen to Wiesner, 8 February 1966, 7/1/AC 135, MITA.

62. "Outline of Organization and Management of Radio Observatory," 20 May 1966; untitled document, dated May 1966; and "Alternative Organizational Arrangements," 20 May 1966, 7/1/AC 135; Agenda, CAMROC meeting of 15 June 1967, 8/1/AC 135, and documents in 61/1/AC 135, 66/1/AC 135, and 67/1/AC 135, MITA; NEROC, Scientific Objectives of the Proposed NEROC Radio-Radar Telescope (Cambridge: NEROC, 1967), p. 1; Certificate of Incorporation, 22 June 1967, "NEROC," LLLA. The annotated agenda of the first meeting of the NEROC Board of Trustees, the minutes of that meeting, the certificate of incorporation, and the NEROC by-laws are in 11/64/AC 118, MITA.

63. Documents in 8/1/AC 135 and 65/1/AC 135, MITA; Certificate of Incorporation, 22 June 1967, and "Qualifications of Northeastern Institutions for CAMROC Membership," 22 March 1967, "NEROC," LLLA.

64. Long to Wiesner, 27 June 1967, and Wiesner to James A. Perkins, 16 June 1967, 72/1/AC 135, MITA.

65. John T. Wilson to Howard W. Johnson, 17 January 1967, 8/1/AC 135, and Seamans to Wiesner, 15 November 1966, 55/1/AC 135, MITA.

66. "Report of the Meeting of the Advisory Committee for Mathematical and Physical Sciences," 13-14 April 1967, p. 7, NSFHF.

67. National Science Board, Approved Minutes of the Open Sessions, meeting of 8 September 1967, pp. 113:14-113:15, National Science Board; "Draft of G. Pettengill's material for CAMROC facilities proposal," 21 April 1967, 62/2/AC 135, and NEROC, "A Large Radio-Radar Telescope: Proposal for a Research Facility," June 1967, 61/2/AC 135, MITA; "Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Panel for Large Radio Astronomy Facilities," 14 August 1967, typed manuscript, pp. pp. 2-4, 9-10 & 13-14, NSFL. The members of the Dicke Panel were Bart J. Bok, Stirling A. Colgate, Rudolph Kompfner, William W. Morgan, Eugene N. Parker, Merle A. Tuve, Gart Westerhout, and Robert H. Dicke.

68. Memorandum, Burke to Lilley, 6 October 1967, 8/2/AC 135, MITA.

69. Documents in 62/1/AC 135, MITA. For the Jodrell Bank 440-foot (134-meter) MARK V telescope, see Lovell, The Jodrell Bank Telescopes, Chapters 5-6 & 9-11. For the Effelsberg telescope, see Otto Hachenberg, "The 100-meter Telescope of the Max Planck Institute for Radio Astronomy in Bonn," Proceedings of the IEEE 61 (1973): 1288-1295, also in Mar and Liebowitz, pp. 13-27, which are the proceedings of the International Symposium on Structures Technology for Large Radio and Radar Telescope Systems.

70. Weiss to Wiesner, 21 September 1967, 18/2/AC 135, and documents in 63/1/AC 135, MITA. MIT contributed $72,381, Harvard $30,000, and the SAO $18,860; NEROC had received $1,615,000 from the NSF.

71. "Board of Trustees: Second Meeting of the NEROC Board of Trustees, 10/22/67," 62/1/AC 135, and "Board of Trustees: Third Meeting of the NEROC Board of Trustees, 5/25/68," 63/1/AC 135, MITA.

72. NEROC, Proposal to the National Science Foundation for Programs in Radio and Radar Astronomy at the Haystack Observatory, 8 May 1970, p. V.2, LLLA; "Board of Trustees: Third Meeting of the NEROC Board of Trustees, 5/25/68," 63/1/AC 135; "Board of Trustees: Fourth Meeting of the NEROC Board of Trustees, 1/18/69," 64/1/AC 135; and NEROC, Proposal to the National Science Foundation, for Research Programs in Radio Astronomy Using the Haystack Facility, for the period 1 July 1969 to 30 June 1970, p. 4, 11/64/AC 118, MITA. The proposal can be found in "Research Proposals in Radio Astronomy Using the Haystack Facility, 7/1/69-6/30/70," 23/2/AC 135, and "Operating Expenses for the NEROC Haystack Observatory, 7/1/69-6/30/70," 24/2/AC 135, MITA.

73. Memorandum, Lilley to NEROC Board of Trustees, 21 November 1968, Box 1, UA V 630.159.10, PUHA; Documents in 64/1/AC 135, MITA.

74. James C. Bradley, Charles A. Lundquist, and Lilley, draft letter to all regents, 20 November 1968, and Memorandum, Lilley to NEROC Board of Trustees, 21 November 1968, Box 1, UA V 630.159.10, PUHA; "Minutes, Radio and Radar Astronomers Meeting," pp. 1-5, 8-9, 11-12, 15-18 & 24, "List of attendees and observers," Attachment 1, and "Conclusions and Recommendations," 61/137, SIAUSC, 1959-1972; J. W. Findlay, "Summary of a meeting to consider a large filled-aperture radio-radar telescope," 1 December 1968, "SAO 1968," 217, SIAOS, SIA.

75. Memorandum, Bradley to Ripley, 16 December 1968, "SAO 1968," 217, SIAOS, SIA.

76. Ripley to Haworth, 17 March 1969, 9/2/AC 135, documents in 10/2/AC 135, 12/2/AC 135, and 64/1/AC 135, MITA. Members of the Smithsonian Telescope Advisory Group, 18 February 1969: John W. Findlay, NRAO, Green Bank; Alan H. Barrett, MIT; Von R. Eshleman, Stanford; Richard M. Goldstein, JPL; Carl E. Heiles, UC Berkeley; John D. Krauss, Ohio State University; Frank J. Kerr, University of Maryland; A. Edward Lilley, Harvard; Alan T. Moffet, Caltech; Gordon H. Pettengill, Arecibo; Irwin I. Shapiro, MIT; Harold F. Weaver, UC Berkeley; and Gart Westerhout, University of Maryland. "NEROC Bd. of Trustees Minutes," Box 2, UA V 630.159.10, PUHA.

77. NEROC, Proposal to the National Science Foundation, for Research Programs in Radio Astronomy Using the Haystack Facility, for the period 1 July 1969 to 30 June 1970, pp. 1-2 & 4-5, 11/64/AC 118, MITA. The proposal also can be found in "Research Proposals in Radio Astronomy Using the Haystack Facility, 7/1/69-6/30/70," 23/2/AC 135, and "Operating Expenses for the NEROC Haystack Observatory, 7/1/69-6/30/70," 24/2/AC 135, MITA. The scientific advisory committee consisted of Alan H. Barrett, William A. Dent, A. Edward Lilley, and Irwin I. Shapiro.

78. Memorandum, Sebring to M. U. Clauser, 21 November 1969, 12/56/AC 118, and "Haystack Observatory Office, Agreement Establishing the H.O.O., 3/14/69," 31/2/AC 135, MITA.

79. "Report of the Second Meeting of the Ad Hoc Advisory Panel for Large Radio Astronomy Facilities," 15 August 1969, p. 22, NSFL; Louis Levin to Wiesner, 12 September 1969, 18/2/AC 135, MITA; NEROC, Proposal to the National Science Foundation for Programs in Radio and Radar Astronomy at the Haystack Observatory, 8 May 1970, p. IV.3, LLLA.

80. Brunk, Memo to the Files, 18 December 1969, NHOB.

81. James L. Penick, Jr., Carrol W. Pursell, Jr., Morgan B. Sherwood, and Donald C. Swain, eds., The Politics of American Science 1939 to the Present, rev. ed. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1972), pp. 338-349.

82. W. D. McElroy to Grant Hansen, 5 May 1970, 18/2/AC 135, Hurlburt to Sebring, 20 May 1970, 18/2/AC 135, and Wiesner to Orlen, 16 July 1970, 16/2/AC 135, MITA; Hansen to Thomas O. Paine, 26 February 1970, NHOB.

83. NEROC, Proposal to the National Science Foundation for Programs in Radio and Radar Astronomy at the Haystack Observatory, 8 May 1970, p. IV.1, LLLA; Wiesner to Wilbur W. Bolton, Jr., 15 October 1970, 18/2/AC 135, MITA.

84. Documents in "Radio-Radar Telescope Legislation, 91st Congress, 7/1/69-12/31/69," 60, SIAOS, and "SAO 1968," 217, SIAOS, SIA; "Congress Gets 'Big Dish' Bill," Vol. 9, No. 4 The SAO News (March 1969): 1&4, 24/1/AC 135, MITA.

85. Whipple to Bradley, 3 April 1969, "Miscellaneous Correspondence and Other Material," Box 1, UA V 630.159.10, PUHA.

86. See, for instance, "Biggest Radio-Radar Scope Asked for U.S.," Washington Evening Star, 1 April 1969, p. A15, in "Radar Astronomy," NHO.

87. John E. Naugle to Richard A. Buddeke, 18 February 1969, NHOB; "Radio-Radar Telescope Legislation, 91st Congress, 7/1/69-12/31/69," 60, SIAOS, SIA; "SAO 1968," 217, SIAOS, SIA; "Congress Gets 'Big Dish' Bill," pp. 1&4, 24/1/AC 135, MITA.

88. Robert Fleischer to Wiesner, 20 May 1969, 18/2/AC 135, and Ripley to Haworth, 17 March 1969, 9/2/AC 135, MITA.

89. "Report of the Second Meeting of the Ad Hoc Advisory Panel for Large Radio Astronomy Facilities," 15 August 1969, typed manuscript, pp. 1-3 & 15-17, NSFL. The membership of the second Dicke Panel was the same as the first, with the exception of Merle A. Tuve, Carnegie Institution of Washington, who was unable to attend.

90. "Radio-Radar Telescope Legislation, 91st Congress, 7/1/69-12/31/69," SIAOS, 60, SIA; "Statement by Herbert G. Weiss for Congressional Subcommittee Hearings, October 1969," 9/2/AC 135, MITA.

91. Transcript of Congressional hearing of 29 July 1970, Subcommittee on Library and Memorials of the Committee on House Administration, pp. 381-382 & 393, "Miscellaneous Correspondence and Other Material," Box 1, and "Miscellaneous Correspondence and Other Material," Box 2, UA V 630.159.10, PUHA.

92. Transcript of hearing, pp. 381-382 & 393, "Miscellaneous Correspondence and Other Material," Box 1; Memorandum for the record, James Bradley, 16 September 1969, and James M. Frey to Frank Thompson, Jr., 2 September 1969, "Miscellaneous Correspondence and Other Material," Box 2, UA V 630.159.10, PUHA; "SAO Radio-Radar Telescope, 1970," and Ripley to Lucien N. Nedzi, 2 April 1971, SIAOS, 61, SIA; Memorandum, Orlen to Wiesner, 4 February 1969, 9/2/AC 135, MITA.

93. Ripley to Nedzi, 2 April 1971, "SAO Radio-Radar Telescope, 1971," 61, SIAOS, SIA.

94. Ripley to Anderson, 23 June 1971, "440' Congress Suspension," Box 1, UA V 630.159.10, PUHA. The subpanel for radio telescopes included David S. Heeschen, NRAO; Geoffrey R. Burbidge, UC La Jolla; Bernard F. Burke, MIT; Frank Drake, Cornell; Gordon Pettengill, MIT; and Gart Westerhout, University of Maryland.

95. Memorandum, Lilley to Bradley, 1 May 1972, "SAO Radio-Radar Telescope, 1971," 61, SIAOS, SIA. Those attending the meeting included: Alan Barrett, MIT; Bernard Burke, MIT; Irwin Shapiro, MIT; Paul Sebring, Haystack and Lincoln Laboratory; Edward Purcell, Harvard; Herbert Weiss, Lincoln Laboratory; and Ed Lilley, Harvard and SAO.

A footnote to the NEROC story: a Haystack upgrade completed in January 1994 made it the premier United States radio observatory at 3 millimeters. An NSF review of Haystack carried out in the summer of 1994, only months after the NSF-funded upgrade, put funding for Haystack radio astronomy in jeopardy. Ramy A. Amaout, "NSF Review Puts Funding for Haystack in Jeopardy," The Tech vol. 114, no. 18 (5 April 1994): 1 and 9.

96. Weiss 29/9/93.

97. Photocopy of Haystack logbook entry provided by Richard P. Ingalls and Alan E. E. Rogers.

98. Memorandum, Henry J. Smith, 15 December 1969, and memorandum, Brunk to Distribution List, 10 June 1970, NHOB.

99. Sebring to Hurlburt, 27 March 1970, 18/2/AC 135, MITA. In March 1970, for example, of the 290 hours scheduled, 90 (31 percent) were spent on radar observations.

100. "Plan for NEROC Operation of the Haystack Research Facility as a National Radio/Radar Observatory, 7/1/71-6/30/73," 26/2/AC 135, MITA.

101. NEROC, Semiannual Report of the Haystack Observatory, 15 January 1972, p. 1; ibid., 15 July 1972, p. 1; ibid., 15 January 1973, p. 1; and ibid., 15 August 1975, p. iii, MITA. For the 12-month period January through December 1973, out of 5,462.5 hours of total scientific use, planetary radar accounted for 658 hours, or about 12 percent. "Haystack Notes June 73-Dec 74," SEBRING.

102. Sebring to Hurlburt, 27 March 1970, 18/2/AC 135; NEROC, Semiannual Report of the Haystack Observatory, 15 August 1975, p. iii; and ibid., 15 January 1972, p. 1, MITA. Also, see the references to complaints by radio astronomer William A. Dent in Memorandum, Sebring to Haystack Observatory Office Members, 2 February 1971, 44/2/AC 135, MITA.

103. Pettengill 28/9/93.

104. George M. Low to Grant L. Hansen, 2 April 1970, NHOB.

105. Ingalls 5/5/94.

106. Memorandum, Brunk to Joyce Cavallini, 25 July 1973, NHOB.

107. Haystack Observatory, Final Progress Report: Radar Studies of the Planets (Westford: NEROC, 29 August 1974). This was for NASA grant NGR-22-174-003.