The nature of the service provided by Wallops Station shifted during the transition era as the scope of research broadened and the customer base grew. Under the NACA, Wallops existed to serve the program needs of Langley, and occasionally Lewis, Labs. The research examined a range of aeronautical engineering issues, but whether delving into fundamental principles or focusing on a particular airframe, the program came through Langley. NACA Headquarters consisted primarily of administrative staff, not the centralized program offices that characterize NASA. Due to this management structure, Wallops really had to answer only to Langley. The military was a regular customer at Wallops, but again, the projects came through the "Mother Lab." The establishment of NASA, and the growth of the Space Race, provided stimulus for the expansion of the base. These factors also brought the new programs and clients that allowed the Wallops personnel to expand their niche within the organization.
As transonic and supersonic wind tunnels became more effective, the focus of military testing shifted. Hypersonic and high-temperature research for all areas of DOD soon replaced the launching of model airframes.1 Most of these tests were conducted in a generally open manner, as such things go. The raw data held little value for anyone prior to reduction (the process of converting data readings into useable form), and truly sensitive hardware rarely appeared at the base, so the need for oppressive security measures seldom arose.2 Many of the tests involved small pieces of larger puzzles, providing incremental progress to the researchers in a relatively short period of time. Occasionally, longer term projects like Trailblazer or RAM occupied the Station's attention, but since even the Scout had weight limitations compared to boosters available at the Cape and Vandenberg, small projects were the norm.3
One somewhat ironic exception to this norm resulted in both a Thor and a Jupiter missile coming to Wallops for tests in 1963. While still prohibited from developing the capability to fire the liquid-fueled boosters, the engineers erected the vehicles, filled them with water to simulate fuel, and began measuring how the winds at ground level stressed the airframes. The goal was to provide full-scale data to validate wind tunnel readings. Wallops could perform the tests with meteorological equipment already in place, without the need of tying-up an active launch pad at the Cape.4
Experiments also continued to come to the Station from within the parent organization. Langley remained a primary customer, and Lewis also  continued to utilize the range. In addition, there were new members of the team to accommodate. Goddard became as large a source of projects as Langley, and even the Marshall Center, occasionally came to Wallops.5 As with the military projects, NACA/NASA projects shifted from being almost exclusively aeronautical, to a mix of hypersonic and space science research. As time passed the shift became more pronounced, especially as three new types of customers began to arrive at the base: universities, non-military government agencies, and researchers from other countries.
It is important to realize that the term "space science," refers to more than just astronomical research focusing on celestial bodies. According to one NASA definition the term "space science" included, "theoretical and experimental research on the ground and in the earth's atmosphere," ..., [and] "also includes instrumentation development and directly-related supporting research and technology required for carrying out [these] investigations."6 The wide range of topics that could be included under this broad definition attracted many research proposals. The NASA leadership, concerned with both facilitating basic research, and demonstrating practical applications of these publicly funded activities to Congress, developed a detailed organizational structure to coordinate space science research.
Under the leadership of Homer E. Newell, Jr., first as an Assistant Director of Silverstein's Office of Space Flight Development and later as an Associate Administrator in charge of the Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA), a series of program offices was established at Headquarters to pursue research in differing fields.7 A Space Science Steering Committee with associated subcommittees, reminiscent of the old NACA organizational style, worked to bring NASA personnel and researchers from outside the organization together to evaluate research proposals, and set priorities. The Space Sciences Board of the National Academy of Sciences played a similar role from a position outside of NASA.8 Field centers had a voice in this planning function, but projects required OSSA approval in order to proceed, especially given that the November 1963 NASA reorganization placed the space science centers (Goddard, JPL, and Wallops) under Newell's cognizance.
From Wallops' stance this represented only a minor change from past practices. NACA projects came to the Station through PARD. For NASA, though field centers could "initiate proposals for scientific investigations and flight projects," approval from above was still mandatory, just from a different location.9 "Since endorsement of the scientific objectives of any proposal must be obtained by the appropriate Headquarters Program Director, you should refer requesting organizations to deal directly with the cognizant program offices in Headquarters. This procedure is necessary to ensure the evaluation of a proposal not only in terms of the proposal's scientific validity but also in terms of its compatibility with on-going and planned NASA program efforts.... Final approval for the implementation of  any [research] program will be by the Administrator. In no case will any commitment of NASA resources or facilities take place prior to such approval.10 Wallops' background as a service center lent an air of normalcy to this type of relationship with higher authorities, perhaps helping the Station to avoid the type of frictions that arose between Goddard and JPL, and OSSA.11
An October 1960 planning document, "Long Range Thinking in Space Sciences," listed nine areas of scientific investigation to be pursued from Wallops. These areas included meteorology, atmospheric motions, and solar studies.12 Flights investigating atmospheric electron density and atmospheric probes joined the heat-transfer and materials research on the island's flightline. Add the Mercury and Scout work to the roster and the result is a very busy schedule. While early research, like Shotput which supported William O'Sullivan's Project Echo, came from within NACA/NASA, an increasing number of universities began to avail themselves of the emerging scientific sounding rocket program at Wallops.13 Just as World War II opened the way for physicists to receive major government funding for their research, Sputnik and the Cold War resulted in increased government funding for space science.14 Unlike the investigations of the past, conducted mostly with passive devices like telescopes, the development of the sounding rocket allowed instruments to be lifted to altitudes unreachable by air-breathing vehicles and balloons. Also, while satellites promised to provide a powerful new tool for researchers, orbital altitudes could not drop much below 100 miles or the atmosphere would drag the vehicle down. Sounding rockets, often based on military designs, provided access to this intermediate zone. Since the government controlled most of the affordable hardware, and requisite facilities, universities looked to Washington for both logistic and financial support.15
The research projects conducted by the Universities of Michigan and Maryland in 1958 paved the way for other universities to conduct experiments at Wallops. These projects resembled the earlier NACA projects in variety, if not in subject matter. Some concerned "pure," fundamental research while others pertained to applied research of interest to both scientists and the military.16 The military, of course, provided financial support for many programs pertaining to their needs. Wallops provided a few research grants, however a large portion of the basic research grants came from NASA Headquarters, through OSSA.17 The research team "would produce their own hardware, and they'd interface with us here at Wallops, ..., so it would fit into the rockets, and we'd figure how high they wanted to go and what they wanted to do, and guide them so they could get the experiments [accomplished] .. ."18 The size and civilian orientation of the facility allowed professors to launch small projects and train graduate students without interfering with operations at the large ranges. This educational aspect of Wallops' operation helped not only to advance the  cause of science, but it also provided a supportive clientele that would "rise up in arms" in response to later attempts to close the base.19
Another new group of customers at the Wallops base during the early 1960's consisted of government agencies outside the Defense Department and NASA. These organizations began to apply space age technology to their missions and found sounding rockets to be a valuable tool for certain tasks. In May 1963 Langley collaborated with the Atomic Energy Commission on a payload launched by Scout from Wallops. The Re-entry Flight Demonstration Experiment - 1, provided data relating to NASA-AEC efforts to build reactors for spacecraft that, in the event of an emergency, would be safely destroyed upon re-entry into the atmosphere.20 While this "model" reactor carried little radioactive material, Krieger saw the need to formalize procedures for dealing with such substances. "In the past, this station has had negligible opportunities for support of research efforts in which radioactive sources were involved; however, in anticipation of increased contact with radioactive material, definite radiological safety regulations, procedures, and requirements applicable to all radioactive sources and experiments will be established...."21
In June 1964 a researcher with the National Bureau of Standards proposed cooperation with NASA on Project RAM, through use of equipment the NBS already had in place at Wallops, "in support of most of the rocket-probe experiments conducted there."22 The runways at the Main Base were utilized in cooperative projects with the FAA, which included research on tires, and landing aids.23
The Weather Bureau became a frequent, then a permanent, customer at the base. Even though Project Hugo proved impractical, the Bureau's hurricane research benefitted from work at Wallops. In August 1958 the FPS16 radar at the base tracked Hurricane Daisy as the storm moved along the coast.24 NASA planners conceived a two-front approach to meteorological research. The first involved building on past programs with balloon launches and sounding rockets to probe the atmosphere. Both systems offered advantages. Balloons could remain aloft for a long period of time, while sounding rockets could reach to the fringes of space. A combination of the two systems resulted in sounding rockets that could release a balloon at a high altitude, allowing data to be taken during the balloon's long, slow descent. The establishment of a "meteorological network," gave atmospheric researchers the opportunity to obtain data from several areas around the world.25
While participation in this network acquainted Wallops with a novel type of rocket, and tied into Langley's investigation of wind shear phenomena, Krieger was not overly enthusiastic about the quantity of launches the weather program would entail. "Mr. Krieger says that participation in the Meteorological Network does not provide material assistance to his operations and therefore, as far as Wallops is concerned, it has no interest in  the network once the present program is completed. However, if some group within NASA felt that further participation was justified for meteorological research he would be willing to continue although it does represent a fairly heavy workload for Wallops."26
These misgivings did not fade easily. Seventeen months later Krieger reported, "It should be pointed out from a range's viewpoint that the present operational status of meteorological rockets requires considerable range time; and launching, tracking and data facilities in addition to range clearance and surveillance of impact areas. Therefore, much range effort is required with the present state of the art, and should be considered in the selection of rockets, payloads, number of firings and scheduling."27 A month later he added, "Being on the operational end of this business, we have been somewhat disappointed for it seems to us that this program turned from a research and development effort into an operational effort almost immediately after its initiation."28
Despite the early problems Wallops, and Krieger, adjusted to the meteorological program. In March 1963 developmental launches of a Nike-Cajun meteorological rocket began, and by April 1965 "a regular launch schedule [had] been established," for the smaller rockets that performed most of the weather flights.29 By late 1965, perhaps because of the usefulness of the program for both science and justification of budgets, Krieger accepted that the meteorological research occupied a prominent place in the Station's agenda.30
The second portion of NASA's weather program involved the construction and launch of an orbiting satellite. Inherited from the Army Ballistic Missile Agency when NASA was established, a meteorological satellite program contracted to RCA came under Goddard's jurisdiction. The resulting TIROS (Television Infra-Red Observation Satellite) revolutionized weather research and forecasting, and provided a high-profile example of an everyday application of space technology. After successful launches of the first two TIROS, plans were made to move the data reception station from the Army base at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Wallops Island.31 RCA already held the contract for operation and maintenance of Wallops' FPS-16 radar, and could thus easily expand on its existing activities there.32 NASA hoped to relocate the data reception equipment in time for the launch of Tiros 3 in July 1961, but the work went faster than anticipated and the facility became operational a month early, in time to support Tiros 2, already on orbit. Though most of the funding came from the Weather Bureau, Edmund Buckley requested funds to cover the extra personnel costs incurred in running the radar and processing the received photographs. In December the facility underwent an overhaul.33
By late 1962, in keeping with its research and development mission, NASA was planning a second generation weather satellite called Nimbus. The Weather Bureau, pleased with Tiros however, began planning the "Tiros  Operational System" (TOS), and in 1964 pulled out of the expensive Nimbus effort.34 Wallops saw both sides of the controversy as NASA considered the base for a backup Nimbus station, while simultaneously upgrading the Tiros facility.35 Whatever difficulties the NASA-Weather Bureau spat caused at higher levels of the organizations, working relationships at Wallops seem unimpaired. In September 1964 NASA recommended that the East Coast Command and Data Acquisition station for TOS be located at the base. The presence of this operational system required some balancing of projects at the test range, but "The Director of Wallops has indicated that he will cooperate to the fullest in order to prevent conflicts between [different projects'] operations." By this time, the meteorological sounding rocket program had provided Wallops with experience in the conduct of an operational program supporting Weather Bureau needs, so this work integrated into the Wallops program without too much trouble.36
The increase in Wallops' obligations and range users brought about a new round of construction funding. The initial post-Sputnik infusion of money into the base, $20 million for Project 2080 in fiscal 1959, was followed in fiscal 1960 by $0 in the "Construction of Facilities" account. NASA's request for fiscal 1961 contained a modest $2.03 million in Wallops CoF for a computing station and a vehicle check-out building.37 The $13 million request in fiscal 1962 represented a hefty boost in the Station's budget. $1 million of this money went to complete repairs to damage caused by the Ash Wednesday Storm, the remaining amount bought improved tracking equipment and better vehicle handling facilities.38
In addition to more fixtures the Station also doubled the size of its workforce within three years, growing from 229 paid employees in mid-1960 to 493 by mid-1963.39 The number of contract personnel grew in roughly equal fashion. "When we became NASA we realized that, some of us, we were not going to get as many people as we thought we needed.... The magic number has always been 1000 to 1100 employees. When we would cut back the civil servants we seemed to be able to fill in with contractors.40 While these personnel and funding increases might have drawn serious Congressional scrutiny in other years, during the early stage of the Project Apollo expansion, it constituted a drop in the bucket. The construction budget for Cape Canaveral in fiscal 1962 topped $115 million. The same three years in which Wallops doubled its complement saw the in-house employment at the Manned Spacecraft Center rise from 668 to 3345.41 Granted these are extreme examples, but they illustrate the point; the growth at Wallops was in the "enviable position" of being overshadowed by other, more visible growth in the space program.42
Coordination of the rising launch rate with the incorporation of new facilities into the Wallops infrastructure called for efficiency in the Station's operations. As early as April 1960 Abe Silverstein felt compelled to issue a memorandum that addressed the subject of, "Launching Schedule Problems  at Wallops Station." Directed to the two primary range users, Langley and Goddard, the memo emphasized the need to maintain firm flight schedules. "Continual changes to the established monthly schedules is becoming a source of embarrassment to Wallops and NASA Headquarters ...."43 To help alleviate these problems, and refine the processing flow of projects, the Wallops staff issued a four volume "Wallops Station Handbook," in December 1961. The cover letter that accompanied the first edition stated, "This 1961 edition of the WSH is the station's first attempt to outline the policies, procedures, facilities, and organization of the station for the guidance of prospective range users." These policies and procedures went promptly into effect.44
One potential extension of Wallops' capabilities that NASA decided not to authorize resulted in limiting the growth of the Scout program on the island. The question of launching into high-inclination or polar orbits from Wallops had been considered, and in April of 1961 two studies recommended against the proposal. The primary reasons involved range safety issues. Such launches would come too close to inhabited areas, so Scout payloads requiring these orbits continued to fly from Vandenberg Air Force Base.45
Coordination with the military ranges did not always prove easy, as the civilian range often found itself overlooked.46 In May 1962 Buckley sought to correct this situation by proposing, "that the appropriate agreements and policies be established which would allow the NASA Wallops Station to be included in [the] lead range concept." This concept served to facilitate operations by giving the designated "lead range" the assignment of planning, coordinating, and controlling the requisite facilities for a particular launch. Acceptance of this proposal allowed Wallops easier access to components of the Atlantic Missile Range (and vice-versa), and also gave the Station more credibility as an "integrated range," rather than as simply a "launch site."47
The designation of Wallops as a lead range occurred as the Scout launch facility completed a refurbishment in July 1962. This refurbished pad still did not provide the base enough capacity. "A two per month Scout launch capability is required by the summer of 1963 to meet the NASA launch schedule and additional Department of Defense missions."48 To meet this need NASA took advantage of its ability to reprogram certain appropriated funds and sidestepped Subcommittee Chairman Albert Thomas by allocating $1.5 million to begin construction of a second Scout pad.49 Even though its program financially paled in comparison to larger space initiatives, Wallops did not always get what it asked for. The Senate removed $2 million from the fiscal 1964 budget, having deemed a planned sounding rocket launch facility (intended as Wallops' #6 launch pad), "desirable, but not essential at this time."50 The previous year both House and Senate Authorization Committees had imposed a 5% cut in funding at several field centers, including Wallops.51 Still, with the pads built during Project 2080, the Scout pads, and an Aerobee launching tower that had commenced service in 1960, the total launch capacity at the Station was now varied and ample.52
 The tracking and data acquisition program at Wallops diversified as the variety of experiments increased. In June 1961, while Wallops oversaw the operation of the Mercury tracking station in Bermuda, Langley requested permission to build and operate, "a temporary base for ... mobile tracking trailers," at Coquina Beach on North Carolina's Outer Banks. This station would provide down-range support for longer flights such as RAM. Abe Silverstein agreed to the proposal, but stipulated that, "when certain range instrumentation now under development at Langley becomes operational, and is assigned to Wallops for integration with other equipment ... as a part of a continuing requirement in support of Wallops launchings, it appears logical and necessary that Wallops assume full responsibility, with, of course, continued co-use by Langley as required."53 In May 1965 contracts relating to the North Carolina facility were transferred from Langley to Wallops.54
Tracking operations continued to migrate off the Wallops base when, in May 1962, Wallops contracted with the Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) for the operation and maintenance of a tracking and recovery ship, USNS Range Recoverer. Acquired and outfitted with assistance from Langley, Wallops personnel handled the tracking equipment while leaving the nautical tasks to an MSTS crew. As Buckley told Congress, "we do feel it's necessary for us to operate the instrumentation on a ship, so that the whole ground system works together as an integrated system."55 Equipment aboard included helix antennas, recording systems for data, and a communications suite with direction finders to help locate and recover payloads. Wallops had used shipboard tracking systems before, calling on the Navy for assistance and occasionally renting ships. The accelerated launch schedule called for a level of support that made it practical for Wallops to have a ship of its own.56
The increased range of the vehicles launched from Wallops also meant that a greater area of ocean had to be cleared of shipping. "Range safety regulations dictate that the probability of impacting a ship shall be less than 1 in 100,000." An SPS-12 radar at the base could search areas out to around thirty miles. A shot travelling much further than that required personnel to go out and verify that the range was clear. The Range Recoverer helped with this task, but the ship's slow speed and the limited range of its surface search radar minimized its effectiveness in this role. To fill in the gaps in ocean surveillance Wallops relied on aircraft supplied by different organizations. Also useful for calibrating tracking systems, finding sources of radiofrequency interference, and locating downed payloads, surveillance aircraft became a vital tool in Wallops' arsenal. So much so, that in September 1964, Krieger requested that Headquarters transfer two Langley planes to Wallops, and acquire a Lockheed C-121 to meet the Station's needs. NASA met Krieger halfway, they arranged for a Lockheed contract for two C-121's to cover Wallops.57
 The Navy provided much support to Wallops at this time. Aircraft for range surveillance, divers to recover test components, and ships for tracking purposes.58 There was even a proposal to use Navy airships from Lakehurst, New Jersey, to recover missile nose cones. A nose cone and parachute were sent to Lakehurst in 1961 so airship crews could practice recovery techniques, but the plan fell through when the Navy retired its airship fleet later that year. Soon after that, Wallops contracted for the Range Recoverer.59
One facet of the space program new to many in NASA stemmed from section 102, paragraph c (7) of the Space Act. "The aeronautical and space activities of the United States shall be conducted so as to contribute materially to ...: Cooperation by the United States with other nations and groups of nations in work done pursuant to this Act and in the peaceful application of the results thereof; ...."60 Since a high-level concern revolved around the possibility that some nations might react to Sputnik by strengthening their ties with the Soviet Union, both Executive and Legislative decision makers wanted NASA to include foreign governments in selected portions of the space program. This would provide the opportunity to showcase U.S. space technological prowess, highlight Soviet secretiveness, and permit other nations to advance their scientific and political stature.
A study of the political motivations of NASA's international program characterized official sentiment toward this issue as being either "innovative," or ''conservative.''61 Innovators believed that cooperation could lead to more  peaceful international relations, an opening of the Iron Curtain, and the creation of a new political reality. Conservatives saw the opportunity to wield a potent propaganda tool, and stimulate research and the creation of scientists, engineers, and technologies needed for more effective maneuvering within the existing reality. Cooperative projects were therefore useful to both ideological camps, only for different reasons. An examination of four areas of cooperation concluded that although NASA, on the whole, spoke the language of cooperation like an "innovator," the agency followed a "conservative" path out of political necessity.62
No matter how well this conclusion applied to NASA as a whole, it does not adequately describe Wallops. While "conservative" motivations, particularly propaganda value, were recognized at the Station and Wallops' major role in the program provided NASA with ammunition to fight later proposals to close the base, the value of the science performed and a perception of being NASA ambassadors seemed to have also been consistent "innovative" motivations.63 The explanation for why this should be the case, and why Wallops received a large share of the program, stemmed from several roots.
The NACA had almost as little experience with cooperative foreign projects as it had with public relations. Established specifically to advance the state of aeronautical research in the U.S., in response to European progress, the Committee usually saw competition when it looked abroad. Also, the NACA did not hold the near monopoly on aeronautical technology that NASA later held on space technology. NACA officials traveled to Europe to learn and observe rather than to teach and the NACA era was almost at an end before any non-American researchers came to Wallops.64
Through their experience with the International Geophysical Year, many of the Project Vanguard researchers who constituted the core of Goddard had at least some grounding in the organization and conduct of international cooperative ventures. The success of the IGY's wide ranging research program of atmospheric and geophysical studies, performed under the auspices of the International Council of Scientific Unions, demonstrated that such ventures could produce good scientific results. Scientists like Homer Newell and Milton Rosen had both influential positions within NASA and recognition in the international scientific community. The growing role of the research techniques in use at Wallops, relatively inexpensive rockets familiar to these scientists, made the Station a logical place from which to launch cooperative projects.65
One NACA veteran who had gained some experience in international relations, and also occupied an influential position within NASA, was Edmund Buckley. His long association with Wallops provided the base with a friend at Headquarters who would look-out for its interests. The decision to locate the Mercury demonstration tracking facility at Wallops, for the convenience of both the Space Task Group, and Tracking and Ground  Instrumentation Unit at Langley, resulted in many foreign nationals visiting the area during the course of this program. The negotiations Buckley participated in no doubt familiarized several governments with Wallops' overall potential for science research.66
NASA Headquarters established the Office of International Programs on 1 April 1959 and assigned it the task of coordinating NASA's cooperative ventures. This included assisting Buckley in locating sites for Mercury stations, and coordinating the international use of the Wallops range.67 In December they reported to the Administrator an agreement reached with Canada for cooperative launches from Wallops. Since the Canadians had been the first non-US group to use the base, this hardly represented a political breakthrough.68 As the differing components of NASA settled into their roles, however, the program made more progress. Though an earlier House committee report on the subject of "International Cooperation in the Exploration of Space," made no reference to Wallops, by May 1960 Hugh Dryden told Congress that, "This station will be the scene of launchings made in cooperation with other nations in our program of international cooperation in space activities."69
From 28 to 30 June 1960 the "second working group meeting," for the International Ionospheric Satellite (a joint US-UK project) was held at Wallops. The resulting Ariel 1 satellite represented NASA's first joint satellite project and was launched from the Cape in 1962. Two of four subsequent Ariel missions launched from Wallops.70 In January 1961 a French professor and a Norwegian engineer both arrived at the Station to work on separate tracking systems. In March, France announced plans to launch soundings from Wallops, and a joint US-Italian agreement was formalized. Over the course of the next several years, researchers and trainees from Australia, Japan, Sweden, India, and Pakistan came to the Station in association with a variety of projects. (See appendix 4).71
The introduction of people from different cultures and backgrounds into the local Virginia communities caused some frictions at first, as might be expected. "We had a few problems, like getting haircuts and motels, but we worked it out behind the scenes, and most people were pretty decent about it. This is back in the time before integration, you know, and these people, a lot of them, were dark-skinned, but they spoke beautiful English, most of them, ..., each country sent its best."72 As time passed and people came to know some of these visitors, the problems eased. Indeed, during the three years the Italian team was here, "some were married to some of the local girls around here and they had started families." Krieger noted that the Italians, "really got to be a part of the family here. We almost had tears in our eyes when they left."73
One method the staff used to educate the public about the programs, foreign and domestic, in progress at the base was a series of annual "Open House" events. The first of these events took place in October 1962, included  self-guided tours, literature describing the Station and its programs, and the opportunity to talk to NASA employees and witness rocket launchings. Besides helping to strengthen ties between the base and the community, the open houses allowed Wallops to showcase the open, civilian nature of its work.74 The ability to demonstrate such accessibility without compromising either national security or the launch schedule of a multi-million dollar project provided one of the major justifications for bringing the international guests to Wallops. The issue of appearances counted for much, especially as the US endeavored to score propaganda points against the USSR. Joe Robbins stated, "We had to be very careful, that when foreign people came here, ..., if we had any military, I instructed my people to go around and tell every one of them, 'Don't come on this base wearing a uniform; if you do you're not going to be admitted. You're going to be dressed in civilian clothes.' As a matter of fact, I had to tell a general that too.... What would it look like if you were bringing a foreigner in and you had half the people you see on the base were military? Going back to their own country, 'Well, they just say it's civilian, but it's all military.' ... We tried to keep a clean slate."75
Specific cooperative research projects covered a wide range of services. Projects that utilized flight hardware included launches of foreign payloads, coordinated launches from Wallops and other ranges, and the study of rocket preparation and launch techniques. Researchers also studied and received training on the assorted tracking and data acquisition equipment. Using surplus radars Wallops put together an "instrumentation lending library," where foreign customers "could borrow a radar, borrow a telemetry system, ...." Some visitors simply came to tour the Station and observe a portion of the American space program close-up.76
These projects permitted the participating countries to conduct space flight research and advance their technological base without having to expend the enormous, or (for some) impossible, sums of money required to build a massive space transportation infrastructure. Sounding rockets, balloons, and the Scout were comparatively cheap, and the operation of these vehicles entailed small, low-budget facilities similar to Wallops in scale if not in diversity. This should not be taken to indicate that the scientific data generated had little use. The establishment of sounding programs at several points around the globe gave researchers the ability to study atmospheric conditions at a variety of locations, and helped create a comprehensive picture of the Earth's climatic system. NASA's concentration on high-priority missions like Apollo, Tiros, and the Orbiting Observatories, prevented the agency from establishing a large number of small facilities to gather this data. By cooperating with interested governments, they could at least obtain access to the data coming from these smaller programs.
The most prominent example of this mutually beneficial international cooperation was the San Marco Project conducted with Italy. After a series of sounding rocket launches from both Wallops and Sardinia, the Italian  Space Research Commission expressed a desire to utilize the Scout booster for satellite research. Arrangements were completed by April 1962, and the US-Italian team went to work.77 On 15 December 1964 a group of Italian technicians launched San Marco 1 from Wallops, "the first satellite entirely designed and constructed in Europe," on a mission to analyze the fringes of the atmosphere.78
Not content with launching only from Wallops, the Italians commenced construction of a mobile launch facility in Formosa Bay, off the East Coast of Africa to provide a Scout launcher near the equator. The San Marco Equatorial Mobile Range contained two platforms anchored to the sea-floor, and an on-shore base in Kenya. One platform provided for assembly, testing, and launch of the Scout, the other served as the launch control facility. A tracking station, integrated into NASA's STADAN network, supported operations from the Kenyan base. Owned by the University of Rome, and operated by the Italian Aerospace Research Center, the facility was completed in 1967 and launched San Marco 2 into orbit on 26 April of that year. On 12 December 1970 the range launched Explorer 42, the first satellite launched for the U.S. by another government.79
In 1965 Wallops began to coordinate its meteorological soundings with those of Argentina and Brazil to create the Experimental Inter-American Meteorological Rocket Network (EXAMETNET). With OSSA at Headquarters overseeing the project, and Langley providing the hardware, Wallops participation in this project enabled, "comparative analysis of the structure and behavior of the atmosphere in both hemispheres."80
Not only did foreign researchers come to Wallops, but Station personnel traveled abroad to assist in establishing ranges, and launching rockets. In addition to helping the Italians with both sodium vapor launches from Sardinia, and the San Marco Project, Wallops people travelled to Sonmiani Beach, Pakistan, to help set up that launch site.81 Cooperation with Canada included launches by Wallops personnel from the Ft. Churchill range in Manitoba. In a cost sharing arrangement with the U. S. Air Force, which also used the range, Wallops maintained facilities at that launch site. After a fire heavily damaged the facility, Canadian engineers brought their Black Brant test program to Wallops for a time, while the US participated in the restoration of Ft. Churchill.82 As a result of the international programs, "Wallops is better known overseas, in a way, than it is here in this country, 83
Intimate knowledge of Scout procedures took Wallops engineers to other American launch ranges to provide assistance. A meeting held at Wallops on 14 April 1961 with representatives from Headquarters, Langley, Marshall, and Vought Corporation, discussed the requirements of the Scout facility at the Point Arguello (Pacific Missile Range) launch site. Marshall's involvement did not last long, as in August the decision to transfer "technical cognizance" of the Scout from Langley to the Huntsville facility was reversed. Werner  von Braun, working on the Saturn booster for the recently accelerated Apollo Project, probably lost little sleep over this decision.84 Wallops dispatched personnel to the Pacific Range several times over the course of the next few years to help with problems like "pyrotechnic procedures," or to "provide technical consultation on the dynamic balance" of various Scout missions.85
In mid-1964 Wallops engineers participated in the investigation into the cause of a fatal accident at Cape Canaveral. While attaching an Orbiting Solar Observatory to an X-248 rocket motor (the third stage of the Delta booster assigned to loft it into orbit) static electricity activated the motor's ignitor. The solid-fueled motor fired inside the test building, injuring eleven technicians, three of whom later succumbed to their wounds. Since the X248 also served as the fourth stage of the Scout, Goddard (responsible for the Delta) included representatives from both Wallops and Langley in the fact finding board.86 Those assigned to the board lent their experience with the X-248 to the investigation, and learned all they could to prevent a similar accident from happening at Wallops.87
The operation at Wallops was not accident free during this period, though fortunately no-one died. On 8 June 1964, a meter measuring the flow of nitrogen gas in a test apparatus exploded under pressure, injuring the Langley engineer running the test. While directly caused by the improper installation of a valve, the accident report cited a number of contributing factors that added up to trying to do too much, too fast.88 The acceleration of the space program, and especially the influx of experimenters inexperienced with the rocket operations, made "keeping track of everything that was going on ... sometimes pretty difficult." "[Krieger's] philosophy was you don't do anything unsafe, ..., even if you're handling rockets you never do anything unsafe because they're not safe devices; ..., and assume that you're going to screw-up, because humans do make mistakes."89 This philosophy, combined with the experience of a rocket misfire in 1951 that had cost a technician his right hand, created a safety consciousness that spread throughout the Station.90 In 1962 Goddard and the University of Michigan brought the ARGO D-8 radio noise probe to Wallops for launch. "A launch was set for the last week in July, but the Range Safety at Wallops postponed the launch to an unspecified future date so that they can evaluate the ARGO D-8 performance limits as related to a Wallops launch." ARGO D-8 flew on 22 September.91
The off-range experience served the Wallops engineers well when, in May 1964, they began to conduct Nike-Cajun firings from a new launch site at Point Barrow, Alaska. Situated near the Arctic Research Laboratory, the new site gave NASA a launch range in the far north, especially beneficial to the meteorological sounding program. A survey team from Headquarters, Goddard, and Wallops considered several sites and decided that, "Point Barrow was by far the most favored by reason of its desirable location, and the presence of an active research laboratory housing upwards of 350 scientists and technicians, a DEW line station, an NBS ionosphere sounding  station, a W.B. station and adequate commercial air service."92 Working out of Quonset huts, and restricted to setting up equipment only during the brief Arctic summer, the Point Barrow program was reminiscent of the early years at Wallops. While OSSA and Goddard handled the program management, OTDA and Wallops constructed the NASA facility. Wallops also had the responsibility for, "preparation and launch of vehicle," and, "training of launch crew."93 Support and year-round maintenance was furnished by the Arctic Research Lab "on a cost-reimbursable basis." Though the operations "up north" put "a strain on the travel budget," it did not cause exceptional administrative headaches for the Wallops staff; "just a logistic problem of getting things there, we were used to doing [off-range launches] anyhow, ..., it didn't make that much difference."94
By far the most ambitious off-range operation conducted by Wallops during this era was the Mobile Sea Launch Expedition of 1965. From the beginning of serious U.S. space planning the concept of launching rockets from ships at sea attracted attention.95 Launching from sea complicated missile navigational planning, but it would provide mobility, thus allowing the launch platform to be placed in an advantageous spot. The Navy made use of this advantage by launching sounding rockets from a ship positioned in the path of a solar eclipse in 1958.96 The open expanses of water would also provide a margin of safety, especially for the larger or nuclear powered boosters then under consideration. In 1961, the House Committee on Science and Astronautics convened hearings on the concept as it related to the possible establishment of an American launch range along the equator. During these hearings, NASA depicted the use of ships to launch large boosters as uneconomical and unnecessary, but, "a continuing requirement exists for shipboard launch of sounding rockets in the equatorial regions and the extreme southern latitudes."97 No direct connection to Wallops appears to have been made during these proceedings, however.
The Office of Space Flight Programs made a request in August 1961 to use the tracking ship Coastal Sentry Quebec, then on station in the Indian Ocean supporting Project Mercury, in conjunction with the sounding rocket project underway with Pakistan. The desire was to utilize the ship's equipment for tracking launches, and for the ship itself to conduct rawinsonde operations.98 Wallops' association with this project, through its assistance in training personnel from both Pakistan and India, meshed with their acquisition of the Range Recoverer. "The whole space science thing generated a lot of interest, and as young people we jumped on the bandwagon, and thought up projects. "99
By November of 1962, the engineers at Wallops had formulated a plan to lease a small aircraft carrier from the MSTS, and outfit it with "roll-on instrumentation and bolt-down rocket launchers." "It will also be used to provide downrange telemetry tracking of rockets launched from Wallops Island, a platform to launch small two-stage rockets for obtaining  meteorological data in the upper atmosphere, and a take-off and landing area for helicopters to be used for recovery operations."100 The rockets utilized would be reliable Nike-Cajuns, and others of that, or smaller, size. The cost of contracts to prepare the ship and equipment was estimated at $191,050, and the operational cost placed at $3,700 per day.101
Unlike the other programs which came to Wallops, this one originated there. While Langley, Goddard, and other segments of NASA supported the plan, "this was one of the first jobs we went out and sold...., and they [Headquarters and Goddard] bought it, they bought it solid."102 One of the reasons the project "sold" was the impending multi-national research effort for the International Year of the Quiet Sun (IQSY), which provided the ideal opportunity to use the mobile range concept. One of the motivating factors in the organization of the IGY was the occurrence of a period astronomers refer to as solar maximum in 1957 and 1958. Variations in the number of spots visible on the sun, and thus the amount of solar magnetic activity, exhibit an eleven year cycle. A period of many sunspots during the IGY permitted researchers to obtain information about the atmosphere and near-Earth environment, then repeat their experiments during the following period of minimum solar activity, and compare the two sets of data. The international scientific community organized the IQSY to coordinate the research activities associated with this 1964 to 1965 solar event.103
On 21 November 1963, OSSA's Director of Physics and Astronomy Programs, John Naugle, wrote to Stanley Ruttenberg, Executive Secretary of the US-IQSY Committee, informing him that, "NASA is considering a mobile balloon and sounding rocket expedition, to be carried out during the second half of 1964, in the broad ocean area of the southern hemisphere," and asking for research proposals. The attached distribution list indicates that copies of this letter went out to over seventy researchers in NASA, various groups associated with the DOD, and numerous universities.104 Positive responses proposed meteorological soundings, studies of the Earth's magnetic field, and a few flights to support classified DOD programs. Preparations for the expedition commenced.105 The game plan for the expedition included outfit of the carrier at the Port of Baltimore, followed by a shakedown cruise to a position off Wallops Island, where launches from both ship and shore would provide research data as well as practice operating the mobile range.
The plan almost received a serious setback when the Military Sea Transport Service reported that the carrier intended for use had suffered "extensive damage," precluding an East Coast shakedown.106 Quick action by the service, however, gave Krieger "reason to hope that a Card class carrier can be supplied for the shakedown cruise.''107 The Service supplied USNS Croatan for NASA's use, an escort carrier that had seen use during World War II. MSTS provided the crew for the ship, Wallops provided most of the  instrumentation and engineers, and various researchers and their NASA sponsors provided the payloads.108
The November 1964, shakedown cruise of the ship demonstrated the efficacy of the mobile range concept and the ability of the Croatan to perform its new mission. Twenty-five Wallops personnel conducted a series of rocket launches during the two week cruise, flying payloads provided by Goddard and the Universities of Michigan and Illinois.109 Coordinated launches of sodium vapor rockets from both ship and shore launch sites took place from 10-12 November, followed by tracking tests on the 17th, and a launch to investigate electron density in the ionosphere two days later. After removing equipment back to Wallops, Croatan returned to Baltimore to be prepared for its mission to the Pacific.110
In January a convoy of vehicles left Wallops bound for Baltimore where the equipment was reinstalled, and preparations finalized. Croatan departed on 15 February 1965, spent two days off Wallops Island calibrating equipment, then headed for the Panama Canal.111 After transiting the Canal, the ship left Balboa, Panama, on 6 March bound for Lima, Peru, and launched a series of ten sounding rockets while on route.112 While in port, more equipment and personnel came on board, and "we opened it up so the public could go aboard and see what was going on." Local officials and media also toured the ship. This followed NASA's policy of demonstrating openness, while generating support for space science research, and touting the ship's peaceful mission.113 The experience of conducting the open house events and hosting international researchers at Wallops served the engineers well here, as they already had practiced this type of public relations affair.
The ship sailed from the Port of Callao two days later and began the principal scientific portion of its mission.. Experiments were launched over the following three weeks for Langley and Goddard; the Universities of Illinois, Michigan, and New Hampshire; the Naval Ordnance Test Station, Air Force Cambridge Research Lab, and Sandia Corporation. Meteorological work conducted by the Weather Bureau, in support of the mission as well as for research, took place on a daily basis, and the National Bureau of Standards launched ionospheric soundings.114 The ship then returned to Callao, off-loaded the equipment and personnel who had boarded at that Port, and departed for another three weeks of launchings.115 The last launch of the mission occurred on 16 April, and the expedition officially ended later that week when Croatan made port at Valparaiso, Chile, where the engineers again conducted an open house. The NASA personnel then disembarked to fly back to the U.S., while Croatan returned to Baltimore where the mobile launch equipment was removed. The expedition had launched over eighty payloads, and numerous weather balloons and small meteorological sounding rockets. Five of the major launches occurred north of the equator, one on it, and the remainder from southern latitudes.116
 The ship returned to carrying cargo, but the mobile launch equipment became a feature of the Wallops program. Engineer Robert Duffy stated, "That really led to the campaigns, nowadays Wallops is doing a campaign a year someplace. Up to that time space science was done at existing launch ranges, ..., we really cut our eyeteeth on that."117 While the aircraft carrier turned out to be a little too expensive for regular use, Wallops used the Range Recoverer for similar missions, if on a somewhat smaller scale. The Wallops tracking ship travelled to Greece in May of the following year to conduct coordinated research on a solar eclipse. While in port there, Engineer Abraham Spinak and the other Wallops personnel met the Greek royal family; and, while only a part of the American contingent present, they continued to fulfill their dual roles in NASA's international program, science, and public relations.118
The influx of new customers, and the expanding role of the space science program in NASA, thus served to alter the scope of Wallops' operations. While still participating in aeronautical engineering research, the Station's mission changed to one of support for science research. The staff also became familiar with coordinating the activities of diverse groups in the performance of its mission. By the end of 1965, Wallops had changed in many ways, yet in other ways remained very similar to the place it had been in 1957.
1. Letter, Abe Silverstein to Dr. L. A. Del[eceso?], 7 August 1961, in "Chron. File, July - December 1961," in NASA HQ box #1, for example of an Army request for two sounding rocket and five balloon launches. For examples of work for the Navy at this time, see: Flight Plan, LRC E135 3111, 13 December 1960, in folder, "Wallops, August 62 - May 63;" Letter, Robert L. Krieger to Commander U. S. Navy Ordinance Lab, 24 March 1964, in folder "Wallops, November 63 -March 64," in RGA181-l(C). For examples of Air Force projects see: Letter, Trygve Blom to NASA, 27 January 1961, in Chron. File, January - June 1961," in NASA HQ box #1; and chapter 2, above, for work on the Blue Scout then underway.
2. "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape la: 140-60.
3. Project RAM (Radio Attenuation Measurement) investigated the radio "blackout" that occurs when a spacecraft re-enters the atmosphere. It involved seven launches from 1961 to 1968: Data Book II, 464-66. For Trailblazer see chapter 2, note 125, above.
4. Memorandum, Wilmer H. Reed III and Robert M. Henry to Associate Director, LaRC, 5 October 1962, in folder "Special File, October 62 April 63;" Memorandum, Jerome T. Foughner Jr. to Associate Director, LaRC, 27 May 1963; Memorandum, Jerome T. Foughner Jr. for Aeroelasticity Branch Files, 13 June 1963, both in folder "Special File, May 63 - February 64;" all in RGA181-l(S). Here we see another idea that died hard; there are several references throughout this period to field level hopes of outfitting Wallops for the large, liquid-fueled boosters. See, for example: Memorandum, Carl A. Sandahl for Associate Director, 10 December 1962, in folder "Wallops, August 62 - February 63," in RGA181 -I(C).
5. See "NASA APR, April 1961", section arp, pp. 1.5, 1.6, 6.1, 8.2, for examples of Langley projects. For the 0 Gravity fuel experiments in support of Centaur engine development see "NASAAPR, February 1961," section arp, p. 1.6; "NASA APR, April 1961," section apr, p. 1.5; "NASA APR, June 1962", c, 1.2; "NASA APR, July 1962," c, 2.10; and "NASA APR, June 1963," c, 2.4. Letter, Robert L. Krieger to Gerhard Heller, 11 May 1961, in folder "Special File, April - August 61," in RGA181-l(S). U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, NASA Authorization for 1962, hearings before the House Committee on Science and Astronautics on H.R.3238 and 6029, 87th Cong. 1st sess., 6103-13H, part 1, 24; for Robert Seaman's testimony regarding projects underway at Goddard, which include quite a few (Echo, Tiros, sounding rockets) that involve Wallops.
6. NASA Management Instruction #7100.1, 29 April 1964, attachment A, 2, in box, "NASA HQ Organizations, O.S.S.A. (con't)," in NHO.
7. Data Book II,197-202. Some of the fields included: Lunar and Planetary Programs, Bioscience Programs, Geophysics and Astronomy, and Meteorological Systems.
8. Levine, 167-68. See also: NASA Management Instruction cited in note 6 above.
9. NASA Management Instruction as cited in note 6, above. On attachment A of this instruction is stated, "For the purposes of this Instruction, the term field center includes: ... (11) Wallops Station," [emphasis in original].
10. Letter, Thomas F. Dixon to Robert L. Krieger, 31 January 1962, in folder 005065 "15.1 Sounding Rockets to 1963," in file tray "Sounding Rockets - General," in NHO.
11. Levine, 16, 167-72. "At Goddard the differences between Director Harry Goett and Headquarters officials became so serious that he was dismissed in July1965." Levine also points out that the contractual relationship between NASA and JPL was a source of difficulties.
12. NASA Headquarters, "Long Range Thinking in Space Sciences," October 1960 in box "NASA HQ Organizations, O.S.S.A. (con't)." The areas either directly referring to Wallops, or to Wallops related programs are: Meteorology, Upper Atmosphere, ionosphere, Atmospheric Motions, Magnetic Fields and Particles, Solar Studies, Stars, Interstellar Matter, Shipboard Launchings. No role for Wallops is forecast in Lunar and Planetary Studies.
13. Shortal, 685-95, for Shotput and Echo.
14. Nathan and Ida Reingold, ed.s, Science in America: A Documentary History, 1900-1939 (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1981), 1-6.
15. Data Book II, 270-72.
16. For an example of a pure research launch see: Memorandums (2), Ernest J. Ott for the Files, 20 September 1962, both in folder 005085 "15.6 Journeyman," in file tray "Sounding Rockets General (con't) Alphabetical Aerobee thru Javelin," in NHO. This was a Univ.of Michigan radio astronomy launch. For an applied research project of Ohio State University, with Air Force sponsorship, see: Letter, Ross Caldecott to E. A. Brummer, 7 August 1963; Letter, T. R. Patterson to Mr. Littell, 5 September 1963, both in folder "Special File, May 63 - February 64," in RGA181-l(S).
17. "Robbing," OHI, Tape 1b: 445. Joseph Robbins notes that problems arose when scientists would move to different universities and attempt to take their grant money along. The grant, having been made to the given institution, stayed with that institution wherever the research went.
19. Ibid. "Milliner," OHI, Tape la: 505, for quotation; 1b: 420 for education.
20. Letter, Robert L. Krieger to Director, Langley Research Center, 20 May 1963; Letter, U. M. Staebler to Floyd Thompson, 7 June 1963, both in folder "Special File, May 63 - February 64," in RGA181-l(S). See also: A&A, 1963, 208.
21. Letter, Robert L. Krieger to Langley Research Center, 20 September 1963, in folder "Special File, May 63 - February 64," in RGA181-l(S).
22. Letter, J. W. Wright to S. L. Seaton, 10 June 1964 in folder "Special File, March - December 64," in RGA181-l(S).
23. "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape 2a: 440-80; "Milliner," OHI, Tape Ib: 250.
24. Letter, F. W. Reichelderfer to Director Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 15 September 1958, in folder "Special Files, September December 58," in RGA181-I(S); the 17 October reply is also in this file. See Shortal' 544, for a radar image of the hurricane.
25. Data Book II, 346-48. Letter, Earle F. Cook to Director Langley Research Center, 12 January 1959, in folder "January - May, 1959," in Wallops box #4.
26. Memorandum, H. R. Brockett for Dr. Tepper, 18 October 1960, in folder 005065 "15.1 Sounding Rockets to 1963," in file tray "Sounding Rockets - General," in NHO. Letter, Robert L. Krieger to Willis L. Webb, 21 December 1961, in folder "Wallops, January - March 62," in RGA181-l(C). The "NASA ARP, April 1961," page arp 8.2, lists other firing sites as Pt. Mugu (CA), Eglin Field (FL), White Sands, and Tonapah (NV).
27. Letter, Robert L. Krieger to Morton J. Stoller, 9 April 1962, in folder "Special File, May - September 62," in RGA181-l(S).
28. Letter, Robert L. Krieger to Morton J. Stoller, 24 May 1962, Ibid.
29. Airmail, Herbert A. Wilson Jr. to E. Whitney, 14 March 1963, in folder "Special File, October 62 - April 63," in RGA181-l(S); Memorandum, Harold N. Murrow for Associate Director Langley Research Center, 30 April 1965, in folder "Wallops, January - June 46 [sic]," in RGA181-l(C).
30. Letter with enclosure, Robert L. Krieger to Director of Meteorological Programs, 15 December 1965, in folder "Special File June - December 65," in RGA181-l(S).
31. "NASA APR, March 1961," page sfp 27.5.
32. Shortal, 543, for the FPS-16 radar; "NASA APR, June 1962," page A 40.0 for NASA contract NAS6-386 to RCA, "Services necessary to operate and maintain the Wallops Station AN/FPS-16 radar and Tiros ground data acquisition systems." Contract was for $216,000.
33. "NASA APR, April 1961, page osfd 1.2, for the transfer of the station. Memorandum, Edmund C. Buckley for Director Space Flight Programs, 10 July 1961, in "Chron. File, July - December 1961," in NASA HQ box #1. "NASA APR, December 1961" page B 1.4, for station overhaul.
34. Pamela Mack, "Satellite and Politics: Weather, Communications, and Earth Resources," in Spacefaring People, Roland, ed., 32-34, for NASA-Weather Bureau controversy.
35."NASA APR, September 1962," page B 1.1, for Tiros, B 2.2, for Nimbus.
36. Letter, Gerald M. Truszynski to Homer E. Newell, 21 September 1964, in folder "July thru December, 1964," in NASA HQ box #1.
37. See chapter 2, above, for Project 2080. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Astronautics and Space Sciences, NASA Authorization for 1960, Hearings before a Senate subcommittee of the Committee on Astronautics and Space Sciences on S. 1582 and H.R. 7007, 86th Cong. 1st sess., 5905-21S, 792, for FY 1960 Wallops funding wherein Administrator Glennan told the Senators that the build-up at the island was "essentially complete." U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriation, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1961, Hearings before a House subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 86th Cong.2nd. sess., 6003-OlH, 353-55 for FY 1961 funding. See also: Data Book I, 491, table 6-147 for "Funding by Fiscal Year;" and 168, table 4-28 for "Construction of Facilities Direct Obligations, by Installation." The figures in these charts differ somewhat due to the fact that the money requested in a given year might be spent over several.
38. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, NASA Authorization for 1963, Hearings before the House Committee on Science and Astronautics on H.R. 10100, 87th Cong. 2nd. sess., 6203-06H, 944, 948. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1963, Hearings before a House subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 87th Cong. 2nd sess., 6203-13H, part 3, 882-87. By comparing the figures from these two hearings I noticed that Wallops figures on page 948 of the former are misprinted, someone copied the number above the summation line instead of the total.
39. Data Book I, 489, table 6-145 "Personnel".
40. "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape 2a: 545. This 50/50 mix of contract/in house personnel was unusual compared to NASA's average of 3 to 4 contract personnel to each NASA employee during this time. See: Data Book 1, 118, table 3-26 "Total NASA Employment, Selected Characteristics."
41. Data Book I, 345, table 6-54 "Funding by Fiscal Year," for the Cape's budget; 415, table 6-94 "Personnel," for employment at Houston.
42. "Robbing," OHI, Tape Ib: 300-20.
43. Memorandum, Abe Silverstein for Directors, 6 April 1960, in folder "Wallops, January to June 1960," in RGA181-l(C).
44. Cover Letter, Robert L. Krieger, 8 December 1961, in folder "Wallops Station Handbook, DTD 12-8-61," in RGA181 l(C). This folder contains a copy of all four volumes of the Handbook. I: General Information; II: Flight Test and Support Facilities; III: Range Users Information; IV: Safety. Letter, Robert L. Krieger to Langley, Goddard, and Lewis Centers, 8 January 1962, in folder "Special Files, January - April 62," in RGA181-l(S), for 1 January effective date for the Handbook's procedures.
45. "NASA APR, October 1960," page lvp 51.3; "January 1961," page lvp 51.3; "April 1961," page lvp 51.3, follow the course of the decision on this issue.
46. Memorandum, Paul A. Price for File, 25 September 1961, in "Chron. File, July - December 61," in NASA HQ box #1. This memo describes the "September Meeting of the DOD Inter-range Communications Planning Committee." Price lists 3 representatives from AMR, 2 from PMR, and 1 each from White Sands, Defense Communications Agency, and NASA (Price himself). No one from Wallops seems to have attended. Recall, also, that the investigations of labor problems at missile bases ignored Wallops. In "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape 2a: 380, Engineer Robert Duffy states that Wallops "has always been an Associate Member," of the DOD's "Range Commander's Council," but it seems that most of the contact between Wallops and the other ranges took place on an informal basis in the early days.
47. Letter, Edmund C. Buckley to Brigadier General Paul T. Cooper, 4 May 1962, in "Chron. File, January thru December 1962," in NASA HQ box #1. Memorandum, Andrew G, Swanson for Associate Director, 10 July 1962, in folder "Special File, May - September 62;" Memorandum, Carl A. Sandahl for Associate Director, 10 December 1962, in "Special File, October 62 - April 63," both in RGA181-l(S).
48. "NASA APR, May 1962," page D 2.4, for Scout pad refurbishment. For increase in Scout capacity see: Memorandum, Floyd L. Thompson to Wallops, 27 September 1962, in folder "Special Files, May - September 62," in RGA181 l(S).
49. Levine, 183. Levine notes that Congress tightened-up NASA's ability to use this technique in 1965. See also: "NASA APR, September 1962," page A 4.4; U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA Authorization for FY 1964, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences on S. 1245, 88th Cong. 1st sess., 6304-24S, 67.
50. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA Authorization for FY 1964, S. Report 385, 88th Cong. 1st sess., 6308-02S, 331-2, for quotation. For NASA planning for this budget see: Report, "Wallops Island Fiscal 1964 Estimates Supporting Facilities," 19 December 1962, in "Chron. File, January - December 1962," in NASA HQ box #1. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, NASA Authorization for 1964, Hearings before the House Committee on Science and Astronautics on H.R. 5466, 88th Cong. 1st sess., 6303-12H, part 4, 2897-2898. While I have no direct evidence that this denial of funding was in retaliation for the reprogrammed bypass of normal channels, it should be noted that the Senate Authorization Committee was usually the most lenient committee NASA had to appear before, and Wallops tried again for the funding (apparently without success) in fiscal 1966.
51. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Authorizing Appropriations to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, H. report 1674 to accompany H.R. 11737, 87th Cong. 2nd sess., 6205-15H, 145; U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA Authorization for FY 1963, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences on H.R. 11737, 87th Cong. 2nd sess., 6206-13S, 745.
52. The Aerobee is a small, liquid-fueled sounding rocket, one of the few liquid-fuel vehicles Wallops handles. For operational status of the tower see: "NASA APR, February 1960," page sfp 65.3.
53. Memorandum, Charles J. Donlan to NASA - Code RTM, 30 June 1961, for first quotation. Memorandum, Abe Silverstein to Director Advanced Research Programs, 9 August 1961, for Silverstein's quote, emphasis in original. Both memos are in "Chron. File, July - December 1961," in NASA HQ box #1.
54. Memorandum, T. Melvin Butler to Robert L. Krieger, 17 May 1965, in folder "Wallops, January - June 46 [sic]," in RGA181-l(C).
55. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, NASA Authorization for 1964, Hearings before a House subcommittee of the Committee on Science and Astronautics on H.R. 5466, 88th Cong. 1st sess., 6303-12H, part 4, 2890, for Buckley's testimony. See also: Memorandum with enclosure, W. J. Boyer to R. L. Rrieger, 9 May 1962, in folder "Special File, May - September 60," in RGA181-l(S); "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape 2b: 330-80.
56. "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape 2b: 330-80. Data Book I, 485, table 6 141. There is a photo of Range Recoverer in A&A, 1966,186.
57. Letter, Robert L. Krieger to NASA Headquarters (Code T), 25 September 1964, in folder "Special File, March - December 64," in RGA181-l(S). Data Book I, 485, table 6-141. C-121 was the military designation for the Lockheed Constellation passenger airliner. See also: "Floyd," OHI, Tape la: 250.
58. Memorandum, G. T. Ragon to Commander Service Squadron 8, 6 August 1962, in folder "Special File, May - September 62," in RGA181-l(S), for Navy diver service. Memorandum with enclosure, Abe Silverstein for Associate Administrator, 14 April 1961, in "Chron. File, January - June 61," in NASA HQ box #1, for "NASA request to CNO to extend Navy support of Wallops Island Operations." U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, NASA Authorization for 1963, Hearings before the House Committee on Science and Astronautics on H.R. 10100, 87th Cong. 2nd sess., 6202-27H, part 1, 118, for funding for naval support.
59. Letter, Floyd L. Thompson to Commanding Officer ZW-1,11 January 1961; Letter with enclosures, Floyd L. Thompson to Wallops Station, 11 January 1961, both in folder "Special Files, January - March 61," in RGA181-l(S).
60. National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Section 102, c(7).
61. Don E. Kash, The Politics of Space Cooperation (West Lafayette, IN.: Purdue Research Foundation, 1967), 1-23.
62. Ibid., 50-76. The four areas of cooperation are: information exchange, personnel exchange, operations support, and cooperative projects. See also: Draft #2, "A statement of responsibilities of the Director of the Office of International Programs," 13 February 1959, in folder 11.2 "International Affairs, Office of," in box "Office of International Affairs; Office of U.N. Conference (OUNC); Office of Policy Coordination and International Affairs," in NHO. Hereafter cited as "folder 11.2 in box OIA." Logsdon, "Opportunities.
63. "Milliner," OHI, Tape la: 520-lb: 50.
64. Roland, I: 4-5. For Canadian and NATO projects at Wallops see chapter 1 above.
65. Green and Lomask, 18-26.
66. "Milliner," OHI, Tape la: 190; "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape 2a: 195, for Buckley's relationship with Wallops. Data Book II, 546, for MSFN negotiations.
67. Statement, "International Programs of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration," 9 February 1961; Memorandum from the Administrator, T. Keith Glennan, 1 April 1959, both in folder 11.2 box OAI. See also: Data Book II, 524.
68. "NASA APR, December 1959," page OIP 17.2. For the CF-105 program see chapter 1 above.
69. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Aeronautics and Space Exploration, International Cooperation in the Exploration of Space, H. Report 2709, 86th Cong. 1st sess., 5901-03B. Statement, Hugh L. Dryden before the Subcommittee on Independent Offices of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 19 May 1960, 13, in folder "VIII Budget: Background Briefings, Supplemental Material (FY 1961)," in file tray "Budget, FY 1961, FY 1962," in NHO. Aside from noting that "sounding rockets and Scout satellites," were functions of Wallops, the reference to international cooperative projects provides the bulk of the Wallops mission definition that Dryden gave the Committee.
70. "NASA APR, July 1960," page IPP 52.3, for meeting. Data Book II, 291-93 for Ariels 1, 2, and 3; Data Book III, 184 85, for Ariels 4 and 5.
71. The NASA APR gives a good running record of foreign researchers at Wallops each month. For examples see January 1961, page GA 17.4 for French professor, "utilizing specialized optical equipment," and page 17.6 for the Norwegian engineer, "studying range telemetry systems.'
72. "Milliner," OHI, Tape la: 520.
73. "Rockets' Red Glare Lights Up Remote Island," The Washington Post, 9 August 1980, B7, first quote is from Joyce Milliner, second is from Robert Krieger.
74. Public brochure, Robert L. Krieger, undated (for Open House 28-29 September 1963), in folder 004680 "Wallops General (1958-1963)," in file tray "Centers, Wallops Flight Facility," in NHO.
75. "Robbing," OHI, Tape la: 535.
76. "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape 2b: 250. Data Book I, 482, indicates that equipment was on loan to India, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, and Spain. See also: Library of Congress Staff Report, "Meteorological Satellites," for the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 6203-29S, 112, for the November 1961 visit of delegates to the "International Meteorological Satellite Workshop," to Goddard and Wallops.
77. Minutes, Administrator's Staff Meeting, 18 January 1961, 3, in book #2, in box "Administrator's Staff Meeting Minutes, October 60 - June 61," for an account of the Sardinia launches, "Two Wallops people were there." For Italian interest in Scout see: "NASA APR, October 1961," page A17; "NASA APR, April, 1962," page A 17.1.
78. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Proceedings of the Panel on Science and Technology, 6th Meeting, before the House Committee on Science and Technology, H. Report, 89th Cong. 2nd sess., 6501-26H, 13, for the statement, "European Progress in Aeronautics by Professor Luigi Broglio, President Italian Space Research Commission."
79. Centro Ricerche Aerospaziali of Roma, Italy, San Marco Range, undated (early 1972) leaflet, in folder "FLT/Scout," in FLT Papers. See also: Data Book II, 64-65, 299-300.
80. Letter, Robert F. Garbarini to Langley Research Center, 26 August 1965; Letter, Sidney Teweles to Morris Tepper, 17 August 1965; Letter, Robert F. Garbarini to Wallops Station, 26 August 1965, all in folder "Special File, June - December 1965," in RGA181-l(S).
81. Minutes, and "NASA APRs" as cited in note 77 above. A sodium vapor rocket dispensed the chemical at a programmed altitude creating a very visible cloud. The motions of this cloud provided data relating to atmospheric motions.
82. "Robbing," OHI, Tape Ib: 430. Memorandum, Edmund C. Buckley for Dr. Silverstein, 6 October 1961, in "Chron File, July - December 1961," in NASA HQ box #1. Data Book I, 487, table 6-143.
83. "Milliner," OHI, Tape la: 530.
84. "NASA APR, April 1961," page LVP 51.3, for 14 April meeting. "NASA APR, August 1961," page LVP 51.4, for the reversal of the Scout transfer. Vought Corp. was the prime contractor for Scout.
85. Memorandum, Floyd L. Thompson to Robert L. Krieger,6 March 1962, in folder "Special Files, January - April 62," in RGA181-l(S). NASA Wallops News Release #63-12, "Wallops Station Personnel Participate in West Coast Launching," 12 February 1963, in folder 005085 "15.6 Journeyman," in file tray "Sounding Rockets General," in NHO. Letter, Floyd L. Thompson to Robert L. Krieger, 21 May 1963, in folder "Special File, May 63 - February 64," in RGA181-l(S).
86. Memorandum, R. B. Morrison to SD/ Deputy Associate Administrator, 14 April 1964, in folder 006255 "Documentation OSO," in file tray "Earth Satellite Probes, Open - OSO," in NHO. Minutes, Administrator's Staff Luncheon, 22 April 1964, 5-6, in folder #4 "January - November 1964," in box "NASA Administrator's Policy Meetings, (1962-1965), Action Items (1962-1968)," in NHO. A&A, 1964, 135, 141, 147, 166. The fatalities were Sidney J. Dagle and L. D. Gable of Ball Brothers Co., and John W. Fassett of Goddard.
87. "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape 2a: 382. Letter, Robert L. Krieger to List, 19 June 1964, in folder "Special File, March - December 64," in RGA181-l(S).
88. "Report of accident at Wallops Island on June 8,1964," Hubert K. Clark, 12 June 1964, in folder "Special File, March - December 64," in RGA181-l(S). "Contributing factors," noted are: "a. Too many organizations making decisions without proper designation of single point of authority; b. Requirement for meeting tight schedules on a non-interference basis; c. Inadequate review of technical requirements of proposed systems."
89. "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape 2a: 400-20, first two quotes are from Abraham Spinak, last quote ("and assume that...") is from Robert Duffy.
90. Shortal, 193-96, for accident involving Durwood A. Dereng. Spinak refers to this accident in OHI, 2a: 400. For Krieger's vehemence on range safety see letter cited in note 87, above.
91. "NASA APR, July, 1962," page D 2.4. It is interesting to note that,"Wallops has requested Langley review the ARGO D-8 aerodynamics and structure. GSFC has supplied Langley with a number of reports on the ARGO D-8 vehicle."
92. Memorandum with enclosure, G. M. Truszynski for Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications, 24 June 1964, enclosure page 2, in folder 005064 "15.1 Sounding Rockets 1964-69," in file tray "Sounding Rockets General," in N80. DEW is Defense Early Warning, a series of radar sites to detect incoming missiles; NBS is the National Bureau of Standards; W.B. is the Weather Bureau.
93. Memorandum, Facilities Engineer to E. C. Buckley, 16 October 1964, Ibid. "Milliner," OHI, Tape Ib: 525.
94. Memorandum, Ibid, for ARL support. "Milliner," OHI, Tape Ib: 525, for travel budget. "Robbing," OHI, Tape Ib: 420, for logistics. See also: Data Book I 482 table 6-138.
95. Staff Study, "An Accelerated NACA Space Flight Program (Langley Version)," undated (early 1958), in folder "NASA Space Flight Program 1958," in FLT Papers. This study includes "cost breakdowns" for: "Conversion of each of 3 ships for down-range tracking and instrumentation and for the launching of small (100 lb.) satellites," and "modifying and equipping one large ship for launching and monitoring flight of manned satellite."
96. "The Sun's Awesome Impact," Life, 28 November 1960, 78, for a photo of Navy ship launching eclipse research rocket.
97. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Equatorial Launch Sites - Mobile Sea Launch Capability, H. Report 710, 87th Cong. 1st sess., 6107-12H, quotation is on page 6.
98. Memorandum, H. R. Brockett to E. P. Odenwalder, 15 August 1961, in "Chron. File, July - December 1961," in NASA HQ box #1. See also in the same file: Memorandum, E. C. Buckley to H. J. Goett, 5 December 1961, on the same subject. Rawinsonde [RAdar-WINd-radioSONDE] operations entailed using the ship's tracking and telemetry equipment to support weather balloon launches, some of which launched from the ship, some from shore.
99. "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape Ib: 170.
100. Memorandum, Robert R Rhinehart for Associate Director, 11 December 1962, in folder "Special File, October 62 -April 63," in RGA181-l(S). Memorandum with enclosure, Hugh S. Fosque for Range Engineering Branch Files, 5 February 1963, in folder 005105 "Mobile Launch of Sounding Rockets from Shipboard (1963-64), in file tray "Sounding rockets (con't) Prometheus thru Wasp."
102. "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape Ib: 180, first part of quote is from Robert Duffy, second part (and they bought it..) is from Abraham Spinak.
103. National Academy of Sciences, International Geophysics Bulletin #69, March 1963, "Provisional Programme International Years of the Quiet Sun, 1964-65," in folder OI 391400-01 "International Q. S. Year," in Space History Collection, NASM. Wallops participated in the IQSY with several launches, including Explorer XXX on 19 November 1965. In regard to the solar cycle, it should be noted that the polarity of sunspot pairs reverses with each 11 year cycle, so that astronomers usually speak of a 22 year cycle. A given source might refer to either.
104. Letter, John E. Naugle to Stanley Ruttenberg,21 November 1963, in folder 005105 "Mobile Launch of Sounding Rockets from Shipboard (1963-64), in file tray "Sounding rockets (con't) Prometheus thru Wasp," in NHO.
105. Memorandum, Harold N. Murrow to Associate Director, 7 April 1964, in folder "Wallops, April - June 64," in RGA181 I(C). This memo states, "The Sandia Corporation has a requirement for high altitude wind measurements near the equator both for fallout studies and other classified projects." See also: "Carrier to Serve as Rocket Launch Range," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 19 October 1964, 33.
106. Memorandum, Robert L. Krieger to Floyd L. Thompson, 29 June 1964, in folder "Special File, March - December 64," in RGA181-l(S).
107. Memorandum, Robert L. Krieger to Floyd L. Thompson, 28 July 1964, in folder "Wallops, July - December 64," in RGA181-l(C).
108. Escort carriers were small ships with a limited number of aircraft that provided air cover for convoys, protecting them primarily from submarines. Croatan's small size combined with its designed ability to handle aircraft made it a suitable platform for sounding rocket operations.
109. Memorandum, Abraham Spinak to Floyd L. Thompson, 19 November 1964, in folder "Special File, March - December 64," in RGA181-l(S). See also: A&A, 1964, 384-5, 391, 393.
110. NASA Wallops News Release #64-86, "Sounding Rocket Ship Complete"; Shakedown Cruise," 23 November 1964, in folder 005104 "Sounding Rockets IQSY Program, 1964-65 (also USNS Croatan)," in file tray "Sounding rockets (con't) Prometheus thru Wasp," in NHO.
111. "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape Ib: 157-240. In folder 005106 "Shipboard Sounding Rockets," in NHO, there are a number of photos of the preparations for this voyage. In folder 005104 "Sounding - Rockets IQSY Program," photo G-65 4787 shows Croatan in Baltimore Harbor. Interestingly this photo was issued by the Goddard public information office.
112. A&A, 1965,110, 121.
113. "Robbing," OHI, Tape Ib: 390. NASA Wallops News Release #65-22, "NASA SeaGoing Platform Completes Launch Expedition," 22 April 1965, in folder 005104 as cited in note 110 above.
114. A&A, 1965, 163. NASA Wallops News Release #65-23, "NASA Sea-Going Expedition to Sail in Mid-February," 11 February 1965, in folder 005104, as cited in note 110 above.
115. i, 169. Chart, "Launch Schedule for Mobile Launch Facility Expedition No. 1," undated, in folder 005106 "Shipboard Sounding Rockets," in NHO. This preexpedition schedule is not completely accurate for retrospective dates, but is useful in showing the general itinerary of the mission. See also: NASA Wallops News Release #65-23, as cited in note 114 above.
116. NASA Wallops News Release #65-22, as cited in note 113 above. Report, Robert L. Krieger to Langley Research Center, 26 November 1965, in folder "Wallops July - December 65," in RGA181-l(C). This report lists the following numbers of major rocket launches during the mission (keeping in mind that small rockets were launched on virtually a daily basis): Langley (18), Univ. Michigan (14) Goddard (13), Naval Ordinance Test Station (9), Univ. New Hampshire (8) Sandia Corp. (7), Air Force Cambridge Research Lab (6), Univ. Illinois (5).
117. "Spinak, et al.," OHI, Tape lb: 200.
118. Ibid., Tape 2b: 360. "Milliner," OHI, Tape lb: 545. A&A, 1966, 87, 178, 185-87.