Day two starts with the crew asleep after a textbook launch that was followed by trouble with the docking system and subsequently a long stretch of troubleshooting.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
This is Apollo Control; 16 hours, 57 minutes Ground Elapsed Time. Crew has been asleep now for at least we haven't heard from them in about the last hour. The scheduled 10-hour sleep period which may run a little bit longer since they did go to bed earlier. Apollo 14 now 77,595 nautical miles [143,706 km] out from Earth, traveling at a velocity of 6,231 feet per second [1,899 m/s]. The latest status report from the Spacecraft Analysis room in the back of the building here, for a Ground Elapsed Time of 16 hours, it appears as the earlier report. It came out all systems normal, no change in status. One brief mention of the fluctuation in oxygen flow rates, which occurred shortly before the crew went to sleep, where some of the waste management valves have apparently had to be recycled to return the oxygen flow rate to its normal rate of something around 3/10 of a pound per hour. Battery B in the Command Module was taken off charge, at about 13½ hours Ground Elapsed Time. All batteries are topped off now to rated value. Fuel cells in the Service Module; fuel cell 1 is outputting 24 amps as is number 2 and number 3 is putting out 28 amps. Cryogenic storage system hydrogen and oxygen in the Service Module all showing nominal values of quantity remaining. Fluid temperatures in the percentage of quantity oxygen tank number 1 is 92.6 per cent remaining; oxygen tank number 2, 93 per cent; oxygen tank number 3, 57 per cent. Number 3 is the tank that was added after the Apollo 13 incident and of course the plan is to use from it first and then go to the other two tanks. Hydrogen tank number 1 has 90.98 per cent quantity remaining; hydrogen tank number 2, 89.11 per cent. At 17 hours Ground Elapsed Time in the mission of Apollo 14, this is Apollo Control.
The total power output at the moment comes to 2.128 kilowatts.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
This is Apollo Control; 17 hours, 57 minutes Ground Elapsed Time. It's been slightly more than 2 hours since we last heard from the crew of Apollo 14. In the midst of a sleep period, well deserved. Apollo 14 presently 81,112 nautical miles [150,219 km] out from Earth. Velocity, 6,038 feet per second [1,840 m/s]. It's rather quiet here in Mission Control as the Gold Team nears the end of its first shift in this mission. At 17 hours, 57 minutes Ground Elapsed Time; this is Apollo Control.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
This is Apollo Control; 18 hours, 8 minutes Ground Elapsed Time. An announcement of local interest here in Manned Spacecraft Center for newsmen covering Apollo 14; a briefing on the Space Shuttle program which had been scheduled for 9:30 Monday morning - that's today - has been slipped until 1:30 pm in the small briefing room in the News Center. The major participant in this briefing will be Charles W. Mathews, Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Manned Space Flight, NASA headquarters. To repeat, this briefing has been rescheduled to 1:30 pm today in the small briefing room, not at 9:30 as previously announced. Apollo 14, meanwhile, now 81,826 nautical miles [151,542 km] out from Earth, going in an even 6,000 feet per second [1,829 m/s]. At 18 hours, 9 minutes Ground Elapsed Time; this is Apollo Control.
Some 1,700 reporters were accredited for the coverge of Apollo 14, a figure similar to that of Apollo 13 the year before. 3,497 members of the press were accredited for Apollo 11 in 1969. Alan Shepard's 1961 suborbital flight apparently garnered the interest of 440 reporters.
Come February 1971, the space shuttle program was still very much in a state of flux. Multiple companies and increasingly cash-strapped NASA centers continued studies on various concepts of a reusable orbiter combined with a wide variety of reusable and expendable booster components. It wasn't until March 1972 that NASA announced the now familiar Space Transportation System that included the Shuttle Orbiter, the expendable External Tank, and the twin reusable Solid Rocket Boosters.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
This is Apollo Control; 18 hours, 37 minutes Ground Elapsed Time. Apollo 14 crew still asleep at this time. The clock on the front screen of Mission Control, here, showing an awake time 7 hours, 22 minutes from now. Some velocity and distance figures: distance out from Earth, 83,399 nautical miles [154,455 km]; velocity, 5,917 feet per second [1,804 m/s]. To recap the past 7 or 7½ hours of the Gold Team tenure here in Mission Control: The - shortly after the shift of flight controllers under Flight Director Gerry Griffin came in, the crew was given a Go to set up the Passive Thermal Control, the barbecue mode of stabilizing the thermal response of the spacecraft by rotating about its X-axis. This took a little while to set up and they had to make two attempts of it. Roosa asked if it wouldn't be alright to stow the probe, which had been under examination in the spacecraft, back in the tunnel attached to the drogue and everyone agreed that was the ideal place to stow it rather than have it rattling around in the cabin. All attempts onboard the spacecraft and here in Mission Control with the training model of the probe and drogue to duplicate the malfunction of the latches failing to engage - all these attempts failed because it worked every time. The crew requested that they go to sleep earlier than called for in the Flight Plan and they started their sleep period at about 15 hours, 30 minutes Ground Elapsed Time with a brief exchange of conversation between Stu Roosa and spacecraft communicator Fred Haise about 15 minutes afterward. Prior to going to sleep, there was a brief flurry of high flow rates in the oxygen system in the spacecraft Environmental Control System. It was discovered that it was caused, perhaps, by the valves in the waste management system bleeding the pressure overboard and causing higher flow rate in the oxygen system. But this was corrected without too much difficulty. Passive Thermal Control was set up. The crew made their consumables report of propellants remaining, the amp-hours in the batteries, all the usual standard stuff called for in the Flight Plan prior to sleep, and that they did begin their sleep period at Ground Elapsed Time of 15 hours, 30 minutes. And at 18 hours, 40 minutes Ground Elapsed Time, this is Apollo Control.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
This is Apollo Control at Houston at 19 hours, 31 minutes now into the flight of Apollo 14. Our displays in Mission Control presently show Apollo 14 at a distance of 86,406 nautical miles [160,024 km] away from Earth and now traveling at a speed of 5,765 feet per second [1,757 m/s]. In the Mission Control Center, we're in the process of a shift changeover. The Pete Frank team of Orange flight controllers replacing Gerry Griffin, or Gerry Griffin's Gold team. As has been previously reported, the Apollo 14 crew is in a rest period. We now show a wake-up time 6 hours and 28 minutes away. In the - over the news room television monitors at 11:35 Central Time, there will be a replay of the television transmission that occurred at 11 hours, 6 minutes Ground Elapsed Time. This transmission ran 1 hour and 5 minutes. We repeat in the - over the News Center television monitors, there will be a reshowing of the television transmission that occurred at 11:06 Ground Elapsed Time and ran for 1 hour and a half minutes - an hour and 5 minutes. This will be at 11:35 Central Time. We're at 19 hours, 33 minutes into the flight and this is Apollo Control, Houston.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
This is Apollo Control, Houston; at 20 hours, 32 minutes now into the flight of Apollo 14. Our displays now show Apollo 14 at a distance of 89,728 nautical miles [166,176 km] away from Earth, and travelling at a speed of 5,603.7 feet per second [1,708.0 m/s]. The surgeon reports that the three crew members; Shephard, Roosa, Mitchell; are sleeping quite soundly. We shall remain in sleep time of 5 hours, 27 minutes and at this time we'll take down the release line to replay the television transmission of early this morning - of early this morning, and this will be available on the monitors in the News Center. We're at 20 hours, 33 minutes; and this is Apollo Control, Houston.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
This is Apollo Control, Houston; at 21 hours, 41 minutes now into the flight of Apollo 14. We presently show the 14 spacecraft at a distance of 93,355 nautical miles [172,893 km] and traveling at a speed of 5,435 feet per second [1,657 m/s]. As the rest period for the crew continues, the Flight Control team here at Mission Control will be considering possible Flight Plan changes or updating the Flight Plan both for the balance of our shift and the next shift to come on. The crew wakeup time now shows that it's 4 hours, 18 minutes away. We're at 21 hours, 42 minutes into the flight; and this is Apollo Control, Houston.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
This is Apollo Control, Houston; at 22 hours and 12 minutes now into the flight. We now show Apollo 14 at a distance of 94,979 nautical miles [175,901 km] away from Earth and that it is traveling at a speed of 5,362 feet per second [1,634 m/s]. During this quiet period while the crew is resting, a replay of last night's docking is being rerun on one of the - on the screen here in Mission Control. A Space Shuttle news conference featuring Mr. Charles Mathews is scheduled to be held in the News Center briefing room at 1:30 pm - about 15 minutes from this time. We're at 22 hours, 13 minutes into the flight and this is Apollo Control, Houston.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
This is Apollo Control, Houston; at 23 hours, 23 minutes now into the flight of Apollo 14. Our displays presently show Apollo 14 at a distance of 98,566 nautical miles [182,544 km] out from Earth, and traveling at a velocity of 5,205 feet per second [1,586 m/s]. The crew of Apollo 14 is continuing with their rest period. However, our Flight Surgeon advises that the Lunar Module Pilot Ed Mitchell plugged in his biomed at 22 hours, 50 minutes. This would assume about 7 hours of sleep time. Meanwhile, we have preliminary times, distances and velocities of certain milestone events en route to the Moon. These are preliminary times, distances and velocities. The halfway in distance, in terms of time, that would be at a Ground Elapsed Time of 27 hours, 4 minutes, 42 seconds. The altitude would be 109,172 nautical miles [202,187 km]. The velocity relative to Earth, 4,779 feet per second [1,457 m/s]. Velocity relative to the Moon, 3,694 feet per second [1,126 m/s]. Halfway in terms of time - this from lift-off to Lunar Orbit Insertion - the time would be 40 hours, 56 minutes. The altitude relative to the Earth, 142,119 nautical miles [263,204 km]. The altitude relative to the Moon, 81,723 nautical miles [151,351 km]. A velocity relative to the Earth, 3,601 feet per second [1,098 m/s]. The velocity relative to the Moon, 3,261.7 feet per second [994.2 m/s]. Sphere crossing time, when we cross from the Earth to the lunar sphere of influence; 66 hours, 3 minutes, 7 seconds. The velocity match - when the velocity of the Moon equals the velocity of the Earth at the Ground Elapsed Time of 47 hours, 43 minutes. The velocity reading at that time, 3,214 feet per second [980 m/s]. With regard to the S-IVB, the present forecast time of impact; 82 hours, 37 minutes, 10 seconds. The velocity at impact, 8,347 feet per second [2,544 m/s]. Present predicted coordinates; 9 degrees, 24 09 minutes south; 25 degrees, 600 west. We also would like to advise all news men that there will be a briefing, a News Conference on Apollo 14 mission status in the big auditorium at 3 o'clock. Participants include Rocco Petrone, Apollo Program Director; Chet Lee, Apollo 14 Mission Director; Jim McDivitt, Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager in Houston and Sig Sjoberg, Director of Flight Operations at the Manned Spacecraft Center. We repeat, the Apollo 14 Mission Status News Conference at 3 o'clock in the big auditorium of Building 1. We're at 23 hours, 28 minutes into the flight and this is Apollo Control, Houston.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
This is Apollo Control, Houston; at 23 hours, 42 minutes now into the flight of Apollo 14. Apollo 14 presently 99,521 nautical miles [184,313 km] away from Earth, and traveling at a speed of 5,165 feet per second [1,574 m/s]. We would like to repeat our earlier announcement that Apollo 14 mission status news conference will be held in the big auditorium of Building 1 starting at 3 pm. Participants will include Mr. Rocco Petrone, Apollo Program Director; Colonel James McDivitt, Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager at the Manned Spacecraft Center; Mr. Chet Lee, Mission Director for Apollo 14; and Mr. Sig Sjoberg, the Manned Spacecraft Center's Director of Flight Operations. We're at 23 hours, 43 minutes; and this is Apollo Control, Houston.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
This is Apollo Control, Houston; at 24 hours, 58 minutes now into the flight of Apollo 14. At present we show Apollo 14 at 103,220 nautical miles [191,163 km] out from Earth. Present velocity now reads 5,012 feet per second [1,528 m/s]. One of our clocks continuing to countdown shows the rest period ending at 1 hour, 1 minute from this time. This is Apollo Control, Houston.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
This is Apollo Control, Houston; at 25 hours, 41 minutes now into the flight. Apollo 14 now 105,282 nautical miles [194,982 km] away from Earth and traveling at a speed of 4,929 feet per second [1,502 m/s]. The present plan in Mission Control is - is to not contact the crew of Apollo 14 until 27 hours Ground Elapsed Time, one hour later than the Flight Plan calls for. Even if the crew should awaken and be about and in contact with Mission Control via voice communications, the Flight Plan will effectively in certain areas move back by one hour. All of the activities presently listed in the GETs is between 26 and 27 hours would move back one hour. The launch vehicle systems debriefing would move back to start at 28 hours Ground Elapsed Time. The P23 cislunar navigation star sightings scheduled in the Flight Plan to start at 28 hours, 30 minutes have been deleted. The purpose of this to conserve on the Reaction Control System propellants. The Delta-V test and null bias check and the P52 platform alignments have been delayed until 29 hours, 10 minutes Ground Elapsed Time. The Passive Thermal Control exit has been delayed until 29 minutes - 29 hours, 45 minutes Ground Elapsed Time. So the crew will in effect have an extra hour of rest. We're now at 25 hours, 43 minutes into the flight and this is Apollo Control, Houston.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
This is Apollo Control, Houston. We're picking up conversation with the crew at this point and we'll switch to that conversation.
025:57:55 Mitchell: Houston, Apollo 14.
025:58:01 Fullerton: Roger, Apollo 14. Good evening.
025:58:06 Mitchell: Good morning, how are you? Or is it afternoon?
It is around 5 pm on the 2nd of February, 1971, in Houston, Texas - a Tuesday. The crew wears wristwatches that are usually set to Houston time, but while in space, the Ground Elapsed Time, or GET, is what dictates their next action.
025:58:10 Fullerton: I'm fine. How are you up there?
025:58:13 Mitchell: We're just great, thank you. [Pause.]
025:58:20 Mitchell: We're up and brushed our teeth and shaved, and we're just looking forward to a fine day.
Each crewmember was provided with one toothbrush for the duration of the mission, as well as toothpaste and edible chewing gum.
025:58:26 Fullerton: Roger, Ed. We saw somebody get up and walk in his sleep and work the DSKY there about an hour ago.
025:58:33 Mitchell: Yeah. That's right.
025:58:37 Roosa: Just need to get a little practice, Gordon.
025:58:39 Mitchell: He just had a restless finger.
025:58:41 Fullerton: Okay. We've got a site handover coming up in about a minute and a half.
025:58:49 Mitchell: Roger. We'll wait for that, and then I'll go ahead and give you the complete propulsion checks and postsleep checklists.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
026:02:06 Mitchell: Houston, 14.
026:02:09 Fullerton: Go ahead, Ed.
026:02:12 Mitchell: I have some dosimeter readings for you.
026:02:15 Fullerton: Okay. We've handed over, and - I'm ready to copy here - postsleep.
026:02:22 Mitchell: Okay. Alan dosimeter, 16037; Stu is 01034; mine is 05038. [Long pause.]
026:02:39 Fullerton: Roger. We got Al 16037, Stu at 01034, and you with 05038.
Comm break.
Spaceflight places the astronauts at the risk of exposure to both natural and manmade sources of ionizing radiation. Each crewman wears a personal dosimeter that records their radiation exposure. Each dosimeter is set up to start from a different value to ensure no mixups happen during the verbal reporting of the values on them. In addition, the crew had passive dosimeters in their underwear, which were only analysed upon their return to Earth and required no attention during the mission.
Apollo Control at 26 hours, 3 minutes. You heard that conversations with - those conversations with the crew. The crew sounding alert and wide awake. The launch vehicle debriefing time will not be changed, however, it it appears likely that other events in the Flight Plan preceding that may very well take place at the leisure of the crew. We're at 26 hours, 4 minutes into the flight. We show Apollo 14 at a...
The second day of the mission does not have too many scheduled activities, meaning that the PAO's statement about leisurely pace is correct.
026:03:50 Fullerton: Apollo 14, Houston.
026:03:53 Mitchell: Okay, Houston. I read you now.
026:03:55 Fullerton: Roger. I think we rotated between a couple antennas there. Got you loud and clear now.
026:04:01 Mitchell: For my sleep, I slept for about 4 hours straight and then another 2 or 3 intermittently, and I feel very good.
026:04:10 Fullerton: Roger.
026:04:16 Shepard: Now, about the same for me and feel like [garble].
026:04:22 Fullerton: Al, this is Houston. You're very, very weak. Would you repeat?
026:04:28 Shepard: Okay. I had a sleep cycle about the same for me. I slept soundly for 4 or 5 hours, and then intermittently for another 2 - and we feel excellent up here.
026:04:43 Fullerton: Roger, Al. For some reason, you're not nearly as readable as Ed is, and it sounds like - well, I guess I can't really say what the problem is there on - on your mike. You're getting a lot of - interference when you start and stop a transmission - I got no suggestion on what to do to improve it. [Long pause.]
026:05:11 Shepard: Okay. How do you read this?
026:05:13 Fullerton: That's a lot better, Al.
026:05:17 Shepard: Okay. The mike was a long way away from my mouth. [Garble] Did you get the sleep report?
026:05:26 Fullerton: I think we got it. Four to 5 hours good sleep and a little bit intermittent after that. Is that about it?
026:05:34 Shepard: That's correct. The general condition is excellent.
026:05:40 Fullerton: Al, you're still - breaking up. I really can't give you a good description of what - is wrong, but - you're just not very readable.
026:05:56 Mitchell: Okay. Stand by on that one, Houston. We'll work on it.
026:05:59 Fullerton: Okay, Ed.
026:06:01 Mitchell: And, Houston. I'll go ahead and - start charging Bat A with your concurrence, and we have changed the LiOH canister.
At this time, per the LiOH canister change schedule, they have removed canister 3 from position A and replaced it with canister 1. The used canister is placed into locker B5.
026:06:09 Fullerton: Roger. That's - affirmative. You can go ahead with that, and - also give us the - LM/CMDelta-P as shown at the 27 hours there, when it's convenient.
026:06:26 Mitchell: [Garble]. [Pause.]
026:06:36 Roosa: And, Gordon, this is Stu. How do you read?
026:06:39 Fullerton: You're loud and clear, Stu.
026:06:42 Roosa: Okay. I guess on my sleep I'll split it with you about half. I'll say I got 5 hours.
026:06:49 Fullerton: Roger. [Pause.]
026:06:55 Roosa: My mattress was hard.
026:06:57 Fullerton: Roger. When you're ready to copy, I have some words on - some changes we've figured out for the Flight Plan.
026:07:14 Mitchell: Stand by a minute. [Long pause.]
026:07:36 Shepard: Okay, Houston. Go ahead with your changes in the Flight Plan.
026:07:40 Fullerton: Okay. Before we start, one reminder is that - when you went to sleep, we didn't get any presleep checklist. If there was anything - out of the ordinary there, we'll - presleep report that was - and - we'll take any - Stand by, I'm getting some words from the surgeon here. Okay. Just disregard it. Just trying to - We'll need the - both the pre- and postsleep reports from here on out. Okay, on the Flight Plan, if you're ready. [Pause.]
026:08:25 Shepard: Okay. Go ahead.
026:08:28 Fullerton: Roger. We're going to delay the launch vehicle systems debriefing until 28 hours. And - the P23, which is scheduled at 28:30, we're going to cancel, which will save us some RCS. On - along that line, the results of the last P23 that Stu did, the horizon that he shot at was 28 plus or minus 5 kilometers, and - that's right on the preflight values so an update will not be required. And your average error for pointing error was 3 arc minutes, which rank is right in there with the best ever recorded, and - the expert gives you a pat on the back, Stu, and said it was an outstanding job. [Long pause.]
026:09:33 Roosa: Ah, Jove! Thank you, Gordon.
The main reason that P23 navigational fixes are performed is to give the CMP some practice at the technique. The primary means of navigation is based on the radio signal and P23 is merely a backup. However, should there be a problem with the radio system, it's good to know that the CMP can take over. Stu has already demonstrated his competence at P23 so they can save the propellant that would be required for another practice by deleting his next exercise.
Before the flight, Stu practised on a special navigation simulator which helped him settle on exactly which part of Earth's rather diffuse atmosphere he would consistently mark on. The results of yesterday's exercise demonstrate the simulation's worth because he was marking at the same point, about 28 kilometres above Earth's true horizon, as he did in pre-flight.
026:09:37 Fullerton: Okay. On with the Flight Plan. The Delta-V test and null bias check and the P52; we're going to delay that until 29:10 GET. [Pause.]
026:10:01 Shepard: Okay. So far, I have that we do the launch vehicle debrief at 28 hours to 27 hours [sic]. We're delaying the null bias and the P52 at 28:10 until 29:10; We're canceling the P23 at 28:30.
026:10:20 Fullerton: That's affirmative, Al. And - and then further after that, we're going to delay the exit of PTC until 29:55. And when we do exit PTC, go right into the midcourse 2 PAD attitude. [Long pause.]
026:10:45 Shepard: Okay. PTC to 29:55 and then set up for midcourse 2.
026:10:51 Fullerton: Roger. And all other activities will be nominal, except - on the waste water dump - you want - We want you to dump to zero per cent quantity.
026:11:05 Shepard: Okay. Dump the waste water to zero.
026:11:08 Fullerton: Okay. We have one additional question for the launch vehicle systems performance debriefing. We can either give it to you now so you can think about it, or wait until you get around to it to give it to you. Your choice.
026:11:27 Shepard: We will take it now.
026:11:30 Fullerton: Okay. The question is, you announced during the docking attempts that you thought the booster was maneuvering a little bit. We'd like you to expand on the direction of the maneuver: the type of maneuver, lateral or oscillating, or any other words to that effect; the approximate time the maneuver was first observed, whether it was before the first docking attempt, between the first or second, or if you can relate it to any other activity; any observed vents from the launch vehicle during the maneuver; and anything else unusual or unexpected that you noticed. Over. [Long pause.]
026:12:18 Shepard: Okay, question number 10. Describe the type, direction, and the time relation of the booster maneuvers during docking, and any events that we noticed during maneuvers.
026:12:28 Fullerton: Roger; and I was just thinking as I read it that, on that time, we can probably go back on the tape and find out when you mentioned it as far as tying down the time accurately, and that might be easier for us to get than you.
026:12:42 Shepard: Okay, that would probably help us; thank you.
026:12:44 Roosa: Hey, that - that's no sweat, Gordon. I - I remember the - the comment when I made it, and what the circumstances were.
026:12:51 Fullerton: Okay, Stu. I think that takes care of all the words they got for you right at the moment. [Long pause.]
026:13:43 Mitchell: Houston, 14.
026:13:45 Fullerton: Go ahead, Ed.
026:13:49 Mitchell: Our LM/CMDelta-P is 0.3, and I'm standing by for a Command Module consumables update.
When they talk about the LM/CMDelta-P, they are really discussing the pressure difference across the Command Module's forward hatch, leading to the tunnel. The tunnel's pressure is only the same as that for the LM if there is an open connection between the two. If the LM upper hatch is closed, which it usually is when the CM's forward hatch is in place, then that connection between the gases of the tunnel and the LM is via the Overhead Depress valve.
Measurement of the pressure difference is achieved with the Tunnel Vent valve, which is adjacent to a gauge near the CM tunnel hatch. The valve has four positions: LM Press(urise). Air passes from the CM, into the tunnel and through an open Overhead Depress valve to pressurise the LM. The LM/CM Delta-P gauge should read zero in this mode as it is also connected to CM pressure and since it always measures relative to this, it should indicate no pressure. LM/CM Delta-P. The LM/CM Delta-P gauge is connected to the tunnel. Since the gauge always measures relative to the Command Module cabin pressure, then with the valve in this position, a higher number means more of a vacuum in the tunnel with respect to the cabin. Note that changes in this reading can just as easily be due to changes in the CM cabin's absolute pressure. LM Tunnel Vent. The tunnel is essentially connected to space, allowing it to vent to a vacuum, though this is a time-consuming process. The gauge is disconnected and its reading is meaningless. Off. All lines leading to the valve are disconnected and the gauge reading is meaningless.
To measure the pressure difference across the hatch, the gauge should be read with the valve rotated to the 'LM/CM Delta-P' position.
026:13:57 Fullerton: Roger, Ed. Copy 0.3. We don't have the figures on that update, yet. One thing I didn't mention is that - we are planning to do a midcourse 2, as is shown in the Flight Plan and that - we'll do it such that it will require a clock update as scheduled at about 54 hours and 30 minutes in the time line.
026:14:25 Shepard: Okay.
026:14:28 Fullerton: It'll be a roughly 40-minute...
026:14:30 Roosa: Looks like we...
026:14:33 Fullerton: ...roughly a 40-minute...
026:14:34 Roosa: Say again, Gordon. How much?
026:14:37 Fullerton: It'll be roughly 40 minutes, and I still haven't got used to which direction it is. Actually, it's like - going into daylight saving time. It'll - move your clock ahead.
026:14:53 Roosa: Okay, Gordon. Looks like we get to send that Tephem update after all.
026:14:59 Fullerton: Rog.
Very long comm break.
The ability to update the GET was a brand new feature for Apollo 14 and was even mentioned in the Press Kit showcasing the mission for the media.
Apollo Control, Houston; 26 hours, 15 minutes. The midcourse correction 2 is scheduled for a Ground Elapsed Time of 30 hours, 36 minutes, 7 seconds with a Delta-V of 71.3 feet per second [21.7 m/s] performed with the Service Propulsion System engine, and a burn duration of 10 seconds. This will force the trajectory to arrive at the Moon on time, on time Greenwich Mean Time, thus requiring the, the GMT lift-off update. We're at 26 hours, 16 minutes continuing to monitor; and we show Apollo 14 at 106,915 nautical miles [198,007 km] away, and traveling at a speed of 4,865 feet per second [1,483 m/s].
A burn of 70.3 feet per second [21.7 m/s] is much too large to be a simple midcourse correction burn. The Flight Planning team planned to use the MCC-2 slot to change the trajectory from the current free return trajectory to one optimized for their landing at Fra Mauro. This burn will also be used to recover the 40 minutes and 3 seconds that they lost due to the weather hold at the start of the flight.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
026:28:20 Fullerton: Apollo 14, Houston. Over.
026:28:22 Mitchell: Go ahead, Houston.
026:28:25 Fullerton: Ed, I've got that consumables update now, if you're ready to copy. [Long pause.]
026:28:37 Mitchell: All right; go ahead.
Determining the exact quantities of remaining propellants as well as oxygen and hydrogen is a matter more complex than simply looking at the gauges. The measurement systems have inaccuracies in them and the zero-g environment creates a multitude of challenges. Mission Control reading up their understanding of the remaining quantities allows the crew to compare them with their own onboard readings.
026:28:39 Fullerton: Roger. GET, 26:00; RCS total, 86; quad A, 85; quad Bravo, 86; quad Charlie, 86; quad Delta, 87; H2 tank 1, 87.98 percent; H2 tank 2, 85.7 percent; O2 tank 1, 93.4 percent; tank 2, 92.6 percent; tank 3, 54.6 percent. Over. [Pause.]
026:29:45 Mitchell: Okay, I read back GET at 26 hours; RCS total, 86 percent; quad A, 85; B, 86; C, 86; D, 87; hydrogen tank 1, 87.98; 2, 85.7; oxygen tank 1, 93.4; 2, 92.6; 3, 54.6.
026:30:23 Fullerton: Roger, Ed. Your readback is correct. And we have had considerable discussion today about the docking probe. There are still four questions as a result of all these discussions that we would like to put to you - the crew. It'll probably take some discussion to answer them. There's no hurry. Don't let us interrupt breakfast there. When you're ready, we'd like you to take these questions and comment on them.
026:30:44 Mitchell: Okay, Gordon. We'll probably be through here in another 45 minutes, and we'll jump right into that one then.
026:30:50 Fullerton: Roger.
Very long comm break.
The crew is scheduled to eat between 26:00 and 27:00 GET. With the booster debriefing delayed and the P23 exercise cancelled, they are allowed to take their time beyond that allotted period.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
This is Apollo Control, Houston; at 26 hours, 37 minutes now into the flight of Apollo 14. We now show the spacecraft at a distance of 107,892 nautical miles [199,816 km], traveling now at a speed of 4,827 feet per second [1,471 m/s]. In approximately 20 minutes we will have a shift change here in Mission Control. The Maroon shift replacing the Orange shift of flight controllers; the Orange team headed by Pete Frank came on duty at about 19 hours Ground Elapsed Time. Until the last hour when Mission Control, in fact, received a call from the crew, Mitchell, Roosa and Commander Al Shepard had spent almost this entire time in a rest period. In the Mission Control Center, our Flight Plan update was in progress for a better period of the time. The plan, as it evolved, did not call for awakening the crew until 27 hours Ground Elapsed Time, but the crew woke up almost per Flight Plan schedule. Commander Al Shepard reported 7 hours deep and intermittent sleep as did Lunar Module Pilot, Ed Mitchell. Stu Roosa reported some 5 hours sleep time. As we look ahead to the next shift, we also look ahead to the Midcourse-2 maneuver and, as we had reported previously, that schedule for a Ground Elapsed Time of 30 hours, 36 minutes, 7 seconds with the delta-V at 71.3 feet per second [21.7 m/s] and burn duration of 10 seconds. This will require a GMT lift-off update which effectively at some future point in the Flight Plan will move the GET clock here in Mission Control ahead about 40 minutes. Because of the absence of activity with the crew on this shift, there is no plan for a change of shift news conference. We're at 26 hours, 39 minutes into the flight. We show Apollo 14 at an altitude of 108,012 nautical miles [200,038 km] at velocity of 4,823 feet per second [1,470 m/s]. This is Apollo Control, Houston"
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
026:49:59 Mitchell: Houston, Apollo 14.
026:50:01 Fullerton: Apollo 14, Houston. Go ahead.
026:50:07 Mitchell: Say, Gordon, do you have any choice news items for us today?
026:50:13 Fullerton: Ah, gosh, I think you all been making all the news. I haven't heard anything very significant and don't have any good summaries for you right now.
026:50:23 Mitchell: Okay.
Comm break.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
026:52:36 Fullerton: Apollo 14, Houston. [Pause.]
026:52:42 Mitchell: Go ahead.
026:52:43 Fullerton: I do have one story here, I'll read from the front page of The Houston Post, this morning's edition. The headline is, "Mrs. Shepard ate an omelette during docking problem." And the first paragraph is dateline Cape Kennedy, Florida; "Mrs. Louise Shepard sat in her motel room eating an omelette while her husband and the two other Apollo 14 astronauts worked with a faulty docking latch that for a time threatened their Moonflight." [Pause.]
026:53:24 Mitchell: She was sure calmer than we were.
026:53:27 Fullerton: Rog.
Very long comm break.
That was Ed Mitchell who responded 'she was sure calmer than we were.' We're at 26 hours, 54 minutes into the flight. Apollo 14 now 108,668 nautical miles [201,253 km] away from Earth. The present velocity, 4,798 feet per second [1,462 m/s].
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
This is Apollo Control at 27 hours, 7 minutes. We've completed the Change of Shift handover here in Mission Control. Flight Director Milton Windler now sitting at the Flight Director's console replacing Flight Director Pete Frank. Our Capsule Communicator on this shift will be astronaut Bruce McCandless. At the present time Flight Director Windler's going around the room checking the status with each of his flight controllers and reviewing the overall mission status. Apollo 14 at this time is traveling at a velocity of 4,773 feet per second [1,455 m/s] and we've continued to watch that velocity drop off. The current spacecraft altitude is 109,301 nautical miles [202,425 km]. One of the principal items that this shift will be concerned with is midcourse correction 2, a midcourse correction aimed at targeting the arrival point of Apollo 14 at a preplanned Ground Elapsed or Greenwich Mean Time at an altitude of about 60 nautical miles [111 km] above the surface of the Moon. The planned time of that maneuver is at a Ground Elapsed Time of 30 hours, 36 minutes, 7 minutes [means seconds], and the midcourse correction will change the perigee or the high - the low point of passage around the Moon from 2,100 nautical miles [3,889 km] to the targeted 60-nautical-mile [111 km] altitude.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
027:20:15 Mitchell: Houston, Apollo 14.
027:20:17 McCandless: Apollo 14; this is Houston, your friendly Maroon Team on station. Go ahead.
027:20:24 Mitchell: Well, hello, Bruce. How you doing today?
027:20:26 McCandless: Okay, Ed. How about yourselves?
027:20:29 Mitchell: Great, thank you. Bruce, these questions that are being proposed on the probe operation, should I copy them, or shall we just let you go ahead and talk about them and then we'll get back to you?
027:20:40 McCandless: Well, I think probably the easiest thing to do would be to start going through them one at a time, and, if you feel like you need more time to discuss it or to recall the exact things you went through, why we can just take the time as we go along. There's no big rush on it. It'd probably be easier than your trying to prepare a formal report or something and voice it down. [Long pause.]
027:21:11 Mitchell: Okay.
027:21:12 McCandless: And we're just finishing up the...
027:21:14 Shepard: We'll be...
027:21:16 McCandless: We're just finishing up...
027:21:17 Shepard: It'd be a little while before we're ready to go that way.
027:21:19 McCandless: Okay. We're just finishing up the change-of-shift briefing down here and it'll probably be 5 or 10 minutes at least before we're ready to roll on it, too.
027:21:30 Mitchell: That's good.
027:21:32 Roosa: Hey, Bruce, did you get a good night's sleep? You put in a hard day yesterday.
027:21:36 McCandless: Yes. I got up about 1:30 or 2 o'clock this afternoon. Felt real good.
027:21:44 Roosa: Rog.
027:21:49 Shepard: We're happy to discover there really is a patch after all. We're constantly reminded of it.
027:21:53 McCandless: That there really is a what, after all?
027:21:59 Shepard: [Garble] is a patch.
027:22:00 McCandless: Yeah, how about that; that's a beautiful one.
027:22:04 Roosa: Hey, Bruce, would you pass on to Ray that it was not 100 percent at the bench check.
027:22:12 McCandless: That's to Ray, that it was not 100 percent at the bench check. You mean the equipment...
027:22:17 Roosa: [Garble].
027:22:18 McCandless: ...equipment loaded on board was not completely represented at the bench check?
027:22:24 Roosa: That's affirmative.
The plethora of backup crew patches secreted around the spacecraft is causing a few comments.
027:22:26 McCandless: We've got the backup crew...
027:22:28 Roosa: I don't know why, but we...
027:22:29 McCandless: We've got the backup crew commander standing here monitoring the system.
027:22:34 Roosa: We seem to be finding a few things around that we didn't see at our bench check and a few crew preference decals.
Stu's comment is certainly aimed at Gene Cernan, whom he blames for hiding the backup crew patches into the spacecraft. The bench check mentioned would've been a review of all the onboard equipment by the flight crew before being stoewd inside the Command Module. This came to hundreds of items ranging from space suit hoses to paper towels.
027:22:43 McCandless: Yeah. How was breakfast, by the way?
027:22:48 Shepard: It was great. We ate every scrap.
027:22:52 Roosa: Hey, it sure was.
027:22:54 McCandless: Yeah. And I found my headset all right this morning, too, but there was a little difference from last night.
027:23:03 Roosa: Okay. You keep us posted on that headset.
Very long comm break.
Sy Liebergot's 'Gotcha' on McCandless is still playing out.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
027:42:13 Shepard: Houston, 14.
027:42:16 McCandless: Apollo 14, this is Houston. Go ahead. Over.
027:42:21 Shepard: We're standing by for the booster launch phase discussion and the probe discussion any time you're ready to go.
027:42:27 McCandless: Roger.
Comm break.
This is Apollo Control at 27 hours, 44 minutes. You heard Al Shepard ask the CapCom whether or not we're ready to proceed with the continuing analysis of the probe, and we are preparing to proceed with that analysis. Last evening, on this shift, a series of 12 questions were forwarded to the crew after removing the probe in a preliminary analysis. We'll be picking up where those 12 questions left off, with a series of additional questions, and with additional Apollo program and NASA management officials here in the control center to participate in the evaluation.
027:44:36 Roosa: Houston, 14.
027:44:45 McCandless: Go ahead, 14.
027:44:48 Roosa: Say, Bruce, how far away is S-IVB from us?
027:44:53 McCandless: Stand by; I'll see if I can get you a figure on that.
027:44:57 Roosa: Yeah, and on the same subject, if you got any - say, give us a roll angle during PTC and some place to point the optics, I wonder if we could see it.
027:45:14 McCandless: Okay. I'll see if we can get that.
Long comm break.
Among the interested officials here in the control center at the present time, who will be participating in this probe evaluation are Apollo Program Director Rocco Petrone; Donald K. Slayton, Director of Flight Crew Operations at the Manned Spacecraft Center; Sig Sjoberg, Director of Flight Operations at MSC; and Apollo 14 backup commander, Eugene Cernan. Also astronaut Tom Stafford has just walked into the control center and is at the CapCom console at this time.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
This is Apollo Control at 27 hours, 48 minutes. Apollo 14 now traveling at a velocity of 4,704 feet per second [1,434 m/s] and we show the spacecraft 111,159 nautical miles [205,866 km] from Earth. In addition to those officials here on the floor of the control center, we also have Dr. George Low, Acting NASA administrator in the viewing room; and Charles Mathews, Deputy Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight alongside Dr. Low in the viewing room. We have a series of four planned questions which will be asked the crew in addition to follow up questions I'm sure that their responses will elicit.
027:49:11 McCandless: Apollo 14, this is Houston.
027:49:16 Roosa: Go ahead.
027:49:18 McCandless: Roger. We'd like to pick up the discussion on the docking probe situation now, if you're ready.
027:49:26 Roosa: Okay, stand by just 1 here. [Long pause.]
027:50:19 Roosa: Okay, Bruce. I guess we're all hooked up and ready to go. [Pause.]
027:50:34 McCandless: 14, this is Houston; go ahead.
027:50:38 Roosa: Rog. I think we're all hooked up and ready to go.
027:50:43 McCandless: Roger. I guess number 1 question would be, is - was there ever more than one bottle selected on the docking probe, and if so, which ones.
027:50:57 Shepard: That's negative. We used primary one, and the only one we used.
027:51:03 McCandless: Roger; very good. How many times was the Extend/Release position of the docking probe extension/retraction switch operated, and for when and about how long was it held in these positions? Over. [Long pause.]
027:51:23 Shepard: Well, it was operated per Flight Plan for the initial extension, and the dock latch worked normally. We felt a jar, a good solid thump, but it went on out and then it was not operated again until after the problem started. At the ground suggestion, we went to Extend/Release and then back to Retract - I think twice - no more than twice. [Long pause.]
027:51:57 McCandless: Okay, so - grand total, I guess we could say that you've had three cycles to the Extend/Release position; the one nominal one, and the two after the problem started developing? Is that correct?
027:52:12 Shepard: Let's call it no more than four, Bruce. We did one of them on our own, so one normal and no more than three additional.
027:52:21 McCandless: Roger. We copy.
027:52:24 Roosa: And, Bruce, no response at all except for the first one, which went normally.
027:52:31 McCandless: Okay, and on the first one there, you were actually causing the probe to extend, were you not?
027:52:38 Roosa: That's affirmative. We extended it, and, as Al said, we heard her clunk in and the talkbacks did their thing, flashed barber pole and then went to gray, as advertised.
027:52:50 McCandless: Okay, then on the subsequent ones about all we'd be operating is the capture latch cocking motor.
027:53:00 Roosa: Okay.
027:53:01 McCandless: They probably wouldn't feel that in the form of a mechanical shock or anything like that. And...
027:53:06 Roosa: Rog.
027:53:08 McCandless: You may want to kick this next one around before you answer us on it and make sure you got all the details lined up. We'd like you to go through the procedure in as much detail as you can on the final docking, including the switch positions, talkback indications, the dynamics, the order of your contact with the - with the LM drogue, the plus-X thrusting, the barber poles, the bottle selection, and the actual probe retraction. I think you mentioned yesterday that you had a 3-second delay in probe retraction, and we'd like to know when that 3-second delay was measured, starting, that is, from throwing the switch or from some other event. Over. [Long pause.]
027:53:57 Shepard: Okay. I'll start off by saying that all the switches were per checklist. And, of course, those were one of the first things that we verified at - when the problem occurred, at your suggestion as well as our own. And - everything was normal up to the point where Stu made his first contact. I'll let him take it on in from there.
027:54:23 Roosa: Okay, Bruce, why don't we just back up a little bit, and you - you asked for the specific one where we got the - the docking, but let's go back to the first one, and everything looked just real fine coming in on it. I'd say the - the whole docking operation was just so much like the CMS that it was hard to believe. I mean the - the procedures, and the view, and the response of the vehicle, and I'd say I had 2/10ths of a foot per second closing speed. And then, the reaction when I hit the drogue was just exactly like the - you know, the docking trainer that we had where you didn't hit the capture latches, but you just went in and banged into the drogue? [Long pause.]
027:55:11 McCandless: Roger. The one over there in building 5?
027:55:15 Roosa: Yeah. That's the exact response I got. On the first one, I - I clunked into it and - you know - and then I could tell that I was slipping out, and, of course, Al didn't call the barber pole. So, at that time, I did the natural thing and jabbed it with a little plus-X, and drove it into the drogue, and we were lined up good, holding plus-X and the - the alignment - you know - still good on the - on the target just like - you know - you can do in the docking trainer. Okay, and then I realized that it hadn't made contact, so I let her back off. At that time we called you, and I said, "Well, I'll try it again," and increased the velocity. And, on this one, I'm estimating that my contact velocity was about a foot per second. Now, it might have been a little less than that. As you know, a foot-per-second closing looks like you're going to run right through the thing, so - but I would - I've looked at a lot of these on the simulator and I'd say that probably the second one was right at a foot per second. And got the - got the same response - and I really can't remember whether that's the one where you told me to try plus-X after I hit or not. You know, I had already done that on the first one, but anyway, if this was the one, then I hit - you said, oh 3 seconds; I held 4, and no - no luck at all. We came back out. At that time, I suggested we fall back, regroup, and talk about it. And then, y'all pretty much know the story then. You suggested that we try it again with everything normal, and I guess the second time there was - I contacted and I - that was not the time I held the plus-X. It was the next one on your suggestion. Yeah, the second one I - I did it on my own and then you - on the third one you said, let's try a normal docking and hold 3 seconds, and I did that and held 4. And, also, it was after the second docking that I noticed the radial scratches and - and at that time, that's when I became convinced that from the action and then seeing the scratches, that the docking latches were not giving and were indeed locked, instead of the cocked position. Okay, so we went through that one as you suggested, and I held plus-X 4 seconds and - we're right in - right in the drogue - you know - holding steady. And then we came out and then down to - to the last time...
Comm break.
027:58:16 McCandless: Stu?
027:58:17 Roosa: I came in, I'd say probably about a tenth, maybe 0.15, in that area, two-tenths, maybe a little less, contacted it and, at contact, the - the attitude stayed fairly good. There was maybe a degree and a half, 2-degree pitchup movement on the COAS. I then applied the plus-X and held it. At that time, I put it in the center of the drogue, and the COAS and the reticle and the translation were all just looking real good, and so I gave the cue to Al to retract, and he hit the Retract switch at that point. And then I'll let him take it from there. [Long pause.]
027:59:06 McCandless: Stu, before you press on, where in this sequence of dockings did you actuate the Extend/Release switch position again? Over.
027:59:20 Roosa: Okay. It would be after the second attempt. We - It was per your suggestion - the ground suggestion, and we went through the extend/release - in through there - No, wait a minute, we tried it ourselves after the second one, didn't we? [Pause.] Okay, consensus here is, after the first one, we went back to Off and then back to Retract. And then after the second one, we went to Extend and then back to Retract. [Long pause.]
028:00:05 McCandless: Okay, and did you do anything with the Extend/Retract switch after the last unsuccessful docking but prior to the final successful one? [Long pause.]
028:00:48 Shepard: I don't think we did, Bruce. We did - We told you everything we did with that switch, after the [garble] first [garble] one time when I [garble] from Retract to Off and then back to Retract again.
028:01:04 McCandless: Okay, now, in going through this sequence, did you ever move the docking probe retract, that is, the Bottle Select switch off of Primary 1; that is, did you recycle the switch or do anything in this sequence, or just leave it in that position once you'd initially selected it? [Pause.]
028:01:25 Shepard: Well, we don't touch that switch until we get the capture latches. We stay to the Off position until...
028:01:32 McCandless: Okay.
028:01:33 Shepard: 'Til we [garble].
028:01:34 McCandless: Roger. Copy. Okay. So we're coming up on the final successful docking here, and you told us that you got this 1½, 2 degrees pitchup on the COAS that looked pretty good. You applied plus-X and held, and I think that's where I broke in. Go ahead. [Long pause.]
028:01:56 Roosa: Okay, and then on the plus-X then that - that brought the - you know - the COAS right down and the alignment - then everything was fine and translation was - was real good all the way except - except like I say, for that - you know - small pitchup - a degree and half or whatever it was, right at contact as the - as the probe sliding into the drogue. [Long pause.]
028:02:27 McCandless: Okay, and did you...
028:02:28 Shepard: And when - when Stu called out Retract, I went to Retract position on Primary 1. And it looked pretty normal from there. Just long enough - to - for you - to say to yourself, "Well, it hasn't worked." And then it went barber pole and gray and simultaneously there we got the feeling that we'd hard docked. So it's probably about a 3-second time period from the time I went to Primary 1 until I had the barber pole, and approximately a second later after that, to gray and the hard dock. [Long pause.]
028:03:09 McCandless: Okay. Stand by.
Comm break.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
028:05:25 McCandless: 14, Houston.
028:05:29 Mitchell: Go ahead.
028:05:31 McCandless: Roger. Were you thrusting plus-X all the time from initial contact until the time that you got the hard docking? Over.
028:05:40 Roosa: That's affirmative, Bruce. Once I got her in the drogue - you know, we'd talked among ourselves, and we told Al to hold off until I'm thrusting and I'm satisfied with the alignment. So when we made contact and I thrusted and it looked like we were - Everything was good, and I - I held a positive plus-X all the way until we got the - the latches.
028:06:08 McCandless: Okay, now. From contact, when you started thrusting plus-X, did you feel anything after the initial contact that would indicate that you'd moved on in and seated the probe in the center of the drogue? Specifically, do you feel that at the time that you selected Retract, the probe head was in such a position in the drogue that you should have already been in a barber pole position on the talkbacks? Over.
028:06:40 Roosa: Well, Bruce, the - the probe was obviously in the drogue, but - you know - there's no way of knowing. But the feeling among us here and - my feeling is that, no, I don't think we had capture latch lock until after we went to Primary. Now, I - You know; I'm sure y'all have looked at it and you've got people down there tearing the probe apart, but I don't even know if it's physically possible. But I don't feel that we had any capture latches in that hole until that last operation when we went to Primary and drove the beauty in there.
028:07:25 McCandless: Okay. Do you feel like the - the probe head was in such a position - do you feel like the position of the probe head changed on you any after you went to Primary?
028:07:38 Roosa: No. No, I was watching the - the LM - I was plus-X-ing and Al called "Primary," and we started closing on it and there was no movement; no. [Long pause.]
028:08:17 McCandless: Okay. We copy. No movement after - after you started the plus-X and got yourself seated in there until such time as the bottle fired; that is, no - no more closing movement. Is that correct?
028:08:34 Roosa: That's affirmative. As far as I can - you know - tell, we were there, thrusting, holding steady - Okay, do you read me, Bruce?
028:08:47 McCandless: Roger. Reading you loud and clear, Stu.
028:08:51 Roosa: Okay. And - you know, we got - We're sitting steady in the drogue, plus-X, everything looking fine. We hit the Retract switch and we start moving together. I didn't hear anything nor see any action until we heard the latches close.
028:09:11 McCandless: Roger. But while you were sitting there then - the talkback was gray and then 3 seconds after you went to Primary, approximately, it went barber pole and the nominal sequence started.
028:09:22 Shepard: Well, I was looking at the talkbacks, and that's about the only thing we saw as we pointed out before. About 3 seconds after the initiation of the primary contact - of the Primary Retract switch to the 1 - number 1 position, they went barber pole for perhaps a quarter or a half a second and then went gray simultaneously with the hard dock. [Pause.]
028:09:46 McCandless: Roger. [Pause.]
028:09:56 Roosa: Hey, Bruce?
028:09:57 McCandless: Go ahead, Stu.
028:10:00 Roosa: Okay. And on that one, we've sort of hassled this out. I guess it's something we need - We're probably going to get to, but we - Yesterday, you know, we called it a ripple fire and we felt like we had them all, which we did; but it really felt like the - the latches - we got a couple or, you know, it's hard to say how many; but we got some latches and then at some discrete time, maybe a quarter of a second or something like that; then we got the rest of them in a ripple. So, I think we got the docking latches in two distinct times, separated by, you know, a very small amount. But at least it was enough to say it was not one continuous ripple fire.
028:10:48 McCandless: Okay, Stu. We copy that and I guess one last point on this - this final docking sequence. Did the closure of the two vehicles start when you selected Primary and continue for some period of time with the barber pole indication appearing during this period of closure, or did the flash to barber pole and then back coincide with the beginning of the closure for hard docking? [Pause.]
028:11:19 Roosa: Hey, let us talk about that one for a second, Bruce.
028:11:21 McCandless: Roger. [Long pause.]
028:11:44 Mitchell: Bruce, let me give you my opinion from the right seat. We're coordinated, I think, on the way this happened. I saw us move in as in previous attempts. We hit, moved just a little bit to improve alignment as the drogue forced the probe toward the center, and we started to bounce - it looked like we bounced - started to bounce back out. Stu hit the plus-X thrust and held it for what appeared to be right in the middle of the drogue with thrust. He called the Retract. Al hit the Retract, and a moment after that, it seemed like we started to move together. Al then called barber pole, called gray, and we were moving together continuously during this time; and then I heard the - the fire go off on the - the latches making.
028:12:42 McCandless: Okay. We copy that, Ed. Thank you.
028:12:46 Mitchell: No. We did not [Answering Al or Stu]. [Pause.]
028:12:54 McCandless: And I wonder if you could comment on the thrusting activity immediately after contact for each docking.
028:13:06 Roosa: Okay. As I said on the first one, I - was going along...
028:13:12 McCandless: I think we're referring - We're referring more to the nature of stable - attitude control or stabilization thrusting other than the plus-X. I think you've pretty well covered the plus-X for us.
028:13:24 Roosa: Oh, that's the only thrusting I did. That's all it took to - to align it. I did no other movements either with the RHC or the THC after contact except plus-X.
028:13:36 McCandless: Okay. We copy that.
028:13:39 Mitchell: Bruce, the probe was sufficiently close to the center of the drogue on each of those contacts. I believe that the marks that we pointed out to you on television yesterday represent the initial contact of the probe. It could not have been more than an inch and a half or 2 inches from the center of the drogue at that time on any of the contacts.
028:13:57 McCandless: All right. It looks like Stu was right in there in the center from what we could see on the - the TV last night on those contacts.
028:14:06 Mitchell: That's affirmative. It looked the same way out the right window.
Comm break.
028:15:50 McCandless: 14, this is Houston. In the process of making the docking yesterday, we advised you to check some circuit breakers, which you did. Did you at any time cycle any of these circuit breakers, that is, open and then reclose them? Over. [Pause.]
028:16:14 Roosa: Okay. All we did was check them. That's the group 4 and the docking probe circuit breakers. I just checked them, you know, by pushing on them; but, no, we did not pull any and then push them back in.
028:16:28 McCandless: Okay. We copy. And that about winds up our queries on the docking-probe situation. We'll be ready to go on the - the launch-vehicle debrief here in a minute or so. [Pause.]
028:16:40 Shepard: Okay, Bruce.
028:16:43 Roosa: Okay.
Comm break.
028:18:37 McCandless: 14, Houston.
028:18:41 Shepard: Go ahead, Houston.
028:18:43 McCandless: Roger. Last night on the docking probe removal, after you took the preload off the probe, could you tell whether the probe head was, in fact, locked into the drogue at that time or not? [Long pause.]
028:19:06 Roosa: No - I - It - it - it appeared to be, Bruce. I took the preload off. In fact, I think Al made that question and we both looked up around at the probe head to see if we could see anything that looked unusual about it or whether it looked like it was out or anything, and - and it did not. Everything looked - looked normal. [Long pause.]
028:19:36 McCandless: Could you - could you feel and tell whether the head of the probe was locked into the drogue or not? [Pause.]
028:19:49 Roosa: No. I guess the answer to that would be we don't know. [Long pause.]
028:20:11 Roosa: But now, I guess as you've realized, after I collapsed the - the probe, it definitely was.
028:20:20 McCandless: Okay. You say after you collapsed the probe, the head of the thing was definitely locked in there?
028:20:28 Roosa: Yeah. It was hanging in there and I had to apply a little tug to - to get it out. I went right by the decal on the checklist, and I think you asked at that time about the force that it took to bring it out; and it appeared, you know, reasonably normal for the first time that I had done it in - in zero-g. It didn't appear to be anything funny about it. [Pause.]
028:21:04 Mitchell: Bruce, let's make it clear. There is no question about the capture latches being through the drogue. But the question of whether they were locked or not is the one we don't know the answer to.
028:21:16 McCandless: Right. That, of course, is the question that we were trying to get out here just now.
Long comm break.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
028:25:54 McCandless: Apollo 14, this is Houston. At GET of 28 hours and 30 minutes, you are approximately 1,180 nautical miles. That's 1 1 8 0 nautical miles away from the S-IVB. If you'd care to look for it, we suggest you use a P52 program with a star code of zero and load the - the following numbers in Noun 88, if you're ready to copy.
028:26:25 Roosa: Go ahead.
028:26:27 McCandless: Roger. Noun 88 values are 1, minus 31505, minus 87189, minus 37491. Read back. Over.
028:26:46 Roosa: Okay. We'll plug in minus 31505, minus 87189, minus 37491.
028:26:57 McCandless: Roger. Your readback's correct and we'll probably, at the end of the launch vehicle systems debriefing here, have some more numbers for you if you want to - if you don't acquire on this first pass.
028:27:10 Roosa: Okay.
At 1,180 nautical miles or 2,185 kilometres distance, the S-IVB is already quite far away from Apollo 14 as it makes its sacrificial dive to the Moon. The crew can attempt to view it using the spacecraft's optics by having the computer aim them in a predetermined direction. It's presumed they would use the 28-power of the sextant rather than the unity power of the telescope. The three five-digit values given represent a vector that should point directly to the S-IVB.
028:27:12 McCandless: And we're ready to press on with the debriefing. If you've got your Flight Plan handy, you can just proceed down through the questions, and we'll interrupt if we find anything that's unclear or, if you prefer, I can ask them to you in a panel discussion-type thing and you can answer back. Over. [Pause.]
028:27:36 Shepard: We'll go ahead with the [garble] questions in the Flight Plan. Stand by 1 minute.
028:27:40 McCandless: Roger. [Long pause.]
028:28:17 Shepard: Okay, Houston. On question number 1, regarding significant changes in the noise level, the only change in noise level that we noticed was during the first part of the launch on the S-IC, when we had the initial noise of ignition and the buildup in noise during Max Q. And, of course, the associated... [Pause.]
028:28:52 McCandless: 14, Houston. I think we're coming up on an antenna switchover for you. You seem to be fading down into the mud.
028:29:01 Shepard: Okay. [Long pause.]
028:29:18 Shepard: Are you reading, now, Houston?
028:29:21 McCandless: Okay. We're reading you better signal strengthwise, Al. We still seem to be getting a little bit of breakup from your comm carrier. Can you reposition the mike? See if that helps any.
028:29:33 Shepard: Okay. I have the mike right in front of my mouth right now. Is that better?
028:29:37 McCandless: Roger. [Pause.] I think we better take it from the top again.
028:29:46 Shepard: Okay, from the top. The only significant change in noise level we noticed was, as mentioned, due to the burning of the engine in the atmosphere, that is, the ignition, of course, a buildup of noise there. And the noise level increased through Max Q, and then a drop off. Other than that, with respect to - to the noise itself, we had no problems at all in our communications at any time during the stages of the flight. Does that satisfy everybody on question number 1?
028:30:26 McCandless: That's affirmative. Press on. [Pause.]
028:30:33 Shepard: Okay. Number 2. On the S-IC, we noticed no significant changes in noise level and vibration, other than what we just discussed. S-IC we felt was a real fine ride, nothing unexpected. The S-II, we noticed a change in vibration, a sort of a slight pogo, which started at 8 plus 40. Nothing of really any great magnitude. And on the S-IVB to orbit burn, we noticed no significant changes in the noise and vibration level. We noticed nothing unusual on S-IVB during TLI ignition. However, we did notice the beginning of a slight hum, low hum, or buzz toward the end of the TLI burn. That's it for number 2. Do you have any questions there? [Long pause.]
028:31:50 McCandless: We have no questions right now on that, Al. We're closing our loop down here with the Huntsville Operations Support Center, so it takes us a - a few seconds to a minute or so to get a response back. Why don't you press on with the question number 3? If we get any queries, why, we'll reopen the previous ones.
028:32:11 Shepard: Okay. On number 3, nothing unexpected in the way of transients that - on which we had not been briefed. As a matter of fact, it went pretty much according to the way we had expected it through all the events mentioned in question 3, that is, ignition and staging, engine shutdown, mixture ratios, and so on. We did experience a little more abruptness with the cut-off of S-II. The S-II SECO, I think, we [garble] a little more than we expected. Otherwise, everything was pretty much the way we'd kind of planned them. Question 3.
028:32:59 McCandless: Roger. Question 4.
028:33:02 Shepard: Okay. Stu is ready for you on question 4.
028:33:05 Roosa: Okay, Bruce. I got a good look at that shroud, of course, station keeping with the S-IVB, and you couldn't see all of it; but, as we moved around, you could see a good portion of it back around behind the - the LM and every place that I could see and Ed also and Al - Al was looking through the hatch window part of the time, and everything looked just tight as a drum. We saw no loose pieces of the shroud anywhere. Nothing out of the ordinary, and after Sep - as the - I mean after ejection and the booster came into view - came into my window pretty much of a head-on view, and we were out a little ways, but there was no - no visible damage at all to the shroud at any time. And, like I say, I think we got a real good look at it the time we spent around it.
028:34:07 McCandless: Roger. We copy.
028:34:12 Shepard: Okay. Going on to - going on to number 5. We experienced good communications throughout the entire powered flight and launch. We've been able to hear the ground on all the calls, and we had no comm problems at all.
028:34:36 McCandless: Roger.
028:34:36 Shepard: [Under McCandless] How about you, Jim? Any comm problems from us?
028:34:38 Shepard: How about you, Jim? Any comm problems from us?
028:34:44 McCandless: Negative. We experienced no comm problems. [Pause]
028:34:51 Shepard: Okay, question number 6. Was there visible venting? Stu, do you want to take over, now?
028:34:57 Roosa: Okay. We didn't see any - anything unusual other than those that you called; and when you called the venting while we were station keeping, well, of course, it came on, rather beautiful sight. And the only other thing was when you gave a mark for the APS evasive burn, why, I noticed the booster venting and it appeared to be the same area as it had been venting during the station keeping phase; and the answer came back that that was expected, and so forth; and that was the only thing out of the ordinary. Other than that, everything was fine and all the other vents you called. [Pause.]
028:35:46 McCandless: Okay, on to number 7. And I guess that one may still be open.
028:35:52 Roosa: Yes, I was just trying to whip off a fast answer for you on that one, but we don't have any. So I guess that Al will tell you the last time that we - we saw it.
028:36:04 Shepard: Well, I guess the last time we saw the S-IVB was with the eyeball, naked that is, and it was during the propulsion venting. It was kind of a tough angle for us to see because of - it was just very low on the edge of the window number 1. However, the Sun angle on it was good; it was stable when it was venting, as near as I could tell, approximately, a couple of miles away. We took a few pictures of it with the Hasselblad, so we may be able to see the beautiful conical-shaped pattern coming from the venting; but as far as control was concerned, it was going in the right direction and appeared to be stable.
028:36:48 McCandless: Roger. We copy. [Long pause.]
028:36:59 Shepard: Okay, number 8. Stu, you want to take that one?
028:37:03 Roosa: Okay, I guess the guidance obviously was good and the velocity was - was real fine. It looked like, during the - during the boost phase, they were running a - maybe 2, 2½ miles, maybe 3 miles low along my profile, looked rather consistent; but we obviously arrived at the right place, so the - and the velocity cut-offs were right on the money and the TLI guidance, I think, was within 10 feet, 17, or something like that. You've got the numbers, but it looked real good, and the only thing I can comment there was it looked to me like we were going into Earth orbit insertion maybe a couple or 3 low, pretty much on the profile.
028:37:54 McCandless: Roger.
028:37:55 Roosa: All the way on the profile I should say. [Pause.]
028:38:05 Shepard: Okay, are you ready for number 9?
028:38:08 McCandless: Roger. Go ahead with number 9.
028:38:13 Shepard: Okay. The ORDEAL ball at ignition was as advertised at 8 and a half degrees. After ignition, went to the normal pitchdown, the ball settled down very close to zero; and, as the burn progressed, eased on up to about a plus-1 degree; then, slowly on back to zero; then, close to the pitchdown, just prior to - to the cut-off, and I would say somewhere around 2 or 3 degrees negative, that is at 357 and 358 on the ball, prior to cut-off. [Pause.]
028:38:58 McCandless: Okay, and we've got one more write-in, Question number 10; and it's based on...
028:39:07 Roosa: Okay, I'll take that one, Bruce.
028:39:12 McCandless: Okay.
028:39:13 Roosa: Okay, Bruce. That - that came from my comment. And as we were station keeping and watching the venting, it looked to me like the booster had picked up a little right yaw as - as I looked at it. I meant - moving left on me, but then I just mentioned, it looked like it was moving over a little; but then, later on, I decided that that was just the scatter of the two vehicle's deadbands because the IU - the S-IVB deadband all the time was solid as a rock, even during the venting. And after all that venting, when I went back to - to try the other dockings, I expected to have to change my attitude a little bit. And as it turned out, the attitude was still - you know - right within a degree, so that was just a call that appeared to, at that time. But the S-IVB vented from both sides and it was steady. And I think I was just picking up the movement of the deadbands of the two vehicles.
028:40:20 McCandless: Okay, Stu; thank you.
028:40:24 Roosa: Rog. [Pause.]
028:40:35 McCandless: And while the Huntsville people are closing the loop here, we had previously given you a Flight Plan update concerning your waste water dump at 30 hours plus 15 minutes, and our update was that you dump to zero percent. We'd like now to modify that to a nominal dump to 25 percent on the waste water. Over.
Huntsville, Alabama, is the location of Marshall Space Flight Center, and the hometown of the Saturn V. It would make sense for them to listen in on the conversation about the performance of the booster.
028:41:01 Shepard: Okay, we are now modified; 25 percent it shall be.
028:41:05 McCandless: Roger; out.
028:41:09 Shepard: Could you tell me about Al's comm? You mentioned some dropouts in EKG prior to launch. Apparently you're still not seeing those. Are they in any way associated with these voice dropouts you talked about today? [Pause.]
>028:41:30 McCandless: Stand by, please.
Comm break.
028:43:01 McCandless: 14, this is Houston. Our belief is that there's no correlation at the present time between your earlier EKG problems and the current degraded comm through Al's comm carrier. We would like to suggest when you have the chance that Al try using the spare comm carrier, and see if that improves communications.
028:43:26 Shepard: Okay, we'll shift over.
Comm break.
028:44:53 McCandless: 14, this is Houston. We've received some inquiries regarding your answer to question number 2. The Huntsville Operations people would like to get a little more detail on the slight hum or buzz. Was it actually an acoustic or audible noise, or was it felt through the structure of the spacecraft, and can you give us approximately the time that it commenced and duration, that is, did it proceed until TLI cut-off? [Long pause.]
In astronaut lingo, an issue such as the buzz described would be known as a 'physiological cue' to the operation of the booster, referring to the crew's subjective personal experience, rather than anything indicated by the onboard sensors or the instrumentation.
028:45:36 Shepard: Stand by 1, Houston.
028:45:37 McCandless: Roger. [Long pause.]
028:46:14 Roosa: Okay, Bruce. I think the noise is kind of hard to describe, I guess, and maybe make ourselves clear, but it definitely was not an acoustic buzz. It was a high frequency buzz that we felt through the structure; and, I'd say, it probably started - and this is an approximation - say 2 minutes into the TLI burn.
028:46:43 McCandless: Okay. And continued through the balance of the burn?
028:46:48 Roosa: Pretty much so, yes. Just about the same level. I wouldn't say that it increased any significant amount.
028:46:57 McCandless: I realize this is sort of hard to put your finger on. Is there any way you can quantify the level, or give us some feeling for how much of - how high the level was? [Long pause.]
028:47:18 Roosa: No. No, I think that's pretty tough, Bruce. In fact, you know - the - the burn was going so well and the ride was so smooth that - you know we - we had time to - to pick it up. I suspect that, you know, it was low enough level that if you had something else on your mind, you wouldn't even have noticed it.
028:47:45 McCandless: Did this - did this just sort of start abruptly, or build up from the background, do you think?
028:47:55 Roosa: Well, Ed feels it was a buildup and I'm not sure. So let's vote that it was a buildup then. That seems to be a majority. And it just came on kind of slow and came up and stayed at low level and - and was there.
028:48:13 McCandless: Okay. And the only other question we got back in is at 8 plus 40, this pogo-type thing that you mentioned was - Could you give us a little more detail on direction of motion of it and amplitude. Any more elaboration you have on that would be appreciated.
028:48:33 Roosa: Okay. I guess I called out the time on that one in the cockpit. I - It was no doubt but what it was a slight pogo and I think it was longitudinal; and as far as amplitude, I'm trying to think back to some of those pogo tests I rode on the shake table, but they were of such high level that I wouldn't - couldn't compare them to this. But, it was a pogo; it started to slip out that time because when I - when I felt it, I looked at the clock and it was not of... [Long pause.]
028:49:34 McCandless: 14, Houston. We had an antenna changeover here and... [Long pause.]
028:50:11 McCandless: 14, Houston. How do you read? [No answer.]
028:50:28 McCandless: 14, Houston. How do you read? [Long pause.]
028:51:13 Roosa: Okay. How do you read, Bruce?
028:51:15 McCandless: Loud and clear, Stu. How do you read me?
028:51:18 Roosa: Oh, you're 5 square. The static's died down, and - As I was saying, there was no question but what it was a low amplitude pogo starting right at 8 plus 40. However, the magnitude was low enough that it was not affected - did not affect any of our voices; and, you know, a fairly low level will - will do that, so I'd - I'd say, you know, it was pretty small. It was not of any concern, but picked it up just because - you know - thinking about pogo, I guess. [Long pause.]
028:51:56 McCandless: Roger. Thank you. [Pause.]
028:52:02 McCandless: And, Stu, did that last all the way until shutdown of the S-II, or did it die back out? [Long pause.]
028:52:22 Roosa: Bruce, I can't give you a positive answer; none of us can. My impression is it was there all the way, but that data really isn't a very good input.
028:52:33 McCandless: Okay. Thank you. I believe this concludes our discussion on the booster questions.
028:52:40 Roosa: Okay.
Comm break.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
028:55:37 McCandless: 14, this is Houston.
028:55:41 Roosa: Go ahead, Houston.
028:55:43 McCandless: Okay. Just a little status on the probe situation. We have no further queries on the docking probe at this time. The conclusions of our ground analysis are that the system is now working nominally. And our current intention is that you'll be Go for the lunar landing and all subsequent events. If we have any further commentary or further discussion on the subject, why, we'll get back to you later on it. With respect to midcourse correction number 2, we plan for that to take place at the nominal time which is about 30 hours, 36 minutes GET. And it'll be about 71 feet per second, which is also close to nominal. We're planning a GET update of some 40 minutes tomorrow at the nominal time in the Flight Plan of about 54:40. Over. [Long pause.]
028:56:42 Roosa: Okay. We got that, Bruce, and are we going to leave this Earth dark-side dim-light photography in?
029:00:48 McCandless: Roger. That sounds a lot better to me.
029:00:52 Shepard: Okay. We'll take mine and make it the spare.
029:00:55 McCandless: Roger. [Long pause.]
029:01:13 McCandless: Are you - Al, are you using the lightweight comm carrier now or the Snoopy hat?
029:01:20 Shepard: Using the lightweight at the moment.
The crew has the option of wearing two different comms headsets during the mission. The lightweight carrier has one earpiece and one microphone and is generally worn during general unsuited operations. For all suited operations and other intense portions of the mission, the Snoopy cap - official known as the Communications Soft Hat or the Personal Communications Assembly - offers a more robust headset.
029:01:22 McCandless: Roger. Thank you.
Long comm break.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
029:10:54 Roosa: Houston, 14.
029:10:55 McCandless: Go ahead, 14.
029:10:58 Roosa: Okay. The Delta-V check went fine. And the - on the null bias check, we had a minus 100 to start, minus 99.6 at the end.
The spacecraft uses accelerometers to measure the change in velocity or Delta-V during the burns. As well as those in the IMU, there is one in the Entry Monitor System (EMS). In order to see if it has any bias or offset when it should be reading null (0.0), the crew periodically enters a velocity value of 100.0 into the EMS velocity display and then let the system run for 100 seconds. An end value of say 98.4 would means a change in velocity of 1.6 feet per second in 100 seconds which is 0.016 feet per second squared (0.5 centimeter per second squared). Although this may not seem like much, during the 370 seconds of the LOI burn, this would produce an error of almost 6 feet per second (2 m/s).
029:11:08 McCandless: Minus 100 and minus 99.6. And I have your midcourse correction 2 PAD here, whenever you're ready to copy.
029:12:18 Mitchell: Houston, Apollo 14. Ready to copy the MCC-2 PAD.
029:12:22 McCandless: Go ahead - 14, this is Houston with the midcourse correction 2 PAD. SPS/G&N burn: 64213, plus 1.02, minus 0.23; TIG 030:36:07.01; minus 0025.9, plus 0004.4, plus 0066.4; roll, 282; pitch, 354; 298; Noun 44, N/A; Delta-V total, 0071.4; 0:10; 0066.5; 25; 278.5; 39.0. The balance of the PAD is N/A. GDC align, Sirius and Rigel; roll align 230, 170, 002; no ullage. In the burn attitude, S-Band High Gain Antenna pointing angles: Pitch, minus 22; Yaw, 0; Wide Beam, Manual mode; LM weight, 33647. Your burn time to the nearest tenth of a second is 10.3 seconds for use in checking ball valve operation. Over.
Comm break.
029:14:31 Mitchell: Okay. I read back MCC-2 SPS/G&N: 64213, plus 1.02, minus 0.23; 030:36:07.01; minus 0025.9, plus 0004.4, plus 0066.4; 282, 354, 298; N/A; 0071.4; 0:10; 0066.5; 25; 278.5; 39.0. The rest N/A; Sirius and Rigel; 230, 170, 002; no ullage; High Gain Antenna in the burn attitude; Pitch, minus 22; Yaw, 0; Wide Beam and Manual; LM weight, 33647; burn time, 10 - 10.3.
Purpose: This PAD provides the details of a midcourse correction burn which will be carried out at the second preplanned opportunity. The first opportunity was not used.
System: The burn would be made using the large SPS engine at the rear of the Service Module, under the control of the Guidance and Navigation system.
CSM Weight (Noun 47): 64,213 pounds (29,127 kg).
Pitch and yaw trim (Noun 48): +1.02° and -0.23°. The SPS engine is mounted on gimbals and can be aimed so that its thrust vector (the direction in which it pushes) acts through the spacecraft's centre of mass. These angles represent a calculated direction for these gimbals. They will only be used if the crew need to control the burn manually using the Stabilization Control System (SCS). In a normal automatic burn, the TVC (Thrust Vector Control) system automatically adjusts these angles for shifts in the stack's centre of mass.
Time of ignition, TIG (Noun 33): 30 hours, 36 minutes, 7.01 seconds. Note that the time is given as precisely as the Command Module Computer allows, which measures time down to one centisecond level, or one hundredth of a second.
Change in velocity (Noun 81), fps (m/s): X, -25.9 (-7.9); Y, +4.4 (+1.3); Z, +66.4 (+20.2). These velocities are all with respect to Earth and the local vertical that the spacecraft makes with that body.
Spacecraft attitude: Roll, 282°; Pitch, 354°; Yaw, 298°. This is with respect to the attitude of the guidance platform, itself aligned to the PTC REFSMMAT.
HA (Noun 44): The apogee of the expected orbit. Not applicable.
HP (Noun 44): Expected perigee of resulting orbit. Not applicable.
Delta-VT (total velocity change): 71.4 fps (21.8 m/s). This is the total change in velocity the spacecraft would experience and is a vector sum of the three components given above.
Burn duration or burn time: 10 seconds.
Delta-VC: 66.5 fps. This is the value to be entered into the EMS Delta-V display. It is a lower value to take into account the extra thrust the engine imparts as it tails off. The EMS will stop the burn if the G&N system fails to do so.
Sextant star: Star 30 (Menkent, Theta Centaurus) visible in sextant when shaft and trunnion angles are 208.2° and 37.0° respectively.
Boresight star: Not applicable. This would be a second attitude check which is made by sighting on another celestial object with the COAS (Crew Optical Alignment Sight) at a window. It is not being used in this case.
The next five parameters in a standerd PAD all relate to re-entry and are not applicable to this burn. The PAD then continues with a backup alignment check.
GDC Align stars: Sirius and Rigel are to be used to align the gyro assemblies if it is not possible to use the guidance platform for this purpose. When these two stars are viewed through the telescope in the correct manner, the spacecraft's attitude will be known and given by the following angles.
Additional notes in the PAD include pointing angles for the HGA of -22° and 0° to allow good quality data to be telemetered to Earth during the burn. Since they are still relatively near Earth they can use a wide beamwidth so that any attitude excursions don't interrupt the signal. The weight of the LM is quoted as 33,647 pounds (15,262 kg). A more accurate burn time is given at 10.3 seconds.
029:15:58 Shepard: Thank you. [Long pause.]
029:16:22 McCandless: 14, Houston. We've had a correction to the Yaw angle for the S-band pointing. That should be plus 8 degrees. Over.
029:16:36 Shepard: Roger. The S-band pointing is Pitch, minus 22; Yaw, plus 8.
029:16:41 McCandless: Roger; out.
Long comm break.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
Stu is performing a P52 platform realignment. For this, he uses star 20 (Dnoces, Iota Ursa Major) and star 23 (Denebola, Beta Leonis). As a result of these sighting, it was found that the platform had to be rotated, or torqued, by 0.449° in X, -0.13° in Y and 0.082° in Z. The 'star angle difference' (the difference between the true angle between those stars and the measured angle) was 0.01°, demonstrating good sighting accuracy by Stu.
029:20:01 McCandless: Roger. We have them, 14.
Mission Control can see the torquing angles for the platform in their telemetry as Stu brings them up on the DSKY.
029:20:06 Roosa: Okay, and they were torqued at 29 plus 20.
029:20:09 McCandless: Roger.
Very long comm break.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
This is Apollo Control at 29 hours, 23 minutes. During the last 2 hours or so of this shift, shortly after the Maroon team of flight controllers came on, we began preparing for the discussions on the probe and also for the scheduled discussions on the booster performance during the powered ascent - during the launch phase. During the discussions on the probe, among the comments that were made by the crew, Roosa noted that there appeared to be no capture latches activating until the probe was retracted or as he put it, we got no capture latches until we went to primary at which time the crew activated the nitrogen pneumatic system which retracts the probe. Ed Mitchell summed up the operation on the successful docking. As Mitchell described it, he said Stu Roosa, who was at the controls of the spacecraft moved in on the drogue - he said we started to bounce out and at that point Roosa held plus-X on the thrusters, moving the spacecraft into the center of the drogue. He said the vehicles began moving together as they activated the primary switch which activates the pneumatic system that retracts the drogue. And at that point he said Al called out barber pole and gray and then we got hard docking. The talkback indicators that Mitchell was referring to indicate initially that the probe is extended and the docking latches - the capture latches are caught. The second indication of barber pole indicates that the capture latches have in fact captured and latched and finally the third indication of grey shows that the main docking latches have engaged and closed - the hard docking latches. Perhaps the most significant comments during the discussion of the booster were reports from the crew that they noticed a slight hum or buzz as Roosa described it during the Translunar Injection portion of the S-IVB burn. Roosa noted that this very low level hum or buzz, which he said could be felt through the structure, began about 2 minutes into the TLI burn. He also noted that it was slight enough that, had the crew had their minds on other things, they probably would not have noticed it. Flight Director Milton Windler observed on the circuits here in the control center that this is the sort of vibration or hum that has been reported also by previous crews and there appear to be no particular concern over this. Roosa also reported a slight pogo in the second stage operation beginning at 8 minutes, 40 seconds Ground Elapsed Time. He described it as a longitudinal vibration; very light, very slight. The one thing that he used to characterize this vibration was to compare it with similar vibrations the crew members have been subjected to on vibration tables. Roosa noted that with even a relatively light pogo-type vibration on a - in a simulated situation, it's difficult to talk. He said that this was light enough that it did not affect their voices in the spacecraft.
The CapCom also advised the crew that at about 54 hours, that we will have the update to the Ground Elapsed Time clocks in Mission Control and aboard the spacecraft. At this time the GET clock, clock that is currently reading GET here in Mission Control, will be updated. It will be moved ahead some 40 minutes. The clock that is currently designated TB5 will become the actual Ground Elapsed Time. In other words, that clock will display the true Ground Elapsed Time, the total amount of time that has elapsed since lift-off. The clock which is designated GET will retain that designation. The nomenclature will remain the same on that clock as it's displayed here in the control center and the nomenclature on the clock which will be displaying the actual GET will remain TB5. To repeat that again, recognizing that it's probably a bit confusing, the nomenclatures on the clocks will remain the same. However, what they're displaying will be changed. The clock that is designated GET will actually be referred to here in the control center as the PET clock, the Phase Elapsed Time clock, however, the nomenclature on it, as we understand now will not be changed. It will remain fixed as the GET clock and the nomenclature on the TB5 clock will also remain TB5, however, it will be counting actual Ground Elapsed Time, the total time since lift-off. The rationale for the update to the clocks is roughly as follows: of course, launching 40 minutes late without changing the amount of energy that was put into the trajectory by the Translunar Injection maneuver with the Saturn third stage, we would have arrived at the Moon 40 minutes late. However, the translunar coast phase is in many respects like a big sponge. You can squeeze things out of it or you can put things into it, use it to absorb time differences. And in this case, at Translunar Injection, the proper Delta-V, the proper velocity was added to put us into lunar orbit at the same Sun time or Greenwich Mean Time as the Flight Plan called for. The Sun time on arrival then will be the same as it was originally planned to be in the Flight Plan. And mission events will occur in the same sequence after Lunar Orbit Insertion as the Flight Plan called for. In order to make the Flight Plan agree with the Sun time and the Greenwich Mean Time, it will be updated 40 minutes. The clock will be moved ahead 40 minutes so that the Phase Elapsed Time, which is used as a reference to the Flight Plan, will agree with the Flight Plan. The alternative to this would be to update the Flight Plan by 40 minutes making numerous changes to the Flight Plan in pencil both here on the ground and by the crew. To circumvent this problem the clocks themselves will be changed recognizing that the clocks are in fact, the GET clock is in some senses an arbitrary time reference which allows us to reference time to the Flight Plan. The crew was advised that this will occur at about 54 hours as planned in the Flight Plan.
At the present time, Apollo 14 is traveling at a velocity of 4,536 feet per second [1,383 m/s] and the spacecraft is 115,742 nautical miles [214,354 km] from Earth.
The midcourse correction number 2 is scheduled to occur at 30 hours, 36 minutes, 7 seconds Ground Elapsed Time. The velocity change in that maneuver, which will be performed with the spacecraft Service Propulsion System engine, will be 71.4 feet per second [21.8 m/s]. And it will change the spacecraft approach to the Moon, the point of closest approach, from the current distance of about 2,104 nautical miles [3,897 km] down to the planned 60-nautical-mile [111-km] perigee or perilune. The burn will be a 10-second maneuver; a 10-second burn with the Service Propulsion System engine. The spacecraft at the time of the maneuver will be oriented with it's engine bell pointed in the direction of travel, about 66 feet per second [20 m/s] of the burn will be in the direction pointing back to Earth or in other words it will be radial or radial component and 25 feet per second [8 m/s] - there will be a 25-foot-per-second component which is retrograde or in the easterly direction. The total composite Delta-V, as I said will be 71.4 feet per second [21.8 m/s]. At 29 hours, 34 minutes; this is Apollo Control, continuing to stand by.
It's not easy explaining some of the more complicated aspects of rocket science to the general public, especially if you have to do it live. The Apollo 14 mission had been meticulously planned to arrive at the Moon at a certain date and time. Rather than making a long series of small adjustments to the Flight Plan to account for the late start, FIDO (flight dynamics officer) and his team decided to alter the spacecraft trajectory in order to arrive at exactly the preplanned time. However, one change needed to be made. All planning for an Apollo mission is based on the Ground Elapsed Time or GET which is usually just a measure of the time that has elapsed since launch. However since the spacecraft will now arrive 40 minutes and 3 seconds sooner after launch than planned, the GET will have to be advanced by this amount to made sure that they arrive at the exactly the GET time that is listed in their Flight Plan. By 'big sponge', the PAO announcer meant the 50-hour-long, low speed coast period between the MCC-2 and the entry into lunar orbit. A small change in the spacecraft's velocity can have a big effect on how long it takes to reach the Moon.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
029:43:17 McCandless: Apollo 14, this is Houston.
029:43:22 Roosa/Mitchell: Go ahead.
029:43:23 McCandless: At your convenience, we'd like P00 and Accept and we'll uplink you a new state vector, target load, and the PIPA and IRIG bias updates. Over. [Pause.]
The state vector is the set of numbers that define the spacecraft's position and velocity at a moment of time. The Target Load defines the conditions that the upcoming burn is to satisfy. The PIPA and IRIG bias updates concern the accelerometers (PIPAs) and the gyroscopes (IRIGs or Inertial Reference Integrating Gyros) within the IMU. As their inherent biases become known, the computer can use values to compensate.
029:43:42 Roosa: Okay. You have it, Houston.
029:43:44 McCandless: Roger. They're on their way. And at the same time, we'd like to give you one minor Flight Plan update. Due to your later lift-off time, on page 3-32, the Flight Plan, 'Darkside Dim Light Photography,' we have a new value of longitude over 2 for you. [Long pause.]
The story about why the Apollo computer uses 'longitude/2' instead of just longitude is a nice example of the clever engineering that went into programming what would nowadays be thought of as an extremely primitive computer. The limitations of its hardware meant that all numbers were expressed in five digits and the position of the decimal point was fixed, based on context. So, for example, the change of velocity in X expected from a burn as given in the above PAD would be '00259'. Here, the programming assumes that the decimal point is after the fourth digit so the number is interpreted as 25.9 feet per second. This gives adequate precision for its calculations on speed.
Being primarily a navigation computer, it also had to deal with the positon of features and places on the Moon. Obviously, the already familiar system of degrees in latitude and longitude would be used. Latitude could be expressed within the range ±90° and by that scheme, the latitude of the northerly Apollo 15 landing site at Hadley Rille would be '+23132'. Here, the programming assumes that the decimal point comes after the second digit so this would be interpreted as 23.132°N. The full range of values that would be expected range from +90.000° to -90.000°. In this case, 0.001 of a degree represents the precision of this number and this translates to a distance of about 30 metres across the ground.
So what happens with longitude? It is conventionally expressed as values between ±180° and if the five-digit constraint is applied, then the decimal point would have to be after the third digit to accommodate integers greater than 99. The best precision of this five-digit number is 0.01 of a degree, ten times larger than for latitude and representing a distance on the surface of 300 metres. Engineers felt this was unacceptable accuracy for what they wanted the computer to do. Their solution was to express all longitudes as the original number divided by two. This means that the range is now ±90° which could be expressed to three decimal places. The precision of this scheme is two times 30 metres, or about 60 metres, a much better value.
029:44:07 Shepard: Okay. Go ahead.
029:44:10 McCandless: Roger. The old value is minus 42.500; new value, minus 47.500. Over. [Long pause.]
029:44:25 Shepard: Okay. Longitude over 2 is now minus 47.500.
029:44:31 McCandless: Roger. And I've been asked to remind you that, in connection with the midcourse burn number 2, if there is stratification in the oxygen tanks, you may get a Cryo Low Press light as this is reduced. Over.
029:44:47 Shepard: Roger.
Long comm break.
The contents of the reactant tanks (hydrogen and oxygen) are in a supercritical state meaning that they are at a temperature and pressure that allows a large amount of the substance to be stored without there being two phases, liquid and gas. It is often described as being like a dense fog. By this means, there is no worry about whether liquid or gas reaches the outlet, and as reactant is drawn off, the source pressure of the tank can be maintained by switching on heaters. A problem with this arrangement is that if left to sit, the contents of the tank begin to stratify, forming layers of differing densities around its walls and internal hardware. The engine burn will essentially stir the contents of the tanks and Mission control are warning that this may trip a pressure warning light.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
029:51:42 McCandless: 14, Houston. Your computer.
Comm break.
029:53:06 Shepard: Houston, 14. Have you finished with the uplink?
029:53:08 McCandless: 14, affirmative. How are you reading us now? We passed up 'computer's yours.'
029:53:17 Shepard: Okay, I guess we must have missed it during the [garble] and we're terminating PTC here in about 2 minutes.
029:53:24 McCandless: Roger. Out. [Long pause.]
029:54:18 Mitchell: Houston, Apollo 14.
029:54:21 McCandless: Go ahead, Ed.
029:54:24 Mitchell: We're seeing Noun 81's Delta-V by 1/10th different from the PAD. Which is correct?
029:54:36 McCandless: Apollo 14, Houston. We understand the onboard value is correct, and - that's an R2 that you're concerned about?
029:54:48 Mitchell: Yeah. We've never seen Noun 81s round off like that.
029:54:56 McCandless: Okay. We'll have an explanation for you in a second.
029:55:01 Mitchell: Okay.
Comm break.
029:56:12 McCandless: Houston - Apollo 14, Houston.
029:56:18 Mitchell: Go ahead.
029:56:20 McCandless: Roger. On your query on Noun 81, 4.3 is the number that was actually uplinked to the spacecraft. There is no problem involved with the spacecraft rounding off numbers or anything of that sort. The maneuver that was passed to you on the maneuver PAD was generated from one computer reading a 4.35 which was rounded upwards by the FIDO to 4.4. A separate computer processed the information leading to the automatic uplink, and they rounded down to 4.3. Over. [Long pause.]
029:56:59 Mitchell: Okay. Those computers ought to talk to each other.
029:57:05 McCandless: Roger. Out.
Very long comm break.
Data flow through the Mission Control Center computer systems and over to the Apollo spacecraft.
It appears that there is a small difference between the value computed at the IBM/76 mainframe at the Real Time Computer Complex and the Univac 494 computer that runs the CCATS - Communications, Command and Telemetry System, which interfaces between the RTCC computers and the Apollo communications network. It is the CCATS computer that produces the actual data loads that can be radioed up to the ship. Although the difference is small and not significant, the crew expresses dislike at such uncertainty.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
This is Apollo Control at 30 hours, 6 minutes. Apollo 14, at this time, is 117,213 nautical miles [217,078 km] from Earth. The spacecraft velocity is 4,483 feet per second [1,366 m/s]. About 2 hours ago, an auspicious event slipped by unnoticed as the spacecraft passed the half way mark in terms of total mileage, or in terms of mileage to the Moon I guess we should say. At 27 hours, 4 minutes, 42 seconds; Apollo 14 was 109,172 nautical miles [202,187 km] from Earth or half way between Earth and the Moon. The spacecraft velocity at that point was 4,779 feet per second [1,457 m/s]. We'll cross the halfway point in time on the trip to the Moon at 40 hours, 56 minutes. Both the distance and the time half way point are dependent upon a normal midcourse correction 2. Should that MCC-2 maneuver, which is scheduled to be performed in a little less than 30 minutes, give us different values it will of course change the total distance by some small amount. The Flight Dynamics Officer has also computed a new set of coordinates and a new time for the arrival of the S-IVB at the lunar surface. The impact is scheduled to occur at a Ground Elapsed Time of 82 hours, 38 minutes, 3 seconds and our new set of coordinates are as follows: the latitude of the impact point now appears to be at 9 degrees, 32 minutes south. The longitude; 26 degrees, 20 minutes west. What we're seeing is a gradual shift of the impact point slightly to the west and moving a bit closer to the Apollo 12 seismometer. Again to repeat the information on the scheduled midcourse correction which is occurring at the second midcourse correction opportunity. It will be the first midcourse. The burn is scheduled to occur at 30 hours, 36 minutes, 7 seconds Ground Elapsed Time. The burn duration will be 10 seconds. It will be performed with the Service Propulsion System engine giving a total velocity change of 71.4 feet per second [21.8 m/s]. The bulk of that velocity change will be in a radial direction or back towards Earth. And the effect of the maneuver will be to bulge the trajectory slightly so that the spacecraft arrives at the Moon a little later and also at the planned altitude of 60 nautical miles [111 km]. Without the burn the spacecraft would pass by the Moon at an altitude of 2,104 nautical miles [3,897 km], and it would arrive 40 minutes earlier. With the burn, it places the arrival time back 40 minutes to coincide with the Ground Elapsed Time, and the Greenwich Mean Time. Correction on that, the time of arrival is fixed by the cut-off conditions of the Translunar Injection, and the midcourse correction burn, taking into account the fact that we will be arriving at the Moon at the planned Greenwich Mean Time, we'll depress the trajectory so that the flyby the Moon, prior to going into lunar orbit, is at 60 nautical miles [111 km]. And we're now 25 minutes, 54 seconds away from that midcourse correction maneuver. The maneuver in addition to lowering the distance at which the spacecraft passes by the Moon, will also remove the spacecraft from a free return trajectory in at least one sense, and that is that, following the burn it will no longer be possible to re-enter the Earth's atmosphere in the proper entry corridor using only RCS propulsion capabilities. Once this midcourse correction has been performed, in order to enter the entry corridor properly, it will require either the, either subsequent midcourse corrections using the SPS engine, or the Descent Propulsion System engine on the Lunar Module. At 30 hours, 11 minutes; this is Apollo Control in Houston standing by.
030:09:45 Roosa (onboard): That's kind of wild, isn't it? Noun 20 Enter. 281.2, 353, and 297.5. Okay. There's an Enter. Computer's yours, Leader.
030:10:09 Shepard (onboard): [Garble] Okay, it's star 25.
030:10:12 Roosa (onboard): Okay [garble]...
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
030:14:34 McCandless: 14, this is Houston.
030:14:37 Roosa: Go ahead, Houston.
030:14:39 McCandless: Roger, Stu. We're looking at your DSKY display here and - noticed it was a little, different from the PAD burn attitudes. We believe that if you go back and reload Noun 48 with the pitch and yaw trim values that we sent up on the PAD, which are for the combination CSM/LM, and then redo P40, you'll get better agreement with the PAD values for attitude.
030:15:06 Roosa: Okay.
Very long comm break.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
This is Apollo Control at 30 hours, 17 minutes. We now show the spacecraft to be in the proper attitude for the midcourse correction. I would like to go back over one point that perhaps got a bit garbled in the last report, and that is the effects of this maneuver on the trajectory. Without the burn, without the midcourse correction, the spacecraft, as we said would pass about 2,104 nautical miles [3,897 km] from the Moon. Also, its time of closest approach would be about 15 minutes later than desired. With the midcourse correction, we place the time of approach at the time desired which is 82 hours, 0 minutes, 37 seconds. That'll be the time of closest approach with no further maneuvers, and we'll lower the point of closest approach from the 2,104 nautical miles [3,897 km] to 60.3 nautical miles [111.7 km]. We're now about 17 minutes, 30 seconds away from that midcourse correction maneuver.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
030:27:19 McCandless: 14, this is Houston.
030:27:25 Roosa: Go ahead, Hous - Houston.
030:27:28 McCandless: Roger. You can go ahead and terminate charging on battery Alpha at this time.
030:27:34 Mitchell: Okay. [Long pause.]
030:27:46 Shepard: 14 to Houston. We're in position, standing by for a Go for MCC-2 burn.
030:27:53 McCandless: Roger; you are Go.
030:27:57 Shepard: [Garble].
Long comm break.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
This is Apollo Control at 30 hours, 35 minutes. Flight Director Milton Windler has just reminded his flight controllers that we're one minute away now from our first midcourse correction. That maneuver scheduled to occur now in about 45 seconds. The flight controllers here are monitoring their data and we'll be observing the performance of the Service Propulsion System engine and spacecraft systems during the period of this burn. Total burn duration again is planned to be about 10.3 seconds. It'll give us a change in velocity of 71.4 feet per second [21.8 m/s].
030:34:37 Roosa (onboard): [Garble] and we have AC/DC, Direct. We have CMC Auto. We are Att 1/Rate 2. We have A, On. We are Rate Command. We are Auto. We're sitting at Attitude. We're sitting at trim.
030:35:06 Mitchell (onboard): Okay, Gordon, looks like we've got the High Gain.
And you heard Stu Roosa report a mightly good burn. No necessity to trim out the residuals with the RCS.
030:37:22 Roosa (onboard): Okay, you got minus 4.1, [garble] off.
030:37:31 Shepard (onboard): Okay. [garble].
And our Guidance and Control Officer reporta that the burn duration was an even 10 seconds which is almost precisely as planned.
030:37:42 Roosa (onboard): Direct, two, Off.
030:37:43 Shepard (onboard): Okay, open the Ullage, two, circuit breakers.
030:37:46 Roosa (onboard): They're open.
030:37:47 Shepard (onboard): And [garble].
030:37:49 Roosa (onboard): Okay, Pitch 1 and Yaw 1.
030:37:50 Shepard (onboard): Rate 2 and PCM Bit Rate, Low.
030:37:56 Roosa (onboard): How about a boot in the ass, huh?
030:37:57 Mitchell (onboard): That was pretty nice.
030:37:59 Roosa (onboard): Man, TEI is going to be a kick in the butt.
After over a day of weightlessness, the crew got a real 'kick' out of the 0.2 g acceleration of the SPS MCC burn. They are now looking forward to the much bigger kick they are going to feel when then SPS engine pushes the CSM, then with partially empty tanks and without a fully loaded LM, out of lunar orbit and back towards Earth.
030:38:00 Shepard (onboard): Probably [garble].
030:38:01 Mitchell (onboard): Okay, [garble]...
030:38:01 McCandless: 14, for your information, we showed the actual burn time to be 10.0 seconds. Over. [Long pause.]
Our telemetry data - Our telemetry data shows that the spacecraft onboard computer...
030:38:43 Roosa: Hey, Bruce, that was really great. The CMS was never like that.
030:38:48 McCandless: Roger.
030:38:55 Shepard: Houston. At the end of the burn we're showing fuel, 002; oxidizer, 989; unbalance, 300 decrease.
030:39:23 McCandless: Okay. Delta-VC, minus 4.1; fuel, 100.2; oxidizer, 98.9; and unbalance is 300 decrease. Is that correct?
030:39:38 Shepard: That's affirmative.
030:39:39 Roosa: And if you didn't get the residuals, they're plus 0.2, minus 0, and minus 0.1.
030:39:47 McCandless: Roger. We copy.
Long comm break.
The residuals represent the difference in the effect of the engine burn between what what was desired and what was achieved. It is stated as three components at right angles to each other.
Our telemetry data showed that the onboard clock timed that burn at 10.19 seconds which is extremely close to what we showed on the ground, our reading being 10.0 seconds. You heard Stu Roosa comment that the simulator was never like this, a reference to the fact that the onboard guidance system controlled that burn almost precisely as planned. The Flight Dynamics Officer will begin at this point to gather telemetry data on the trajectory to compute a trajectory in order to determine what effect the maneuver had on the trajectory. This is a process that normally requires several hours before the data becomes refined and the Flight Dynamics Officer has a good stable prediction on the effect of the maneuver. He'll have a preliminary report somewhat before that, usually in a matter of 15 to 20 minutes.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
030:44:16 McCandless: 14, this is Houston. We've reviewed the chamber pressure and the SPS engine operation from this last midcourse on the strip charts, and it looks real fine. We'll have some more words for you - for you - later on the reconciliation of the burn times in tenths of seconds. We're curious as to what value you got with your stopwatch. Over.
030:44:41 Mitchell: I showed about 10.2, Bruce.
030:44:45 McCandless: Understand, 10.2. Over.
030:44:48 Mitchell: That's affirm.
030:44:51 Roosa: Hey, Bruce. What do the strip charts show us PC, two banks? [Pause.]
030:45:00 McCandless: We're going to have to convert from percentage of thrust to PSI, Stu. We'll be right at you.
030:45:08 Roosa: Oh, no sweat. Don't want to cause you any trouble. I was just curious.
030:45:11 McCandless: They're doing it anyway. Just, we hadn't gotten it accomplished for this burn yet.
030:45:17 Roosa: Okay. Just wanted to calibrate my gauge.
030:45:25 McCandless: You might check your middle gimbal angle, Stu, for the maneuvering.
030:45:30 Roosa: Rog. We - we're eyeballing it.
Long comm break.
The platform is supported by three gimbals, each with its rotating support at 90° to that of its neighbour so that all the gimbal axes are about 90° apart. In normal use, properly aligned, this gives the platform three degrees of freedom to maintain its alignment as the spacecraft rotates. However, if the spacecraft's rotation causes the middle gimbal's angle to become too great, then two of the gimbal axes approach a common plane, bringing all three axes onto that same plane. Essentially, one degree of freedom is lost and the arrangement can no longer keep the platform stable. This is termed gimbal lock and they would like to avoid it. The 8-balls are marked with an area to avoid to help crews keep clear of the condition as it requires that the platform be realigned.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
030:50:26 McCandless: 14, this is Houston. For your information, when starting the PTC spinup, we'll use quads Alpha and Delta. Over.
030:50:39 Roosa: Okay. We'll use Alpha and Delta for the spinup.
Comm break.
Quads A and D are only 90° apart on the Service Module's exterior. If a roll manoeuvre is executed with this pair, the burn will be uncoupled. Normally thrusters on opposite sides of the SM are used to perform a roll because, by firing in opposite directions, any translation thrust cancels out and a pure roll is achieved. But using adjacent quads means there will be a translation component to their thrust with the result that they would be slightly pushed off their trajectory. Having just completed a midcourse correction, with engineers trying to measure its effect on their trajectory, an uncoupled thruster firing is undesirable. The crew realise that Mission Control have made a mistake but the situation will be clarified at 031:35:12.
030:52:11 McCandless: Apollo 14, this is Houston. Your average chamber pressure for this last burn was 100 psi even.
030:52:21 Shepard: Okay, the average was 100 even. Thank you.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
031:14:26 Roosa: Houston, 14.
031:14:29 McCandless: Go ahead, 14.
031:14:32 Roosa: Okay, Bruce. I tell you, I'm sure not seeing what I expected to on this - dark side of the Earth through the sextant here. The angles that - that you gave me lined up the - the optics pretty much over on the edge of the dark side all right. But through the - through the sextant, there's still a lot of light coming in, and I - with that high-speed black and white, I don't see why we're not going to wipe it out. I - I guess I really expected to see pretty much darkness through the sextant here. [Pause.]
031:15:22 McCandless: Okay. Stand by.
031:15:25 Roosa: Okay. And there's another strange thing on the sextant on this sighting, Bruce. We got a...
031:15:31 McCandless: Stand by.
031:15:33 Roosa: Okay.
Long comm break.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
031:20:34 McCandless: 14, this is Houston.
031:20:39 Roosa: Go ahead, Houston.
031:20:42 McCandless: Roger. We've been advised that there was some illuminated area of the Earth expected to be visible in the field of view for this dim-light photography. What we'd like you to do is to go ahead using the nominal angles; take your three exposures; and then, if it's agreeable to you, we'll have a new set of shaft and trunnion angles for you and you could squeeze off three more. Over.
031:21:11 Roosa: Okay. No sweat. I'll press ahead and take some photos.
031:21:17 McCandless: Roger. Press on. [Long pause.]
031:21:51 McCandless: 14, Houston. In your original transmission, did you say that you could see any of the illuminated portion of the Earth through the sextant eyepiece or just that you had some scattered light coming in? Over.
031:22:04 Roosa: I've got quite a bit of scattered light. It's negative on seeing any of the - of the lit portion. I - Manually, you know, I've driven it over to the terminator and then the CMC pulls it back to the dark side. We're pointed on the dark side, but there sure is a lot of light showing.
031:22:26 McCandless: Okay. We copy.
Comm break.
031:24:13 McCandless: 14, Houston. Have you already mounted the camera on the sextant adapter? - or to the sextant?
031:24:19 Roosa: That's affirmative, Bruce. I'm in the middle of the first frame right now, but it's no sweat to change. I can do anything you want.
031:24:25 McCandless: No, no. Don't do that, because we'd have to squeeze off more film at that 24 frame per second prior to dismounting it.
031:24:34 Roosa: Okay.
Comm break.
This is Apollo Control; at 31 hours, 26 minutes. As you heard, Stu Roosa is preparing to use the Maurer sequence camera, 16-millimeter Data Acquisition Camera aboard the spacecraft for the dim light photography scheduled in the Flight Plan at this time. Roosa will have the camera mounted or actually has the camera mounted at this time to the sextant of the spacecraft. He uses the spacecraft computer to point the optics in the proper direction, which in this case is at the Earth dark side. And he will take three frames, one...
031:26:11 Roosa: Okay, Bruce. I've finished the - the 1-minute, the 20-second, 5-second exposures, and I'll just hold here until you give me some more angles if that's what you want.
031:26:22 McCandless: Okay, Stu. What we'd like you to do is in your longitude over 2 for a P22, just put in minus 42.5, which was the - the value that was originally in the Flight Plan before we updated you and run three more exposures and that will wind it up. [Long pause.]
031:26:45 Shepard: Okay. We'll enter that in long-over-2 like it was originally in the Flight Plan and repeat.
031:26:55 McCandless: Roger. Out.
Long comm break.
That last comment came from Apollo 14 commander Al Shepard. Roosa took the first two frames - first three frames, one exposure at 60 seconds, one at 20 seconds, and one at 5 seconds. These pictures taken with very high speed black and white film, hope to show some of the phenomena on Earth that are visible only in very dim light such as lightning. And as you heard, Roosa will now re - repoint the optics and take three more frames of the same phenomena at slightly different pointing angle. Hopefully, one of the two angles will give a minimum of reflected light into the optics. That reflected light, of course, tends to wash out the amount of detail that's visible.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
031:34:50 Roosa: Okay, Bruce. I completed the - the pictures. I put the sextant back on and looked at our second one and it's - it's going to be just about the same.
031:35:04 McCandless: Roger, Stu. I think that wraps up the requirements for the dim-light photography.
031:35:11 Roosa: Rog.
031:35:12 McCandless: And just to clear up the situation that I created on giving you a quad Alpha Delta. We are recommending Alpha and Charlie for the PTC spinup and your option on the quads that you used for rate damping.
031:35:30 Roosa: Okay. We figured that's what you meant.
Very long comm break.
[Download MP3 audio file. PAO loop. Clip courtesy John Stoll, ACR Senior Technician at NASA Johnson.]
This is Apollo Control at 31 hours, 42 minutes. The Apollo 14 crew has completed the dim light photography scheduled in the Flight Plan. The next event will be to stabilize the spacecraft and then spin it up at the relatively slow rotational rate of 3 revolutions per hour. This is the Passive Thermal Control mode used to maintain the proper thermal stability - the proper temperatures of the spacecraft, exposing all sides of the spacecraft equally to the radiation from the Sun. At the present time we show Apollo 14 121,264 nautical miles [224,581 km] from Earth, traveling at a velocity of 4,271 feet per second [1,302 m/s]. The preliminary data from that midcourse correction maneuver performed at 30 hours, 36 minutes, 7 seconds as called for in the Flight Plan as with the Delta-V gained the velocity resulting from the maneuver was 71.4 feet per second [21.8 m/s]. And the preliminary tracking data shows that the maneuver had the effect of lowering the point of closest approach to the Moon from 2,104 nautical miles [3,897 km] to 67.05. The maneuver was targeted to lower the point of closest approach to about 60 nautical miles [111 km]. And the Flight Dynamics Officer reports that with additional tracking, we expect the data to show that we came very close to that. The burn was almost precisely normal as planned. The burn duration had been targeted for about 10.3 seconds, and on the ground we measured the burn time at 10 seconds. Of course the guidance system on the spacecraft is designed to shut down the engine, based on the amount of velocity gained rather then the time of the maneuver - rather then the time of burn, so that it is perfectly consistent for the guidance system to shut down within a fraction of a second or a second of the pre-computed time based on the amount of energy that is gotten from the engine at any particular maneuver. During the burn and for about 1 hour before, Louise Mitchell, wife of Lunar Module Pilot Edgar Mitchell, was in the control center viewing the procedures. We don't have a great deal of activity scheduled on the Flight Plan now. The astronauts are scheduled to begin another sleep period at 41 hours, or about 9 hours, 15 minutes from now. During that - during the interim period of time, primary activities will be systems monitoring and such things as charging batteries, venting the batteries, and of course setting up the Passive Thermal Control mode which will be beginning soon. Earlier this evening, we again talked with the crew about the condition and the events preceding and leading up to the docking operation and the condition of the probe assembly. Following the crew answering some additional questions about the probe assembly, they were advised that the probe appears to be normal and that we will continue with the normal Flight Plan leading up to a landing on the Moon, as things stand right now. The Saturn third stage, the S-IVB, based on our last computations will impact the Moon at 82 hours, 38 minutes and 3 seconds at a latitude of 9 degrees, 32 minutes south; longitude 26 degrees, 20 minutes west; and as we continue to gather more tracking data, these numbers have been changing and we expect that they will continue to change somewhat. At 31 minutes, 47 seconds; this is - rather 31 hours, 47 minutes; this is Apollo Control.
