Dear Dr. Fletcher:

The enclosed document is the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's (ASAP) annual report to the NASA Administrator. This report provides you with our findings, conclusions and recommendations regarding the National Space Transportation System (NSTS), the Space Station Freedom Program (SSFP), aeronautical projects and other areas of NASA activities. The period covered is from February 1988 through January 1989.

This letter provides an overview of ASAP's findings and recommendations. The ASAP requests that NASA respond only to Section II, "Findings and Recommendations" and to the "Open" items noted in Section IV.B "NASA Response to Panel Annual Report."

The effort associated with the STS recovery program following the Challenger accident was one of the most intensive tasks that NASA has ever undertaken. This led to two successful missions, STS-26 and -27 conducted September 29 - October 2 and December 2-6, 1988 respectively. These flights and the management by NASA of the effort that led to these successful missions has started NASA well on its way to recover the momentum that is necessary for the U.S. space program.

The main focus of the ASAP during 1988 has been monitoring and advising NASA and its contractors on the STS recovery program. NASA efforts have restored the flight program with a much better management organization, safety and quality assurance organizations, and management communication system.

The ASAP believes that the orientation of current NASA activities will result in NSTS operations that are of significantly lower risk than those prior to the Challenger accident. Nevertheless we still consider the NSTS an inherently high-risk endeavor. The present management organization with its greater emphasis on safety and quality assurance and communications should be nurtured by all means possible.

The NASA NSTS organization in conjunction with its prime contractors should be encouraged to continue development and incorporation of appropriate design and operational improvements which will further reduce risk. The data from each Shuttle flight should be used to determine if affordable design and/or operational improvements could further increase safety. The review of Critical Items (CILs), Failure Mode Effects and Analyses (FMEAs) and Hazard Analyses (HAs) after the Challenger accident has given the program a massive data base with which to establish a formal program with prioritized changes.
The ASAP views as very important the incorporation of a Launch Approval focal point, Deputy NASA Director for Operations, (Captain Robert Crippen) in the NSTS organization. The positive result of this was noted during our observation of the Flight Readiness Review processes and the "go" for launch of both STS-26 and -27. As the launch rate increases, this official will come under increasing pressure to relax the strict observance of launch criteria in order to meet schedules. It is imperative that this key Director of Operations continues to receive full support from NASA management. The ASAP will monitor this effort closely.

Now turning to more specific comments we offer the following:

The Office of Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA)

The establishment of the Office of Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance headed by an Associate Administrator reporting directly to the NASA Administrator was a positive major change. This organization, under George Rodney, has come a long way toward providing an essentially independent certification authority within NASA. The success of this organization in the future will depend to a large extent on the backing and support it receives from NASA management. It should be manned with skill levels equal to those which exist in other NASA technical and program organizations. The SRM&QA personnel now are among those having authority and responsibility to "sign-off" or certify design reviews, test plans and test results, and launch criteria and approval. With the proper manning of the SRM&QA organization these approvals will go a long way toward ensuring that every waiver gets the proper attention. The ASAP considers monitoring the effectiveness of the SRM&QA organization one of its prime responsibilities.

Space Shuttle Design Safety Reviews

Prior to the launch of the Orbiter Discovery (STS-26), NASA conducted a complete review of the External Tank, Solid Rocket Boosters, Space Shuttle Main Engines, Orbiter, Launch Processing System and their many components. Extensive resources were devoted to these essential activities to support the decision to return to flight status. Failure Modes and Effects Analyses, Critical Item Lists, and Hazard Analyses were rebaselined and expanded. The in-depth review process resulted in a large number of changes to the Shuttle elements (e.g., 226 modifications to the Orbiter alone). All previous waivers were cancelled, and new waivers were granted as required only after careful analysis and assessment.

The result of this process was a Space Shuttle that has successfully returned to flight. It also yielded a much clearer understanding of the many risks and safety margins built into the present system. This understanding, in turn, has led each of the program elements to identify modifications which would further reduce risk and improve safety. A list of some of these modifications which the ASAP believes warrant inclusion in the Space Shuttle System as soon as practical is contained in Table I. What is needed now is a program to prioritize the remaining risks by using the "data bank" developed from the post-Challenger review. This prioritization of continuing safety improvements should take advantage of risk analysis techniques which are available.
**Advanced Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM)**

The continuous program to increase the safety and reliability of the current solid rocket motors which will be used for the foreseeable future raises the question as to the wisdom of proceeding with the procurement of a new solid rocket motor which, by the time it is introduced, will have less proven and documented safety and reliability features than the current Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM). The ASAP recommends that NASA reconsider its intention to procure the ASRM because for a small and questionable increase in reliability over the continually improved RSRM it will command large expenditures which should better be directed towards the improvement of the STS's overall safety. Furthermore, as NASA has not yet decided on those steps it will take regarding Space Shuttle and Expendable Launch Vehicle evolutionary development, it would be prudent to delay the ASRM decision until these future launch vehicle decisions are made. Among the things that should be included in this evaluation are an independent risk assessment and the possible replacement of the solid motors with liquid rocket boosters.

**Lessons Learned and Their Application**

The present management, communications and quality assurance systems of the STS should be maintained and strengthened and under no circumstances should backsliding toward the systemic problems which existed prior to the Challenger accident be permitted. Complacency must be avoided, and a strong, competent and authoritative systems engineering and integration function must be maintained. Each new flight should incorporate those system, component, and operational changes which have been demonstrated by previous flights to be needed for the enhancement of safety. At no point should the STS be declared to be an operational system in the routine sense. The risk level of STS operations will always be high.

**Space Station Freedom Program (SSFP)**

The ASAP has increased its activities on the Space Station since our last report. The Space Station program has reached a more defined state, thereby allowing the ASAP to offer more specific commentary.

We have a basic concern that many of the problems that occurred in the STS program may recur in the Space Station because of the lack of clean cut interfaces, lines of responsibility and communications. The ASAP urges NASA to continue to examine the Space Station organization and interfaces to take advantage of the lessons learned that led to the current STS program structure.

In 1988, a committee headed by General Sam Phillips recommended that NASA establish a Space Station Freedom management structure featuring a fully authoritative program office (Level II) co-located with and operating under the direction of the Associate Administrator for the Office of Space Station (Level I). This program office has been established and located at Reston, VA, for lack of office space at NASA Headquarters. The rationale for the recommendation was to establish a strong program office that could direct and control the design, development, certification and operational activities of the NASA centers assigned these different responsibilities.

The program office in Reston, while attempting to implement its responsibilities, has not utilized its systems engineering and integration support contractor effectively, is currently understaffed and appears to be encountering some difficulty in effectively
directing and monitoring the work at the centers. It is additionally burdened with intra-program office administrative tasks occasioned by its separation from the Headquarters complex.

The ASAP recommends that NASA Headquarters closely monitor the performance of the Space Station Freedom management structure and provide the necessary resources and support for effective leadership and management of the SSFP.

**Space Shuttle Launch Rate**

The ASAP is concerned about NASA’s ability to maintain the currently manifested launch rate required for assembly of the Space Station Freedom. Depending upon the Space Shuttle alone to accomplish this task is risky. The use of expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) could alleviate pressure to achieve overly optimistic flight rates for the Space Shuttle.

We recognize the severe budget pressures and difficult choices involved in carrying out many of our recommendations. Program managers have to make certain that funds under their control are not wasted on inefficient or unnecessary activities. Top NASA management has to determine a clear sense of priority in apportioning available funds while vesting managers with authority to execute programs and holding them responsible and accountable. As Congress plays a role, they should provide NASA with greater flexibility to manage programs efficiently by avoiding micro-management but holding NASA accountable for its stewardship. Finally, it is hoped that the Administration and Office of Management and Budget will recognize that nothing is so costly as short-sighted efforts to sustain a cut-rate, bargain-basement space program. Expenditures made in a timely manner to achieve desirable objectives almost always turn out to be the most cost-effective spending possible.

The task of having restored the Space Shuttle to flight status should be viewed as the beginning rather than the end of the improvement process. NASA should now take advantage of the output of its many reviews to enhance further the safety of the Space Shuttle system. This can best be accomplished by embarking on a vigorous program of product improvement aimed at those design areas where analysis has shown that significant reduction of risk can be achieved at reasonable costs.

It has been our pleasure to work with the dedicated people of NASA and its contractors during this past year. We look forward to further NASA successes in 1989 and truly appreciate your continued support.

Sincerely,

Joseph F. Sutter
Chairman
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
TABLE I
TYPICAL SPACE SHUTTLE SAFETY ENHANCEMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELEMENT/ENHANCEMENT</th>
<th>SAFETY REASON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SSME:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Install the 2-duct hot gas manifold to &quot;unload&quot; the internal components of the SSME.</td>
<td>2. Smoothing the flow profile reduces lateral pressure differentials and consequent material cracking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Use of the enlarged throat diameter to &quot;unload&quot; all parts of the SSME, particularly the pumps.</td>
<td>3. Lower internal operating environment thereby provide greater safety margins and longer life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Use of single-crystal turbine blades.</td>
<td>4. Increase blade life and structural margins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. SSME needs a degree of redesign to both reduce welds and to make welds totally inspectable.</td>
<td>5. For example, the internal heat exchanger has always been a source of concern because of weldments. A &quot;single-tube&quot; HX design eliminates some welds and makes others inspectable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SRB/SRM:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Locking feature for nozzle leak check port plugs.</td>
<td>2. Prevent plugs from allowing gas flow during propellant burn. Increase structural margins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. One-piece case stiffener rings.</td>
<td>3. Increase structural margins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Lightning protection enhancement for case and nozzle.</td>
<td>5. Environmental hazard reduction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Aft skirt structural modification.</td>
<td>6. Increase margins to enhance RSRM safety, reliability and performance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELEMENT/ENHANCEMENT</td>
<td>SAFETY REASON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ET:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Upgrade Liquid Hydrogen and Oxygen temperature, pressure and liquid level sensors.</td>
<td>1. Structural integrity and performance are dependent upon sensor data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Upgrade thermal insulation on areas where dislodged insulation can affect the Orbiter.</td>
<td>2. Protect the Orbiter thermal protection tiles from damage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Corrosion prevention methods should be investigated to preclude structural problems.</td>
<td>3. ETs are stored for long periods and must maintain structural integrity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ORBITER:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Structural modifications to eliminate negative margins.</td>
<td>1. Tail, wings, aft fuselage and mid-body should be brought up to specification and ability to meet expected flight envelope.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Upgrade of the auxiliary power units (APUs).</td>
<td>2. Preclude dangers associated with turbine blade cracking, fuel decomposition/fire and so on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Nose Wheel steering redundancy, possible extension of the nose wheel strut.</td>
<td>3. Landing-rollout steering effectiveness, reducing loads on landing gear system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Elimination of Kapton electrical wire insulation.</td>
<td>4. Reduce fire hazard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Upgrade of valves and regulators to preclude leakage of fuels and oxidizers.</td>
<td>5. Fire and performance degradation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LAUNCH PROCESSING:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Personnel exposure to toxic materials during ferry flights, OPF/VAB/Pad processing.</td>
<td>1. Upgrade of ground detectors and aging equipment and facilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Hardware Interface Module (HIM) card upgrade (circuit boards) for restart commands for ground equipment, GH$_2$ fire detectors.</td>
<td>2. Prevent hazardous processing situations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Eliminate single failure points on Firex systems.</td>
<td>3. Prevent hazardous processing situations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 1

II. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................ 2
   A. National Space Transportation System (NSTS/STS) .................. 2
      1. Management Structure ........................................... 2
      2. Safety Enhancements ............................................. 3
      3. Advanced Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM) .......................... 3
      4. Logistics and Support ............................................ 3
      5. Space Shuttle Elements ........................................... 4
         a. Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor/Booster (SRM/SRB) .......... 4
         b. External Tank (ET) ........................................... 4
         c. Orbiter ........................................................ 4
         d. Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs) ......................... 5
         e. Launch, Landing, and Mission Operations ..................... 5
   B. Space Station Freedom Program (SSFP) .................................. 6
      1. Management Structure ........................................... 6
      2. Safety and Product Assurance .................................... 6
      3. Technical Issues ................................................ 7
   C. Aeronautics .................................................................. 8
   D. Risk Management .......................................................... 9

III. INFORMATION IN SUPPORT OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .... 11
   A. National Space Transportation System (NSTS/STS) .................. 11
      1. Management Structure ........................................... 11
      2. Safety Enhancements ............................................. 12
      3. Advanced Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM) .......................... 14
      4. Logistics and Support ............................................ 14
      5. Space Shuttle Elements ........................................... 16
         a. Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor/Booster (SRM/SRB) .......... 16
         b. External Tank (ET) ........................................... 18
         c. Orbiter Loads/Stress Analysis and Structural Modifications .. 18
         d. Space Shuttle Main Engine .................................... 18
         e. Launch, Landing, and Mission Operations ..................... 21
   B. Space Station Freedom Program (SSFP) .................................. 24
      1. Management Structure ........................................... 24
      2. Safety and Product Assurance (S&PA) .......................... 27
      3. Technical Recommendations .................................... 27
   C. Aeronautics .................................................................. 31
   D. Risk Management .......................................................... 32

IV. APPENDICES ..................................................................... 36
   A. Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Membership ....................... 36
   B. NASA Response to Panel Annual Report, 16 Sep 88 .............. 36
   C. Panel Activities During Reporting Period ............................ 36
   D. Improvements Recommended for Space Shuttle System Elements 36

-vii-
I
INTRODUCTION

The STS-26 and -27 missions are strong indications that the massive effort put forth by NASA and its many contractors has produced a safer and more reliable ground and flight Space Transportation System (STS). This does not, however, eliminate the inherent risks associated with manned space flight which are noted in the Mission Safety Assessment documentation. This means that NASA and its contractors must maintain a vigilance over its many operations to assure that complacency does not overtake either management or the "hands-on" operators.

The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) continues to examine many critical aspects of programs and projects dealing with both aeronautics and space (manned and unmanned) in a manner which provides timely and, we hope, useful information to enhance safety, quality and performance. The ASAP has conducted in excess of 60 factfinding sessions during this reporting period of February 1988 to January 1989. As noted in last year's report, the ASAP members and consultants were active participants in outside review panels (including the National Research Council) established to examine the STS Solid Rocket Booster/Motor. The ASAP has provided testimony during congressional hearings and has made wide distribution of its annual report (in all approximately 2,100 copies).

During the 2½ year period prior to STS-26, the ASAP spent the major portion of its resources on supporting the return-to-flight activities. Nonetheless, the ASAP has already begun placing additional emphasis on the Space Station Freedom Program (SSFP) and its interfaces with the STS. Panel members have been participating in System Safety meetings/reviews as well as meeting with SSFP personnel at NASA centers (JSC, KSC, MSFC). There is more time allocated to examining the role of management in major manned space flight programs and the impact of resource restrictions on both maintaining as well as enhancing the safety of flight.

The primary areas of interest in the aeronautical disciplines at NASA have been, as before, the management of the safety of flight programs at Headquarters and at the Centers, and specific areas of research and development as they relate to the safety of design, test and research flight.

As of January 1988 there have been two changes in ASAP consultants: Dr. Walter W. Williams, former NASA Chief Engineer and Consultant to the NASA Administrator, has been brought onboard, and Herbert E. Grier, a former ASAP member and a consultant for some years has retired.

John G. Stewart (Tennessee Valley Authority) recused himself from the Panel's consideration of the Advanced Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM) project and therefore has not participated in the Panel's recommendations on this subject.
II
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. National Space Transportation System (NSTS/STS)

1. Management Structure

**a. Finding:** Strengthening the role of NASA Headquarters (Level I) and STS program management (Level II), coupled with tighter management and budgetary controls over NASA's R&D Centers (Level III), has clarified responsibilities within the total STS program and strengthened authority and accountability at all levels. Of special importance is the position of Deputy Director (NSTS) for Operations as the focal point of the highly complex shuttle processing and launch activities at the Kennedy Space Center.

**Recommendation:** It is essential that this more disciplined management structure--characterized by clear lines of authority, responsibility and accountability--continue in place once the launch rate accelerates in order to support NASA's commitment to the operating principle of "Safety first; schedule second."

**b. Finding:** The Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA) function is now stronger, more visible, better staffed and better funded since establishment of the position of the Office of Associate Administrator for SRM&QA which reports directly to the Administrator. The Panel notes that the incumbent, George Rodney, is a part of the key decision loops and has established the beginnings of an essentially independent "certification" process within NASA. However, there is recent evidence that budgetary pressures within the Shuttle program are causing project directors to propose budget cuts in various SRM&QA activities (e.g., safety documentation associated with the Space Shuttle Main Engine, such as FMEA/CILs and Hazard Analyses, and oversight of major STS projects.)

**Recommendation:** Across-the-board budget cuts that jeopardize the recently strengthened SRM&QA function must be denied. Funding to maintain essential safety-related documentation of STS systems must be provided.

**c. Finding:** Management communications, a necessary component in achieving a successful STS program, have improved, both horizontally and vertically within NASA. In particular, the reinstatement of the Management Council, an entity that fosters direct and regular communication among all top STS managers and center directors, has brought a higher level of awareness of common problems and coordinated action to resolve them. This, in turn, has resulted in better informed and effective design certification reviews (DCRs) and flight readiness reviews (FRRs).

**Recommendation:** As the flight rate increases, greater attention to maintaining these improved communication channels will be required.

**d. Finding:** NASA, along with many other Federal agencies, has suffered through more than a decade of hostility directed toward Federal employees and a related failure to maintain salary comparability at the higher management levels. NASA urgently needs greater flexibility and resources in competing for and retaining the skilled personnel who are required to carry forward the Nation's space and aeronautical programs.

**Recommendation:** Although the salary comparability question will be settled by the Administration and Congress, NASA should speak out clearly about the increasing costs of the present situation and the specific steps that are needed to once again make NASA careers among the most desirable and respected.
2. Safety Enhancements

Finding: To ascertain the nature of efforts to enhance the safety of the NSTS through upgrading of the five elements (Orbiter, External Tank, Solid Rocket Motor/Booster, Space Shuttle Main Engines, and the Launch and Landing Processing System) the ASAP requested compilations of such improvements from both NASA centers and their prime contractors. These lists are shown in Appendix IV.D. which only cover currently recommended changes for reliability and flight and ground safety beyond those installed for STS-26. Other such changes may reveal themselves as the program progresses.

Recommendation: These lists, and other changes as they are identified, should be prioritized based on attributes of safety enhancement (severity and consequence), cost, schedule and performance. This prioritizing should use the data bank developed as a result of the post-Challenger reviews and the results of the missions from STS-26 and on. Advantage should be taken of risk analysis techniques.

3. Advanced Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM)

Finding: NASA's decision to procure the Advanced Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM) is based on the premise that the new motor will benefit from advanced solid rocket motor technology and new manufacturing methods and thus would evolve into a safer and more reliable motor than the current redesigned solid rocket motor (RSRM).

On the basis of safety and reliability alone, it is questionable whether the ASRM would be superior to the RSRM which has undergone extensive design changes until the ASRM has a similar background of testing and flight experience. This may take as long as 10 years from go-ahead. In the interim, the current design is expected to have had over 160 additional firings prior to the introduction of the ASRM.

Furthermore, it is not evident why the new manufacturing processes planned for the ASRM cannot be applied to the manufacture and assembly of the RSRM. Consequently, it is not clear to the ASAP why NASA is proceeding with its plan to develop a new and expensive solid rocket motor, especially as there are still many elements of the STS system which, if modified or replaced, would add significantly to the safety of the operation. Furthermore, NASA has not thoroughly evaluated other alternative choices to the ASRM such as liquid rocket boosters.

Recommendation: The ASAP recommends that NASA review its decision to procure the Advanced Solid Rocket Motor and postpone any action until other alternatives, including consideration of long range objectives for future launch requirements have been thoroughly evaluated.

4. Logistics and Support

Finding: A review of the development of the overall logistics and support systems for the STS shows a very satisfactory trend. Full advantage has been taken of the "stand-down time" resulting from the STS-51L accident. Especially noteworthy is the movement of key Rockwell personnel to the KSC area and the enhancement of direct control of the logistics program right up to the launch pad itself. The NASA-KSC logistics organization has made great strides in facilities, equipment and inventory and has been aided immeasurably in this task by protection against having its funds occasionally diverted to other STS areas, as was the case in earlier years. There appears now to be excellent liaison between top management of NASA-KSC and Rockwell-Downey and a real spirit of cooperation is observable at this level which has permeated down to the ranks.

There are, however, areas still in need of attention: (1) the control of all STS logistics is not centralized at KSC, and (2) the repair pipeline turnaround time is much too long to support the program.

Recommendation: Continue the good work. Focus efforts on the need to improve overhaul and repair turnaround time, and the integration of all STS logistics programs in one place--KSC.
5. Space Shuttle Elements

a. Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor/Booster (SRM/SRB)

(1) Finding: The redesigned solid rocket booster is more reliable than those used through the STS-51L mission. A number of significant areas of continuing concern were identified during redesign and testing of the new booster. These included the following:

(a) the need to eliminate possible voids and blow holes in the polysulfide adhesively bonded case-to-nozzle joint;
(b) a better characterization of the materials used in the internal nozzle ablative composite parts;
(c) the need to prevent the accumulation of slag, which plugs cowl vent holes during tail-off burning, resulting in adverse differential pressure across the nozzle flexible boot;
(d) the need to develop a resilient O-ring material (temperature compatible) for primary and secondary seals in order to eliminate the required field joint heaters; and
(e) the need to conduct a structural analysis in order to determine the criteria for safe reuse of rocket motor case segments.

Recommendation: NASA should develop a program based upon the items listed above and other significant items to improve the solid rocket motors/boosters and further reduce risk.

(2) Finding: The booster aft skirt failed on STA-3 static structural test article at 120% of limit load. This is below the required factor of safety of 140% (1.4 over limit load).

Recommendation: Perform tests to determine the effect of various loadings and provide fixes needed to meet the original design requirements.

b. External Tank (ET)

Finding: There have been numerous failures of various sensing devices for liquid levels, temperature and pressure on both the hydrogen and oxygen tank systems. Many of these measurements are used in launch commit criteria and are required during flight.

Recommendation: NASA needs a coordinated effort to resolve the cause of these sensor problems and should take the necessary actions to remedy this situation.

c. Orbiter

(1) Finding: Upon completion of the 6 loads/stress analysis it was determined that negative margins of safety existed in the Orbiter structure. In order to launch STS-1 and subsequent missions it was necessary to reduce the design flight envelope to such an extent that the probability of launch was considerably below the original target of 95%.

Recommendation: If NASA desires to attain the originally specified high probability of launch they should implement the identified structural modifications (structural area of wings, fuselage and vertical tail).

(2) Finding: The current General Purpose Computer (GPC) flying on the Orbiter is built upon very old, outdated technology and is a limiting factor in Shuttle operations (due to memory limitations, among other things). It will be increasingly difficult to maintain because parts for the older technology will become increasingly difficult to obtain. The GPC needs to be upgraded as soon as possible. NASA has been working on a replacement central processing unit for at least 5 years now and use of the new processor is still not scheduled until 1991. The sooner that the upgrade is completed, the sooner advanced application programs can be placed in the computer system.

Though the new GPC has been tested extensively in the laboratory, there are no flight tests scheduled for the new processor.

Recommendation: NASA should plan at least one flight test with the new GPCs carried as a test payload and used throughout the flight in a test mode. The computers should be used as close to an actual flight mode as possible including sensor inputs if that can be done except, however, that the new GPCs should not be in line with any actual control outputs. This test should be performed and the upgrade completed as soon as possible.
d. Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs)

**Finding:** The engines used for the successful STS-26 flight incorporated 39 changes. Extensive certification testing was carried out on these changes with excellent success on all of the most critical items with the exception of the High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump (HPOTP) bearings. The data indicates that the various cracking problems in the turbopump blades have been resolved. Limited testing on a large-diameter throat engine (0208) showed major reductions in various engine stress environments. A two duct (vs current three-duct) hot gas manifold power head was completed and made ready for testing at year end. A complete structural audit, a detail assessment of all key welds on the engine, and a thorough failure trend analysis were also completed in 1988. Evaluation of a reliability model for the SSME was continued.

**Recommendation:** The contractor should continue work to provide a high pressure oxygen turbopump (HPOTP) bearing having better margins to prevent failures due to wear and to provide longer cycle life. The two-duct power head and the large throat combustion chamber should be vigorously pursued and certified as rapidly as possible.

e. Launch, Landing, and Mission Operations

**Finding:** As the flight schedule picks up in FY 1989, there remains the clear and present danger of slipping back into the operating environment at KSC that helped to contribute to the Challenger accident. At the same time, the need to achieve greater efficiency and cost-effectiveness in turnaround procedures is clear. In this situation, NASA's commitment to the operating principle of "Safety first; schedule second" must be retained. If experience of the past is a guide to the future, the pressures to maintain or increase flight rate will be intense.

**Recommendation:** NASA must resist the schedule pressures that can compromise safety during launch operations. This requires strong enforcement by NASA of the directives governing STS operations.
B. Space Station Freedom Program (SSFP)

1. Management Structure

   a. Finding: The Space Station Freedom Program (SSFP) has an extremely complex organizational structure which includes a program support contractor (PSC) with system engineering and integration (SE&I) capability. NASA has not utilized this program support contractor effectively.

   Recommendation: NASA should ensure that the SSFP has a strong, competent systems engineering and integration team with the responsibility and authority to pull all of the various parts of the program together.

   b. Finding: There are semantic and definitional differences across the international partners and, perhaps, even the work packages. There is also an abundance of new acronyms being used. Some of these are a redefinition of acronyms used on previous NASA programs. As a result, there is great potential for confusion.

   Recommendation: NASA should ensure that there are commonly accepted definitions for key terms and acronyms. Where commonality is not possible, corresponding lists should be developed and widely disseminated. Continuing control over this process is required throughout the life of the SSFP.

   c. Finding: Some of the international partners have difficulty following discussions in English at the numerous working meetings. This limits their ability to make contributions and leads to the possibility of misunderstandings.

   Recommendation: Interpreters should be available at all meetings attended by international partners who have difficulty keeping pace with the English proceedings. The SSFP should make sure that it has ready access to document translators for sending and receiving meeting minutes, letters of clarification and project memoranda.

   d. Finding: The number of interfaces across which designs must be consistent, is very large. The responsibilities for defining design requirements to span these interfaces are not clear. This may lead, at best, to the need to backtrack in the design effort and, at worst, to the omission of a safety-critical element.

   Recommendation: SSFP management should clearly define the interface responsibilities for design definition as soon as possible. This will help ensure that each item is addressed as the design work progresses because the cognizant center, work package or design office will be aware of its role in the definition.

2. Safety and Product Assurance

   a. Finding: The level of activity of the SR&QA program for the SSFP appears low considering the complexity of the system design, integration and operational problems. A human factors function is not evident in the program's organizational structure.

   Recommendation: Management should make sure that the resources applied to SR&QA activities are commensurate with the need. An identifiable human factors function at Level II should be established and should be tasked with key relevant issues. The SR&QA activity must maintain its independence of operation and not be subordinated within the program.

   b. Finding: The Safety Summit process started in February 1988 has shown the potential to make a marked improvement in the depth and breadth of the program's safety function. This process is being conducted despite a lack of a charter, which is needed to formalize its activity.

   Recommendation: The Safety Summit process should be made formal through approval of a charter specifically delineating its functions and responsibilities.
3. Technical Issues

a. Finding: The SSFP design as baselined still does not include a specific "lifeboat" or crew emergency rescue vehicle (CERV). It is not clear whether NASA has given up on providing this capability or still has the issue under study.

**Recommendation:** The Panel has stated previously: "that a single purpose crew rescue vehicle or lifeboat should be an essential part of the Space Station's design."

b. Finding: The design philosophy for the caution and warning system (CWS) as embodied in NASA-STD-30000 does not provide sufficient guidance for establishing the precedence that the CWS should have in the design hierarchy. It also dictates a classification system which may not be best for the unique mission of the SSFP.

**Recommendation:** The CWS system design should be given primary status among all SSFP signaling and information systems.

c. Finding: The Software Support Environment (SSE) being developed as the Station's primary software development tool appears excellent. It does, however, lack a provision for making safety checks of software as it is being developed. The SSE design process also does not include an independent validation and verification (IV&V) of the SSE itself.

**Recommendation:** The SSE development program should be modified to incorporate both IV&V of the SSE and functional checks of the safety and reliability of the software developed using the SSE.

d. Finding: There have been many good "preliminary" or "quick look" studies performed to support SSFP preliminary design activities. These studies often involve broad assumptions which are used to fix certain items while others are varied. This is an excellent approach. History tells us it is important to document the extent and nature of these assumptions very clearly. This will minimize the possibility that people reading these studies in the future will mistake areas not examined for those examined and excluded as potential problems.

**Recommendation:** The SSFP management should develop and disseminate a standard policy for documentation of assumptions in preliminary studies. This policy should clearly differentiate among things assumed and not studied, items given a partial examination, and those studied fully.

e. Finding: It is understood that consideration is being given to expanding experiments or the storage of experimental gear into the nodes. This would make them essentially undifferentiated from the attached modules with respect to safety considerations.

**Recommendation:** SSFP management should establish a policy on node use as soon as possible. However, since there will always be the possibility that the nodes will be used for experimental or storage purposes, they should receive the same safety scrutiny as the remainder of the Station.

f. Finding: The baseline design does not include a provision for cleanup of hazardous spills in the open cabin area. Prevention of the spills appears to be the sole countermeasure approach.

**Recommendation:** The Space Station should include the capability and equipment for the crew to manage and resolve a toxic spill in the open areas and prevent spills from propagating to the remainder of the Space Station.

g. Finding: There is concern that the use of the current Shuttle space suits will be inadequate to meet the time line required for the erection of the Space Station Freedom.

**Recommendation:** NASA should go all-out to develop the new higher pressure suit so that it can be made available for timely use in the construction of the Space Station.
C. Aeronautics

Finding: Review of the safety policies associated with the NASA flight research programs at Langley, Ames and Dryden indicate good appreciation of the importance of a comprehensive aviation safety program that is closely linked to, but independent of, the flight projects. Whereas there are similar functions and activities being followed by all flight research centers, they operate under different operational procedures and are organized differently. The safety procedures of each center seem to have evolved separately. As an example, the Basic Operations Manual published by Dryden establishes the Chief Engineer as the focal point for aviation safety with the Aviation Safety Officer assigned to the Flight Crew Branch. The Langley Flight Research Program Management document establishes the Chief, Low-speed Aerodynamics Division as responsible for the overall flight research program including aviation safety with the safety officer in a subordinate branch.

Recommendation: Headquarters should review the flight research policies and procedures of the concerned flight research centers to determine if their existing flight safety procedures are adequate or if it is appropriate to standardize on a NASA-wide set of procedures for conducting flight research.
D. Risk Management

(1) **Finding:** In 1988 NASA issued several NMI and NHBs that provide policies and direction designed to improve the identification, evaluation and disposition of safety risks. In particular, NMI 8070.4 titled "Risk Management Policy for Manned Flight Programs" calls for a risk management process that includes categorization and prioritization of "risks" using qualitative techniques for ratings of the frequency expectation and severity of the potential mishaps. The documents also provide for use of quantitative risk analysis to provide a more definitive ordering of risks for purposes of risk management.

**Recommendation:** The risk management policies and initial implementing methodologies which have been issued in 1988 need to be evolved further. Practical quantitative risk assessment and other relative risk-level rating techniques should be actually developed. They should then be applied to help define the risk levels of flight and ground systems.

(2) **Finding:** The Panel has found strong commitment by each of the Center Director Offices to the rebuilding of the System Safety Functions in NASA. They have provided valuable guidance, encouragement and some level of financial support to the difficult restructuring, staffing and new policy implementation activities at their respective Centers. We are concerned that program resource cuts may be beginning to erode the progress which has been made.

**Recommendation:** In addition to continuing their good work we believe that additional vigorous assistance is required on the part of each Center Director's Office to assure the allocation of resources that are necessary so that the promising progress toward a truly effective Systems Safety capability does not falter and wither away after a few successful STS flights. The Center Directors must be seen as major champions of safety engineering within NASA.

(3) **Finding:** At JSC there is a clear commitment from the Director's level down to implementing the general policies and requirements of NMI 8070.4, and to improving techniques for risk assessment and risk mitigation. We observed that the SRM&QA organization is still not completely staffed. The organization has assembled hazard information that is used in the decisions of whether or not to fly. Whether this same information can be used to identify safety enhancing changes has yet to be examined.

**Recommendation:** Examine the collected data to see if it can be used to identify safety enhancing changes, and, if so, define these changes.

(4) **Finding:** At JSC the ASAP was presented a new approach to hazard rebaselining and rating, and a new format for the Mission Safety Assessment report (MSA). The new report is basically a set of evaluated fault trees which identify the potential system mishaps which might result from various hardware or human faults. For STS-26, 25 "significant risk" mishaps were "selected" for evaluation. All items selected had worst-case severity levels of "loss of crew and/or vehicle." All items were also rated as "unlikely," which was the lowest probability rating used in the hazard rating matrix. Thus, the MSA did not address even the relative risk-levels of the selected potential mishaps. However, the system safety organization did color-code various faults -- red, which designates that Improvement is Highly Desirable (IHD). Because all of the items selected for inclusion in the MSA are rated as unlikely to occur and therefore "safe to fly," there remain a large number of undifferentiated items designated IHD.

**Recommendation:** The ambiguity regarding risk levels implied by the red color-coded MSA needs to be removed. NASA needs to provide a much more objective (quantitative) and data-based risk assessment methodology that will differentiate the "unlikely" events for purposes
of assessing the principal contributors to risk on STS and Space Station type programs.

(5) Finding: Functional areas such as system-safety engineering at the Centers appear not to have received the resource support necessary to fulfill their responsibilities. The SRM&QA organizations at the centers appear to be relatively loosely coupled to Headquarters.

Recommendation: The various systems safety organizations throughout NASA should get stronger assistance from Headquarters especially regarding financial support.

(6) Finding: At MSFC the ASAP found an excellent SRM&QA organizational structure and good progress in staffing it with experienced engineering personnel. As other centers have done, they have engaged the services of two contractors to aid in developing the analysis techniques for practical, more quantitative risk assessment and statistical evaluation of data bases.

Recommendation: MSFC is to be commended for their progress in evolving its SR&QA function and these efforts should receive continuing high level support.
III
INFORMATION IN SUPPORT
OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. National Space Transportation System (NSTS/STS)

1. Management Structure

NASA will continue to face stern management challenges in this period of tightening budgetary resources. In this environment, there will be little opportunity to reflect on the important improvements that have been achieved during the long period of post-Challenger recovery. The ASAP, however, wants to make note of these improvements, many of which had been advocated for several years prior to the loss of STS 51-L. It is especially important that the expected budgetary pressures in fiscal year 1989 and beyond not be allowed to erode these advances.

a. Strengthening of the role of NASA Headquarters (Level I) and STS program management (Level II), coupled with tighter management controls over NASA's research and development centers (Level III), has clarified responsibilities within the total STS program and strengthened accountability at all levels. Of special importance is the position of Deputy Director (NSTS) for Operations as the focal point of the highly complex shuttle processing and launch activities at the Kennedy Space Center. It is essential that this more disciplined management structure continue in place once the launch rate accelerates. The ASAP has advocated for many years the operating principle of "Safety first; schedule second." NASA must always manage the STS program with this principle firmly in mind.

b. The Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA) function is now stronger, more visible, better staffed, and better funded since establishment of the position of Associate Administrator for SRM&QA, reporting directly to the Administrator. The incumbent, George Rodney, has brought to this position the professionalism and management ability to ensure that safety considerations receive the priority attention they should have. He is clearly in the key decision loops and has established an essentially independent "certification" function within NASA. At the NASA Centers, the respective Directors of SRM&QA report directly to the Center Director and provide oversight of all projects at the Center while also reporting functionally to the Associate Administrator. Channels exist for appealing issues of concern to higher authorities within SRM&QA and program organizations. There are budgetary pressures within the NSTS program which are causing directors of major STS elements to propose cuts to reduce SRM&QA activities. In a similar vein, cutbacks have been proposed in critical safety documentation associated with the Space Shuttle Main Engine, i.e., FMEA/CIL and Hazard Analysis documentation.

In the ASAP's view, the SRM&QA function should not be subject to budget reductions of a magnitude that will eliminate or downgrade essential activities. This view is reinforced by the fact that increased, not reduced, attention will be required as the flight rate increases and the dangers of complacency and human error expand accordingly.

c. Management communications have been greatly improved, both vertically and horizontally. Evidence of this improvement is the return of the Management Council, an entity that fosters direct and regular communication among all top STS managers and R&D Center Directors. This straightforward sharing of critical problems and information among persons who must deal with them has, in turn, produced important benefits throughout the STS organization. These benefits are evident at critical program milestones, such as Design
Certification Reviews and Flight Readiness Reviews, in terms of knowledge of outstanding problems, status of fixes to these problems, availability of resources, and impacts on the total program.

As the flight rate and attendant operating pressures increase, additional efforts will be needed to maintain the viability and usefulness of these communication channels.

Two other management issues merit comment:

(1) In launch processing, the operating principle of "Safety first; schedule second" must be reinforced while NASA is working to achieve greater efficiency and cost-effectiveness in turnaround procedures. This is a delicate balance to achieve and maintain. At present, NASA's philosophy and strategy regarding launch processing, along with related operational criteria, are not universally understood. It is extremely important, as budgets grow tighter that NASA develop and communicate a clear, unambiguous statement of the nature, purpose, and operating principles of the STS and how these are served by the launch processing function. This statement should take into account the Shuttle's continuing R&D characteristics, the alternative of using expendable launch vehicles for missions not requiring human presence in space, budget priorities, and the level of risk that is acceptable in Shuttle operations. There remains the clear and present danger of slipping back into the operating environment at KSC that contributed to the Challenger accident.

In this regard, the Shuttle Processing Contractor (SPC) appears to be growing in capability and control of the highly complex turnaround and launch procedure aided by knowledgeable personnel from the element contractors. SPC personnel are now routinely part of key JSC, MSFC, KSC, and element contractor teams working on launch processing matters (a situation not initially true). Integrated data systems to track the condition of the Orbiter and its elements, along with the launch processing sequence, are still in development; various interim systems will continue to be relied upon for the foreseeable future. There is also a need to involve more hands-on technicians in efforts to streamline the turnaround and launch process. The importance of logistics and maintenance factors in the process (discussed in more detail in Section III.A.4 of this report) cannot be overstated. Nonetheless, launch processing must continue to receive the continuing attention of NASA's top management.

(2) NASA, along with many other Federal agencies, has suffered through more than a decade of hostility directed toward Federal employees and a related failure to maintain salary comparability at the higher management levels. Not too many years ago Federal careers were viewed as highly desirable by many of the Nation's "best and brightest." NASA, in particular, was able to recruit from among the most highly respected scientists and engineers and retain these employees. This commitment to excellence among its personnel was perhaps the single most important factor in NASA's many successes. Many of these outstanding civil servants have chosen to stay with NASA, usually at great personal financial sacrifice, but many others have left. Recruitment of the best graduates is increasingly difficult, if not impossible.

The ASAP recognizes that NASA urgently needs greater flexibility and resources in competing for and retaining the skilled personnel who are required to carry forward the Nation's space and aeronautical programs. This recognition is growing through the work of such groups as the National Commission on the Public Service, chaired by Paul Volker, and the American Agenda project, chaired by former Presidents Ford and Carter. Although the salary comparability question will be settled by the Administration and Congress, NASA should speak out clearly about the increasing costs of the present situation and the specific steps that are needed to once again make NASA careers among the most desirable and respected.

2. Safety Enhancements

After the Challenger accident NASA embarked on a major review of all matters relating to safety of flight. All waivers were cancelled. All critical items, failure mode effects and analysis and hazard analyses were thoroughly reviewed at all appropriate levels of
NSTS and NASA management. Final decisions were made by the Level I management team headed by Mr. Arnold Aldrich. Many changes in hardware and software design as well as operational procedures were approved and implemented.

Using the Orbiter as an example, there were over 200 design changes made prior to the STS-26 mission. These were tested, retested as appropriate, leading to qualification for flight on STS-26. Reviewing the effectiveness of the manner in which these modifications(changes were implemented revealed that NASA, Rockwell and other contractors felt they were all mandatory to bring the Space Shuttle to an acceptable level of safety and it was reported that not one of them showed any anomalies during the STS-26 and -27 missions.

The flights of Orbiters Discovery (STS-26) and Atlantis (STS-27) did, however, show the impact of weather, particularly upper winds and low level cloud formations on launch ability. Obviously structural margins above those now available would certainly improve the probability of launch and safe flight through changeable weather conditions. Structural changes to improve this situation are now well understood.

The tile damage on STS-27 clearly shows that there remains much to learn from each and every mission and that a continued effort toward a sturdier tile system and reduction in impacting debris is required.

As the flight rate increases a very strong effort will be needed to determine what is necessary to further enhance safety—and a method for incorporating the changes will be required to prevent undue disruption of operations. A major portion of management's attention and action will be required to make this effort effective.

As a result of the post Challenger efforts many mandatory changes were incorporated and a large data base was developed. This data base can provide the means to further enhance flight and ground safety. The NASA centers and prime contractors have provided the ASAP with their own candidate lists of items which need further study, see Appendix IV.D.

STS management should establish an aggressive program to prioritize these lists with the end objective being to incorporate safety enhancing changes into the Space Shuttle. As discussed elsewhere in this report, modern analytical risk assessment methods could be used to prioritize proper changes with emphasis on real gains in safety while taking into consideration the many other factors needed to support risk management decisions. Program management must maintain the momentum now evident to achieve further needed safety related hardware and software changes within the resources available to the STS program.

Such an effort merits a high priority if the future flight rates are to be achieved with acceptable safety levels. The ASAP views this as a two-step process:

The first step is the identification of design and procedural changes which can lead to a cost effective reduction in risk and, hence, a safety improvement. The extensive analyses, design modifications and procedural changes leading to the flight of STS-26 provided new insights into the design of the STS system and identified numerous changes which were necessary or desirable. The identification process is continuing as lessons are learned from each flight and fed back into the planning and mission safety assessments for the subsequent efforts.

The second step in the process involves the control and communication of the product improvement information to ensure that STS management is constantly aware of changes which can reduce risk in a cost effective manner. This step is not presently well understood. Although there are lists of desirable and required changes, there is no methodology/system for making sure that a change, once identified, is kept constantly in front of management. A decision to defer action on an identified change should not cause that change to disappear.
NASA should review and implement a simple management information system to collect information on design changes and keep that information in front of management at key decision times.

3. Advanced Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM)

NASA has received well deserved worldwide congratulatory comments on the successful resumption of Space Shuttle flights. Of particular interest at this time has been the performance and post-flight condition of the solid rocket motors. Examination of the motors thus far has not disclosed any flaws or unusual condition that would indicate cause for concern about the safety and reliability of the Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM). In view of this it is difficult to understand NASA's determination to proceed with the procurement of a new solid rocket motor -- designated as the Advanced Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM) -- for which is claimed superior safety and reliability. As discussed in the section of this report devoted to the Solid Rocket Booster, the Redesigned Solid Rocket Booster (RSRB) has corrected the major design deficiencies of the STS 51-L SRMs and improved other components that were considered marginal.

NASA's premise is that the ASRM will benefit from advanced solid rocket motor technology and automated manufacturing methods and thus evolve into a safer and more reliable solid rocket motor than the current RSRM. It is not evident why such improvements, as they develop, could not be introduced into the current production process. In any event the current STS schedule, if successfully carried out, would see more than 160 uses of the RSRMs before the new ASRM is introduced. With such a history behind it, any quantitative risk assessment analysis would most certainly favor the RSRM as regards reliability and safety.

In view of this situation—and because other elements of the STS system, if modified or replaced, could contribute more to improving safety margins—the Panel recommends that NASA reexamine the plan to procure the ASRM and study other options for the replacement of the current solid rocket motors. Such options should consider liquid rocket motors including the pressure-fed type. Safety and reliability should be the prime objective but it is believed these features can be achieved along with a desired performance enhancement.

The ASAP endorses the liquid pressure-fed rocket technology program being undertaken at MSFC and recommends that NASA support an expedite their effort. Also, rocket technology improvements arising from the Advance Launch System (ALS) technology program should be carefully monitored and applied to the manufacturing processes of the current rockets.

4. Logistics and Support

The transfer of a major part of Rockwell logistics and support activities for the Orbiter to the immediate KSC area has been complete and management programs as well as certain facilities and equipment are in place. The Rockwell Service Center program has been funded for $419 million covering three years from October 1, 1988, and will provide for all Rockwell management functions related to logistics, material, ground support equipment and quality assurance functions. Continuity of management and technical experience is thus assured. An arrangement of this kind was, in fact, recommended by the ASAP several years ago and we are pleased to see that it has now come into being.

Relationships between the SPC contracto (Lockheed) and Rockwell appear now to be excellent and the technical working interface is maturing well. A great deal of credit for this generally satisfactory situation must be accorded to the NASA-KSC logistics management group together with top management of RI-Downey and the KSC Center Director. Some general comments upon major aspects of the program follow:

Control of Cannibalization

The cannibalization issue, over which a great deal of concern has been expressed in earlier ASAP Annual Reports, appears to be yielding to careful control methods instituted by KSC, RI and SPC. Under the original funding guidelines a large number of components could not be provisioned and some cases have caused multiple removals. There is now funding for a
high proportion of these under a Zero Balance Cannibalization Candidate program. A system of priority allocation for Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) repair and overhaul programs has also been instituted. The rate of cannibalization is decreasing and, most important, any contemplated action towards cannibalization must receive approval from the highest authority at KSC, JSC and RI/SPC. Each individual cannibalization action is continuously tracked by the NASA-KSC Integrated Logistics organization.

While cannibalization in such a small-fleet program of highly specialized and unique Orbiter vehicles can never be completely eliminated, the management attention and control mechanisms instituted should ensure an acceptable pattern. The need for cannibalization can be expected to rise again as the launch rate increases but will now, we believe, be under satisfactory control.

Improvement in Overhaul and Repair Turnaround Time

This vital aspect appears to be receiving full attention on the part of NASA and its contractors and the individual component and equipment manufacturers. Control programs identifying the worst offenders in terms of component turnaround periods are now in place and a vigorous auditing system involving team visits to selected manufacturers is in place.

An LRU spares reservation policy was established in November 1987 to ensure that components or units should not be issued until the real need date thus conserving shelf supplies. In spite of diligent management attention of this kind, however, the backlog of repairable components is increasing and "aged items" (items over six months old) quantities are increasing. This remains a serious problem and continuing attention is required. In line with this, some thirteen extensive meetings are planned with key vendors in an effort to improve the turnaround times.

Acquisition and Control of Inventory (fill rates)

Budget—at least in the near term—does not now appear to be a constraint in the spares acquisition process. Lead times for procure-

ments are, of course, still occasionally critical but the actual fill rates (the response ratio to demands for spares) are close to 99% for non-repairable items and moving toward a goal of 95% for repairable items. Alternative procurement for selected items through DOD sources has shown significant cost savings.

Development of ATE (Automatic Test Equipment)

The ATE program at the Rockwell Service Center (RSC) is proceeding well. The test equipment has been modified to emphasize the type of units that will offer the best economical return. For example, large population LRUs offer excellent opportunity for employing ATE, the multiplexer units being good candidates. The programs are now ahead of schedule and are expected to be fully operational in FY 1993.

FMEA/CIL Completions

The Failure Modes and Effects Analyses and the Critical Item List resolutions have been completed. This task encompassed some 12,000 FMEAs. 2,585 CIL waivers were required but all have been resolved or approved. This enormous task is viewed as being very beneficial to the logistics program and a large number of the FMEAs will be rewritten in 1989 using the experience gained.

Control and Communication for Logistics

Control and communications for logistics management from coast-to-coast and also between the NASA Centers has been greatly improved. The evolving Rockwell Service Center at KSC is central to this and as the repair facilities come fully into effect with both RSC and NASA Logistic groups, combined with the necessarily tighter integration with the LSOC-SPC, good results may be anticipated. At the detailed controls end of the spectrum such devices as the Logistics Assets Tracking System (LATS), which is a desktop computer component or item locating system, can be expected to enhance control. Within the KSC Logistics organization, innovative statistical and trend analyses are being developed to provide full visibility of the use of logistics assets. These data will permit enhanced man-
agement control and, insofar as possible, decrease the need for cannibalization activities.

The following notes refer principally to activities or directions which should be considered for 1989 and beyond:

a. There is a need to properly implement the plan for scheduled structural overhaul in a phased manner for the Orbiter fleet. Such a plan should probably be divided into zones on the vehicle culminating in a period out of service at KI Palmdale for major overhaul actions such as control surface removal, landing gear exchange, etc. Specific programs would inspect for corrosion and heat damage and the repair or replacement of fatigued structural parts. It may well be that such an overhaul program is being contemplated now but the ASAP would welcome an opportunity to examine it in detail.

Allied to the above is the need for a pilot program to remove selected functional system high-time components (Rockwell has such a maintenance sampling program proposal in conjunction with JSC). This pilot program needs to be studied and expanded with rather earlier periods for removal, teardown and reporting than the 8 years time-since-new typically shown for OV-102.

b. On the matter of SSME logistics and support there needs to be a closer working relationship and attendant information exchange between RI Downey and Rocketdyne. This also applies to MSFC and the KSC Logistics operation. This element of all the support issues, seems to be considered in isolation, that is, "outside the loop" of the Orbiter vehicle itself. What is required is a "systems approach" to total logistics support.

c. When considering support and supply programs one must project real plans to at least the year 2000 when most of the vendors will have totally lost interest and the real problems begin. The Space Station has no other carrier and self-sufficiency at KSC will be paramount.

d. The continued attraction of technical skills and management capability upon a career basis at the KSC complex over the next 10 to 20 years demands expanded interest and attention now.

e. If the entire logistics and supply program is allowed to continue on its present course the KSC complex will constitute uniquely valuable space-launch facility. It unthinkable that the Space Station should not be designed from the outset to take the full advantage of this superb program.

5. Space Shuttle Elements

a. Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor/Booster (SRM/SRB)

The redesigned solid rocket booster has corrected the design deficiencies found in the original boosters used with the STS 51-F vehicle. In addition, other components that were considered to be of marginal design were improved. Extensive subscale and full-scale testing results and analyses provided the confidence needed to launch STS-26. Most of the changes that were incorporated and action taken are documented in the Report of the National Research Council's Panel for the Technical Evaluation of NASA's Redesign of the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor/Booster. A ASAP member served with this special panel.

The major items redesigned were the case-to-case field joints, the igniter, internal nozzle joints, nozzle ablative parts, nozzle outer bore ring, the External Tank attach ring, and ground support equipment. The most important redesign effort centered on the case-to-case joint which corrected the former design deficiencies. The redesigned field joint feature included:

1. The adhesively bonded insulation joints and barrier o-rings which prevents the hot combustion gases from reaching the primary and secondary o-rings. Tests proved that the seals worked even with the introduction of severe intentional flaws.

2. The capture feature of the field joints and the addition of 100 radial bolts to the case-to-nozzle joint reduced the gap opening.

All of these improvements have made the redesigned rocket boosters more reliable than the original rocket boosters, and were proven out by an extensive test program. The test program included:
**PV-1 Test Article**

![Diagram of PV-1 Test Article](image)

Figure 1

**Flaw Test Summary**

![Diagram of Flaw Test Summary](image)

Figure 2

*International Flaws

* Tests 24 ea. at Morton Thrasher and 13 ea. at MSFC
** Tests 2 ea. at Morton Thrasher and 3 ea. at MSFC
(3) A number of full scale, full duration hot firing tests. The production verification motor (PV-1) test (Fig. 1) was typical of these. Other full-scale, short duration and sub-scale tests, as shown in Fig. 2, also exhibited consistent results. All of these tests were conducted successfully without appreciable erosion or "blow by" affecting the primary or secondary o-rings. In many of these tests, where deliberate flaws were introduced to the primary and secondary o-rings a pressure of 700 to 800 psi reached these o-rings, but because it took over 10 seconds for the pressure to build up, the combustion gas had cooled to below 130 degrees F.

(4) As further assurance, the o-ring resiliency has demonstrated its ability to track a gap opening of .018 inches, which is twice the joint gap opening. Electric heaters were added to the joints in order to maintain a temperature of approximately 75° F which guarantees the required resiliency.

There are a number of enhancements that need to be considered in the following areas which affect reliability:

(5) The polysulfide adhesively bonded case-to-nozzle joint forms voids and blow holes because the fixed housing slides over the insulation on the aft dome during assembly. Although full scale testing with intentional flaws show that only cooled gas can reach the o-rings, these voids should be eliminated to obtain a better reproduceable product.

(6) Internal nozzle ablative composite parts which protect vital components against hot combustion gases have shown blisters, charring and "wedge-outs" in carbon-cloth phenolic material during nominal full-scale hot-fire tests as well as during the STS-26 mission. Because of the unpredictable behavior of these materials as a result of process and manufacturing variations a program of analysis and testing should be undertaken to understand and then eliminate these problems.

(7) The field joint heaters allow the baseline fluoroelastomer o-ring to act as a satisfactory seal. However, NASA should continue its efforts to find an o-ring material compatible with grease which has low temperature resilience so that it can function without heaters.

(8) Stricter environmental control systems for internal insulation bonding and protection of components should be established and implemented.

(9) Improved non-destructive testing and evaluation methods are needed.

(10) Current requirements specify SRM case segments are to be designed for 20 uses. However, the effect of interference fit, joints, hydroburst tests, corrosion protection and the effect of ocean splash-down need to be properly assessed and validated by structural analysis in order to determine criteria for reuse of case segments. Appropriate data concerning reuse, cost and lead time to obtain additional cases should also be developed.

(11) The accumulation of propellant slag that plugs the nozzle boot ring vent holes causing excessive differential pressure across the flexible boot ring at rocket motor tailoff should be eliminated.

In addition to the above items, there are other situations that require attention and corrective action. The aft skirt weld cracked at hold down post #8 at 128% of limit load during the STA-3 static test (140% required). Although it was considered safe to fly STS-26, additional analysis and testing is needed to determine why the welded area failed at 0.8% strain, when specimen uni-axial tests showed failures at 4.0% strain level. Tests to determine the effect of various loadings and potential fixes should be conducted. Experimental techniques like stress coat with additional strain gauges should be employed to better understand the stress distribution so the analytical model can be improved. Many of the Finite Element Model structural analyses have yielded predicted stresses that were in error by 30%. Structural modeling and analytical methodology of the behavior of complex structures subjected to multiple loads is challenging and must be verified by information from tests.
b. **External Tank**

Of all the elements of the STS the external tank has displayed two characteristics of note: reliability and small but annoying anomalies. There have been few problems with the external tank during its use in the ascent phase of the mission and its programmed entry and destruction. The external thermal insulation and various sensors have been troublesome almost continuously but neither of these has been a major concern. How to protect the orbiter external tile system from insulation debris is a problem that is being worked continuously but poses little threat to the orbiter tiles. The sensors for temperature, pressure, valve positions and liquid levels have been bothersome and to some degree detract (during launch processing and the countdown for launch) from other, more significant activities. To reduce any impacts on ground and flight operations it behooves NASA to develop an integrated plan to provide solutions to these problems.

c. **Orbiter Loads/Stress Analysis and Structural Modifications**

The Space Shuttle orbiter original loads/stress analysis program, Automatic Systems for Kinematic Analysis (ASKA), was stretched out over a period of six years and the follow-on ASKA 6.0 loads/stress analysis over a period of four years. Some of the reasons for this lengthy analysis program are:

1. The existing ASKA loads and stress analysis computer programs had to be upgraded to solve the complex problems associated with the Space Shuttle configuration.
2. The proper level of funding was not available to keep the analyses progressing at a uniform rate and there were too many starts and stops as well as changes in personnel.
3. New requirements were injected into the analysis from time to time which compounded difficulties by adding to the scope of the activity.

The lessons learned from the orbiter stress analysis program should be used to avoid unnecessary problems in the design of the Space Station and future vehicle systems.

The Orbiter structure has been proof test to 120% of design limit load, but flight test results show that the wing and tail loads are 15% to 20% higher than anticipated. Because of this it is necessary to employ trajectory shaping to protect the structure.

A restricted allowable flight envelope was established to protect the structure during flight. The character of the envelope is illustrated, in part, by diagrams called "squatcheloids" such as shown in Fig. 3. This figure shows an original squatcheloid which was used in the Integrated Vehicle Baseline Configuration IVBC-3/ASKA 6.0 loads/stress analysis. Negative margins in the wing, fuselage and vertical tail structure cause the flight limitations. Restricting the flight profile to avoid both regions of negative structural margins and major modifications of the existing structure has lowered the probability of launch from the original goal of 95%. Although this situation can be somewhat mitigated by more time aloft data.

The ASAP feels that the Orbiter structure should be strengthened as soon as practical in order to decrease the risk to the STS during ascent. There are some modifications to the wing and aft fuselage that can be accomplished in a short period of time, however, there are other structural modifications (aft fuselage and vertical tail) that are more costly and require a larger downtime for rework.

d. **Space Shuttle Main Engine**

In its 1988 report, the ASAP noted that many changes were to be incorporated into the shuttle main engines prior to the flight of STS-26. Of the various problems underlying these changes, The ASAP considered the following to be the most significant:

1. HPFTP* First Stage Blade Cracks
2. HPFTP Second Stage Firtree Face Crack
3. HPFTP Coolant Liner Maximum Pressure
4. HPOTP** First Stage Shank Cracks
5. HPOTP Bearing-Ball Temperatures
6. HPOTP Bearing Failure
7. 4000 Hz Pressure Resonance in Liquid Oxygen (LOX) Inlet Region

*(HPFTP = High Pressure Fuel Turbopump)
**(HPOTP = High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump)
Example of Ascent Flight Restriction Derived From 6.0 Analysis Results

IVBC-3/6.0 Flight Envelope for Assessment L.P. = 95%

"OCA-D" Flight Envelope

- Flight Restrictions Result in Lower Launch Probability (L.P.)
- L.P. is Mission Dependent

OMS Pod (M = 1.55)  OMS Deck (M = 1.05)

*Allowable Envelope Determined by:
- Wing Structure
- Wing Leading Edge
- Vertical Tail

Complete Set of Flight Restrictions Defined in SODB Structural Constraints Document
Upper Forward Fuselage
- Skin-Stringer Aluminum 2024-T31

Crew Compartment
- Floating
- Welded Skin Aluminum 2219-T851

Payload Bay Doors
- 2 Doors Split at Vertical
- Graphite Epoxy Inconel Hinges

Forward RCS Module
- Skin-Stringer

Midfuselage
- Skin-Stringer

Wing
- Skin-Stringer Covers Aluminum 2124-T831
- Web and Truss Spars
- Elevon Honeycomb Coverage Aluminum 2124
- Conventional Aluminum Structure 2024-T6

Aft Fuselage
- Skin-Stringer Shell Aluminum 2124-T831
- Titanium/Boron Epoxy
- Thrust Structure
- Aluminum Honeycomb Base Heat Shield With Thermal Insulation

Body Flap
- Aluminum 2024

Vertical Stabilizer
- Skin and Stringer Aluminum 2124-T851
- Fin Covers Aluminum 2124-T81
- Honeycomb Rudder Cover
- Machined Spars
- Sheet Metal Ribs

OMP/RCS
- Skin-Stringer
- Graphite Epoxy and Milled Skin
- Titanium Thermal Barrier

ORBITAL STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS
Figure 3a
Each of these problems and the design or manufacturing process changes underway to resolve them were discussed. During 1988 extensive testing of the changes met with major success in all areas with the exception of the HPOTP bearing failure. The status in late 1988 was:

**HPFTP First Stage Turbine Blades**

The problem was transverse cracks of the blade firstree lobe resulting from excessive strain levels in presence of hydrogen. The phase II changes improved the blade root fit and used shot peening to increase the strain capability. Extensive certification testing was completed in 1988. No lobe cracks were detected and wear patterns showed improved load sharing resulting from tighter fit acceptance standards.

**HPFTP Second Stage Turbine Blades**

The second stage TP blade cracks initiate at defects or carbide inclusions during the first mainstage cycle. They were enhanced by thermal stresses and the hydrogen environment. The initial process changes (shot peening and gold plating) eliminated downstream face cracks but appeared to cause many corner cracks. The above processes combined with recontouring shank and enlarging the corner radii have been extensively tested with no cracks detected. Unmodified blades incorporated into the same turbine shells showed cracks in as high as 40% of that population.

**HPFTP Coolant Liner Maximum Pressure**

Reorificing and manufacturing weld controls incorporated in the improved liner design continued to demonstrate throughout 1988 that major pressure differential reductions from earlier configurations have been achieved.

**HPOTP First Stage Turbine Blades**

This problem was the appearance and growth of high-cycle fatigue cracks in the blade shank after only 1000 to 2000 seconds of operation. The design solution was to incorporate a two-piece damper in the blade. This design was tested in 1987 with encouraging results. In 1988, validation testing was continued to establish inspection and replacement cycle times. By year end, two blade sets had undergone ten cycle 5500-second certification tests and eight sets had accumulated 114 cycles and more than 59,000 seconds with no shank cracks. The highest time on a single set was greater than 11,000 seconds.

**HPOTP Bearing-Ball Temperature**

The issue of whether the balls in the turbopump bearings have any realistic probability of undergoing sustained auto-ignition in the oxygen environment should be considered closed. Extensive tests and micro-surface analysis in 1988 and the very high total time of bearing ball exposures since the start of the SSME development have all shown sustained ignition (or any ignition) to be a vanishingly small risk.

**HPOTP Bearing Failures**

This short operating-life problem with the HPOTP bearing showed up more explicitly in 1987 tests with HPOTP units having internal strain gauges and accelerometers and was described in ASAP's 1987 report. The basic design problem is complex, involving inadequate loadsharing, design tolerance, cage design and materials, etc. Based on extensive review and analysis during 1988, a decision has been made to limit the current bearing to a single flight. ASAP endorses this action since the data shows that a significant margin (3x) would exist against wear/play criteria. There will be a number of bearing redesigns investigated in 1989 for later incorporation to provide better engine turnaround economics.

**4000 Hz Pressure Resonance**

This problem was discussed in ASAP's 1986 and 1987 reports. ASAP agrees with Rocketdyne that this is an engine-build specific phenomenon which can be (and now is) screened out by acceptance test rejection. It is, therefore, a cost effectiveness issue, not a hazard.

For several years ASAP has strongly supported the benefits of the two-duct powerhead and the large diameter throat combustion chamber, and has advocated their earliest incorporation into flight engines. Both of these changes would result in significant reductions of
stress on the turbopump systems and structural loads on various parts of the ducts and liners. Therefore, they would significantly reduce the risk levels at the 104% power setting, and even more critically during operation at 109% during certain abort modes. We are pleased that both of these improvements were converted into hardware in 1988.

The large throat engine (0208) underwent limited testing quite successfully. System pressures decreased, turbine temperatures were lowered and overall internal engine stress environments were significantly reduced. The post test hardware condition reflected these reduced stresses. As an additional benefit, the engine performance was only minimally impacted. The improvement in operating margins can be seen in Figure 4 where the power level equivalent of various key stress parameters are compared at 104% thrust with a standard Phase II engine.

A two-duct hot gas manifold power head was also completed and was ready for testing at year end. Three other units are in work which would permit full certification in 1989-90. ASAP believes both of these new designs should be certified and introduced into the SSME flight hardware as soon as possible to provide major safety risk reduction.

In late 1987, three other important activities were underway at the SSME contractor, Rocketdyne, and these were continued during 1988.

(1) A structural audit
(2) A weld assessment
(3) Failure trend analysis and reliability model

**Structural Audit**

The structural audit reviewed all of the structural analyses with special emphasis on long-term durability. It reexamined critically the environments, analytical models, material properties, fabrication processes and total history of verification testing. The work was done by an audit team of specialists experienced in various disciplines such as structures, dynamics, aero-thermal, heat transfer, materials and manufacturing. As completed in 1988, there were a total of 192 part audits, with heavy emphasis on the turbo-machinery. Of 192 parts, 25 had residual concerns identified. Of these, all but eight were resolved by further analysis or measurements. The eight remain limited by Deviation Approval Requests (DA)

**Weld Assessment**

The weld assessment project identified "critical item" welds and reviewed them in detail for their specifications, safety factors, fabrication processes and inspectability. The activity calculates critical initial flaw sizes for critical welds and assessed their detectability using the best non-destructive inspection techniques. Over 3000 welds were reviewed. The rationale for retention of each weld was reassessed against various acceptability criteria. It is ASAP's view that more work needs to be carried out on weld inspection techniques for both root-side and butt-side welds. Furthermore, the uncertainty in verifying such welds should demand higher design factors of safety in all future hardware designs where such welds cannot be eliminated.

ASAP commends NASA and its contract Rocketdyne for completing these objective and thorough audits. They have served to greatly increase confidence in the engine's structural design and in the techniques for verifying engine's true configuration.

**Failure Trend Analyses and Reliability Model**

As reported in 1987, the SSME contractor Rocketdyne, has been evolving methodology for analyzing the entire data base obtained from the development and flight engines. The failure trend analyses were matched to component failure models using both "failures" and "unsatisfactory condition reports." Adverse "trends" would be quantified when possible as an aid to managing corrective actions. The failure data are also being used to make estimates of selected confidence levels of the "statistic failure probabilities," assuming the engine is a random failure statistical system. The data are being summarized at two stages of mission operation: prior to SRB ignition and after liftoff; and for two general consequences shutdown of an engine and criticality 1, loss of life or vehicle. Results are presented for three
### Phase II vs Engine 208 Rated Performance Comparison Based on 104% Data (MR = 6.011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Phase II</th>
<th>Engine 0208 (Rated)</th>
<th>Equivalent Power Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Altitude Thrust</td>
<td>490,000</td>
<td>490,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Impulse</td>
<td>452.9</td>
<td>452.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC Pc</td>
<td>3126</td>
<td>2856</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Turbopump Speeds**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Turbopump Speeds</th>
<th>Phase II</th>
<th>Engine 0208 (Rated)</th>
<th>Equivalent Power Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LPFTP</td>
<td>15,925</td>
<td>15,177</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPOTP</td>
<td>5,158</td>
<td>5,011</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPFTP</td>
<td>35,131</td>
<td>34,887</td>
<td>103%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPOTP</td>
<td>28,109</td>
<td>28,205</td>
<td>104%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Turbine Discharge Temp.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Turbine Discharge Temp.</th>
<th>Phase II</th>
<th>Engine 0208 (Rated)</th>
<th>Equivalent Power Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HPOTP</td>
<td>1390</td>
<td>1280</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPFT</td>
<td>1700</td>
<td>1569</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pump Discharge Pr</td>
<td>4311</td>
<td>4090</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPOTP Main Boost</td>
<td>7378</td>
<td>7284</td>
<td>103%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPFTP</td>
<td>6390</td>
<td>6093</td>
<td>101%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4
# MTBF After Redesign

Mean Number of Flights Between Engine Shutdowns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Redesign Effectiveness Factor</th>
<th>0.0</th>
<th>0.25</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>0.75</th>
<th>1.0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liftoff</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainstage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power Level</th>
<th>100 Percent</th>
<th>104 Percent</th>
<th>109 Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liftoff</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainstage</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>89</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>135</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>280</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5
power levels, 100, 104 and 109%. The data base is quite extensive, comprised of 49 equivalent engines and almost 1000 tests with nearly 300,000 seconds of hot fire.

The results can be expressed in the form of "mean number of flights between engine shutdowns" for (1) prior to liftoff, assuming a three-engine cluster, and (2) at mainstage (a function of power level) with the effectiveness of all redesigns subsequent to each failure as a parameter. Current data is shown for a confidence value of 50% in Figure 5. The prudence of limiting engine operation to 104% is supported by these results, as is the potential value of incorporation of the two-duct powerhead and the large throat combustion chamber.

It should be noted, however, that such "probability" data (particularly with relatively limited data using the phase II turbopumps) does not really describe the probable risk level associated with the engine. For developing a "risk level" one needs to evolve probabilities for the various consequences of an engine shutdown during mainstage. One also should estimate the most likely asymptotic values of the curves depicting cluster reliability versus number of cycles for the reconfigured engines with LRU replacement criteria as a parameter. These most likely asymptotic values will be dominated by the demonstrated margins against the critical failure modes with the uncertainty around the values being a function of the extent of the test data base.

For many years the ASAP has been advocating that margin-to-failure demonstration is most important in assessing the risks associated with critical failure modes. Therefore, we were pleased to see that significant work along this line was carried out on the SSME during 1988. Some of the most significant tests were:

- Demonstration (360 seconds at 1760 R) of flight redline temperature on the HPOTP
- Incorporation of degraded bearings on two HPOTP units
- Fuel pre-burner injector contamination
- Sustained hot and cold wall leaks in the engine nozzle
- HPOTP nozzle-plug ingestion - two units
- Stuck throttle evaluations with electrical and hydraulic lock-up

Such testing, when carefully planned and instrumented, can provide the most cost effective way of estimating the asymptotic failure-rate values for the various critical failure modes.

The Panel is aware of work underway on an alternate set of turbopumps to replace the existing Phase II configurations. This activity, in support of enhanced reliability and safety, is an excellent use of NASA resources. The ASAP commend the STS program for this initiative. The sheer magnitude of the test data base on the existing pumps developed over the past nine years and the fact that each of the serious failures pinpointed original design weaknesses that have now been corrected, provides strong arguments against switching to an all new turbopump concept. While such new pumps may (or may not) provide somewhat improved life-cycle replacement costs, they would bring a whole new set of failure modes which would need many years of testing and corrective action to develop a basis for risk assessment. During that period, flights with such engines would have a much lower indicated cluster reliability status.

e. Launch, Landing and Mission Operations

The pre-launch processing for STS-26 had virtually no time constraints. The launch date was allowed to slip as needed to accomplish a thorough assessment of all systems and processes. Much learning and re-learning was involved so both delays and unusual costs were acceptable.

Processing for STS-27 has shown some greater efficiencies, particularly with respect to the stacking of the solids. The launch pad has now sustained two flights, and the launch crews are more aware of processing strengths and weaknesses.
Based on the launch of STS-26 and the processing through the FRR of STS-27, it does not appear that the turnaround rate implied by the shuttle manifest can be reached. Discussions with managers of various STS program elements yield somewhat different outlooks ranging from confidence that efficiency can be significantly improved to the belief that none of the existing processing steps can be eliminated.

There is a clear need for a re-evaluation of the processing which leads to a Shuttle launch. In particular, a formal, inter-center review of the need for and composition of each major step in the processing flow should be undertaken. The objective of this review should be to characterize steps as:

- Essential in their present form.
- Essential but subject to change to improve their speed and/or results.
- Not needed and capable of being eliminated immediately.
- Suitable for elimination in the future at a predetermined milestone point and under a predefined set of conditions.

The review of each step should be based on formalized inputs from those managers who used (or did not use) the step's results. STS program management and the SRM&QA organization each should be able to veto the elimination of a step but not a consensus decision to retain it.

The ASAP is still concerned with the availability of appropriate processing staff at KSC without the need for excessive overtime. Plans to control excessive work hours have been established, and KSC and contractor management are to be commended. However, future processing flows on a tighter schedule and with four orbiters will be a problem. Personnel planning for current and future processing operations should continue to receive a high priority so that the excellent overtime and work policies currently in place can be maintained.

Data vs. Information

During the return-to-flight activities instrumentation was added to the STS system. The acquisition of additional data covering system status can assist in decision-making however, data are not necessarily information. Only when data are processed into valid and reliable measures whose implications are understood can they be of real use to management.

There have been instances where such new data were included in establishing a launch commit criterion (LCC) without validation. Obviously no formal system criteria should be based on information if the data to develop the information are suspect.

Schedule

The Shuttle manifest appears to be optimistic. This could lead to pressure to "cut corners." Management should have a formal evaluation process in place in order to have firm basis for safely deleting or modifying steps in the flow.

The ASAP continues to emphasize "Safe first; schedule second." NASA program management working with the SRM&QA organization must act to preserve the appropriate emphasis on safety.

Human Factors

Even as a "mature" system design, the Shuttle should be subject to continuing human factors analyses. Last year, the notion conducting a study to identify and correct possible design induced errors at all stages of preparatory, launch and in-flight activities was recommended. It has yet to be undertaken. In the meantime, there have been human factor related incidents such as improper load and entry (a reversed sign) and the inability of flight crew members to reach certain cockpit switches when wearing the new pressure suits.

Now that the Shuttle has returned to flight plans for future improvements have been discussed. These include the upgraded computer and a possible retrofit of a "glass cockpit" (of cathode-ray tubes instead of dials).
these changes are likely to be productive and important for the service life of the Shuttle, they should be undertaken after a total human factors analysis of the system. As with the revised Hazard analyses coincident with the return-to-fight activities, a human factors assessment of proposed modifications will help limit the risk of human error.

Flight Readiness Review Process

The Flight Readiness Review process, as we observed it, was well organized, comprehensive and well conducted. The discussions were open, uninhibited and, where they could be, decisions were made on the spot. The numbers of people in attendance were large but didn't seem to impede the process and individuals with detailed knowledge were always available to clarify details or provide detailed discussion.

The mission management team, chaired by Capt. Crippen, was very much in evidence and was well informed on all the issues that arose. In effect, Crippen was the launch and test manager for the program--something that had not been present in the past in the Shuttle program. This is certainly a large plus.

A key to the efficacy of the FRR we observed was the fact that everyone had done their homework at Levels III and IV and all those involved were intimately familiar with all the details of problems and issues. There were no surprises in any of the discussions. This is crucial to a successful space flight program and must continue. Also, the face-to-face meeting was more effective than the telecons that had been used in the past.

A concern that remains is the ability to close out anomalies from the preceding flight before the next flight. Such close-outs are a key element of any FRR and they must be closed properly before the next launch can occur.
B. Space Station Freedom Program (SSFP)

1. Management Structure

The Space Station Freedom Program (SSFP) is an ambitious undertaking. It is attempting breakthroughs in technology while simultaneously designing, deploying and operating a long-term orbital platform. All of this is to be accomplished with single-year funding and a background of uncertainty arising from changes in the Administration and less than universal support for the program. This is obviously a situation fraught with opportunities for safety hazards to occur.

The ASAP has begun a continuing review of the organization and design activities that will lead to the development and deployment of the Station. During the course of the year, the ASAP carried out the following fact-finding and oversight activities:

- Participated in Safety Summits.
- Attended several Level I program review meetings.
- Attended portions of the Preliminary Requirements Review sessions.
- Reviewed safety activities conducted at Level II.
- Reviewed computer safety related activities.
- Participated in AIAA conference on Space Station Automation and Robotics.

In spite of the difficult environment in which development must take place, the ASAP has seen a major step forward in Space Station (SS) activities this year. There are many SS developments that the ASAP applauds, including: 1) the safety summit process, 2) efforts at establishing a risk management program, 3) efforts early in the program to establish an integrated Technical Information and Management System and a coordinated Software Support Environment, and 4) the beginnings of a life-cycle cost thinking in its system design. Nevertheless, there are still many areas in which the ASAP believes improvement in safety related matters needed. These include:

- Organizational interactions.
  - Systems Engineering and Integration.
  - International glossary and acronyms list.
  - Language barrier with internationals.
  - NSTS/SSP conflicts on safety certification of payloads.

- SR&QA Activities.
  - Formal SS SR&QA activity.
  - Charter for Safety Summit.

- Technical studies.
  - Assured crew return.
  - Caution and Warning display signals.
  - Independent SR&QA (product assurance) for SSE.
  - Evolution management.
  - Documenting assumptions in "quicks" studies.
  - Treat nodes as labs with respect to hazard detection.
  - Toxic cleanup.
a. Organizational Interactions

The Space Station Freedom organizational structure is very complex and at times appears unmanageable. It was spawned from a 1986 management study conducted by General Sam Phillips and is modeled after the Apollo Program organizational plan of the 1960's which concentrated key administrative and technical leadership in the Apollo Program Office at NASA Headquarters supported by a system engineering contractor, Bellcom Inc. That management concept was perhaps ideal for the time. NASA was itself a fledgling agency overseeing four nascent centers, each thoroughly occupied with specific assignments requiring full-time dedication. There was need for a strong and visible focal point of leadership which was the Apollo Program Office in NASA Headquarters.

At the present time NASA is experiencing growing pains in applying that management concept to the Space Station organization. However, there has been in this past year or two several top level personnel changes as well as a major relocation of the program office from NASA Headquarters to Reston, VA. This move, in effect, established a "mini-center" which has to organize and manage its own in-house support activities as well as managing the program. In addition, five now mature NASA centers have been assigned major roles, each with a set of program ideas of their own, and each possessing broad technical competence to support their views. In effect, the centers are more mature and experienced in their assigned tasks than the organization set up to provide overall leadership and guidance. This situation has frequently led to confusion and indecision and is most evident at joint meetings where key issues are debated.

Nevertheless, the current management structure is set in place and with the newly assigned Associate Administrator for the Space Station Office, a newly assigned Deputy Associate Administrator, and a newly assigned Space Station Freedom Program Director, one can hope that some of the glaring deficiencies in the management implementation will be overcome and that the system will be made to operate effectively in the manner originally envisioned.

b. Safety

The safety function appears to have been downplayed while management addresses the myriad of start-up problems being faced. It is not sufficient to be aware of safety and analyze for it after the design is set. Safety must be an inherent part of the SSFP design process from the beginning if the desired level of risk reduction is to be achieved.

c. Systems Engineering & Integration

Grumman Aerospace Company, the Program Support Contractor (PSC), has been given the contract to be the SE&I organization for the Space Station Freedom Program Office. It is not evident that the PSC is being utilized as effectively as it might be in its role. Its activity appears more of a support service function where certain tasks are assigned by the program office rather than serving as the major integration arm for the program office. This deficiency has been recognized by NASA top management and it is our understanding that NASA is reassessing this situation and taking the necessary actions to have the PSC perform the role intended for it.

NASA plans show that it intends to erect the basic structure of the Space Station during flights of the STS. This basic structure is to be sufficiently complete so that the Station can be permanently manned. NASA has also stated that the erection of the Station will be accomplished using the EVA (Extravehicular Activity) soft suit. This suit is currently limited to two or three EVA's and requires major reconditioning of the suit after the two or three EVA's. This reconditioning cannot, at this time, be done in flight. Thus, for each STS flight there will be a maximum of 24 to 36 manhours of EVA to construct the Space Station. It is our opinion that the construction program cannot be completed in the allocated number of STS flights because of the limitations of the current suits.

NASA has allowed considerable time to pass without authorizing a full-blown effort to develop the so called "hard suit." It should not lose any more time and should authorize a full blown effort to develop the new suit since it bears promise of:
1. Greater flexibility—therefore easier to do work in space.

2. Longer life between major required maintenance.


4. Capability for higher internal pressure with resultant reduction or elimination of required prebreathing. Therefore, more time will be available for productive work by the astronauts.

**d. International Glossary and Acronym List**

The Safety Summit meetings revealed that there are a number of terms that do not appear to have the same meaning among all of the international partners, or that there are differences in some of the basic program goals.

For example, simple words such as "risk" and, particularly, "hazard," appear to have different meanings across the international community. In some cases risk refers to loss of crew and/or vehicle and in other cases, it includes that or a failure to accomplish mission objectives. A definition of mission objectives to support the prevailing risk management classifications would help overcome much confusion.

Another example arises in the interpretation of the words "standards and specifications." Some take them quite literally, while others view them as a "first cut" that can be changed or waived later on.

The ASAP, therefore, believes that there should be an international effort for developing a glossary of terms and semantics used in the Program. If common definitions cannot be achieved, then, at least, the different groups should be documented. The glossary should then achieve wide circulation throughout the international teams involved in the Space Station Freedom Program.

Every new program in NASA leads to many new terms and acronyms. Many of these grow up locally within individual centers or, since this is an international effort, within an individual country or group of countries. The Space Station effort seems particularly prone to the development of new acronyms. And acronym are generally used without definition; listener then often try to fill in the gaps using words an semantics familiar to them which seem to fit the context. Unfortunately, such a process will often lead to misinterpretations, and ultimately, to errors in the system.

The acronym problem has the potential to become severe, and even dangerous. Acronym are particularly subject to local definition or subsequent use in a broader context. Clearly, with many groups creating acronyms independently, many acronyms will acquire multiple meanings. NASA should create some form of acronym control. It could be as simple as a central computer database clearinghouse for acronyms with which groups must register their meanings of their acronyms. Then, a list of acronyms could be prepared and distributed each month. A more sophisticated scheme might associate a "level of usage" with each acronym indicating the level at which it has been cleared for uniqueness and at which it is safe to use.

**e. Language Barriers with International**

It was evident during the Safety Summit that there were language difficulties in working with some of the international partners. In various discussions proceeded too quickly for some people to follow. As a result, they had to try to work almost exclusively from vu-graphs.

Participants must also be careful to remember that preparation of documentation does not ensure understanding. Care must be taken through faithful translations and careful discussion to be sure that others understand what is being said. If an interpreter cannot be used during meetings with internationals participants, then someone should be tasked with an interpreter and any internationals representatives needing assistance at the end of the session to make sure they understand agreements reached and any action it relating to them.
f. NSTS/SSFP Conflicts on Safety Certification of Payloads

There are a number of different groups defining safety standards and procedures for different parts of the system that will be in operation when the Space Station is in orbit. Aside from terminology issues, there are technical liaison issues that arise. It is important that the safety procedures be compatible for both sides of an interface component.

For example, certain NSTS requirements place severe restrictions on SSFP operations, e.g., the requirement to be ready to deorbit in 30 minutes (20 minutes to get the payload ready and 10 minutes for payload bay door closing) could necessitate that Station assembly include safing the structure every 20 minutes! That would surely interfere with assembly of the Station, especially given the limited available EVA times. There are many different scenarios for the occurrence of failures while people are working on the assembly of the Station, both before and after achieving the permanently manned configuration (PMC).

Some form of arbitration on interfaces of this sort is needed, and NASA should ensure that there is agreement and a safety interface among all components that interact in Space Station operation.

2. Safety and Product Assurance

Organizational and budgetary problems have had an impact on the SSFP's safety functions. The SSFP safety organization has not been allocated the staff necessary to function at maximum effectiveness. The extent of human factors involvement in all aspects of SSFP from design through launch to operation and, ultimately, final disposition, strongly suggest that human factors should be given programmatic recognition. The ASAP believes that it is urgent that this situation be remedied during the coming year.

a. Safety Summit Charter

The SSFP "Safety Summit" process started in February of 1988 and is an excellent way for the various centers and international partners to exchange information and work on common problems. It is one of the more progressive activities that has been undertaken with respect to safety for the Space Station and, in the view of the ASAP, should continue throughout the lifetime of the program. The Summit has no official charter. Accordingly, no one is obliged to attend (and there have been some notable absences from the summits) and the conclusions of the summits are binding upon neither the participants nor others within NASA.

3. Technical Recommendations

The ASAP has seen a number of positive things about the technical development of the Space Station during the past year. Among these are: 1) the decision to utilize a 32 bit data processor, 2) the incorporation of a means to evolve from a 16 bit data bus to a 32 bit (or larger) bus, 3) the early release of a contract to develop the Software Support Environment (SSE), and 4) the efforts toward a common information management system.

The ASAP has a number of specific technical recommendations for the Space Station which it believes will enhance safety.

a. Assured Crew Return

There are many possible scenarios that lead to either the Station no longer being habitable for the crew on board or the need to immediately return an individual crew member to Earth. Such situations might arise from catastrophic failures (e.g., meteor hit), loss of logistics (e.g., NSTS failure), failure of life support system, or crew illness. Moreover, there are many situations in which it would be impossible to wait for a rendezvous with an orbiter. STS launch commit criteria are advisedly stringent and substantial delays are the norm rather than the exception. Or worse, another Challenger-like disaster could block Shuttle flights for some time. Sick crew or a limited life support capability could make the delays intolerable. The ASAP thus believes that an alternative crew return vehicle is an essential safety device that must be required for the SSFP.
b. Caution and Warning Display Signals

The Space Station is a special operating environment in which there will be an almost continual need to communicate operating status and safety information to the crew. If the caution and warning system (CWS) part of this communication is divorced from the overall system, if it does not have the highest priority from the outset or if SSFP information system planning is not undertaken early in the program, problems will surely arise. Perhaps they will not pop up immediately, but, rather, after the Station has been in operation for some time and multiple events occur which generate confusing signals leading to incorrect decision-making and, possibly, a disaster.

The ASAP believes that the Safety Summit process has improved the original approach to the SSFP CWS on which we were briefed last Spring. Unfortunately, there still seems to be the very real possibility that the CWS will be developed as an add-on after the Station design is mature and the hazards are identified and classified. The basic concepts in the NASA-STD-30000 which are being adapted are fine. However, it is particularly disturbing that this standard does not give the CWS specific precedence over all other information presentations to the crew. On the contrary, the words in the NASA-STD-3000 seem to suggest that the CWS should be designed to co-exist with the other systems of the Station rather than vice versa.

There are many examples of poor CWS design in aircraft, power plants, etc., which arose through the process of insufficient emphasis on the CWS during design definition. The problem is magnified by the difficulty of systems integration which the SSFP will surely face. The ASAP therefore suggests that the SSFP consider a sequence of activities such as the following to obtain a maximally effective CWS design:

- The SSFP management at Levels I and II should make it clear that the CWS is part of a total Space Station Information System which must be defined and developed as a whole rather than as a set of discrete units.
- The CWS be designated as the driving force in all information presentation. The CWS and its associated signals and displays should be defined first. Then, other subsystems must avoid using the same signals and display. Further, it will be the duty of the other subsystems to demonstrate that their messages do not conflict with the signals emanating from the CWS.

Space Station Management would be prudent to consider taking the following steps regarding the CWS:

- Determine if the 5 alarm classification in paragraph 9.4.4.3.1 of STD-30000 is appropriate for the SSFP.
- Select display and signaling modality to associate with each of the 5 alarm classifications.
- Produce a guidance document which prescribes signals and alarms to be used in the CWS and establishes rules for the other subsystems which ensure that the CWS usage is unique and maximally discriminable.
- Establish a clearinghouse as the program progresses for determining if other signals are conflicting with the CWS.

c. Independent SR&QA for the SSE

The Software Support Environment (SSE) currently being developed under the auspices of the Johnson Space Center, is one of the important initial developments for the Space Station. The SSE will comprise the set of tools (e.g., compilers, editors, debuggers) which all software for the Space Station and many of the payloads, will be built.

The SSE will impact virtually every phase of the Space Station program. It is thus essential that the SSE itself be free from errors. Independent validation and verification (IV&V) function, as would be conducted by an SR&QA program, is essential.

The SSE will not be a static entity; it will continually evolve as new tools and hardware are added and compilers and other tools...
updated. Underscoring this is the fact that the SSE will contain a component for evolution management, as described below. The N&V function must be a continuing one, and NASA must ensure that the SR&QA program for the Space Station includes an effort directed toward the SSE.

In addition to ensuring the integrity and accuracy for the SSE itself, the activities of SR&QA will ultimately encompass verifying that the software produced using the SSE is safe to operate on the Space Station. It is generally true that efficiency is increased and costs reduced if safety-related errors, particularly in software, are caught and corrected as early in the development process as possible. Hence, it would seem wise and cost-effective to include some built-in safety checks of the software as part of the basic SSE design.

d. Evolution Management

During the 30 year lifetime of the Space Station, it will evolve and change. New laboratory modules will be added, experiments will be changed, the physical structure will be modified or grow most dramatically, and at least four or five generations of computers can be expected.

The Space Station must be capable of dealing with this evolution. The geometric models of the Space Station must be modified as structure evolves. The computer systems must evolve, and this should be handled in an organized and efficient manner. Equally important, the tools used for operating the Station will evolve, for example, compilers will change to produce more efficient codes, and editors, debuggers, and other environment tools will be frequently upgraded in capability.

Two basic sets of tools whose use will pervade nearly all of the Station are the Technical Management Information System (TMIS) and the Software Support Environment (SSE). The former will hold information regarding all aspects of the Station, while the latter will be used for preparation of most of the software used both in the Space Station and for ground support. Although the ASAP is very pleased to see coordinated efforts in these two areas started early in the life-cycle of the Station, sufficient tools or plans for managing the expected evolution were not apparent. Specifically, it is believed that the design of the SSE, TMIS and other relevant parts of the Space Station effort must include evolution management capabilities.

e. Documenting Assumptions in "Quick Look" Studies

Much of the analytical work performed to date for the Space Station has been in the form of "quick and dirty" case studies. These are very useful, but they do not provide an in-depth look at the problem. The ASAP has found that NASA frequently does not clearly document all the assumptions made in the conduct of such studies. This raises the possibility that someone will look at these analyses at a later date and assume that the area was examined and was not a problem rather than that it was excluded by the assumptions of the "quick look" study. For example, the dual egress studies all assumed that the crew was healthy and able to participate in their own safety activities. That assumption is reasonable as a first look. However, the analyses list no impacts on the various approaches studied if a crew member is incapacitated.

f. Nodes as Laboratories

The nodes on the Station are now being considered for use as more than connectors. There is apparently a move to use them for storage and additional experiment space. This makes them no different than the major modules of the Station with respect to safety. They must be treated like other laboratories with respect to failure detection, e.g., fire and toxics, safe haven and crew escape. NASA management should set boundaries on node use immediately so that design and safety efforts can properly deal with them.

g. Toxic Cleanup

It is the understanding of the ASAP that the baseline design of the Space Station does not include any provision for kits or other means to clean up toxic spills. The process material management subsystem (PMMS) will be able to scrub the recirculated air of the many contaminants. Spills in open areas, however, are apparently being dealt with solely by prevention.
Experience with other programs and the long-planned life cycle of the Space Station suggests that hazardous spills in the open cabin areas are something which should be covered by design. Some type of cleanup kit or other means of correcting the problem appears worthy of consideration. Likewise, a firm definition of a "panic button" system which would seal a module in which a spill occurs is needed. This will avoid having a toxic spill contaminate the entire station through the distributed systems. A study of the nature and type of such a system, e.g., manual versus automatic, response time, appears warranted.

The current baseline design provides the capability of a single repressurization of one of the Station's attached modules. This seems unnecessarily limiting in light of the preliminary meteor and debris impact studies presented at the Safety Summit and the possibility of having to completely exchange a module's atmosphere to remove toxics.
As a result of reviews of the three NASA centers involved in flight research (Langley, Ames and Dryden), it is apparent that flight safety procedures have been developed by the centers to suit the individual nature of their flight research projects. In addition to flight research projects that relate to the basic aeronautical sciences (aerodynamics, structure, controls, etc.), flight activity extends to support programs that require platforms, such as the Boeing 737 aircraft that supports the Advanced Transport Operating System (ATOPS) program at LaRC. Here, a second cockpit with operational controls and displays for navigation and approach research is incorporated in the fuselage of the aircraft. A wide variety of different type aircraft including rotary wing, general aviation, fighter, large transport and executive class are included in the flight research programs. With the large diversity of aircraft and the unique configurations being flown on each of the aircraft, there is a significant need for maintenance, test, training and proficiency flying at each of the centers.

These functions are handled by different management organizations and procedures at each of the centers. For example, at Langley the assurance of flight safety is the responsibility of the Director of Aeronautics. Implementation of a safety program is part of the responsibility of the Chief of the Low-Speed Aerodynamics Division (LSAD). Within the LSAD is the aircraft operations branch which includes the Airworthiness and Assurance Officer, and the Research Aircraft Support section - all participating in the flight research programs with well defined functions. The Airworthiness and Safety Review Board (ASRB) is formed as an ad hoc board for each project with membership from the Aeronautics, Electronics, Structures, and Systems Engineering and Operations Directorates and also includes the Aviation Safety Officer and other members assigned by the Center Director. It provides oversight of the line functions and includes the following responsibilities: (1) conduct safety reviews as required for all flight research programs, (2) evaluate hazards analyses and risk assessments, (3) approve "Flight Test Operations and Safety Report," and (4) issue "Flight Safety Release." The ASRB does not have responsibility for routine flight functions such as maintenance, incorporation of airworthiness directives, etc. The Aviation Safety Officer is responsible for the review of established operational safety and maintenance procedures and to recommend approval for the safety aspects of all flight-related activities. He is also responsible for coordinating with the Airworthiness Assurance Office and the Project Engineer as required for creation of flight research System Safety Program plans. The Project Engineer also has a set of prescribed responsibilities relating to safety which include identification of possible hazards peculiar to the project and generating a description of modifications which might affect the aerodynamic and/or stability and control characteristics of the aircraft or any other needs for flight conditions that fall outside the normal flight envelope for the particular aircraft.

The flight safety procedures at LaRC appear to possess adequate mechanisms to insure a safe flight operation including overlapping procedures that serve as checks with members of a number of separate offices inspecting the projects. Although this is also true for the other centers, it may be beneficial to develop a more standard set of procedures for all of the flight research activities. The vortex flap project is an excellent example of a full-fledged flight program combining flight, wind tunnel, analytical and other center activities to assure that the program is conducted in a safe manner while achieving technical objectives. On a note of caution, the vortex flap project's low budget may be causing a "short-cutting" of structural loads analysis with its detrimental effect on the stress analysis. In this connection, the method of determining the loads (and stresses) in the redesigned wing involve approximations that could be more accurately defined if greater resources were available.
D. Risk Management

1. Policies and Organization

In the ASAP 1988 report we commented on the significant progress being made in structuring the safety engineering and quality assurance functions throughout NASA. We noted that NASA had several NASA Management Instructions (NMIs), NASA Notices (NNs) and NASA Handbooks (NHBs) in work that would provide new policies, guidelines and implementation techniques for performing many of the activities necessary to improve the identification and evaluation of safety risks. These documents were to provide guidance for the development of Risk Management plans for each major program, and defined the role of the Office of SRM&QA in providing support and oversight to each program's risk management process. A Code Q "Centralized Safety Program," released in March 1988, provides a framework for overall systems safety management. A top level NMI 8070.4 titled "Risk Management Policy for Manned Flight Programs" was released in February 1988, and an update of NHB 1700.1 (Volume 7) was released in August 1988. Drafts of two NHBs, one on "Risk Management Program Roles and Responsibilities" and one on "Risk Management Program Tools and Techniques" are in work.

NMI 8070.4 provides policy statements regarding establishment of a structured risk management process for each manned flight program. The risk management process is to encompass risk identification, categorization, estimation of risk levels, definition of risk acceptance criteria and selection of risk mitigation alternatives. The policy also indicates that a wide variety of methods may be used to conduct risk assessments. It further states that NASA believes that qualitative risk assessments will be appropriate for most NASA programs. These qualitative assessments are to be based on FMEA and hazards analysis. It does state also that the hazards analysis should be augmented whenever appropriate by fault tree analysis (FTA). The results of these activities are to be reviewed and subjectively assessed risk during various reviews.

To enhance the procedures above, 8070.4 requires that critical failure modes: their corresponding hazards, as well as hazards identified as arising from other sources, be categorized and prioritized with at least subjective ratings of the frequencies and severities of the mishaps that could arise from these hazards. The policy goes on to state that acceptance or risk mitigation decision-making shall then be guided by these ratings, to extent possible, taking into account the uncertainties in them. In the world of systems safety, a rating (value) given to the frequency (likelihood of occurrence) and to the severity (the consequence) of a mishap is almost a definition of a "safety risk." One needs to however, the likelihood of the consequence having a particular severity level in order to actually define safety-risk level for management.

The ASAP is strongly supportive of the framework for risk assessment described in NMI 8070.4. It is our opinion that the methods and criteria to be used for establishing the safety-risks is still an area of significant ambiguity and concern. The qualitative prioritization of mishaps which are only identified by Fault Tree Analysis (FTAs) and Event Tree Analysis (ETAs) is a good first step in focusing on what could possibly be the most significant possible risks. NASA has recognized that the risk levels may be significant, a quantitative risk assessment methodology be required. In NMI 8070.4 the evolution of such methodologies and data handling systems is stated as NASA objective.

During 1988, the ASAP reviewed the structure and operations of the SRM&QA organizations at Headquarters, JSC, and MSFC, with a particular focus on the implementation of
Throughout NASA we found a high level of awareness regarding systems safety and broad commitment to improve the processes of identification, evaluation and control of system safety risks. Policy and overall direction concerning safety activities originate in the Office of the Associate Administrator, SRM&QA, who has direct access to the Administrator of NASA. This office is responsible for agency-wide oversight regarding the implementation of all safety-related matters, and thus provides the required independent path for risk concerns to be elevated through the NASA management structure to the very top.

The ASAP notes that NASA does very little work "in-house" on its programs now. The majority of the work is performed by the contractors—including most of the SR&QA tasks. Therefore a principal function of the NASA SR&QA organization is to see that the tasks mandated by NASA policies are performed properly, and that the significance of the results and recommendations for safety-related actions are communicated to the responsible managers in the various programs. In the event of disagreements, the SR&QA staffs must exercise their right and duty to elevate the issues to higher authority both within SR&QA organizations and through program channels.

In addition to the "monitoring" type work just described (which also entails making sure that the tasks have been stipulated in the contracts) the SR&QA has the responsibility to perform independent assessments and analyses of pertinent subjects. It is our observation that to date much of the execution of the oversight function by Headquarters has been carried out directly by the Associate Administrator for SRM&QA. This has been in part because of the critical requirement to get the STS back into flight, but also it has been the result of a slow buildup of required experienced personnel. We perceive that other programs such as the Space Station need more attention both in the form of stronger Headquarters direction, and in the personal attention of the Associate Administrator for SRM&QA. It is a critical time period in the Space Station schedule if the NMI 8070.4 policy objective of developing a more "quantitative risk assessment methodology and associated data base" is to be realized and made useful for effective risk management.

2. SRM&QA at JSC

At JSC it was very evident to the ASAP that a great deal of attention is now focused on systems safety activities. The Center Director was dedicated to continuing across-the-board improvements in risk assessment and risk mitigation. This commitment was also strongly evidenced by the Deputy Director of the NSTS Program Office and by the Director of the Center's SRM&QA organization. However, we observed that the safety organization is not fully staffed to adequately come to grips with real risk assessment functions nor with how to use such information for systematic risk management. The information gathered by the SR&QA group was clearly used in decisions of whether or not to fly, but it is less clear how the information will be used in decisions of what efforts should be put into modifying the Shuttle or developing the Space Station. NASA needs to examine the kinds of information being provided and determine what kinds of decisions could and should be made and by whom. There should be designated individuals who have the specific charge of looking at the risk information produced for each program and making recommendations regarding action items.

A second issue that was expressed first at JSC and later at MSFC, was the apparent lack of budgetary support to SRM&QA offices in the centers from the Office of the Associate Administrator for SRM&QA. There were reports of budget cuts to SRM&QA without the knowledge or participation of the AA for SRM&QA.

The ASAP was given presentations on new approaches to hazard rebaselining and attempts at risk-level rating using a 3 x 3 matrix. A new format and content for the Mission Safety Assessment (MSA) report for STS-26 was compared to earlier MSAs. A graphical presentation approach is taken using fault trees to highlight system effects resulting from lower-level faults. The selection of hazards to be included in the MSA came from a subjective prioritization of results for rating hazards using the 3 x 3 matrix. It should be noted that the probability of occurrence of the causing faults really is not addressed since they all fall in the "unlikely" box of the 3 x 3 matrix. Similarly, only one level of severity, loss of crew and
vehicle is used to select items for the MSA. The likelihood of the severity level occurring is not addressed, and therefore even the relative risk is undefined.

Thus, the new MSA document highlights a selected set of possible mishaps which might result from various hazards caused by either hardware failures or human errors. It can be used to communicate the selected undesirable events and the control methods in place (or required) to block the fault chain propagation. It does not, however, communicate the risk associated with each possible mishap and therefore makes it difficult for Program Office and NASA authorities to evaluate the real seriousness for the selected "significant risks."

For the NSTS program, a Systems Safety Review Panel has been created which includes members from all centers and Headquarters. The head of the Panel reports to the Director of SRM&QA at JSC in his role as NSTS Level II Safety manager. The NSTS Level II indicates there are several routes to the top of NASA.

An issue raised by the new MSA is the significance of the color coding used. This coding is said to provide better "risk" visibility. The use of red to indicate "improvement highly desirable" (IHD) or even yellow indicating "improvement desirable" (ID) is a way of qualitatively assigning some relative levels of risk to the event. Because the hazards selected were all placed in the unlikely box of the hazard rating matrix, the safety-risk assessment of "improvement highly desirable" becomes non-definitive. If the risk is so low as to be rated unlikely, why are improvements in design or controls highly desirable? If the risk really is greater than unlikely, should STS fly before the improvements are made? How should a program office react to such data? It is difficult for ASAP to see how they can accomplish any really effective management of risks without a much more objective and data-based methodology for assessing the relative risk levels.

The ASAP reviewed a study done to compare the "risks" for two alternative crew escape systems for STS. This qualitative assessment technique utilized five levels for likelihood of each failure model occurrence and considered five levels for likelihood of the worst-case failure effect. This approach provided a more definitive relative risk-level comparison which permitted selection of the "pole" escape system. A similar system was used to compare "risks" of the unlatched and latched 17-incl valve configurations.

Also reviewed were the plans for risk management of the Space Station Freedom Program. This program is evolving its own system safety effort (JSC Space Station Safet Plan, JSC 32066), along with the prime contract's safety plan MDC H4038A (McDonnell Douglas Corporation). These plans include better quantification of uncertainty and severity which can form a basis for prioritization of risks and their management.

Members of the ASAP heard strong concerns with regard to the delay in establishment of the systems-safety requirements for Space Station. The system engineering trades are already far along, and still safety requirement and their resulting impact on all the system are specific hardware design criteria are not available. If system safety is going to become reality on Space Station, this entire function has to get to be rapidly and effectively implemented. Otherwise the designs get forever fixed and risk assessment trades will be "academic because they are too late.

3. SRM&QA at MSFC

The ASAP was impressed with the progress made at MSFC in structuring and staffing the SRM&QA organization. The Center's management is committed to the evolution of a strong professional systems safety organization. Support has been arranged for various aspects of SR&QA from various programs and the Center's resources. We believe the SRM&Q organizational structure at MSFC is excellent and provides good grouping of engineering disciplines and responsibilities. In particular, the Systems Safety and Reliability Office will have two functional divisions contains the organization elements which are necessary to evolve very effective Systems-Safety Engineering capability, something that the ASAP has strongly recommended over the past few years.

The SRM&QA team has been built up using experienced managers from MSFC Science a
Engineering, Special Projects and various major program offices. It now has a staff of over 180 people and includes specialists brought in from industries and universities. The ASAP is impressed with the plans, goals, technical discipline development and personnel training. They are focusing significant efforts on more definitive objective risk assessment and on statistical data base development. Although they currently are also using the 3 x 3 "risk" matrix for hazard rating and JSC's general format for the Mission Safety Assessment, the ASAP found MSFC has a good understanding and concern for the limitations those methods have as far as providing the measurable, objective risk assessments required for systematic cost effective management of the reduction and control of risk levels. To help build the necessary technologies for doing this and analyzing the test and flight data bases, and for supporting activities in systems safety engineering analysis, probabilistic (or quantitative) risk assessments (PRA and QRA) and other related disciplines, MSFC has engaged the services of EMHART Advanced Technology Inc. and Arvin Calspan Inc. They have the potential to evolve this engineering discipline into the complete capability envisioned and recommended by the ASAP.

The MSFC Space Station project organization is still evolving and has had difficulty becoming truly effective, possibly because of the lack of adequate direction and funding. This has been compounded by not having a systems safety requirements document, and no defined, unified approach to safety risk management. Specific criteria for design and test program planning to develop the information required for risk assessment have not yet been developed. The Space Station is the first program to which the objectives of the new systems safety policy in NMI 8070.4 are to be applied. It is crucial that the above problems be corrected.
IV
APPENDICES
A. Panel Membership

AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL

CHAIRMAN
JOSEPH F. SUTTER
Former Exec. VP, Boeing Commercial Airplane Co.
Consultant

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
NORMAN R. PARMET
Former VP Engineering, TWA
Aerospace Consultant

CHARLES J. DONLAN
Consultant
Institute for Defense Analysis

GERARD W. ELVERUM, JR.
Vice President/General Manager
TRW Applied Technical Division

NORRIS J. KRONE
Executive Director
University Research Foundation
University of Maryland

JOHN F. McARDALD
Former VP Technical Services, Tigrer Air
Aerospace Consultant

JOHN G. STEWART
Vice President, Business Operations
Resource Development Group
Tennessee Valley Authority

MELVIN STONE
Former Director of Structures
Douglas Aircraft
Aerospace Consultant

RICHARD A. VOLZ
Chairman, Department of Computer Science
Texas A&M University

EX-OFFICIO MEMBER
GEORGE A. RODNEY
NASA, Associate Administrator for
Safety, Reliability, Maintainability
and Quality Assurance

CONSULTANTS
HERBERT E. GRIER
Former Sr. VP EG&G, Inc.
Consultant

RICHARD D. BLOMBERG
President
Dunlap and Associates, Inc.

SEYMOUR C. HIMMEL
Former Associate Director, NASA LeRC
Aerospace Consultant

HAROLD M. AGNEW
Former President
GA Technologies, Inc.
Science Consultant

L. GRANT HEDRICK
Senior Management Consultant
Grumman Corporation

STAFF
GILBERT L. ROTH, Staff Director
NASA HQ, 453-8973

SUSAN ESMACHER, Staff Assistant
NASA HQ, 453-8971

A-1