Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident

 

Chapter III: The Accident

 

 

[19] Flight of the Space Shuttle Challenger on Mission 51-L began at 11:38 a.m. Eastern Standard Time on January 28, 1986. It ended 73 seconds later in an explosive burn of hydrogen and oxygen propellants that destroyed the External Tank and exposed the Orbiter to severe aerodynamic loads that caused complete structural breakup. All seven crew members perished. The two Solid Rocket Boosters flew out of the fireball and were destroyed by the Air Force range safety officer 110 seconds after launch.

The ambient air temperature at launch was 36 degrees Fahrenheit measured at ground level approximately 1,000 feet from the 51-L mission launch pad 39B. This temperature was 15 degrees colder than that of any previous launch.

The following description of the flight events is based on visual examination and image enhancement of film from NASA operated cameras and telemetry data transmitted from the Space Shuttle to ground stations. The last telemetry data from the Challenger was received 73.618 seconds after launch.

At 6.6 seconds before launch, the Challenger's liquid fueled main engines were ignited in sequence and run up to full thrust while the entire Shuttle structure was bolted to the launch pad. Thrust of the main engines bends the Shuttle assembly forward from the bolts anchoring it to the pad. When the Shuttle assembly springs back to the vertical, the Solid Rocket Boosters' restraining bolts are explosively released. During this prerelease "twang" motion, structural loads are stored in the assembled structure. These loads are released during the first few seconds of flight in a structural vibration mode at a frequency of about 3 cycles per second. The maximum structural loads on the aft field joints of the Solid Rocket Boosters occur during the "twang," exceeding even those of the maximum dynamic pressure period experienced later in flight.

Just after liftoff at .678 seconds into the flight, photographic data show a strong puff of gray smoke was spurting from the vicinity of the aft field joint on the right Solid Rocket Booster. The two pad 39B cameras that would have recorded the precise location of the puff were inoperative. Computer graphic analysis of film from other cameras indicated the initial smoke came from the 270 to 310-degree sector of the circumference of the aft field joint of the right Solid Rocket Booster. This area of the solid booster faces the External Tank. The vaporized material streaming from the joint indicated there was not complete sealing action within the joint.

Eight more distinctive puffs of increasingly blacker smoke were recorded between .836 and 2.500 seconds. The smoke appeared to puff upwards from the joint. While each smoke puff was being left behind by the upward flight of the Shuttle, the next fresh puff could be seen near the level of the joint. The multiple smoke puffs in this sequence occurred at about four times per second, approximating the frequency of the structural load dynamics and resultant joint flexing. Computer graphics applied to NASA photos from a variety of cameras in this sequence again placed the smoke puffs' origin in the 270-to 310-degree sector of the original smoke spurt.

As the Shuttle increased its upward velocity, it flew past the emerging and expanding smoke puffs. The last smoke was seen above the field joint at 2.733 seconds. At 3.375 seconds the last [20] smoke was visible below the Solid Rocket Boosters and became indiscernible as it mixed with rocket plumes and surrounding atmosphere.

The black color and dense composition of the smoke puffs suggest that the grease, joint insulation and rubber O-rings in the joint seal were being burned and eroded by the hot propellant gases.

Launch sequence films from previous missions were examined in detail to determine if there were any prior indications of smoke of the color and composition that appeared during the first few seconds of the 51-L mission. None were found. Other vapors in this area were determined to be melting frost from the bottom of the External Tank or steam from the rocket exhaust in the pad's sound suppression water trays.

Shuttle main engines were throttled up to 104 percent of their rated thrust level, the Challenger executed a programmed roll maneuver and the engines were throttled back to 94 percent.

At approximately 37 seconds, Challenger encountered the first of several high-altitude wind shear conditions, which lasted until about 64 seconds. The wind shear created forces on the vehicle with relatively large fluctuations. These were immediately sensed and countered by the guidance, navigation and control system. Although flight 51-L loads exceeded prior experience in both yaw and pitch planes at certain instants, the maxima had been encountered on previous flights and were within design limits.

The steering system (thrust vector control) of the Solid Rocket Booster responded to all commands and wind shear effects. The wind shear caused the steering system to be more active than on any previous flight.

At 45 seconds into the flight, three bright flashes appeared downstream of the Challenger's right wing. Each flash lasted less than one-thirtieth of' a second. Similar flashes have been seen on other flights. Another appearance of a separate bright spot was diagnosed by film analysis to be a reflection of main engine exhaust on the Orbital Maneuvering System pods located at the upper rear section of the Orbiter. The flashes were unrelated to the later appearance of the flame plume from the right Solid Rocket Booster.

Both the Shuttle main engines and the solid rockets operated at reduced thrust approaching and passing through the area of maximum dynamic pressure of 720 pounds per square foot. Main engines had been throttled up to 104 percent thrust and the Solid Rocket Boosters were increasing their thrust when the first flickering flame appeared on the right Solid Rocket Booster in the area of the aft field joint. This first very small flame was detected on image enhanced film at 58.788 seconds into the flight. It appeared to originate at about 305 degrees around the booster circumference at or near the aft field joint.

One film frame later from the same camera, the flame was visible without image enhancement. It grew into a continuous, well-defined plume at 59.262 seconds. At about the same time (60 seconds), telemetry showed a pressure differential between the chamber pressures in the right and left boosters. The right booster chamber pressure was lower, confirming the growing leak in the area of the field joint.

As the flame plume increased in size, it was deflected rearward by the aerodynamic slipstream and circumferentially by the protruding structure of the upper ring attaching the booster to the External Tank. These deflections directed the flame plume onto the surface of the External Tank. This sequence of flame spreading is confirmed by analysis of the recovered wreckage. The growing flame also impinged on the strut attaching the Solid Rocket Booster to the External Tank.

At about 62 seconds into the flight, the control system began to react to counter the forces caused by the plume and its effects. The left Solid Rocket Booster thrust vector control moved to counter the yaw caused by reduced thrust from the leaking right Solid Rocket Booster. During the next nine seconds, Space Shuttle control systems worked to correct anomalies in pitch and yaw rates.

The first visual indication that swirling flame from the right Solid Rocket Booster breached the External Tank was at 64.660 seconds when there was an abrupt change in the shape and color of the plume. This indicated that it was mixing with leaking hydrogen from the External Tank. Telemetered changes in the hydrogen tank pressurization confirmed the leak. Within 45 milliseconds of the breach of the External Tank, a bright sustained glow developed on the black-tiled underside of the Challenger between it and the External Tank.

Beginning at about 72 seconds, a series of events occurred extremely rapidly that terminated [21] the flight. Telemetered data indicate a wide variety of flight system actions that support the visual evidence of the photos as the Shuttle struggled futilely against the forces that were destroying it.

At about 72.20 seconds the lower strut linking the Solid Rocket Booster and the External Tank was severed or pulled away from the weakened hydrogen tank permitting the right Solid Rocket Booster to rotate around the upper attachment strut. This rotation is indicated by divergent yaw and pitch rates between the left and right Solid Rocket Boosters.

At 73.124 seconds, a circumferential white vapor pattern was observed blooming from the side of the External Tank bottom dome. This was the beginning of the structural failure of the hydrogen tank that culminated in the entire aft dome dropping away. This released massive amounts of liquid hydrogen from the tank and created a sudden forward thrust of about 2.~3 million pounds, pushing the hydrogen tank upward into the intertank structure. At about the same time, the rotating right Solid Rocket Booster impacted the intertank structure and the lower part of the liquid oxygen tank. These structures failed at 73.137 seconds as evidenced by the white vapors appearing in the intertank region.

Within milliseconds there was massive, almost explosive, burning of the hydrogen streaming from the failed tank bottom and the liquid oxygen breach in the area of the intertank.

At this point in its trajectory, while traveling at a Mach number of 1.92 at an altitude of 46,O00 feet, the Challenger was totally enveloped in the explosive burn. The Challenger's reaction control system ruptured and a hypergolic burn of its propellants occurred as it exited the oxygen-hydrogen flames. The reddish brown colors of the hypergolic fuel burn are visible on the edge of the main fireball. The Orbiter, under severe aerodynamic loads, broke into several large sections which emerged from the fireball. Separate sections that can be identified on film include the main engine/tail section with the engines still burning, one wing of the Orbiter, and the forward fuselage trailing a mass of umbilical lines pulled loose from the payload bay.

Evidence in the recovered wreckage from the 51-L mission hardware supports this final sequence of events.

 


 

Immediately after solid rocket motor ignition, dark smoke (arrows) swirled out between the right hand booster and the External Tank. The smoke's origin, behavior and duration was approximated by visual analysis and computer enhancement of film from five camera locations. Consensus: smoke was first discernible at .678 seconds Mission Elapsed Time in the vicinity of the right booster's aft field joint.

[22-23] Immediately after solid rocket motor ignition, dark smoke (arrows) swirled out between the right hand booster and the External Tank. The smoke's origin, behavior and duration was approximated by visual analysis and computer enhancement of film from five camera locations. Consensus: smoke was first discernible at .678 seconds Mission Elapsed Time in the vicinity of the right booster's aft field joint.

 

Immediately after solid rocket motor ignition, dark smoke (arrows) swirled out between the right hand booster and the External Tank. The smoke's origin, behavior and duration was approximated by visual analysis and computer enhancement of film from five camera locations. Consensus: smoke was first discernible at .678 seconds Mission Elapsed Time in the vicinity of the right booster's aft field joint.


Multiple smoke puffs are visible in the photo above (arrows). They began at .836 seconds and continued through 2.500 seconds, occurring about 4 times a second. Upward motion of the vehicle caused the smoke to drift downward and blur into a single cloud.

[24-25] Multiple smoke puffs are visible in the photo above (arrows). They began at .836 seconds and continued through 2.500 seconds, occurring about 4 times a second. Upward motion of the vehicle caused the smoke to drift downward and blur into a single cloud. Smoke source is shown in the computer generated drawing (far right).

Multiple smoke puffs are visible in the photo above (arrows). They began at .836 seconds and continued through 2.500 seconds, occurring about 4 times a second. Upward motion of the vehicle caused the smoke to drift downward and blur into a single cloud. Smoke source is shown in the computer generated drawing (far right).


[26-27]

At 58.788 seconds, the first flicker of flame appeared. Barely visible above, it grew into a large plume and began to impinge on the External Tank at about 60 seconds. Flame is pinpointed in the computer drawing between the right booster and the tank, as in the case of earlier smoke puffs. At far right (arrow), vapor is seen escaping from the apparently breached External Tank.

At 58.788 seconds, the first flicker of flame appeared. Barely visible above, it grew into a large plume and began to impinge on the External Tank at about 60 seconds. Flame is pinpointed in the computer drawing between the right booster and the tank, as in the case of earlier smoke puffs. At far right (arrow), vapor is seen escaping from the apparently breached External Tank.


[28-29]

Camera views indicate the beginning of rupture of the liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen tanks within the External Tank. A small flash (arrows above) intensified rapidly, then diminished.

Camera views indicate the beginning of rupture of the liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen tanks within the External Tank. A small flash (arrows above) intensified rapidly, then diminished. A second flash, attributed to rupture of the liquid oxygen tank, occurred above the booster/tank forward attachment (below left) and grew in milliseconds to the maximum size indicated in the computer drawing.

A second flash, attributed to rupture of the liquid oxygen tank, occurred above the booster/tank forward attachment (below left) and grew in milliseconds to the maximum size indicated in the computer drawing.


[30-31] Structural breakup of the vehicle began at approximately 73 seconds. Fire spread very rapidly. Above [left], a bright flash (arrow) is evident near the nose the Orbiter, suggesting spillage and ignition of the spacecraft's reaction control system propellants. At left, the two Solid Rocket Boosters thrust away from the fire, crisscrossing to from a

[30-31] Structural breakup of the vehicle began at approximately 73 seconds. Fire spread very rapidly. Above [left], a bright flash (arrow) is evident near the nose the Orbiter, suggesting spillage and ignition of the spacecraft's reaction control system propellants. At left, the two Solid Rocket Boosters thrust away from the fire, crisscrossing to from a "V". The right booster- identifiable by its failure plume- now to the left of its counterpart. At right, the boosters diverge farther; the External Tank wreckage is obscured by smoke and vapor. The Orbiter engines still firing, is visible at bottom center.

At right, the boosters diverge farther; the External Tank wreckage is obscured by smoke and vapor. The Orbiter engines still firing, is visible at bottom center.


At about 76 seconds, unidentifiable fragments of the Shuttle vehicle can be seen tumbling against a background of fire, smoke and vaporized propellants from the External Tank (left).

[32-33] At about 76 seconds, unidentifiable fragments of the Shuttle vehicle can be seen tumbling against a background of fire, smoke and vaporized propellants from the External Tank (left). In the photo at right, the left booster (far right) soars away, still thrusting. The reddish-brown cloud envelops the disintegrating Orbiter. The color is characteristic of the nitrogen tetroxide oxidizer in the Orbiter Reaction Control System propellant.

In the photo at right, the left booster (far right) soars away, still thrusting. The reddish-brown cloud envelops the disintegrating Orbiter. The color is characteristic of the nitrogen tetroxide oxidizer in the Orbiter Reaction Control System propellant.


[34-35]

Hurtling out of the fireball at 78 seconds (left) are the Orbiter's left wing (top arrow), the main engines (center arrow) and the forward fuselage (bottom arrow). In the photo below [bottom right], it plummets Earthward, trailed by smoking fragments of Challenger

Hurtling out of the fireball at 78 seconds (left) are the Orbiter's left wing (top arrow), the main engines (center arrow) and the forward fuselage (bottom arrow). In the photo below [bottom right], it plummets Earthward, trailed by smoking fragments of Challenger


[36]

At 11:44 a.m. Eastern Standard Time, a GOES environment-monitoring satellite operated by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration acquired this image of the smoke and vapor cloud from the 51-L accident. The coast of Florida is outlined in red.

At 11:44 a.m. Eastern Standard Time, a GOES environment-monitoring satellite operated by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration acquired this image of the smoke and vapor cloud from the 51-L accident. The coast of Florida is outlined in red.

[37-39] STS 51-L Sequence of Major Events

Mission Time
(GMT, in hr:min:sec)
Event
Elapsed Time (secs.)
Source

.

16:37:53.444

ME - 3 Ignition Command

- 6.566

GPC

37:53.564

ME - 2 Ignition Command

- 6.446

GPC

37:53.684

ME - 1 Ignition Command

- 6.326

GPC

38:00.010

SRM Ignition Command (T=O)

0.000

GPC

38:00.018

Holddown Post 2 PIC firing

0.008

E8 Camera

38:00.260

First Continuous Vertical Motion

0.250

E9 Camera

38:00.688

Confirmed smoke above field joint on RH SRM

0.678

E60 Camera

38:00.846

Eight puffs of smoke (from 0.836 thru 2.500 sec MET)

0.836

E63 Camera

38:02.743

Last positive evidence of smoke above right aft SRB/ET attach ring

2.733

CZR-1 Camera

38:03.385

Last positive visual indication of smoke

3.375

E60 Camera

38:04.349

SSME 104% Command

4.339

E41M2076D

38:05.684

RH SRM pressure 11.8 psi above nominal

5.674

B47P2302C

38:07.734

Roll maneuver initiated

7.724

V9OR5301C

38:19.869

SSME 94% Command

19.859

E41M2076D

38:21.134

Roll maneuver completed

21.124

V9OR5301C

38:35.389

SSME 65% Command

35.379

E41M2076D

38:37.000

Roll and Yaw Attitude Response to Wind (36.990 to 62.990 sec)

36.990

V95H352nC

38:51.870

SSME 104% Command

51.860

E41M2076D

38:58.798

First evidence of flame on RH SRM

58.788

E207 Camera

38:59.010

Reconstructed Max Q (720 psf)

59.000

BET

38:59.272

Continuous well defined plume on RH SRM

59.262

E207 Camera

38: 59.763

Flame from RH SRM in + Z direction (seen from south side of vehicle)

59.753

E204 Camera

39:00.014

SRM pressure divergence (RH vs. LH)

60.004

B47P2302

39:00.248

First evidence of plume deflection, intermittent

60.238

E207 Camera

39:00.258

First evidence of SRB plume attaching to ET ring frame

60.248

E203 Camera

39:00.998

First evidence of plume deflection, continuous

60.988

E207 Camera

39:01.734

Peak roll rate response to wind

61.724

V9OR5301C

39:02.094

Peak TVC response to wind

62.084

B58H1150C

39:02.414

Peak yaw rate response to wind

62.404

V9OR5341C

39:02.494

RH outboard elevon actuator hinge moment spike

62.484

V58P0966C

39:03.934

RH outboard elevon actuator delta pressure change

63.924

V58P0966C

39:03.974

Start of planned pitch rate maneuver

63.964

V9OR5321C

39:04.670

Change in anomalous plume shape (LH2 tank leak near 2058 ring frame)

64.660

E204 Camera

39:04.715

Bright sustained glow on sides of ET

64.705

E204 Camera

39:04.947

Start SSME gimbal angle large pitch variations

64.937

V58HllOOA

39:05.174

Beginning of transient motion due to changes in aero forces due to plume

65.164

V9OR5321C

39:05.534

LH outboard elevon actuator delta pressure change

65.524

V58P0866C

39:06.774

Start ET LH2 ullage pressure deviations

66.764

T41P1700C

39:12.214

Start divergent yaw rates (RH vs. LH SRB)

72.204

V9OR2528C

39:12.294

Start divergent pitch rates (RH vs. LH SRB)

72.284

V9OR2525C

39:12.488

SRB major high-rate actuator command

72.478

V79H2111A

39:12.507

SSME roll gimbal rates 5 deg/sec

72.497

V58HllOOA

39:12.535

Vehicle max + Y lateral acceleration ( + .227 g)

72.525

V98A1581C

39:12.574

SRB major high-rate actuator motion

72.564

B58H1151C

39:12.574

Start of H2 tank pressure decrease with 2 flow control valves open

72.564

T41P1700C

39:12.634

Last state vector downlinked

72.624

Data reduction

39:12.974

Start of sharp MPS LOX inlet pressure drop

72.964

V41P1330C

39:13.020

Last full computer frame of TDRS data

73.010

Data reduction

39:13.054

Start of sharp MPS LH2 inlet pressure drop

73.044

V41Pl lOOC

39:13.055

Vehicle max -Y lateral acceleration (-.254 g)

73.045

V98A1581C

39:13.134

Circumferential white pattern on ET aft dome (LH2 tank failure)

73.124

E204 Camera

39:13.134

RH SRM pressure 19 psi lower than LH SRM

73.124

B47P2302C

39:13.147

First hint of vapor at intertank

73.137

E207 Camera

39:13.153

All engine systems start responding to loss of fuel and LOX inlet pressure

73.143

SSME team

39:13.172

Sudden cloud along ET between intertank and aft dome

73.162

E207 Camera

39:13.201

Flash between Orbiter and LH2 tank

73.191

E204 Camera

39:13.221

SSME telemetry data interference from 73.211 to 73.303

73.211

.

39:13.223

Flash near SRB fwd attach and brightening of flash between Orbiter and ET

73.213

E204 Camera

39:13.292

First indication intense white flash at SRB fwd attach point

73.282

E204 Camera

39:13.337

Greatly increased intensity of white flash

73.327

E204 Camera

39:13.387

Start RCS jet chamber pressure fluctuations

73.377

V42P1552A

39:13.393

All engines approaching HPFT discharge temp redline limits

73.383

E41TnO1OD

39:13.492

ME-2 HPFT disch. temp Chan. A vote for shutdown; 2 strikes on Chan. B

73.482

MEC data

39:13.492

ME-2 controller last time word update

73.482

MEC data

39: 13.513

ME-3 in shutdown due to HPFT discharge temperature redline exceedance

73.503

MEC data

39:13.513

ME-3 controller last time word update

73.503

MEC data

39:13.533

ME-1 in shutdown due to HPFT discharge temperature redline exceedance

73.523

Calculation

39:13.553

ME-1 last telemetered data point

73.543

Calculation

39:13.628

Last validated Orbiter telemetry measurement

73.618

V46P0120A

39:13.641

End of last reconstructed data frame with valid synchronization and frame count

73.631

Data reduction

39:14.140

Last radio frequency signal from Orbiter

74.130

Data reduction

39:14.597

Bright flash in vicinity of Orbiter nose

74.587

E204 Camera

39:16.447

RH SRB nose cap sep/chute deployment

76.437

E207 Camera

39:50.260

RH SRB RSS destruct

110.250

E202 Camera

39:50.262

LH SRB RSS destruct

110.252

E230 Camera

ACT POS

- Actuator Position

MEC

- Main Engine Controller

APU

- Auxiliary Power Unit

MET

- Mission Elapsed Time

BET

- Best Estimated Trajectory

MPS

- Main Propulsion System

CH

- Channel

PC

- Chamber Pressure

DISC

- Discharge

PIC

- Pyrotechnics Initiator Controller

ET

- External Tank

psf

- Pounds per square foot

GG

- Gas Generator

RCS

- Reaction Control System

GPC

- General Purpose Computer

RGA

- Rate Gyro Assembly

GMT

- Greenwich Mean Time

RH

- Righthand

HPFT

- High Pressure Fuel Turbopump

RSS

- Range Safety System

LH

- Lefthand

SRB

- Solid Rocket Booster

LH2

- Liquid Hydrogen

SRM

- Solid Rocket Motor

LO2

- Liquid Oxygen

SSME

- Space Shuttle Main Engine

MAX Q

- Maximum Dynamic Pressure

TEMP

- Temperature

ME

- Main Engine (same as SSME)

TVC

- Thrust Vector Control

Note: The shuttle coordinate system used in Chapter 2 is, relative to the Orbiter, as follows:

+ X direction = forward (tail to nose)
- X direction = rearward (nose to tail)
+ Y direction = right (toward the right wing tip)
- Y direction = left (toward the leftwing tip)
+ Z direction = down
- Z direction = up
 
 
 

Shuttle to Ground Telemetry Channels

 

Channel Identifier
Sample Rate
(Samples/sec)
Sample Period
(sec)
Description

.

B47P1302C

12.5

.080

LH SRM CHAMBER PRESSURE

B47P2302C

12.5

.080

RH SRM CHAMBER PRESSURE

B58H1150C

25

.040

LH SRB TVC TILT ACT POS

B58H1151C

25

.040

LH SRB TVC ROCK ACT POS

E41M2076D

25

.040

ME-3 VEHICLE COMMAND

E41T1O1OD

25

.040

ME-1 HPFT DISC TEMP-CH A

E41T2010D

25

.040

ME-2 HPFT DISC TEMP-CH A

E41T3010D

25

.040

ME-3 HPFT DISC TEMP-CH A

T41P1700C

5

.200

ET LH2 ULLAGE PRESSURE

V41P11OOC

12.5

.080

MPS LH2 INLET PRESS (ME-1)

V41P1330C

12.5

.080

MPS LO2 INLET PRESS (ME-3)

V42P1552A

25

.040

RCS THRUSTER PC

V46P0120A

100

.010

APU-1 GG CHAMBER PRESS

V58H11OOA

25

.040

ME-PITCH ACTUATOR POS

V58P0866C

12.5

.080

LH OB ELEVON PRI DELTA P

V58P0966C

12.5

.080

RH OB ELEVON PRI DELTA P

V79H2111A

25

.040

LH SRB TILT ACT DRIVER

V90R2525C

5

.200

SEL LH SRB PITCH RATE

V90R2528C

5

.200

SEL RH SRB YAW RATE

V90R5301C

5

.200

SELECTED RGA ROLL RATE

V90R5321C

5

.200

SELECTED RGA PITCH RATE

V90R5341C

5

.200

SELECTED RGA YAW RATE

V95H3522C

12.5

.080

BODY YAW ATTITUDE ERROR

V95H3523C

12.5

.080

BODY ROLL ATTITUDE ERROR

V98A1581C

25

.040

LATERAL ACCELERATION


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