S. R. REINARTZ
FEBRUARY 25, 1986
I am Stanley Reinartz, Manager of the Marshall Space Flight Center's Shuttle Projects Office. This office includes the Solid Rocket Booster, External Tank, and the Space Shuttle Engine Projects.
I appreciate this opportunity to present to the Commission data concerning, as I understand it, two points of today's hearing to the Commission. The first is the decision process that was used in arriving at a launch recommendation and the second is the basis for the launch recommendation.
My statement will cover primarily my recollections of the decision process and the summary basis for the launch recommendation emanating from a January 27, 1986, telecon between Morton-Thiokol Wasatch and MSFC elements. I propose that this be followed by Mr. Larry Mulloy, the Level III MSFC SRB Project Manager, who will elaborate on both points, and Mr. George Hardy, Deputy Director of the MSFC Science and Engineering Directorate, who will detail the MSFC engineering considerations and the rationale for agreement with the Morton-Thiokol launch recommendation provided by Mr. Joe Kilminster, Vice President and Manager, Shuttle Projects (Wasatch).
In regard to the launch recommendation process, I continue to believe that all activities associated with this process, specifically the January 27 discussion between Thiokol and MSFC were conducted in a thorough and professional manner, in the NASA tradition, with full and open participation of personnel necessary for appropriate disposition of this specific concern. In the case of STS 51-L, a concern was raised by Thiokol the evening of January 27, the night before the planned launch, concerning possible effects of the predicted temperatures on the Solid Rocket Motor case to case field joint O-rings.
After this concern was raised, an orderly and normal process was set in motion to assure full examination of the concern and the engineering data and rationale associated with this concern.
First was identification of the concern during a preliminary telecon early in the evening and a request for Thiokol to provide written data related to the concern.
The second step was to assemble all the necessary personnel at MSFC, Thiokol, Wasatch in Utah and those senior MSFC and
Thiokol project representatives at KSC and establish good telecon communications. The senior 51-L Thiokol representative at KSC was Mr. Al McDonald, Manager of the SRM Project. Mr. Mulloy and I were the senior MSFC project representatives on site.
Then, in approximately a two-hour meeting, Thiokol engineering presented and discussed material related to their concern; MSFC thoroughly probed the data; and, all parties had an opportunity to provide Inputs and express their views.
At the end of a 2-1/2 hour period, including a 30-35 minute off-the-loop Thiokol caucus and after Thiokol's recommendation to launch, I collectively asked all telecon parties if there were any disagreements with Thiokol's rationale and recommendation as stated by Mr. Kilminster. There were none received from Thiokol at Wasatch, MSFC at Huntsville, nor Mr. McDonald sitting with Mr. Mulloy and me at KSC.
Thiokol was then asked to document their verbal rationale and launch recommendation statement as is our normal practice.
Based on the process I described and the conclusions reached as a result of that process, I concurred with the decision of the Level III Project Manager (Mr. Mulloy) supporting the launch recommendation and continuing with the launch process.
Before going into my post decision activities, I would like to amplify one portion of the above process.
During the January 27 post-scrub discussion, all MSFC support elements and to my knowledge the contractor representatives at KSC were present on the launch center MSFC voice loop when I made a request for capability to support a 24-hour turnaround, recognizing the colder predicted temperatures for the January 28th launch. The senior Thiokol program representative, who has a duty station on the loop at KSC, did not provide any input on the loop or, to my knowledge, to the physically adjacent MSFC SRB representatives, regarding any items that should be looked into while proceeding with launch preparations.
During the 2-1/2 hour telecon between Thiokol and MSFC, I would characterize the presentations and associated discussions on the loop as deliverate and intese, and professional engineering examination of the data - not as highly heated or emotional.
No heated protest was injected into the open discussion by the senior Thiokol representative at KSC in the 2-1/2 hour telecon.
However, the senior Thiokol representative at KSC did inject one significant comment just after Mr. Kilminster asked for a caucus at about the 2-hour juncture in the discussion. This comment by the senior Thiokol representative at KSC was perceived, I believe by all parties, as a supporting point for a positive launch recommendation. The senior Thiokol representative said that Mr. Kilminster should consider a point, made by Mr. Hardy earlier, that the secondary O-ring is in the proper position to seal if blow-by the primary O-ring occurred. The importance of this point will be discussed later by Mr. Hardy.
MSFC elements in Huntsville and those MSFC elements at KSC had no knowledge of the internal Thiokol discussions during the 30-35 minute Thiokol caucus that preceded their launch recommendation. To my knowledge, the senior Thiokol representative at KSC did not take this opportunity to inject any of his thoughts or concerns via a private telephone input, into the internal Thiokol discussions at Wasatch.
As stated earlier, when I asked all parties collectively if there were any disagreements with the Thiokol launch recommendation, there was no statement or comment from the senior Thiokol representative sitting with Mr. Mulloy and me at KSC.
Now I would like to turn very briefly to my actions after the conclusions of this telecon...preceded by a short illustration of another STS 51-L launch issue that illustrates the Level III/Level II interaction.
Since we had been informed of a launch recovery area sea state that had forced the recovery ships to move away from their prescribed launch area, Mr. Mulloy, Mr, Houston, and I contacted the KSC operations personnel (Mr. Gene Sestile) and Mr. Aldrich (National Space Transportation System Program Manager) to advise Mr. Aldrich of the recovery area situation and potential SRB impacts. Since the ships would not be in position at launch time, Mr. Mulloy stated there was a good probability of loss of
the two SRB Parachute systems, the nose cones and frustums. They would probably disperse before the ships could arrive. After discussion of the issue Mr. Aldrich concluded that the launch should proceed.
I have included this Level III/Level II issue resolution process to illustrate that where there is a Level III activity that can not be dispositioned within Level III authority and responsibility, then Level II is informed and a decision is made by Level II.
I would now like to return to the post-decision timeframe and summarize my actions: In consultation with the SRB Project Manager, I concluded that there was:
Based on the above conclusions, we informed the MSFC Director and the MSFC Director of Science and Engineering early on the 28th of January (about 5:00 a.m.) of the initial Thiokol concerns and engineering recommendations, the final Thiokol launch recommendation, and the full support of MSFC engineering for the launch recommendations that led to a successful resolution of this concern.
In conclusion, I believe that the total Thiokol and MSFC teams performed in a responsible manner in a continuation of the dedicated professional approach by which all issues involving the Space Shuttle are addressed and resolved through an engineering and managerial assessment of the data to determine that a vehicle is ready and safe to fly. I believe the process was appropriate and that the concern was dispositioned in a proper manner. I did not perceive, nor did I personally exert, any pressure on Thiokol.
At this time, we do not know the precise cause or causes of the STS-51L accident, but I can assure the Commission that we are diligently pursuing all aspects of this matter to arrive at a full understanding of the failure, its causes, and the required corrections.
Mr. Mulloy and Mr. Hardy will go into additional detail concerning these issues.
Mr. Chairman: This concludes my statement.