Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident

 

Volume 5 Index

 

Hearings of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident: February 26, 1986 to May 2, 1986.

 

Note:
Centered number = Hearing page
[bold number] = Text page.


 

[1240] PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT-FRIDAY, MARCH 21,1986

 

Dean Acheson Auditorium
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 9:40 a.m.

 

PRESENT:
WILLIAM P. ROGERS, Chairman, Presiding
NEIL A. ARMSTRONG, Vice Chairman
DR. SALLY RIDE
DR. ALBERT WHEELON
ROBERT RUMMEL
DR. ARTHUR WALKER
DAVID C. ACHESON
MAJOR GENERAL DONALD KUTYNA
ROBERT HOTZ
DR. EUGENE COVERT
 
ALSO PRESENT:
AL KEEL, Commission Executive Director

 

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PROCEEDINGS

 

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: The Commission will come to order, please.

Since our last public hearing at the Kennedy Space Center the Commission, working in part through subcommittees, has made considerable progress in its investigation of the Challenger incident. The Commission has worked very closely with Admiral Richard Truly and his assistant, J.R. Thompson, as well as with the NASA investigative panels, and has been given excellent help and cooperation in all respects.

This session today is for the purpose of updating the information that the Commission has received and to inform the public as accurately as possible of the progress that has been made to date.

Now we will call on Mr. J.R. Thompson to be our first witness.

(Witness sworn.)

 

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TESTIMONY OF JAMES R. THOMPSON, JR., VICE CHAIRMAN, STS-51L DATA AND DESIGN ANALYSIS TASK FORCE, CAPE CANAVERAL, FLORIDA

 

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Thompson, will you identify yourself and say a few words about your present assignment.

MR. THOMPSON: My name is J.R. Thompson. I'm with Princeton University and I'm on temporary assignment to NASA headquarters, reporting directly to Admiral Truly.

Mr. Chairman, this morning we would like to give you three task force team updates from the report we gave to the Commission, to the full Commission two weeks ago. The specific topics we would like to cover would be: An update on our salvage status. I think we have made a lot of progress in that area and Colonel Ed O'Connor will give you that briefing.

I think we have now almost completed our photo and time line status, and we would like to update that for you, and Dan Germany and his team will be providing the specific information on that.

We would like to focus most of today's discussion on the accident analysis team results and an update from the discussion we had several weeks ago.

 

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Dr. Wayne Littles will lead that discussion and be supported by five additional engineers from the Marshall Space Flight Center.

In summary, I would like to report I think we have made a lot of progress. I think we've got a lot of work still in front of us, but I think it is coming together quite well. And I think over the next one to two weeks we will be seeing a lot of results of the test program that we have reviewed with your Commission.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much, Mr. Thompson.

 

[1242] I would call Colonel O'Connor.

(Witness sworn.)

 

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TESTIMONY OF COLONEL EDWARD O'CONNOR, CHAIRMAN, SEARCH, RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION, CAPE CANAVERAL, FLORIDA

 

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Colonel O'Connor, would you identify yourself and give the Commission some information about your present assignment.

COLONEL O'CONNOR: I'm Edward O'Connor, Colonel in the United States Air Force, assigned to the Eastern Space Missile Center, Patrick Air Force Base, Florida. I'm currently assigned to the task force as the leader of the search and recovery team that is in the process of recovering the debris of the shuttle. [Ref. 3/21-1]

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You may proceed.

COLONEL O'CONNOR: I would like to give you at this time a quick update on the conditions we are facing at sea. The oceanographic features today are predominantly influenced by the weather and the springtime seasonal changes.

We expect that the problems we are having currently with recovery operations will diminish within the next few weeks, permitting us to bring up more components, particularly the right SRB. We are finding most of the right SRB components, as well as left SRB components, fairly close to the axis of the Gulf Stream, still in the depths of 220 to 1200 feet of water.

 

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The next chart, please.

(Viewgraph.) [Ref. 3/21-2]

The current recovery operations include nine ships, one manned submersible, four sonars, and 27 divers. In light of the expected improvement of weather conditions and the completion of some of the analytic work in identifying probable locations of components, we are proceeding to bring another submersible into the recovery operation.

One of our most successful vessels has been the Sea Link II, which is a manned submersible supplied by the Harbor Branch Foundation. At this time we will bring in the Sea Link I, which is their other vessel, similarly equipped, which would speed up many of our recovery operations.

We have released the NR-1, which was a nuclear submarine which was characterizing many of our deep water contacts. If conditions require, we could bring this asset back in to complete the search of certain areas within the next ten days.

The next chart, please.

(Viewgraph.) (Ref.3/21-3]

This chart indicates some of the changes we have had in our search area. You will recall we had an initial search area approximately 25 nautical miles by

 

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10 nautical miles as a box. We then added a small truncated portion going out to the north.

Since that time, using the radar data, optical data, and some information supplied by the FAA area radars, we have included a few additional small boxes for location of specific components. We would expect that this would probably be the completion of our expansion of the search area for crucial components.

Next chart, please.

[1243] (Viewgraph.) [Ref. 3/21-4]

As of yesterday, our search area encompassed approximately 420 square nautical miles. We have done a sonar search of 400 square nautical miles, leaving just a small portion to be completed. We would expect that to be completed within the next week to ten days.

To date, we have made 571 significant sonar contacts. Each of these contacts has to be further identified through video or manned submersible operations. We have investigated 112 contacts. Shuttle components were found at 29 locations. We still need to check 459 different locations.

Next chart.

(Viewgraph.) [Ref. 3/21-5]

The recovery to date has resulted in approximately 20 percent of the orbiter being recovered

 

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and made available for analysis. We have significant portions of the main propulsion system and, as you are all aware, we are recovering portions of the crew module at this time.

In the area of the inertial upper stage, we now have 65 percent of that particular part of the payload complement. We have -less than one percent of the TDRS. The external tank right now is about ten percent complete, and the solid rocket motor-booster recovery has only brought about ten percent of the components to shore.

We have seen nothing of the Spartan Halley payload.

Next chart.

(Viewgraph.) [Ref. 3/21-6]

This chart lists the components that we have recovered from the 51-L accident. We have added a few new components on this list, predominantly in the crew module area. We have come up with some additional skin panels and some additional portions of the base heat shield.

In the area of the SRB's, we have the frustums, the drogue parachute, the rate and gyro system tunnels. At the end of this briefing, I will be covering the specific components of the right SRB that

 

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we have recovered at this time.

In the area of the external tank, we have found few additional portions of the external tank. That has not been a high priority search item at this area - at this time. But in the future we will be bringing more of that in. We have located some additional components on the ocean floor and we'll recover them at a later time.

Next chart.

(Viewgraph.) [Ref. 3/21-7]

I would like to discuss with you now for a few moments the right solid booster recovery status. We have formed a recovery team specifically to support the recovery of the right SRB components and their further analysis. This team is comprised of NASA engineers from both Kennedy Space Center and Marshall, a contractor team from the contractors involved, Thiokol and some of their other support contractors.

We have the design team in place to support all of our activities as quickly as possible when we recover the components. The identification of the critical hardware is being provided by this team, and they also suggest schemes for recovery and what things are important to them from an analytic standpoint.

The National Transportation Safety Board

 

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members of the team are also investigating the components recovered and are establishing investigative protocols to ensure the maximum evidence is recovered from any component.

Next chart, please.

(Viewgraph.) [Ref. 3/21-8]

In order to maximize the effectivity of the search and recovery activities, we have used many data sources. Many of the range radars were used. Optical data was used, and a lot of sonar mapping.

And a quick summary: We have completed the majority of the radar data analysis and data reduction. The optical data has also been reduced in a metric sense to help support the recovery operations. Sonar mapping is approximately 95 percent complete and we are now starting an SRB breakup analysis to better understand the breakup mechanism that occurred on the vehicle after command destruct, to better help locate the components on the ocean floor.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Colonel, are you in a position to make any estimates of how long it will take to complete the work you are doing?

COLONEL O'CONNOR: To recover the total right-hand SRB, assuming that we have some good weather and that our radar predictions are accurate, two to

 

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three weeks would let us get up many of the significant components that you would be interested in.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.

COLONEL O'CONNOR: I have one chart up there that I would like you to take a quick look at. This chart shows some of the radar and optical data that we have reduced, and it indicates what portions of the right SRB we have found to date. [Ref. 3/21-8]

As you can see, we have the frustum identified, parts of the skirt associated with the frustum, some portions of the center case elements. And at the rear of the vehicle, we have found a debris field which encompasses the majority of the aft segment and skirt.

It does not include the area of interest in that joint at this time. We are going to continue to look at that. There is one part there, slightly shaded in in the joint area, I will be discussing in a moment.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I wasn't clear. In the aft section, the shaded part, have you recovered all of that?

COLONEL O'CONNOR: No. We've located that on the bottom.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: You have located it, I see.

COLONEL O'CONNOR: We will start recovery activity in that area early next week.

The next chart, please.

 

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(Viewgraph.) [Ref. 3/21-9]

This chart indicates some of the design features we use for identifying the components. We use many of the index devices that NASA uses in the alignment and the stackup and manufacture of the vehicle, hole patterns and dimensions, paint markings, part and serial numbers if they are available. In many cases on the SRB, these part and serial numbers are not available on the components that we have.

Seeing they were manufactured as large segments, they would only occur in one or two places on the case. If the case breaks into many pieces, that gives us a difficult time associating a particular piece with a particular SRB

[1245] Many of the internal features are also assisting us, such as propellant profiles, and some of the inhibitor characteristics, such as depth and shape and the manufacturing records for scratches and blemishes on the case, are also being used to help characterize and help locate these components.

Next chart, please.

(Viewgraph.) [Ref. 3/21-10]

The right solid rocket booster components that we have located are quickly listed here. This coincides also with the chart on the wall and indicates those that

 

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are recovered: the two case cylinders, the ET attach segment, which we are not exactly sure which SRB is associated with at this time; it has not been recovered, and we will discuss that a little more - and part of the frustum have been located and also recovered.

(Viewgraph.) [Ref. 3/21-11]

There is a chart now-and I believe you will have to turn two charts to get to it, and it is a more detailed breakup or breakdown of the central part of this chart, indicating the type of radar tracking that led us to look into that area and the concentration of right SRB components that we are finding.

Now that we have characterized this debris field, we are better able to marshal our assets to speed the recovery of these elements. This is an important step in that we now know the major areas that have to be investigated, and we can put all of our submersibles in that area, as well as our recovery ships.

Next chart, please.

(Viewgraph.) [Ref. 3/21-12]

This chart, the right SRB aft components - the next chart, please. This chart indicates the SRB aft - right SRB aft components as fragments, as laid out on a plane form. As you can see the aft segment broke into many pieces. They are scattered in a fairly large area of the floor: and it is

 

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going to take a fairly lengthy period of time to recover all of these individual pieces.

We will be using the STENA Workhorse in that recovery. I have not indicated on this chart, the upper part of this chart, any location of anything associated with the clevis or the joint that is suspected of being the failure point.

If there are no questions associated with any of that material, I would like to proceed with the discussion of contact or target 292. This has recently received a lot of press attention because it has been identified as an external tank attach segment.

(Viewgraph.) [Ref. 3/21-13]

The first chart is a sketch of this component as it was on the ocean floor. This component has now been recovered.

Okay, would you roll the video now, please.

(A videotape was shown.) [Not published.]

COLONEL O'CONNOR: I have a short video segment here showing the STENA Workhorse. This is the vessel used to recover this component. The component is being taken from the ship at this time. This was yesterday afternoon at Cape Canaveral.

That is part of the clevis joint. As you can see, it is badly damaged.

 

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On the screen is O-ring grooves.

[1246] DR. COVERT: Colonel O'Connor, that damage, has a metallurgist had a chance to decide whether it was impact damage or damage that existed prior to impact with the water?

COLONEL O'CONNOR: In the preliminary - and I need to stress, preliminary - review of that joint, there does not appear to be any erosion or melting associated with it. That is very preliminary. So it would be expected that that joint was probably damaged at the time of command destruct, as the case experienced some torsion, or at water impact.

DR. COVERT: Thank you very much.

MR. HOTZ: Colonel O'Connor, could you give us any additional information you might have on the external tank stub attachment points, the condition of them and how much of them is left?

COLONEL O'CONNOR: Yes, I can. I have two photos here I think that might help go through that process. Let me bring those up, and then I will address your question.

The first photo, please.

(Slide.) [Ref. 3/21-14]

This is a still photograph of that same component. This is showing the inhibitor, one of the

 

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things that we use to characterize whether it be a left or right SRB.

The next photo, please.

(Slide.) (Ref. 3/21-15]

On this photo you have a better view of the clevis joint, if you look at where the white tag is attached. That is part of the ET attach strut assembly. There is some deformation in that area. There is some insulation just above it that has been eroded and removed.

This is helping us to characterize where on the aft segment this would be located.

DR. COVERT: Do you want to make a guess as to where it is, please?

COLONEL O'CONNOR: I'm not prepared to guess at that right now, sir. We have got a lot of contacts out in the area. We think it may be in that vicinity, but this is a fairly small fragment of the case and the dynamics aren't very well understood now to say it would fall in this vicinity or be taken with a larger structure a further distance.

DR. COVERT: I meant, was this at 300 degrees or 180 degrees?

COLONEL O'CONNOR: Where it is on the case?

DR. COVERT: Yes, sir.

 

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COLONEL O'CONNOR: I have a sketch on that, sir. Next chart, please.

(Viewgraph.) [Ref. 3/21-16]

This chart lists the status of this particular component, seeing it is of such high interest. The portion was recovered on the 17th of March. It was brought into port by STENA Workhorse yesterday. It was removed from the STENA Workhorse yesterday about noon.

We took it over to our ordnance area on Cape Canaveral. Our engineers were evaluating it yesterday afternoon and late into the night. The preliminary evaluation indicates there are no part numbers or other positive identifying features.

It is a confirmed aft segment component. It is a confirmed ET attach portion. The external surface is darkened and blistered. The ET attach stud hole spacing and deformation is consistent with this case segment being from a 90 to 180 degree quadrant on a segment.

It is most probably a right SRB component. Because of the lack of any identification number or anything that can definitely tie it to the right SRB, we have to qualify it being right at this time. We are continuing the evaluation at this time. We brought other engineers in.

 

[1247] 2198

 

We have been reviewing the other stacked SRB's at the Cape, looking for other identifying features.

Next chart, please.

(Viewgraph.) [Ref. 3/21-17]

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Why would you say «most probably» if you don't know which it is?

COLONEL O'CONNOR: Looking at the propellant depth, the inhibitor shape, we have about 20, possibly 25, inferential characteristics would say it is the right SRB. We have nothing that would point it toward being the left SRB.

But we don't have that crisp nice part number stamped on the side that would let us really track it down and say for sure.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.

(Viewgraph.) [Ref. 3/21-17]

COLONEL O'CONNOR: This particular view looking down on the orbiter stack indicates a right SRB with the label pointing to where the black smoke was initially found at the time of launch. Looking at the different characteristics of this particular segment piece, we would suspect it would be, as indicated on that chart, approximately 180 degrees away from the black smoke.

That completes my briefing.

 

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CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you very much.

Any questions?

(No response.)

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you, Colonel.

Mr. Germany.

(Witnesses sworn.)

 


[Please note that some of the titles to the references listed below do not appear in the original text. Titles are included to identify and clarify the linked references- Chris Gamble, html editor]
[
1248] [Ref. 3/21-1] Oceanographic Conditions.

[1249] [Ref. 3/21-2] Recovery Operations.

[1250] [Ref. 3/21-3] Salvage Search Area.

[1251] [Ref. 3/21-4] Search Update- March 20, 1986. [Ref. 3/21-5] 51-L Recovery Update.

[1252] [Ref. 3/21-6] 51-L Components Recovered.

[1253] [Ref. 3/21-7] Right Solid Rocket Booster Recovery Status.

[1254] [Ref. 3/21-8] Location Prediction Status. [Ref. 3/21-9] Method of Identification.

[1255] [Ref. 3/21-10] Right Solid Rocket Booster Components.

[1256] [Ref. 3/21-11 1 of 2] SRB Recovery Assessment. [Ref. 3/21-11 2 of 2] SRB Recovery Assessment.

[1257] [Ref. 3/21-12] Right SRB Aft Components.

[1258] [Ref. 3/21-13] External Tank Attach Segment Evaluation.

[1259] [Ref. 3/21-14] Photo of inhibitor, used to characterize whether it is a left or right SRB.

[1260] [Ref. 3/21-15] Photo of the clevis joint.

[1261] [Ref. 3/21-16] External Tank Attach Segment Evaluation. [Ref. 3/21-17] Suspected Location of Recovered ET Attach Fragment.


Note that the references below are the same as the ones above!. Chris Gamble, html editor.

[1262] [Ref. 3/21-1 1 of 2] Oceanographic Conditions. [Ref. 3/21-1 2 of 2] Oceanographic Conditions.

[1263] [Ref. 3/21-2] Recovery Operations. [Ref. 3/21-3] Salvage Search Area.

[1264] [Ref. 3/21-4] Search Update- March 20, 1986. [Ref. 3/21-5] 51-L Recovery Update.

[1265] [Ref. 3/21-6] 51-L Components Recovered. [Ref. 3/21-7 1 of 2] Right Solid Rocket Booster Recovery Status.

[1266] [Ref. 3/21-7 2 of 2] Right Solid Rocket Booster Recovery Team. [Ref. 3/21-8] Location Prediction Status.

[1267] [Ref. 3/21-9] Method of Identification. [Ref. 3/21-10] Right Solid Rocket Booster Components.

[1268] [Ref. 3/21-11 1 of 2] SRB Recovery Assessment. [Ref. 3/21-11 2 of 2] SRB Recovery Assessment.

[1269] [Ref. 3/21-12] Right SRB Aft Components. [Ref. 3/21-13] External Tank Attach Segment Evaluation.

[1270] [Ref. 3/21-13] External Tank Attach Segment Evaluation. [Ref. 3/21-14] Not Reproducible [See page 1259 above. Chris Gamble, html editor]

[1271] [Ref. 3/21-15] Photo of the clevis joint.. [Ref. 3/21-16] External Tank Attach Segment Evaluation.

[1272] [Ref. 3/21-17] Suspected Location of Recovered ET Attach Fragment.


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TESTIMONY OF: DAN GERMANY, CHAIRMAN, PHOTO AND TELEVISION SUPPORT TEAM, CAPE CANAVERAL, AND DEPUTY MANAGER, SPACE STATION PROJECT OFFICE, JOHNSON FLIGHT SPACE CENTER, HOUSTON, TEXAS; CHARLES STEVEN SON, GEORGE McDONOUGH, AND GEORGE ERICKSON

 

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Germany, do you want to proceed?

MR. GERMANY: Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: I guess you haven't appeared before us. You might identify yourself and identify your colleagues.

MR. GERMANY: I would be glad to do that. My name is Dan Germany. My parent organization is the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas, My current assignment is chairman of the Photographic and TV Support Team, which is a part of the task force that is assisting the Commission in this investigation.

I have with me today three additional representatives of the team: Charlie Stevenson on my right, George McDonough on my left, and George Erickson on his left.

These are primary focal points in each of the center. We have a total integrated effort among the

 

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field centers in order to try to focus and understand all of the photographic and TV products that we have accumulated from this particular incident.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.

We know Mr. Stevenson very well. He testified before. Now he is here as an expert. Last time he said he speculated. Now we want to ask him what his opinion is as an expert witness.

[Laughter.]

MR. GERMANY: Could I have the first chart, please.

(Viewgraph No. 2.) [Ref. 3/21-18]

I think it is important to try to give you an overview before we get into the details, Mr. Chairman, of some of this photographic activity, to help the Commission fully understand the way we are organized and we are proceeding with the efforts amongst the various teams that we have as part of the task force.

The TV team, as well as the salvage support team that you just heard from, are in fact support groups. The four analysis teams are the four blocks that show right below Admiral Truly's block, as well as Mr. Thompson's block there. Those are the teams that are responsible for taking the results of the activities that they have themselves, as well as the activities

 

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from our two support teams, and integrating them together to come up with the engineering conclusions that will be drawn as a result of the final report for this entire incident.

The activities that we're going to have for you today are centered around looking at photographic products and describing to you what we were able to see from those photographic products. The accident analysis team, with Mr. Jones and his people, are the ones that are responsible for taking that information, combining it with the engineering data base, as well as the other overall telemetry data from the flight, and coming up with the engineering conclusions that we will be forthwith as a result of the final report.

Next chart, please.

(Viewgraph No. 3.) (Ref.3/21-19]

I have three charts that are coming up, Mr. Chairman, that will give you, help give you an overview of the photography in general. I'm not going to brief the details of the charts. We have included them for reference sake as much as anything, so as the Commission goes through its deliberations and you hear us talking about various cameras this might help you to pinpoint.

The first chart right there we are looking at is one that gives an aerial view of the pad itself.

 

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There are six positions around the radius of that pad where there are cameras that are located. The fifth position, which is the 270 degree point, you are looking across the gantry structure, so we don't really use cameras there.

But they are in those other positions, and from a total point of view we have somewhere over 100 cameras, which includes photographic cameras as well as video cameras, not only here but on the mobile launch platform, the tower itself, and the surrounding areas as you go external to the pad and the tracking cameras.

Could I have the next chart, please.

(Viewgraph No. 4.) [Ref. 3/21-20]

This is a chart that depicts the mobile launch platform itself. As you can see, you have a multitude of cameras that are located on what we call the MLP.

[1275] Next chart, please.

(Viewgraph No. 5.) [Ref.: 3/21-211

This is a chart that shows the tower itself and the locations of the cameras on there.

Next chart, please.

(Viewgraph No. 6.) [Ref.: 3/21-22]

Now what we're going to do is move into the part of the presentation that deals with the integrated

 

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time line that has been put together. The photographic team uses the integrated time line as a road map, so to speak, to step through all of the events that occurred and try to understand the photography and the video that goes with that.

I'm starting off with this dynamic coordinate system chart for you because I know that it is easy to get confused in the many coordinate systems that we have for this particular vehicle. And so at the front of your integrated time line we have put this chart for clarification as much as anything else, to help you try to remember which axis is which.

And I will try to walk through this to help you try to visualize it. If you were sitting in the cockpit of the orbiter and can visualize yourself sitting there, the plus axis, plus X axis, is in this direction like so. The minus X axis is behind you.

If you think about the torso of your body, the plus Z axis is down through your feet and the minus Z axis is like up through your head. And if you can visualize your arms being out like this, this would be like the Y axis of the vehicle.

So everything that you will see on the time line is related back to this particular coordinate system, to try to help you keep that straight.

 

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The next chart, please.

(Viewgraph No. 7.) [Ref. 3/21-23]

Since the last time that you've seen this, we have changed the graphics of the time line just a little bit, and let me describe the graphics for you so you will understand it as we go through it. We tried to separate out the camera events from the other instrumentation.

On the left-hand side of your chart there, you will see the camera events. You have to read this chart from the bottom of it to the top. The bottom, you start with T-zero, the ignition command. In the subsequent charts that follow it, we read from the bottom to the top.

On the right-hand side of the chart, you will see the other telemetry events that go with the trajectory itself. Now, what we will try to do today for you is, first we will walk through this time line like this, and I will use this model to help depict part of it.

And then what we are going to do is show you a video film that we have put together that is a combination of about 14 different cameras, which includes photographic cameras as well as TV cameras all the way through this time line.

 

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And we also have it set aside-it goes back and corresponds to the events that we have on this time line. But because of the way the presentation facilities are here, we could only do one screen at a time.

So we are going to step through this way first, and then we will do the video second, and we will do the video in a stop-start manner, whichever way you want to go to help you understand the things that we are trying to depict for you.

[1276] On this particular chart, if you start at the bottom there, at the T-zero command-and let me reference myself here. This first chart shows the areas of activity that occur at about the first 3.375 seconds, and it all hinges from an imagery anomaly point of view around the business that we talk about, the puffs of smoke or the black smoke.

Up to this point, there have been different numbers associated with different events, as we have talked to you. This particular time line today is a current status of those events, trying to tie everything back and be consistent from this point on.

The confirmed smoke occurs at .678 seconds, as you see on the left-hand side of the chart. We've got two entries there. One says "confirmed smoke above the

 

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field splice," and it moves initially in the plus X direction, and then "confirmed black smoke." All that's trying to say is that there's been a lot of discussion about the colors of the smoke. We feel, after a thorough analysis of the film that we have available to us, that that smoke is really shades of gray. And it starts off, it is kind of like a light shade and it becomes darker as it goes, before we lose sight of it after a few seconds.

So those particular events there, I have just listed them twice to try to help you understand the fact that it is not a given constant shade.

Then we have what we have been describing as multiple puffs of smoke that occur in a time frame of about .854 seconds up through 2.259 seconds. And in the video film today we will show that to you so you can graphically see what we are talking about.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Now, that is new information from the presentation made two weeks ago?

MR. GERMANY: Yes, sir, I believe it is, in terms of the video that you will be seeing.

GENERAL KUTYNA: Can I ask, what was the frequency of those puffs of smoke? How many puffs per second?

MR. GERMANY: Well, we are off trying to

 

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analyze that right now, General. And it appears to have a beat frequency to it. We are not prepared at this point to say exactly what it is. We do have some enhancement work going on that will help us figure that out better.

GENERAL KUTYNA: Can you give me a ballpark? Two or three puffs per second, 20 puffs per second?

MR. GERMANY: Well, the numbers that I'm hearing at this particular point are approximately about three hertz.

GENERAL KUTYNA: Three puffs per second?

MR. GERMANY: Yes. But we're in the process of understanding that and it will be finalized a little bit later on. I want to emphasize that point for you.

The last positive evidence of smoke above the right aft SRB, ET aft ring occurs at 2.733 seconds. The last positive visual indication is 3.375 seconds. And in there you will see a little parentheses that says "E-217." That is a camera that perhaps is indicating potential smoke even further than the 3.375.

1 believe, based on the analysis we have done since the last time we have talked to you and what we will be doing over the next week, probably we will be able to delete that particular part. I'm not ready to take it off the chart now, but based on the stuff that

 

[1277] 2209

 

we have done this week we are having difficulty validating for sure that smoke is occurring all the way up to that point.

We do feel very positive about the 2.733, and then the 3.375. So we will be updating this as we go.

DR. COVERT: Mr. Germany, on this 2.733, is the inference to draw that smoke is continually coming up until-in that interval, or is the inference that after the puffs the smoke hangs around at that interval with no material addition?

MR. GERMANY: Well, Dr. Covert, as you will see on the film, the smoke appears to not replenish itself after a point. As it is replenishing itself, it tends to be above that ring. As the vehicle moves on through that, it tends to go down.

So we're trying to figure out exactly, does that mean it stops or not, and we are just not prepared to say for sure yet.

DR. COVERT: Well, it must stop sometime.

MR. GERMANY: It must stop sometime, yes, and we are off to try to understand that.

DR. COVERT: You will report later to us what you have decided?

MR. GERMANY: Yes, sir, we sure will.

DR. WHEELON: Mr. Germany, having reviewed the

 

2210

 

similar photography of prior shuttle launches, can you state that no such smoke occurred on prior launches?

MR. GERMANY: We have been off trying to do that, and we have reviewed all of the film that we have from, I believe there is about six different launches for which people have talked about having erosion of the O-rings. On those flights, we have not been able to find any smoke that is duplicative of the smoke that we have seen on 51-L.

There are some other films we are looking at, too, but at this point we have not been able to find any visual evidence of smoke that is duplicative of what we have seen here on 51-L.

DR. WHEELON: Thank you very much.

DR. COVERT: When you say that it is duplicative, does that mean there may be other smoke of other kinds about, or are you just trying to be careful and be precise?

MR. GERMANY: I'm trying to be as precise as we can with the sometimes imprecise analysis that we do.

MR. RUMMEL: Can you account for the puffs versus continuing smoke? Does it relate to, oh, say the natural frequency of the structure or vibratory phenomena or some other situation? Do you know?

 

2211

 

MR. GERMANY: Well, the importance of seeing puffs could be related back to what is happening with the joint, and that is why we're putting it on this time line now and trying to understand that. It could be that the aerodynamics of the situation at that point could be accounting for the puffs, and I'm just not ready to say that we know which it is right now.

But we are indicating it and we are doing enhancement work, and as that becomes clear then we will report what we find.

MR. RUMMEL: Thank you.

MR. GERMANY: Could I have the next chart, please.

DR. WHEELON: But just to be clear, you have said three hertz. Do you mean three puffs per second?

[1278] MR. GERMANY: Yes, sir.

DR. WHEELON: Thank you.

(Viewgraph No. 8.) [Ref. 3/21-24]

MR. GERMANY: Can you zoom in on that just a little bit, that chart, please. Bring it up a little bit closer. There you go.

Now, I've got four charts here to help try to characterize where from a visual imagery point of view we feel the location of the smoke is. There are two

 

2212

 

cameras that we use to do this, E-60, which is the one on this particular chart here.

The key to this chart is as much what you don't see as what you do see. The shaded or crosshatched area is the area that the camera itself cannot see. The white part or the light part of the chart is what the camera can see.

Can I have the next chart, please.

(Viewgraph No. 9.) [Ref. 3/21-25]

Now, this is a little bit closer view, so you can get a better feeling for what I'm trying to describe for you. We can see smoke coming, but we can't see the origin of the smoke from these cameras. So that tells us that on that segment right there around 270 all the way out to 315, which is like 45 degrees, moving from the 270 point around - and for a reference point, the zero segment in this photo is the bottom part of the SRM, which is like - let me get this right here.

Like at this point right here, and it goes around. So we can't see the origin of the smoke from this view, and so that tells you something. And we will lead you through this and then I will draw the conclusion for you.

Could I have the next chart, please.

(Viewgraph No. 10.) [Ref. 3/21-26]

 

2213

 

Okay, this is a view from E-63, looking from the other side, and it is the same setup with respect to what the camera can see and what it cannot see.

Could I have the next chart, please, which will bring it up a little bit closer for you.

(Viewgraph No. 11.) [Ref. 3/21-27]

Now, you can see what the camera can't see there, and the significance is, with these two cameras, plus we have a camera that is from the back side, that is not on this chart, looking in this direction. It can't see the origin of the smoke. Plus, on the back side, I believe it is 217, you don't see the smoke coming from behind the SRM.

And so that isolates the smoke in our opinion from the 270 point out to around the 315 point, 315 degrees. And we feel it is somewhere perhaps around 300 degrees or some point like that. And based on other cameras we have seen, we feel it is within plus or minus about a foot of the joint in question, and that is the most we are able to see from an imagery point of view.

Next chart, please.

(Viewgraph No. 12.) [Ref. 3/21-28]

DR. WHEELON: Mr. Germany, before we leave those shaded diagrams of the shuttle indicating the coverage on the cameras that operated, I have an

 

2214

 

impression that a number of cameras in fact failed that morning, possibly because of the cold weather, and that had they been working properly, that we would have had complete coverage of the event.

Can you comment on the loss of coverage that morning?

[1279] MR. GERMANY: Yes, I can say a little bit for you. You are absolutely right, we did have cameras that failed to operate properly that particular morning. There were two cameras that would have provided excellent viewage of the area in question.

It is suspected at this time probably the cold weather was the culprit with respect to those cameras. I believe we lost somewhere like 11 cameras, and normally we maybe lose two to three on a mission. And we do believe the cold weather was responsible for that.

DR. WHEELON: Mr. Germany, I brought this up only because the photographic team is operating under a limitation of lost data, I think that what you have put forward is quite remarkable in view of that shortage.

MR. GERMANY: In fact, as a matter of fact, you will find in our report when we finish this up, Mr. Chairman, there will be some lessons learned and some

 

2215

 

recommendations we will have with respect to being able to provide better coverage for these types of activities.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Germany, had you anticipated cold weather might affect the camera coverage?

MR. GERMANY: Charlie, do you want to answer that? I'm not that familiar with it.

MR. STEVENSON: We think that the cold weather probably contributed to the film breakage that we had on the two critical cameras. We do purge the cameras, but we do not use a heating purge, and probably in the future we will start using some type of heating purge. And there may have also been a humidity problem, and we are looking into the possibility of correcting the humidity problem.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Mr. Stevenson, my question, though, was had you anticipated that weather might affect the cameras adversely?

MR. STEVENSON: No, we did not.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you.

MR. GERMANY: Mr. Chairman, we have chart 12 on the screen now, and it is the next one after chart 7 that shows something happening from a visual imagery point of view. We have listed on here three flashes

 

2216

 

downstream of the orbiter right-hand wing. These were put on the chart because some members of the Commission and others had seen some white flashes downstream of the orbiter before.

And we are off trying to understand that, and in fact I talked with General Kutyna about it this morning. We believe that there are probably more than these three that we have listed here. However, based on the information we have right now, we can't see anything peculiar to this particular flight as a result of those flashes.

In fact, in the video films you will see in a few moments we will try to graphically depict what is being talked about. The words that are used on here was words that were picked up from this particular camera, 202.

Actually, I believe you will see that these flashes are probably as part of the plume within the SSME, and we have seen this type of phenomenon, I guess you would call it, before. So probably the next time we update this chart we will be removing these from there, because we have not been able to ascertain at this point that these are peculiar to 51-L.

Next chart, please.

(Viewgraph No. 13.) [Ref. 3/21-29]

 

[1280] 2217

 

Now, chart 13 shows a time where the time line starts to get a little bit more filled up with activities that are going on. The first part we talked about was the smoke. Now, beginning at 58.788 seconds is the first time we have evidence of the flame appearing on the right-hand SRB.

As you can see from this chart, we're talking about a period of time here of about six seconds of several things happening. The first evidence of flame, and we have the flickering dynamic plume on the right-hand SRB.

And the reason you see that "TBD" or "to be determined" for the time there is because that is an item that you can't really pick up visually with your eyes as you review the film. However, we have been doing some enhancement work. We have some of that back preliminarily. That, it appears there might be a flicker, so we're off to understand that.

Now, the significance of that is as to how it relates back to the analysis of the joint and what's happening to the joint during the Max Q region. In fact, everything you will see us put on these time lines from the imagery point of view is focused to help the accident team do their engineering analysis. So things that we know that might be peculiar to the joint we put

 

2218

 

on that to help them proceed with their work, and that is the reason we are showing this.

At 59.262 seconds

DR. WHEELON: Excuse me, Mr. Germany. Is it possible yet to tell how many flickers per second you're seeing during this flickering period?

MR. GERMANY: No, sir, Mr. Wheelon. I don't want to give you a number on that, because really I don't have a number. But once we get that, then we will be providing it.

DR. WHEELON: Do you think you will be able to measure that eventually?

MR. GERMANY: Well, I hope so. But don't pin me down too closely, because we are still trying to analyze that right now, and as soon as we get something we will provide it to you.

DR. WHEELON: Thank you.

MR. GERMANY: At 59.262 we have a continuous, well-defined plume on the right-hand SRB in the plus Z, minus Y coordinates. Then at 59.763 is where you see the visual evidence of the flames from the right-hand SRB in the plus Z direction near the ET attach ring. So this is evidence that it is occurring in about the same place that we were talking about before, the same general location we were talking about before with

 

2219

 

respect to the smoke.

And then at 60.238 we have first evidence of the plume deflection, and that deflection of the plume is intermittent. And then at .248, 60.248, the first evidence of the anomalous SRB plume actually attaching itself to the 2058 ring of the ET, which is this ring in this area right here.

Then at 60.988 is the first evidence of the plume deflection being continuous. At first it was intermittent and then it became continuous.

MR. ACHESON: What is meant by the term "deflection" in this context?

MR. GERMANY: It tends to be like moving backwards like this with respect to the vehicle, and we're going to talk about that some more when we get into the film.

Then at 64.660 you see the abrupt change in the anomalous plume shape. It is the first indication of hydrogen, liquid hydrogen, leaking around this or in the vicinity of this ET 2058 ring.

And then at 64.705 is when you see the bright, sustained glow. And all of this will become more evident to you as we go through the film in a few moments.

So that is the series of events that occurs

 

[1281] 2220

 

from the 58.788 up to 64.705. And the significant thing that is really happening here now is that the liquid hydrogen is starting to leak.

The next chart, please.

(Viewgraph No. 14.) [Ref. 3/21-30]

There are quite a few events that occur on this chart. But as you will notice, they all occur primarily in a two to three second point of time. And as you go through there, you can primarily see the 72 second and 73 second time period.

While it may take us a while to describe as we go through this, in fact it is happening very, very fast. On the right-hand side of the chart with the telemetry information, as you scan through there you can see that there is quite a bit of movement and things going on with the vehicle, and we're starting to see the results of that, and that occurs like in the 72 second time frame.

And then we're starting to see the visual evidence of some of that in the 73 second time frame, where we pick up at 73.124 the evidence of a circumferential white pattern on the left side of the ET aft dome.

The LH-2 tank failure, this is the point we feel that the LH-2 tank failed, near this 2058 ring

 

2221

 

frame. The next thing is you will see a hint of vapor at the inter-tank area of the ET. That says the "inter-tank stag"; it truly should say the "inter-tank area" of the ET.

After that, a sudden cloud appears along the side of the ET between the inter-tank and the aft dome. That is at 73.162. Then there's a flash that occurs at 73.191 from the region between the orbiter and the LH-2 tank.

And another flash near the SRB forward attach point occurs at 73.213. Then the first indication of intense white flash is at 73.282, and then what we call the greatly increased intensity of the white flash at 73.327, which is essentially at the point you have the major structural breakup of the vehicle.

So on the one hand, it appears that what is happening is that the right-hand SRB, the attach fitting, either the fitting itself--something has broken loose in this area. The liquid hydrogen is leaking at this point, and what's going on is this part of the vehicle is not tied in as tight as it was, so it's free to move a little bit, and were going to show you some of that in the film.

And as that LH-2 tank lower half fails and the hydrogen is dumped out of there, you get a larger thrust

 

2222

 

increase here. At the same time, this thing is moving. You essentially end up with a structural failure of the external tank, which accounts for the total structural breakup.

So the rest of the chart, the rest of the items on the chart, just kind of pick up the remainder of the time line there.

Now, what we would like to do if we can is roll this video, and it is about a 14-1/2 minute film, Mr. Chairman. And it will help you graphically see some of the things we have been describing here.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Fine.

MR. STEVENSON: It'll take a second to get this stuff synched up.

(A videotape was shown.) [Not published.]

[1282] MR. STEVENSON: The first sequence, we're just going to show you a typical launch sequence.

MR. GERMANY: I might say that part of the film footage we have here on the end of this was supplied by an individual outside the agency that happened to be taking pictures from the New Smyrna Beach area. It turned out to be helpful and so we have incorporated it.

(Pause.)

MR. GERMANY: Because these things are happening so fast, we will go back and pick it through a frame at a time to help you better understand it.

 

2223

 

(Pause.)

This is the New Smyrna coverage right here.

(Pause.)

Okay. Now, it's going to continue to play, and we will go back and go through and we will isolate the time line events for you.

Okay, Charlie, why don't you describe this.

MR. STEVENSON: What we have highlighted here is the actual smoke as we see from the camera that is south of the pad and actually looking north, and we will come back and show you another camera view. This would be E-60, and here's camera E-63 that looks from the northwest toward the vehicle.

MR. GERMANY: This is the one where you can see the puffs of smoke more clearly because you've got the white SRB in the background behind you there.

MR. STEVENSON: Now we will show you both of them together.

(Pause.)

And this is just a closeup, another view.

(Pause.)

We're now moving into the three flashes that we described earlier, and we will actually show you four. You will have to watch closely in the center of the circle.

 

2224

 

(Pause.)

This is just the next view. There will be three on this view.

(Pause.)

Okay, we're now going to the plume development.

(Pause.)

This is a second view of that, and this camera will stop at two stops. The purpose is to view the plume, the SRB plumes and normal plumes.

(Pause.)

Okay. This is the first evidence of the plume deflection. Again, it's intermittent.

MR. GERMANY: That's at 60.238 seconds on the time line.

(Pause.)

MR. STEVENSON: And now it is constant.

(Pause.)

We're now going into the development of the leak:

(Pause.)

In this first indication of the LH-2 leak.

MR. GERMANY: And that was at 64.660 seconds.

MR. STEVENSON: In this frame you see the glow has moved around to where it's on both the plus and

 

[1283] 2225

 

minus Z sides of the ET.

MR. GERMANY: That's at 64.705. And this is a point just a few milliseconds later that the ET LH-2 pressure deviations begin to occur. And Wayne Littles will be coming a little bit later on today and is going to pick up and talk about that for you.

MR. STEVENSON: Okay. Here we have the divergence of the rates which Dan just referred to.

MR. GERMANY: This is a computer-aided design tool that we're using to help understand what happened to the motions of the SRB at this particular time point. It is itself not doing that rocking. We're just doing that to give you an indication of the motion that takes place, so don't get confused with the information there.

MR. STEVENSON: We're moving now into the LH-2 tank failure.

(Pause.)

There you have it, and here are the first hints of vapor from the ET inter-tank area. And we will stop that for you. That's it.

MR. GERMANY: You see, this is extremely hard to see. So we have picked a frame. You learn to train your eyeballs to look for some of these things, and so we picked some to kind of accentuate it for you, because

 

2226

 

it's hard to see it right at first.

MR. STEVENSON: Okay. This one is the cloud of smoke that moves along the ET, down from the inter-tank, and the bright flame that comes between the orbiter. That's it.

Now, this will be the flash between the orbiter and the external tank.

(Pause.)

Now we're moving up to the forward attach between the ET and SRB's.

DR. RIDE: Are those single frames on the camera? Are you stepping ahead single frames?

MR. STEVENSON: Some are single frames, yes.

Okay, here is the white flash at the forward attach point, and the increased intensity.

(Pause.)

Now, this would be a combined view of the steps we just went through, the LH-2 tank failure, and it moves up to vapor from the inter-tank; then the sudden white cloud along the aft of the LH-2 tank; and then the sudden flash between the orbiter and the ET on the LH-2 tank; the flash near the upper ET-SRB attach.

And now we move into the SRB sequence, where we are showing the chute deploy. That's it.

And here we have the right SRB destruct.

 

2227

 

(Pause.)

Followed by the left SRB destruct.

(Pause.)

And this is just a summary, again. That's it.

MR. GERMANY: Mr. Chairman, that is the end of our prepared presentation.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you. That is very good. Any questions?

Let's take a ten minute recess. Thank you very much, Mr. Germany. That was a very good presentation.

(Recess.)

 


[Please note that some of the titles to the references listed below do not appear in the original text. Titles are included to identify and clarify the linked references- Chris Gamble, html editor]
[
1284] [Ref. 3/21-18 1 of 2] STS 51-L Data & Design Analysis Task Force Photographic & Video Support Team.

[1285] [Ref. 3/21-18 2 of 2] Organization Chart.

[1286] [Ref. 3/21-19] Complex 39-B Perimeter Site Locations. [Ref. 3/21-20] MLP Camera Locations.

[1287] [Ref. 3/21-21] Fixed Service Structure, Camera Locations. [Ref. 3/21-22] Dynamic Body Coordinate System Convention.

[1288] [Ref. 3/21-23] STS 51-L Incident Investigation Integrated Events Timeline.

[1289] [Ref. 3/21-24] Vehicle Profile of Areas Visible in Film Item E-60.

[1290] [Ref. 3/21-25] Detail of Vehicle Areas Visible in Film Item E-60 (Also OTV 160). [Ref. 3/21-26] Vehicle Profile of Areas Visible in Film Item E-63.

[1291] [Ref. 3/21-27] Detail of Vehicle Areas Visible in Film Item E-63. [Ref. 3/21-28] STS 51-L Incident Investigation Integrated Events Timeline.

[1292] [Ref. 3/21-29] STS 51-L Incident Investigation Integrated Events Timeline.

[1293] [Ref. 3/21-30] STS 51-L Incident Investigation Integrated Events Timeline.


 


March 7, 1986 Session (part 2) | Volume 5 index | March 21, 1986 Session (part 2)